20.500.12556/DiRROS-29261 Examining the complexity effect on shareholder information in Slovenia This study investigates how managers communicate with shareholders, balancing impartiality and transparency against their vested interests. We examine management communication behaviour through the lens of information asymmetry in Slovenia, exploring how information overload and complexity in disclosures may influence shareholder decision making. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with top managers and a textual readability analysis of annual report letters to shareholders, we find that managers often introduce high levels of complexity in communications, sometimes deliberately, to safeguard their own interests. This observed ‘complexity effect’ provides new insight into information asymmetries in modern organizations, highlighting how excessive complexity can undermine transparent and effective shareholder communication. behavioural economics complexity effect agency problem information assimetry corporate governance Slovenia vedenjska ekonomija učinek kompleksnosti agencijski problem informacijska asimetrija korporativno upravljanje Slovenija true false true Angleški jezik Slovenski jezik ©2026 The Author(s) Neznano 2026-05-05 09:59:42 2026-05-05 09:59:43 2026-05-06 03:51:47 0000-00-00 00:00:00 2026 0 0 str. 1-22 2026 0000-00-00 Zaloznikova Objavljeno NiDoloceno 0000-00-00 0000-00-00 2026-01-01 330.1:005.3(497.4) 0949-6181 10.31083/JEEMS53322 277028611 26-05-05-277028611-Biloslavo.pdf 26-05-05-277028611-Biloslavo.pdf 1 5C315BA21FAE651E0AFB30DE90C483F0 b9677d3254a0234d2d08b39bc214ee237dffd85f932e8832a757922a1d0722f2 78215625-4858-11f1-969d-001a4af901a5 https://dirros.openscience.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=43785 https://www.imrpress.com/journal/JEEMS/31/2/10.31083/JEEMS53322 1 61463bbb-4858-11f1-969d-001a4af901a5 https://dirros.openscience.si/Dokument.php?lang=slv&id=43784 Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče Koper / Centro di Ricerche Scientifiche Capodistria 0 0 0