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Tracing Factions and Power Struggles in Late Medieval Trogir

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Zgodovinski časopis (Historical Review), Ljubljana 79/2025, No. 1–2, pp. 28–57, 94 notes
Language: En. (Sn., En., Sn.)

The paper traces the political agency of factions in late medieval Trogir, by focusing on the most important cases of open conflicts during the 14th and 15th century. Factional power struggles represented a typical feature of Italian communes, and the Trogir case study implies an excellent example of how the political culture in Dalmatian towns resembled greatly that in the Italian communes. Factional blocs were based on political, familial or business ties and headed by powerful nobles or noble lineages. To secure their positions, noble families in Trogir often formed alliances with other noble families and groups within the commoner majority or with extra-communal power holders. However, these alliances could easily be unstable and easily broken, and that only increased intrigue and uncertainty in the political life. The goal of the paper is to contribute to our understanding of the political culture in the late medieval Dalmatian towns within a comparative framework.

Keywords: the Late Middle Ages, Dalmatia, Trogir, factions, political power

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Sledenje frakcijam in spopadi za oblast v poznosrednjeveškem Trogirju

Zgodovinski časopis, Ljubljana 79/2025, št. 1–2, str. 28–57, 94 cit.

1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek: jezik En. (Sn., En., Sn.)

Članek obravnava politično vlogo frakcij v poznosrednjeveškem Trogirju. Osredotoča se na najpomembnejše primere konfliktov v 14. in 15. stoletju. Frakcijske politične borbe so predstavljale značilno lastnost italijanskih komun, in Trogir je odličen primer, kako je bila politična kultura v dalmatinskih mestih zelo podobna tisti v italijanskih. Frakcijski bloki so temeljili na političnih, družinskih ali poslovnih vezeh, vodili pa so jih močni plemiči ali plemiške družine. Da bi zavarovalo svoje položaje, so plemiške družine v Trogirju pogosto sklepale zavezništva z drugimi plemiškimi družinami in skupinami znotraj večine meščanov ali z zunajmeščanskimi nosilci moči. Vendar so ta zavezništva lahko hitro postala nestabilna in so razpadla, kar je povečevalo intrigantstvo in negotovost v političnem življenju. Članek je prispevek k razumevanju politične kulture v poznosrednjeveških dalmatinskih mestih znotraj primerjalnega okvira.

Ključne besede: Pozni srednji vek, Dalmacija, Trogir, frakcije, politična moč

Introductory and Methodological Remarks*

The primary intention of this paper is to provide a compressed overview of the politics of factions in late medieval Trogir (*Tragurium, Traù*), which represents an exemplary case-study for a better understanding of certain aspects of the political culture of late medieval Dalmatian cities. The main focus of the paper is put on collective agency of the late medieval Trogir nobility and their clients from other social groups in the period between 1280 and 1420.¹ Medieval Trogir functioned as a small commune in medieval Dalmatia, a region which included a vast coastline area extending from the Kvarner Bay to the city of Durazzo (Drač, Durachium, Durrës) – an albeit different geographic layout in comparison to the ancient Roman province of Dalmatia.² However, in late medieval reality the area between the Kvarner Bay and the Bay of Kotor (*Cattaro*) represented, in fact, a distinct region with many similarities, e.g. in culture, geographical and climate features, language, the development of law and communal institutions, seafaring and mercantile practices, as well as in the overall social and political organization of these local communities based on the hegemony of patrimonial noble lineages. Although late medieval Dalmatia was a bricolage of different communes and local jurisdictions, it was nonetheless a distinct historical and cultural region, and under great cultural influence from Italy. The Dalmatian city-communes mostly also shared the same political overlord – be it the Hungarian King or the Republic Venice.³ However, the city of Kotor represents an exception because it recognized the sovereignty of various Serbian rulers until 1371, when it came under the rule of the Hungarian King.⁴

* This research paper was co-financed by the Croatian Scientific Foundation within the project *Topography of Power: Eastern Adriatic Cities in Medieval Spheres of Power* (TOPOS IP-2019-04-2055), and within the project *Communities, Communication, and Social Networks in the Croatian Middle Ages and Early Modern Times* (380-01-02-23-40 – COMNET), financed by the Europe Union and the NextGenerationEU program.

¹ On late medieval Trogir cf. Lucio, *Memorie*; Andreis, *Trogirsko plemstvo*; Benyovsky Latin, *Srednjojekovni Trogir*; Babić, *Grad*; Burić, *Trogirski distrikt*.

² For instance, the famous Dalmatian chronicler Thomas, archdeacon of the Split cathedral chapter in mid-13th century, gives the description in his chronicle. Cf. Karbić et al, *Archdeacon Thomas*, 2–3.

³ On the Dalmatian cities cf. Raukar, *Studije*; Krekić, *Dubrovnik, Italy and the Balkans*; Mlačović, *The Nobility*; Benyovsky Latin and Pešorda Vardić, *Authority and Property*.

⁴ Cf. Kotor: Janečković Roemer, *Komuna*.

Based upon anthropological and comparative-historical literature, the article perceives political factions as unstable and volatile political coalitions composed of nobles, commoners and other actors of Trogir's social and political life in the period under consideration, which competed for political power within the borders of the Trogir Commune.⁵ Long-lasting political competition often resulted in escalations of ever-present and latent social conflicts into open factional conflicts. These escalations were directly conditioned by geopolitical changes within the Hungarian Kingdom or Venice on the one hand, or by political relations between the Hungarian ruler or representatives of the Hungarian royal government in the late medieval area of Dalmatia-Croatia, and Venice itself on the other.

