20.500.12556/DiRROS-25212 Intentionality and the Perceptual World Husserl, Schapp, and Blaustein on the Content of Sensations Intencionalnost in zaznavni svet. Husserl, Schapp in Blaustein o vsebini občutkov In the article, I investigate the role of sensation in the manifestation of the world in perceptual experience, as conceptualized through three distinct phenomenological approaches: those of Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Schapp, and Leopold Blaustein. I begin by examining Husserl’s Göttingen lectures, reconstructing his account of the intentional structuring of the perceptual world, with particular emphasis on the immanent dimension that shapes the interpretation of sensory content. I then turn to Schapp’s theory of presentation-qua-Darstellung, highlighting his original claim that sensations themselves directly present objects to consciousness, fusing the properties of things with their appearance without requiring the interpretative intervention of an intentional act. Finally, I consider Blaustein’s position, which maintains the centrality of intentionality, but situates sensations outside of the intentional act, functioning as mediators, through which the external world is apprehended and interpreted. V članku raziščem vlogo občutka pri manifestaciji sveta znotraj zaznavnega izkustva, kakor je bila konceptualizirana znotraj treh različnih fenomenoloških pristopov, in sicer pristopov Edmunda Husserla, Wilhelma Schappa in Leopolda Blausteina. Najprej obravnavam Husserlova göttingenska predavanja in rekonstruiram njegovo dojetje intencionalnega strukturiranja zaznavnega sveta, pri čemer se posebej osredotočim na imanentno razsežnost, ki opredeljuje interpretacijo čutne vsebine. Nato se obrnem k Schappovi teoriji predstave-kot-Darstellung in poudarim njegovo izvirno domnevo, da občutki sami neposredno predstavljajo predmete za zavest, s tem ko lastnosti stvari spojijo z njihovim pojavljanjem, ne da bi pri tem terjali interpretativno intervencijo intencionalnega akta. Nazadnje obravnavam Blausteinovo stališče, ki zagovarja središčnost intencionalnosti, a občutke situira zunaj intencionalnega akta kot funkcionalne posrednike, s pomočjo katerih dojemamo in interpretiramo zunanji svet. phenomenology perceptual world intentionality content of sensations manifestation fenomenologija zaznavni svet intencionalnost vsebina občutkov manifestacija true false true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik Neznano 2026-01-14 03:52:16 2026-01-16 11:03:48 2026-02-17 17:25:27 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2025 0 0 str. 163-186 št. 134/135 Letn. 34 2025 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2025-12-23 130.121:159.9 1318-3362 10.32022/PHI34.2025.134-135.7 264489987 https://www.phainomena.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/07_E-PHI_134-135_Nuccilli.pdf 1 0aaef16e-f0f4-11f0-94a7-001a4af901a5 https://dirros.openscience.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=38039 07_E-PHI_134-135_Nuccilli.pdf 07_E-PHI_134-135_Nuccilli.pdf 1 4D29427F3642F43C5D0A9E252311A4C9 8590447d106188a42157ebfe6e4c7b95590b4d2d377d21700ff624919796f0b1 71f31ceb-08d5-11f1-bcbc-001a4af901a5 https://dirros.openscience.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=40393 Inštitut Nove revije, zavod za humanistiko 0 0 0