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Title:Intentionality and the Perceptual World : Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein on the Content of Sensations
Authors:ID Nuccilli, Daniele (Author)
Files:URL URL - Source URL, visit https://www.phainomena.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/07_E-PHI_134-135_Nuccilli.pdf
 
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Language:English
Typology:1.02 - Review Article
Organization:Logo INR - Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities
Abstract:In the article, I investigate the role of sensation in the manifestation of the world in perceptual experience, as conceptualized through three distinct phenomenological approaches: those of Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Schapp, and Leopold Blaustein. I begin by examining Husserl’s Göttingen lectures, reconstructing his account of the intentional structuring of the perceptual world, with particular emphasis on the immanent dimension that shapes the interpretation of sensory content. I then turn to Schapp’s theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung, highlighting his original claim that sensations themselves directly present objects to consciousness, fusing the properties of things with their appearance without requiring the interpretative intervention of an intentional act. Finally, I consider Blaustein’s position, which maintains the centrality of intentionality, but situates sensations outside of the intentional act, functioning as mediators, through which the external world is apprehended and interpreted.
Keywords:phenomenology, perceptual world, intentionality, content of sensations, manifestation
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Publication date:23.12.2025
Year of publishing:2025
Number of pages:str. 163-186
Numbering:Letn. 34, št. 134/135
PID:20.500.12556/DiRROS-25212 New window
UDC:130.121:159.9
ISSN on article:1318-3362
DOI:10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.7 New window
COBISS.SI-ID:264489987 New window
Publication date in DiRROS:16.01.2026
Views:333
Downloads:270
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Phainomena : [glasilo Fenomenološkega društva v Ljubljani
Shortened title:Phainomena
Publisher:Fenomenološko društvo [etc.], Fenomenološko društvo [etc.], Nova revija, Inštitut Nove revije - Zavod za humanistiko
ISSN:1318-3362
COBISS.SI-ID:29705216 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
Project number:P6-0341-2022
Name:Humanistika in smisel humanosti v vidikih zgodovinskosti in sodobnosti

Funder:ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
Project number:I0-0036-2022
Name:Center za promocijo humanistike Inštituta Nove revije

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Description:A Creative Commons license that bans commercial use and requires the user to release any modified works under this license.

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Title:Intencionalnost in zaznavni svet. : Husserl, Schapp in Blaustein o vsebini občutkov
Abstract:V članku raziščem vlogo občutka pri manifestaciji sveta znotraj zaznavnega izkustva, kakor je bila konceptualizirana znotraj treh različnih fenomenoloških pristopov, in sicer pristopov Edmunda Husserla, Wilhelma Schappa in Leopolda Blausteina. Najprej obravnavam Husserlova göttingenska predavanja in rekonstruiram njegovo dojetje intencionalnega strukturiranja zaznavnega sveta, pri čemer se posebej osredotočim na imanentno razsežnost, ki opredeljuje interpretacijo čutne vsebine. Nato se obrnem k Schappovi teoriji predstave-kot-Darstellung in poudarim njegovo izvirno domnevo, da občutki sami neposredno predstavljajo predmete za zavest, s tem ko lastnosti stvari spojijo z njihovim pojavljanjem, ne da bi pri tem terjali interpretativno intervencijo intencionalnega akta. Nazadnje obravnavam Blausteinovo stališče, ki zagovarja središčnost intencionalnosti, a občutke situira zunaj intencionalnega akta kot funkcionalne posrednike, s pomočjo katerih dojemamo in interpretiramo zunanji svet.
Keywords:fenomenologija, zaznavni svet, intencionalnost, vsebina občutkov, manifestacija


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