From the theoretical and methodological standpoint, factions can be defined as inter-societal vertical groupings. This means that these are groups composed of members from different social strata, although the main role is usually played by members of the social and political elite, such as factional leaders in the case of prominent noblemen from the patrimonial noble families in Trogir.⁶ Perhaps it would be best to perceive such groupings as an 'accumulation or clusters of social capital', in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, within which individuals invest their own resources and influence to achieve common interests. In this sense, a faction's success or failure depends primarily on the capacities of its individual members.⁷ Factions as such have at least their core and periphery, with the core implying leadership and the periphery comprising collaborators or allies of the same leadership, all of whom maintain the same goal or interest at a given moment. In this sense, we can talk about political coalitions of different groups from various social strata under the leadership of members of the social elite. Therefore, factional conflicts are waged between opposing pyramidal structured political networks, all of which claim the same goal: acquiring political power to establish control over their community's the material, symbolic, and human resources.⁸

The social relations that form the connective tissue of each factional pyramid can be understood as patron-client relationships, in which the factional leader, as the patron, rewards his collaborators for their service or favours. Additionally, friendships, business relationships, as well as family and marital ties, represent other elements that contribute to the cohesion (or disintegration) of the factional grouping. These elements could easily be instrumentalized in a political sense,

⁵ Cf. a selection of comparative studies or comparatively valuable studies: Heers, *Parties*; Heers, *Family Clans*; Lantschner, *Political Conflict*; Lantschner, *City States*, 3–49; Firnhaber-Baker, *Medieval Revolt*, 1–11; Gentile, *Factions and parties*, 304–322; Jones, *Communes*, 71–96; Prajda, *Network*; Gamberini, *Clash of Legitimacies*; Tabacco, *Struggle for Power*; Valente, *Theory and Practice*; Brunner, *Lordship*; Dameron, *Italian Magnates*, 167–188.

⁶ Cf. Heers, *Family Clans*, 41, 54–55, 214; Ter Braake, *Hoeken*, 103–104.

⁷ Haemers, *Factionalism*, 1009–1039; Dumolyn, *Symbolic Economy*, 105–131.

⁸ Cf. Bujra, *Dynamics*, 132–152. Also cf. an overview of the secondary literature that deals with factions and political clientelism: Scott, *Political*, 483–505. We can also highlight examples of useful research that deals with factional realities in the area of medieval continental Istria, Duchy of Carniola, and Friuli (belonging to the Holy Roman Empire) in: Darovec, *Turpiter*, 1–42; Darovec, *Language*, 391–432.

meaning that business and social networks could transform into conflicting groups united around a common goal in changed circumstances. Factional cores often retain their consistency and stability over time, while the selection of collaborators, followers, or allies (i.e., the periphery) can vary significantly in each new situation. In this sense, today's allies may become opponents tomorrow, and vice versa.⁹

However, the key factor in the building of a faction was the personal relationship of factional actors with the factional leader, who could act either as a 'patron' (from a position of greater social power and influence) or as a 'broker' (from a position of limited social power based on the leader's ability to mediate within a heterogeneous political coalition).¹⁰ The process of forming a faction involved a number of different factors that could not have been under human control because they included shaping local social reality in all its aspects – family, social, political, cultural, emotional, economic and religious. In other words, behind the factions there were certain patterns of action that are perpetuated as informal 'structures' of long duration, which formed an integral part of the political culture in the medieval Trogir commune, or in all similar Dalmatian or Mediterranean urban communities that underwent a similar historical development.¹¹ This is especially true in the context of Italian communes, in which the intensity of factional conflicts is monitored, and which have been the most frequently written about in European historiography. An overview of Trogir factions makes it clear that Trogir, much like other Dalmatian cities, and Italian communes belonged to a similar cultural context that stemmed from all natural-geographical and cultural determinants within which the existing urban communities functioned.

Political conflicts in the Middle Ages mostly had a vertical character, with the main actors being members of the political and social elite vying for power and dominance.¹² However, in certain specific moments and situations, conflicts of a broader societal basis could occur between opposed horizontal groups (the ruling group and the opposing group from the rest of the populace).¹³ During the Middle Ages, society was deeply divided into various social strata, including nobility, burghers, commoners and peasants. Tensions and disagreements often existed between these groups, particularly concerning economic rights, taxes, or political participation. So, in times of deep societal crises or political instability, the weakness of factional groups could lead to more pronounced societal tensions and conflicts. Nobles and commoners could clash over political rights, economic exploitation, or matters of social justice.¹⁴ Moreover, in some cases, commoners could form their own factions and unite to fight for their interests and rights, thus creating a horizontal conflict within the societal base. In any case, societal tensions and conflicts between different social groups were significant elements of the po-

⁹ Cf. Padgett and Ansell, *Robust Action*, 1265–1266; Prajda, *Network*, 12–23.

¹⁰ Boissevain, *Friends*, 163–164.

¹¹ Cf. Kent, *Family and Patronage*, 165–183; Popić and Bećir, *Politički*, 39–42; Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 276–277.

¹² Hyde, 1972, 273–307.

¹³ Bujra, *Dynamics*, 138–139, 141.

¹⁴ For more detail on the subject see: Cohn, *Popular Protest*; Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*.

litical and social life of the Middle Ages, and their intensity could vary depending on the context and peculiarities of each region or city.¹⁵ The situation in Trogir at the beginning of the 15th century will provide an example of wider social turbulences between the noblemen and the commoners (or citizens), which were only intensified with the ascendance of Venetian rule from 1420.¹⁶

Open Conflict and the ‘*origo factionum*’ in Trogir (1310–1322)

Considering the theoretical framework presented, I now focus on the late medieval context of Trogir. In the next four thematic units, I will shortly consider three periods of open factional wars, namely from 1310 to 1322, a shorter interval at the transition from 1357 to 1358, and yet again a longer period of factional strife from 1386 to 1395.¹⁷ The last thematic unit will focus on the period between 1395 and 1420, during which the usual factional conflicts did not manifest, but rather the tensions between the nobles and commoners only exacerbated. However, the Hungarian-Venetian War (1409–1420) for the control of the Eastern Adriatic led to a moulding of a consolidated ruling group within Trogir, which enjoyed (relatively) more support within the community, if compared to the standard factions in the 14th century.

In this thematic unit I will consider the first case of open factional conflict in Trogir, which occurred between 1310 and 1322. I qualify this period as crucial for the future development of factional and political relations within Trogir, and therefore as the most important case of a factional conflict in fourteenth-century Trogir. In other words, the actions of the factions led by Marin, son of Andrew (noble family Andreis) and Matthew, son of George (noble family Cega), shaped the informal framework of the Trogir ‘political arena’ for the following decades, during which open conflicts or more noticeable latent conflicts between the two factional blocs were reactivated.¹⁸ The cores of these factions remained compact and defined almost within the same prominent noble families.

