<?xml version="1.0"?>
<metadata xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><dc:title>Finks phänomenologische Auslegung des Schematismus-Kapitels in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft</dc:title><dc:creator>Schnell,	Alexander	(Avtor)
	</dc:creator><dc:subject>Kant</dc:subject><dc:subject>Fink</dc:subject><dc:subject>schematism chapter</dc:subject><dc:subject>time</dc:subject><dc:subject>imagination</dc:subject><dc:description>Fink’s Phenomenological Interpretation of the Schematism Chapter in Critique of Pure Reason

Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of the chapter “Von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding]” (schematism chapter) in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason represents a significant contribution to how the relation between being and time can be thought phenomenologically. In a reading closely based on Kant’s text, the essay reconstructs how Fink highlights the fundamental relation of time, imagination, and ego.</dc:description><dc:date>2022</dc:date><dc:date>2024-10-25 12:18:18</dc:date><dc:type>Neznano</dc:type><dc:identifier>20691</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>UDK: 161.2:130.121</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>ISSN pri članku: 1318-3362</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>DOI: 10.32022/PHI31.2022.122-123.2</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>COBISS_ID: 131121155</dc:identifier><dc:language>sl</dc:language></metadata>
