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424. Finks phänomenologische Auslegung des Schematismus-Kapitels in der Kritik der reinen VernunftAlexander Schnell, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: Fink’s Phenomenological Interpretation of the Schematism Chapter in Critique of Pure Reason
Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of the chapter “Von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding]” (schematism chapter) in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason represents a significant contribution to how the relation between being and time can be thought phenomenologically. In a reading closely based on Kant’s text, the essay reconstructs how Fink highlights the fundamental relation of time, imagination, and ego.
Keywords: Kant, Fink, schematism chapter, time, imagination
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 225; Downloads: 60
 Full text (409,56 KB) |
425. „Torweg Augenblick“ : Zu Finks Nietzsche-DeutungCathrin Nielsen, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: “Gateway, This Moment.” On Fink’s Interpretation of Nietzsche
Nietzsche interests Fink as a thinker in whom a new “experience of the world” emerges through the historical trajectories, the narrative, and the language of metaphysics—in its question horizon and yet at the same time beyond it. This, however, does not simply replace the metaphysical worldview, but is fought out in the playing field of that difference which, according to Fink, is the “metaphor of all metaphysics”: the ontological comparative. On the one hand, Nietzsche takes this playing field into account by absolutizing it in the thought of the “will to power” as the movement of all being in time; on the other hand, he undermines it in the thought of the “eternal return of the same” as time as such and thus leads it to its limit. This is narrowly brought about in the image of the “gateway, This Moment” from Zarathustra, which Fink interprets as a “bumping into each other’s heads” of ontology (being) and cosmology (time) or as a breakthrough of the post-metaphysical thought of the “world wholeness” in the sense of the “all-encompassing, all-bringing, and all-erasing play-time of the world” into the historical world. In this antagonistic in-between, this “self-reflection,” Nietzsche’s confrontation with metaphysics takes place—and equally Fink’s interpretation of this confrontation.
Keywords: Nietzsche, Fink, moment, world, metaphysics
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 197; Downloads: 52
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426. Individuation und ontologische Erfahrung : Die philosophische Entwicklung des frühen Fink im Lichte seiner Auseinandersetzung mit HeideggerGiovanni Jan Giubilato, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: Individuation and Ontological Experience. The Philosophical Development of the Early Fink in Light of His Confrontation with Heidegger
Eugen Fink’s philosophy confronts us with a complexity of conceptual constellations that, in their integrity, are specifically aimed at a deep questioning of our way of thinking and of the metaphysical foundations of our experience and understanding of the world. Taking account of the newest materials in Fink’s Collected Works, the following paper 1) proposes a brief distinction of the denominations of Eugen Fink’s early philosophical project, in order to describe the basic lines of his philosophy and to characterize its basic features by approaching “the deepest philosophical problem of all,” as Fink itself affirmed, namely the question of individuation. Thereby, the paper will unveil 2) an essential aspect of Fink’s early confrontation with Heidegger, in order to trace the premises and consequences of Fink’s “cosmological thinking.”
Keywords: Fink, ontogonic metaphysics, ontological experience, essence, individuation
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 194; Downloads: 63
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427. Tag, Nacht, Zwielicht : Eine Annäherung an Fink und LevinasLutz Niemann, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: Day, Night, Twilight. An Approach to Fink and Levinas
This contribution presents Eugen Fink’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s thought along the metaphors of day and night. Both Fink’s cosmology and the philosophy Levinas developed in Totality and Infinity are read as locating the human being between day (light) and night. The present discussion of their philosophies is guided by the question of how Fink and Levinas, who share the criticism of the metaphysics of light, try to overcome it. Special emphasis is put on the notions of unity and difference as well as the notion of totality. Further, both try to break the totalizing tendency of light by radically thinking the infinite. First, Fink’s cosmology is presented. In a second step, Levinas’s thinking from Totality and Infinity is discussed. A juxtaposition of both attempts marks the conclusion of the paper.
Keywords: ontology, difference, alterity, infinity, cosmology, metaphysics
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 207; Downloads: 65
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428. L’espace et le corps vécus du point de vue cosmologique : Eugen Fink et Renaud BarbarasKarel Novotný, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: Space and Body Experienced from the Cosmological Viewpoint. Eugen Fink and Renaud Barbaras
The article addresses the question of the relationship between the phenomenological and the cosmological perspectives on space: space is the encompassing, it gives place and is centered in and through the embodiment of those who perceive in space. Does the oriented character of space, experienced in this manner, bind or separate cosmology and phenomenology? There exists a radical break between the two approaches, which the article pursues selectively in Fink’s university lectures, from early as 1945 onwards. Barbaras, on the contrary, proceeds from phenomenology, even if he moves more and more clearly beyond the Husserlian dualist framework of the universal correlation between consciousness and the world, in order to think the world itself. The article seeks to capture the common features and to understand the differences between the two cosmological perspectives regarding the origin of space, from their shared phenomenological provenance to the philosophical inspirations that separate them.
Keywords: phenomenology, embodiment, cosmology, space
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 197; Downloads: 63
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429. The Sense of Community Is the Community of Sense : On Discovering the “We” with Eugen Fink and Jean-Luc NancyArtur R. Boelderl, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: The article discusses some striking correspondences between the respective accounts of sociality as developed by Eugen Fink in his Freiburg lecture on Existenz und Coexistenz (1952/53, repeated in 1968/69, first published in 1987) under the notion “community” (Gemeinschaft) and likewise by Jean-Luc Nancy in various books and articles since the 1980s, most notably in La communauté désoeuvrée (1983) and Être singulier pluriel (1996). Their common ground is established by a chiasmatic logic Fink considers essential for community as such: if it has a sense (rather than “meaning”), it is this very sense that is a communal one. Thus, the sense of community is community, or, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy who elaborates an analogous idea from a special reading of Kant’s first and third Critiques that is by no means alien to Fink’s own: “We are the sense.”
Keywords: community, chiasmatic logic, sense, Jean-Luc Nancy
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 146; Downloads: 48
Full text (366,58 KB) |
430. Mit Fink am Tisch : Zu Eugen Finks Philosophie der SozialitätJakub Čapek, 2022, original scientific article Abstract: With Fink at Table. On Eugen Fink’s Philosophy of Sociality
Fink’s philosophy of sociality does not start from the experience of the individual other, but from the primacy of participation in the same world. Fink unfolds this idea in the context of material culture, that is, in his analysis of how we interact with everyday things, such as tables. Such things are not merely objects of use, but can become “meaningful things” that symbolically represent our existence, and they represent it as a fundamentally shared existence. The essay draws attention to the fact that not all sharing, as Fink claims, provides unity. Reference is made to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the table and the world, which, like Fink, holds that human dependence on objects is essential, with the difference that she ascribes both unifying and separating significance to objects and the world. In the conclusion, some critical observations on Fink are made. Fink did not reflect on the ambiguity in the concept of sharing, and his claim that sharing establishes communal unity is thus rather unfounded. Further, his conviction that philosophy of sociality is based on the cosmological concept of the world is viewed in a critical light, since it tempts one to assume a unity of the world, which, however, is never guaranteed in advance.
Keywords: Fink, sociality, table, world, Arendt
Published in DiRROS: 25.10.2024; Views: 167; Downloads: 51
Full text (350,87 KB) |