Namely, the core of Marin’s faction consisted of members from the Andreis and Cazarica families, with support from individuals of the Vitturi family. On the other hand, Matthew’s faction was composed of members from the Cega, Lucius, Cipiko and Casotis families, as well as other individuals who had a personal connection to Mathew. In the second period of escalation in 1357 and 1358, the cores remained almost the same. The faction of the archdeacon Jacob, son of Peter

¹⁵ For example, Foretić, *Borbe*, 249–272; Grillo, *Long Life*, 221–236; Cohn, *Repression*, 99–122.

¹⁶ Cf. Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 230–231, 268–269.

¹⁷ About all the three mentioned phases of open factional conflict it is possible to acquire basic informations in: Lucio, *Memorie*, 150–162, 265–271, 328–353; Benyovsky Latin, *Srednjovjekovni Trogir*, 24–26, 28–29, 31–34. Also cf. Benyovsky Latin, *Noble Families*, 19–35, or in Kurelac, *Pučki ustanci*, 239–247; Kurelac, *Društvene diferencijacije*, 237–245. It is useful to compare the Trogir and Dubrovnik case, which has been analyzed by Vekarić, *Nevidljive pukotine*. However, a totally different point of view is available in Kunčević, *Vrijeme harmonije*.

¹⁸ As to make the article more clear for an international audience, the Christian names of the Trogir noblemen have been written in their English form.

(Vitturi), was led by members of the Vitturi and Andreis noble families, along with the archdeacon's personal confidants and relatives. On the other hand, the faction of Joseph, son of Stephen (Cega), was led by himself and his brothers and sons from the different Cega family branches. The third phase of political escalation between 1386/1387 and 1395 followed Casotus, son of Augustin (Casotis), and Joseph, son of Stephen (Cega), as leaders of the Cega-Casotis faction with members of the Cipiko family. The leadership of the opposing faction was made out of members of the Vitturi family, namely Lompre (short from Lampredius), son of Micacius, and his brothers (Vitturi), along with the Andreis and Sobota families.¹⁹

It must be emphasized that the great majority of medieval factions in general did not develop unique, abstract or depersonalized names, but were rather largely defined by their leaders in political practice. The same applies to the factional cores of the Cega and Casotis families, on the one hand, or the factional cores of the Andreis and Vitturi families on the other.²⁰ However, the question of the factional periphery and broader political clientele presents a greater challenge in itself since continuity over longer periods cannot be discerned. Moreover, each new escalation of open conflict brought about a reconfiguration of political coalitions.

Indeed, the Trogir example illustrates both dimensions of factional behaviour – the long-lasting continuity of factional cores, and the unstable and ever-changing political coalitions. The existence of a factional core, with its roots deeply embedded within specific noble families, demonstrates the persistence of certain power structures and interests over time. These factional cores maintained their influence and authority, providing a foundation for the continuity of their political agendas. On the other hand, the political coalitions surrounding these cores were far from stable. Depending on the circumstances and geopolitical context, alliances could shift, and former rivals could become allies. The fluidity of political alliances was a characteristic feature of factional dynamics in Trogir, resulting in ever-changing configurations of power. This combination of enduring factional cores and volatile coalitions added complexity to the political landscape of Trogir, shaping the city's history and dynamics during the late medieval period.

Still, the importance of open factional conflicts should not be exaggerated because they, indeed, represent only cases of violent escalations of latent tensions in political relations within the local 'power elite'.²¹ However, most of the time political opponents did not wage open conflicts, rather latent ones and in this fact lies the main problem.²² Namely, periods of latent conflicts are harder to recon-

¹⁹ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 62–63. For a comprehensive overview of the Trogir medieval nobility cf. Andreis, *Trogirski patricijat*, 5–210; Andreis, *Trogirsko plemstvo*.

²⁰ Heers, *Parties*, 51–52. Stories about Italian Guelphs and Ghibellines, Dutch *Hoeken* and *Kabeljauwen*, Flemish *Leliaarts* and *Klauwaarts*, as well as other similar specific identifiers, represent only those cases where concrete and fixed names indeed existed, regardless of the content that stood behind them. Cf. Gentile, *Factions and parties*, 313–330; Ter Braake, *Hoeken*, 97–111; TeBraake, *Plague of Insurrection*, 31–33.

²¹ For the term 'power elite', which I see as the most practical cf. Wright-Mills and Wolfe, *Power Elite*, Reinhard, *State Building*.

²² Cf. Titone, *Gaining Political Recognition*, 9–10.

struct due to the chronic lack of relevant primary sources. In that regard, cases of open conflicts provide surely many more primary sources because regardless of the omnipresence of violence in medieval societies, they represented something extraordinary or, in other words, something about which contemporaries felt a particular need to leave a written record.

After these insights let us now start our story. Namely, in around 1310 we can trace the beginning of the first such escalation of political violence and an open conflict in Trogir within the political community. The faction of Mathew, son of George (Cega), clashed with Marin, son of Andrew (Andreis), and his faction, which had the direct support of the Croatian Ban Mladen II of Bribir (the Šubići-Bribirski noble family). Namely, on one occasion, Marin came to the communal palace with his entourage, killed the communal chancellor and wounded the two consuls. The disturbed Trogir community consequently appointed Mathew, the leader of the opposing noble faction, as its captain and rector; his first decision was to exile Marin and his supporters from the city and sentence them to a fine.²³ However, this just facilitated a further escalation of factional relations in Trogir, which lasted all until as late as 1322 and the recognition of Venetian rule.²⁴

The Croatian Ban Mladen II tried to overthrow Mathew and his associates in May of 1315, when he was planning to launch a siege of the city. However, he did not go through with the siege, rather he decided to impose a financial tribute of 10,000 pounds (*libras*), which Trogir had to pay to avoid the Ban's wrath and any new punitive expeditions.²⁵ Several fragments of a delegated papal investigation in Trogir from June of 1319 provide us with many extremely important data about the factional dynamics, which can illuminate the whole political and social background in Trogir and in the wider area at that time. Namely, the reason for initiating the investigation was the unfortunate event in which Mathew and his associates ordered the destruction of the Franciscan monastery located outside the walls Trogir city wall in late May 1315. Allegedly, their actions were based on strategic and security reasons, fearing the expected siege of the city by Ban Mladen II.²⁶

