The Latent Implications of Husserl's The idea of PhenomenologyBatiashvili, Irakli (Avtor) self-givennessself-constitutionobviousnesshappeningThe paper analyzes what new perspectives Edmund Husserl’s famous work The Idea of Phenomenology discloses for philosophical thought. I attempt to explain that the phenomenological epoché is not only a theoretical operation; epoché is, first of all, an existential act of a cardinal character; it denotes a crucial change, which concerns me, in particular, as the person who enters the unique space of phenomenological thinking. I accentuate Husserl’s reasoning regarding the so-called issue of obviousness (evidence) that is of key importance in phenomenology. Obviousness is not my subjective emotional attitude towards something; it is the self-givenness of the object, the direct grasp of the object in pure seeing. The interpretation shows that the method of phenomenological reduction excludes the main paradigm of our thinking: the subject–object split. Phenomenology deals neither with the consciousness of the subject nor with the factual objective reality, nor with their interrelationship, but with the field of pure self-givens. Within this field the self-constitution of the so-called external reality and of essential universals happens, as well as the self-manifestation of my subject or person. However, this field is within a certain totality, which limits it as a horizon: the happening (the event)—das Ereignis—of worldliness.20252025-08-22 03:45:43Neznano23363UDK: 165.62ISSN pri članku: 1318-3362DOI: 10.32022/PHI34.2025.132-133.8COBISS_ID: 246205955sl