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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><rdf:Description rdf:about="https://dirros.openscience.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=20691"><dc:title>Finks phänomenologische Auslegung des Schematismus-Kapitels in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft</dc:title><dc:creator>Schnell,	Alexander	(Avtor)
	</dc:creator><dc:subject>Kant</dc:subject><dc:subject>Fink</dc:subject><dc:subject>schematism chapter</dc:subject><dc:subject>time</dc:subject><dc:subject>imagination</dc:subject><dc:description>Fink’s Phenomenological Interpretation of the Schematism Chapter in Critique of Pure Reason

Fink’s phenomenological interpretation of the chapter “Von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe [Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding]” (schematism chapter) in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason represents a significant contribution to how the relation between being and time can be thought phenomenologically. In a reading closely based on Kant’s text, the essay reconstructs how Fink highlights the fundamental relation of time, imagination, and ego.</dc:description><dc:date>2022</dc:date><dc:date>2024-10-25 12:18:18</dc:date><dc:type>Neznano</dc:type><dc:identifier>20691</dc:identifier><dc:language>sl</dc:language></rdf:Description></rdf:RDF>