The investigation was carried out in accordance with the mandate of Pope John XXII in March 1319, when he delegated the task to judges delegates Gregory, Bishop of Hvar (*Faros, Lesina*), and Stephen, the St Peter parish priest from Zadar (*Iader, Zara*), to investigate the circumstances of the monastery's destruction.²⁷ Although Mathew did survive the encounter with the Ban during May of 1315,

²³ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 64–65. On exile as a means of political struggle and the vast topic of exile in medieval Europe, cf. in more detail: Shaw, *Exile*; Brown, *Insiders and Outsiders*, 337–384; Foster Baxendale, *Alberti Family*, 720–756; Ricciardelli, *Exclusion*. On the other hand, on exiles in the Dalmatian context cf. Čoralić, *Banditi*, 157–178; Nikolić Jakus, *Vrijeme rata*, 9–35; Bećir, *Između političkog*, 1–31.

²⁴ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 98.

²⁵ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 64. Cf. Karbić, Šubići, 21–23; Lucio, *Memorie*, 150–162; Karaman, *Epizoda*, 303–313; Klaić, *Trogir*, 214–229.

²⁶ About the papal investigation see in more detail see Popić i Bećir, *Vrijeme i okolnosti*, 55–103.

²⁷ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 88. On papal judges-delegates cf. Donahue, *Judges Delegate*, 229–247.

in a blurry set of events he was ousted by the faction of Marin somewhere in the autumn of 1317 with the help of Šibenik's city authorities.²⁸ Therefore, the investigation was carried out while the faction of Marin was in power and the influence of Ban Mladen probably at its peak. The leitmotif of the investigation was the matter of 'proving' that Matthew was a tyrant, which was a typical medieval, but still a very serious accusation directed against (actual or presumed) political usurpers or oppressors. Unlike other sources, which are mostly of a formal or normative nature, the text of the investigation provides some insight into the informal level, or actual events occurring in the political practice.

Out of the various and 'juicy' testimonies provided against Matthew, I will single out only a few examples, which I find most indicative for the background of the papal investigation, as well as for the factional zeitgeist of that period in general. The Franciscan procurator Gregory, son of Salingver, was asked if Matthew, son of George, ascended to power legally or not, whereupon he answered negatively. Namely, Matthew had come to power by expelling the governing figure in the city at the time, i.e. a vicar named Piliater, and that those who had fled the city, had done so out of fear of the tyranny.²⁹ On the other hand, Gregory also mentions the Trogir clerics (canons of the Trogir Cathedral Chapter) and noblemen who were banished from the city by the order of the podesta Matthew. Among them were, e.g. the leader of the Andreis-Cazarica faction Marin, son of Andrew, and Cazarica, the Trogir archdeacon.³⁰ In fact, Marin also gave a testimony, in which he acknowledged that Matthew was a tyrant (*de tirania uera esse*), and that he was in the Ban's entourage, when the latter promised to restore him and his group to power. Everything was confirmed by the rest of the former exiles.³¹ It was even stated by the said Gregory, son of Salingver, how he 'had heard' that Matthew had been banished from the city by his own accomplices, or by the people from his own regime (*fuit expulsus Matheus per populum de suo regimine*).³²

So overall, Matthew is portrayed as a tyrant, a ruler without legitimacy and legality, terrorizing his subjects, not governing in accordance with statutes and customs, and making decisions outside of existing institutions of authority. Instead, he ruled according to his own will, with the help of personal followers and collaborators. This assessment probably corresponds with reality; nevertheless, he was accused by his opponents who used similar or the same methods, or even ended up being depicted as tyrants themselves, such as Ban Mladen II.³³ However, it is important to note that the period of Matthew's rule truly remained characterized

²⁸ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 89.

²⁹ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 70v.

³⁰ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 71-71v.

³¹ Cf. *,Marinus Andree interrogatus ... respondit de tirania uera esse, et ipsum fuisse cum bano in exercitu cum aliis quos banus restituere uolebat. Et ceteri extrinseci sibi uulgarizatis capitulis respondent uerum de tirania*'. Cf. NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 73.

³² NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 71v.

³³ About the aspect of 'tyranny' in this case cf. Bećir, *Između tiranije*, 92; Popić i Bećir, *Vrijeme i okolnosti*. About the notion of 'tyranny' in medieval political imaginary and practice cf. Watts, *The Making*, 129–157.

as a time of tyranny, as evidenced by the decision of the Grand Council in 1340, which abolished previous restrictions on the total number of councillors but denied the right of entry to the Council to those who held such positions during the time of tyranny (*non intelligendo tempore tirannie*).³⁴

Matthew's case represents an unusual situation in the political reality of late medieval Dalmatia. Typically, power and authority in the cities of that time were divided among different factions and noble families, resulting in dynamic political rivalries and shifting alliances. However, Matthew managed to concentrate power and become the dominant figure in Trogir, using factional conflicts and transforming his office into a formal camouflage for establishing autocratic rule. Such politically ambitious individuals, known as '*signori*', who concentrated power in the cities of northern Italy, were a common phenomenon from the late 13th century onwards.³⁵ This idea of political authority and governance within the cities was gradually transmitted to medieval Dalmatia, where similar political trends were observed. The transmission of political patterns and influences from the wealthier and more dynamic Italy to Dalmatia during the Middle Ages was frequent, contributing to the shaping of local political structures and practices. Matthew's rise as a dominant figure in Trogir can be understood as an example of such transmission and adaptation of political models from northern or central Italy to the Dalmatian cities.

However, at the beginning of 1320 a new coup happened and the exiled faction of Matthew, son of George, returned to power, and the faction of Marin yet again had to escape the city.³⁶ Unfortunately for Marin, this situation did not change and the ruling faction under the auspices of the Cega family welcomed the new Venetian rule in 1322. The banished members of the Andreis faction were repatriated into the Trogir Community only in the first half of the 1330s, after the Venetian government undertook direct action to solve the problem during the second half of the 1320s.³⁷ In other words, for more than 20 years we can trace open conflicts and latent political tensions which did not wither away. On the contrary, they merely took on slightly different organizational forms in the future.

Venice facilitated a procedure of reconciliation between the feuding Trogir factions from 1326. Although the delegated judges Bartholomeo Michieli and Marino Morosini ruled in favour of a reconciliation in May of 1326, with a moratorium of two years, nothing happened in 1328.³⁸ Moreover, the Venetian doge had to warn the Trogir elite in September of 1328 to do their part in this process, but it seems that everything had to be repeated again.³⁹ Namely, the Venetian government picked Francisco Dandolo, Nicolo Faletro and Blasius Geno for the new delegated judges in the new procedure in October of 1328. The new verdict was published swiftly in

³⁴ Smičiklas, *Codex X*, doc. 389, p. 555; Popić i Bećir, *Acta*, doc. 49, p. 152.

³⁵ About the *signori* in Italy cf. Hyde, *Society*, 104–118; Martines, *Imagination*, 94–114; Jones, *Italian City-State*.

³⁶ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 88–89.

³⁷ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 112, 132.

³⁸ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 198.

³⁹ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 260–261v.

November of 1328, and the text was almost identical to the verdict of 1326. That means that the verdict predicted yet another moratorium of two years before the repatriation of the Trogir exiles could finally happen.⁴⁰ We do not know exactly when it happened, but it must have occurred between 1330 and 1333.

As we can see, the entire factional ‘repertoire’ or ‘arsenal’ was used and implemented during these troublesome and dangerous times in the Trogir Commune. In other words, we can see opponents clashing in open conflicts, wounding, stealing, killing or expelling each other on several occasions on an almost regular basis. However, direct killings among equals (nobles and other members of the power elite) were not really perceived as ‘normal’ as it may seem from our point of view, and there were not so many cases of political or factional murders. Political murders took place, but the main targets were the leading figures within each faction as part of the unwritten rules of the political ‘game’ at the time.

Short-Lived Factional Retribution at Saint Nicholas Day (1357/1358)

Although the members of the exiled Andreis faction undoubtedly returned to Trogir between 1330 and 1333, the political situation had significantly changed since 1320, and now the city was under the rule of Venice, with the dominant faction within the nobility being the Cega faction.⁴¹ In accordance with that, it is necessary to point out how the champions of the Andreis factions were weakened in the long run by the confiscation of their property and defensive structures (tower) within the Trogir city walls after 1320.⁴² However, it seems that a somewhat different atmosphere prevailed within the church organization. In 1319, Trogir’s primicerius Lampredije is mentioned as the elected bishop shortly after the death of the previous Trogir bishop Liberius at the end of 1318.⁴³ It is indicative that the election of the new bishop took place while the faction of Marin was in control of the city (October 1317 – spring 1320). Among the ranks of the exiled Trogir nobles was the long-time Trogir archdeacon Cazarica, who – despite his prolonged absence – retained his position until his death in 1338.⁴⁴

In the same year, before August, cleric Jacob, son of Peter (Vitturi), the nephew of the Trogir bishop Lampredius, son of Jacob, was appointed as the new archdeacon.⁴⁵ He held this position until the beginning of 1358, when he was imprisoned by the repressive authorities of the newly established royal Hungarian government on charges of organizing and carrying out a bold attack on Joseph, son of Stephen,

⁴⁰ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 246v.

⁴¹ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 132.

⁴² In more detail cf. Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 115, 121–122, 132–133. About the importance of ‘private towers’ in the Dalmatian cities cf. Benyovsky Latin, *Obrana dubrovačkog predgrađa*, 17–39.

⁴³ Smičiklas, *Codex VIII*, doc. 452, pp. 552–554.

⁴⁴ The death of Cazarica is mentioned in February 1338. See in NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 341.

⁴⁵ NAS-OIL, vol. 542, fol. 348.

and his relatives from the Cega family.⁴⁶ Therefore, it appears that many clerics inclined towards the Andreis-Cazarica-Vitturi faction were handling the affairs of the Trogir church, primarily concerning the bishopric and the Chapter from the end of the 13th century to as late as the mid-14th century.

To fully understand the situation, it would be convenient to say a few words about the Trogir church organisation. Namely, the medieval Trogir Cathedral Chapter functioned as a classic diocesan chapter of the Mediterranean type within the framework of the Dalmatian ecclesiastical organization. The affairs of the Chapter were led by the archdeacon, and below him, there were the archpriest, primicerius, and ordinary canons, along with other clerics, such as presbyters, deacons, and subdeacons, who did not possess a canonicate. Considering Trogir's status within the broader Dalmatian context, even the bishopric itself did not have much greater power. It rarely attracted outsiders (from outside the region of Dalmatia and Croatia or the Kingdom of Hungary) and mainly served as a career opportunity for the children of Trogir nobles and prominent figures, ultimately determining a high level of involvement of Trogir's canons in the city's political currents and factional conflicts, primarily during the first half of the 14th century.⁴⁷ That a medieval Chapter of primarily local importance mostly attracted the descendants of Trogir's elites and nobles is not unusual, but it is worth noting that a provision dated 30 December 1286, in which Trogir's Bishop Gregory (1282–1297) decided that only those born in lawful marriage and not belonging to serf or servant status should be accepted into the ranks of the Chapter.⁴⁸ Additionally, candidates had to be of good reputation and live an honourable life. It is clear that this decision primarily favoured wealthier and influential families, as seen in the recorded canons, most of whom originated from Trogir's noble families.

After the death of Bishop Lampredius in 1348, archdeacon Jacob remained as the most prominent noble within the opposing faction to the Cega family and their supporters. This might explain why the faction led by archdeacon Jacob was perhaps even more personalized than that under the former podesta Matthew at the beginning of the 14th century. Jacob had between 1338 and 1357 a lot of time to shape his own clientelist network from his position of power. Thus, he did not have to shape it to a degree *ad hoc* and 'on the go' like Matthew, rather by 1357 he had built a strong and extensive political base which he 'activated' on 5 December 1357. There is no doubt that this process involved a whole range of social transactions aimed at collecting favours.

A good example of a favour represented the case of presbyter Michael, son of Martin, becoming a canon of the Trogir Cathedral Chapter. Namely, on a small piece of paper the city notary wrote down a simple transaction between the archdeacon

⁴⁶ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 137–138, 140–141. For this episode cf. Klaić, *Trogir*, 295–305; Babić, *Trogirski biskup*, 221.

⁴⁷ In more detail about this, cf. Bećir, *Crkvene institucije*, 21–24; Petrović, *Development*, 267–268, 271–272. About the Mediterranean and Continental type of church organisation cf. Brentano, *Two Churches*, 62–82.

⁴⁸ Sirotković, *Codex Supplementa*, doc. 85, p. 150–151; Lucio, *Memorie*, 138–139.

Jacob and the priest Michael on 6 February 1344. It is written on a small piece of paper that the archdeacon would invest Michael to a vacant canon place within the Trogir Chapter in exchange for a payment of 300 pounds.⁴⁹ The transaction was indeed successful, as evidenced by a later document dated 14 August 1352, in which Michael is mentioned as a canon.⁵⁰ It could be easily guessed that this was not the only favour done by the archdeacon in his nearly two decades on that church position.

Having these remarks about the factional situation previous to 1357 in mind, we can now consider the outburst of factional violence at Saint Nicholas Day (5 December) in 1357 in more detail. In the background of the political events in Trogir at the transition from 1357 to 1358, a war was waged between the Hungarian King Louis I of Anjou and Venice over the control of the eastern Adriatic. In this context, political rearrangements occurred within Dalmatian towns under Venetian rule, officially until February 1358, when the Zadar Peace was signed. This peace treaty resulted in Venice relinquishing the disputed territory from Kvarner to Durazzo in favour of the Hungarian King Louis of Anjou.⁵¹

The Trogir archdeacon Jacob organized an attack on the Hvar bishop Stephen, son of Michael, as well as on Joseph, son of Stephen, and many other members of the Cega noble family, along with the subsequent plundering of their property. The main reason behind all of this was a personal hostility between archdeacon Jakov and Bishop Stephen, son of Michael (Cega), who was also a Trogir canon until he took over the Bishopric of Hvar and Brač (*Brazzia*) in 1348. Stephen owned a house near St. Nicholas Church in Trogir, and the feast of St. Nicholas probably served as a cover for mobilizing a large number of people by the archdeacon Jakov Petrov. The 17th century Trogir historian Ivan Lučić (Giovanni Lucio) believed that the event may have been instigated by the Venetians through their intelligence activity, as they still controlled Hvar, Brač, and Korčula (*Curzola*) with their navy.⁵² However, the Venetian involvement could have only contributed to the escalation of the conflict but did not provide its content and dynamics, which is similar to the situation between 1310 and 1320. External power holders influence the radicalization or escalation of existing political relations, which originate from the local dynamics of the city. Amongst the few preserved Dalmatian chroniclers from the 14th century, the so called *A Cutheis Tabula* mentions that 'the people of Trogir rose against the nobles and attacked 13 noble houses, completely destroying them, especially the house of Joseph, son of Stephen, with all his followers from the Cega family, whom they continued to pursue, but those nobles escaped to Split'.⁵³

⁴⁹ Cf. '... Ser presbiter Micael condam Martini de Tragurio dixit quod ipse obligauerat se penes dominum Iacobum archidiaconum Traguriensem in quodam debito trecentis(?) librarium paruorum scripto per me notarium infrascriptum occasione cuiusdam canonicatus vacantis in ecclesia Traguriense, ad quem canonicatum ipse dominus Iacobus promisserat facere ipsum eligi et assummi'. See in: DAZD-OT, busta 61, fasc. 8, fol. 6. Also, cf. Bećir, *Crkvene institucije*, 34.

⁵⁰ Smičiklas, *CodeX XII*, doc. 82, pp. 117–118.

⁵¹ See in much more detail about this war and the Treaty of Zadar in: Ančić, *Rat*, 39–136.

⁵² Lucio, *Memorie*, 265–271.

⁵³ Cf. 'Populus Traguriensis insurrexit adversus nobiles et XIII domos nobiles Traguriensis totaliter depraedeverunt videlicet domum Iosephi cum omnibus suis sequacibus de Cigis ipsis

Due to the fact that Joseph, son of Stephen, together with his cousins and associates fled to Split (*Spalatum*), the Split authorities found themselves in a dangerous situation. In that regard, it was decided within the Great Council to send three noblemen to Trogir to try to arbitrate and reconcile the Trogir factions, but it seems that they did not have any success whatsoever. Moreover, the situation in Trogir became even more complicated with the election of podesta Rudolphus de Pirro and captain of the people Dragulin, son of Hrvatin, (the latter was a Trogir local).⁵⁴ Hungarian rule was recognized in Trogir in July 1357, but the factional showdown obviously disrupted that development because Hungarian rule was yet again established in March of 1358 after the arrival of the Dalmatian-Croatian Ban János Chuz, who ordered an investigation into the sinister events taking place at that gloomy Saint Nicholas Day of 1357.⁵⁵

The text of the investigation was probably compiled in July or August of 1358, and the final verdict by Ban János Chuz was given on 14 of August 1358; in it he gives judgement to all the accused culprits indicating the manner of punishment which is to be enforced. There is no need to reproduce all the information, rather to pinpoint the most important conclusions. The verdict mostly followed the suggested punishments compiled in the text of the investigation itself. Namely, a certain Stephen who attacked Stephen, son of Michael, was to be punished by losing the hand with which he perpetrated his crimes, as well as of perpetual exile from the town. The archdeacon Jacob was to be confined in prison for the rest of his life, and his estates were to be confiscated so that Joseph son of Stephen and his cousins could be reimbursed. The rest of the culprits were sentenced to pay fines in money or to be exiled for a certain period of time, or both at the time.⁵⁶

Although the event of 5 December 1357 represents continuity with past factional conflicts, it manifested itself in a specific way due to the role of archdeacon Jacob. In fact, practically all of his most important collaborators and assistants were closely related to him, e.g. his first cousin Stephen, the illegitimate son of the late Bishop Lampadius, his nephews Peter and Nicholas, the sons of his late brother Micacius (Vitturi), as well as his own illegitimate son Martin.⁵⁷ On the other hand, political conflicts in Trogir were happening at the same time as the process of the development of political institutions and the political community during the second half of the 13th and first half of the 14th century. It seems possible that the process culminated in the early years of the Angevin rule, i.e. between 1358 and 1365.⁵⁸

persequendo, qui omnes nobiles Tragurienses fugerunt Spaletum, popularesque Tragurienses'. Cf. Lucio, *De regno*, 384. The *A Cutheis Tabula* was probably written by Marin Cutheis, canon of the Split Cathedral Chapter from the second half of the 14th century. The Chronicle narrates events regarding Split and the wider area of Dalmatia-Croatia or the Kingdom of Hungary between 1348 and 1388.

⁵⁴ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 138–139.

⁵⁵ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 135–136.

⁵⁶ For the text of the whole verdict cf. NAS-OIL, vol. 540, fol. 20—24v.

⁵⁷ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 149.

⁵⁸ About the institutional development of the Trogir Commune see in more detail in: Popić i Bećir, *Politički*, 13–57, and Popić, *Political*, 47–82.

Somewhere between 1365 and 1368, the General Council was renamed the General Council of the Noblemen or the Noblemen Council (*consilium generale nobilium civitatis Traguriensis* or just *consilium nobilium*).⁵⁹ This act just confirmed the reality behind the City Council, which had been composed exclusively of Trogir noblemen for decades. All in all, this subchapter has showed us the tight relationship between the secular and the ecclesiastic elites (i.e. institutions) in late medieval Trogir. The factional divide ran clearly through the formal and corporative boundaries, as the clerics were directly involved in the factional conflicts of the secular power elite.⁶⁰

Interregnum in the Archiregnum. New Factional Outburst in Trogir (1386–1395)

For the period from 1358 to 1382, there are no specific pieces of information available that would allow us to trace the factional dynamics. Moreover, it is only with the open conflicts in November 1386 and December 1387 that the political situation can be followed in more detail. Therefore, there is a nearly 30-year-long ‘gap’ in the available sources. However, there might be a concrete reason behind this. After the establishment of royal Hungarian authority in the city from March 1358, and the stabilization of internal affairs from August 1358, the groundwork for a new count of Trogir, a Zadar nobleman Francis de Georgiis, began to be prepared from November 1358. Francis remained in office until his death in November 1377, suggesting that he enjoyed great trust from King Louis I of Anjou and from the Trogir community. It seems that the stable royal authority in the city, as well as in wider Dalmatia and Croatia, also influenced the stable relations within the Trogir nobility. After the death of King Louis I of Anjou in September 1382, a prolonged period of conflict over the ascent of the royal throne began, which lasted to a greater or lesser extent until around 1409. During this time, there were struggles and disputes over the succession to the throne, which eventually culminated in the consolidation of King Sigismund’s power in the Kingdom of Hungary, including Slavonia, Dalmatia-Croatia and Bosnia. The political instability and power struggles during this period had direct implications for various regions, including Dalmatia and its towns like Trogir.⁶¹

Conflicts between King Sigismund and the supporters of the Neapolitan faction, which were particularly intense in the area south of the river Drava, had an impact on the outbreak of open conflict in Trogir in November 1386 and December 1387. These broader political struggles likely influenced the factional dynamics within Trogir, leading to the escalation of tensions and conflicts during that specific period. The most pertinent information regarding the escalation is brought to us via the so-called *Memoriale* of the Zaratin nobleman Paul de Paulo. It is a kind of chronicle which narrates mostly political events within Dalmatia-Croatia and the Kingdom

⁵⁹ Popić i Bećir, *Politički*, 3, 36. That fact was observed already by Raukar, *Komunalna*, 182.

⁶⁰ For more detail cf. Bećir, *Crkvene institucije*.

⁶¹ Šunjić, *Dalmacija*, 35–37; Šišić, *Hrvoje*, 23–79; Ančić, *Od tradicije*, 43–94.

of Hungary in general from 1371 to 1409.⁶² In his ‘diary’, Paul de Paulo mentioned that he had been elected as the count of Trogir on 2 July 1386 having assumed this position on 25 July of the same year. It is worth noting that on that very day, the Battle of Gorjani (Garai) in Slavonia took place, during which Queen Elizabeth and Queen Maria were captured by the Neapolitan supporters from the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia. Furthermore, just two months later, on 23 November, an armed conflict broke out in Trogir’s city square, which, according to Paul’s own account, calmed down without any casualties on the same day. However, it seems that Paul himself may have been a factor of instability, as he mentions how he was overthrown and driven out of the city by an ‘armed mob’ on 26 November, whereupon he immediately returned to Zadar, arriving there on 1 December 1386.⁶³ Apart from being the author of the utilized chronicle, Paul was also a prominent nobleman from Zadar, a supporter of King Sigismund, and a relative of the Cega family and he obviously found himself on the same political side as the Cega family.⁶⁴ It appears that the Cega family did everything to bring him specifically to be the count of Trogir. This seems to be a convincing interpretation and, as a result, Paul encountered resistance from the (most likely) opposing political faction of Vitturi-Andreis, which manifested itself in an open conflict on 23 and November 1386, precisely at the time when the Neapolitan supporters had the upper hand in the lands of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia.

The direct consequence of this short outburst was a quick attempt for a reconciliation via two chosen arbiters, namely the general governor of the Dominican order Raymond of Capua and the Bishop of Molfetta Simon de Nespoli (Simone Lopa). They seem to have found themselves in Trogir at the time of the political unrest within the city by coincidence.⁶⁵ Moreover, Simon was appointed for the Bishop of Molfetta rather very recently, on 6 October 1386.⁶⁶ Judging by that, the last thing on their mind was being stuck in Trogir, dealing with problems for which they had no authority nor interest to resolve. They thus produced their verdict with nine specific ordinations as early as on 27 November; however, due to the fact that their decree did not have any lasting effect, I will only highlight the most important part. Namely, the delegated judges concluded that the commoners were not to be punished because it was on account of them that the city was saved from factional destruction due to a intra-noble conflict. In that regard the commoners, as argued by judges, deserved a crown and not punishment (*ipsi liberauerunt ciuitatem ab exterminio et non sunt digni pena sed premio et corona*).⁶⁷ The duo was again mentioned in Trogir on 5 December as arbiters in a private dispute between two noblemen.⁶⁸ If we start from the premise that both Simon and especially Raymond were highly positioned prelates

⁶² Šišić, *Ljetopis*.

⁶³ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 9.

⁶⁴ About Paul and his family cf. Dokoza, *Zadarsko*, 441–444.

⁶⁵ NAS-OIL, vol. 540, fol. 202v.

⁶⁶ Eubel, *Hierarchia*, 335.

⁶⁷ Cf. the nine ordinations in: NAS-OIL, vol. 540, 203–206v.

⁶⁸ DAZD-OT, busta 61, fasc. 16, fol. 1v.

who happened to be in Trogir at that time due to circumstances, it is clear that they surely had no motive to be biased and to tailor the judgement in favour of one of the parties, particularly the noblemen as the leading social group.

The events from November 1386 foreshadowed a true factional clash on 27 and 28 December 1387, when the leaders of the Vitturi-Andreis faction, with active support from some commoners, eliminated the leaders of the Cega-Casotis faction, namely Augustin, son of Casotus de Casotis, Stephen, son of Duiumus known as 'Chernuch' (Cega), and Peter, son of Joseph (Cega). Consequently, they established a regime ostensibly friendly towards the Neapolitan side and the Bosnian King. As a result of these events, the members of the headless Cega-Casotis faction immediately fled the city and sought refuge in Split, marking (at least) the third repetition of the same factional scenario in Trogir with far-reaching consequences.⁶⁹

A brief overview of these events can be found again in the diary of Paul de Paulo, who apparently had a personal motive to record everything directly related to his Trogir relatives, the members of the Cega family. Paul briefly notes that on 27 December, upon the 'call of the people' (*ad vocem populi*), Stephen, son of Duiumus nicknamed 'Chernuch', and Peter, son of Joseph, were killed.⁷⁰ On the same day it was recorded that the new authority decided to send a letter to the Bosnian *vojvode* (army commanders) instead of an envoy.⁷¹ However, the day before (the coup), it was decided to send an envoy to the commanders of the Bosnian royal army, which could have been the reason for their execution and the sudden political upheaval.⁷² In addition, it was decided that rectors, judges, and seven city councillors, together with four canons (if they wish to participate), have the responsibility to take care of the city's welfare and its fortifications. Therefore, it was an *ad hoc* security committee similar to those in the time of podesta Matthew at the beginning of the 14th century. In the meantime, on 2 January 1386 Lompre, son of Micacius de Vitturi (probably the leader of the Vitturi faction at that time), and Paul, son of Marin de Quarco, were appointed as the city rectors for the month January of 1388.⁷³ However, on the following day, 28 December 1387, Augustin de Casotis was executed, and many other nobles suffered various damages and injustices.⁷⁴

Paul de Paulo further mentions that the attacked nobles were, one after another, Ciga, son of Joseph (Cega), and his sons (Andrew, Joseph, and Stephen), Nicholas, son of John (Acelini), and his sons (Zane and Leo), and George, son of Marc (Mišković), and his sons (Joseph, Marc and Thomas). All of them, along with some other unnamed individuals, managed to escape to Split in various ways.⁷⁵ The nobles from Zadar got involved in the situation and sent three representatives (Ludovicus de Georgiis, Damianus de Ciprianis, and Andrew, son of Nicholas de

⁶⁹ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 180.

⁷⁰ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 12.

⁷¹ Rački, *Notae*, 246.

⁷² That fact has been already noted in Ančić, *Neuspjeh*, 9.

⁷³ Rački, *Notae*, 246.

⁷⁴ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 12.

⁷⁵ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 12.

Grisogonis) to Hungary to deliver letters from the exiled people of Trogir. These letters contained explanations about everything that had happened and a request for royal assistance from King Sigismund and Queen Maria.⁷⁶ The protection sought by the exiled people of Trogir, especially Casotus, son of the late Augustin, and his supporters, came at the beginning of May that same year. King Sigismund issued a letter placing Casotus, as an *aula regis familiaris*, and his supporters under his protection. He commanded the Croatian nobles and Dalmatian cities loyal to him to protect Casotus and his associates, including Peter, son of Stephen (Cega), Matthew, son of Ludovicus (Cega), Donatus, son of Augustin (Casotis), and others who were exiled by ‘some of our clear rebels, the citizens of Trogir’. The document was presented to the authorities in Split by Peter, son of Stephen, and subsequently recorded in the register of the proceedings of the Great Council of Split on 21 May 1388. It is likely that they needed the king’s guarantee to be able to stay in Split at all for an extended period.⁷⁷

During May and June 1389, there was a fundamental change in King Sigismund’s political stance towards Trogir. On 18 June, the king sent a letter to his supporters in Croatia, forbidding them from attacking Trogir or causing any harm to the city, as he was no longer certain that the executions and other events had occurred as they were initially presented to him. In line with this, on 5 June the commander of the royal army and Ban of Slavonia Ladislav of Lučenec (Losonc, Lizenz) warned the people of Split to stop attacking Trogir and to compensate the residents of Trogir for any damages caused.⁷⁸ According to this new attitude, it was noted on 4 August 1389 that Casotus de Casotis, the commander of the brigantine, requested permission to enter Split’s port to apply tar to his ship. The Great Council of Split refused to grant him permission, allowing him only to buy food but not to take anyone with him on the ship or linger in the port.⁷⁹ Given that Casotus was mentioned together with others on 7 April 1389, and by 4 August he was seeking permission for entry, which he was denied, it seems reasonable to conclude that the authorities in Split revoked the possibility of further residence for the exiled people from Trogir after receiving the king’s letter.

Following the trail of the exiled people from Trogir in the published decisions of the Dubrovnik councils, one can find a decision to grant a certain sum of money to the Trogir exiles (*de providendo nobilibus de Tragurio expulsis*) on 27 April 1389. This record directly follows that from Split on 7 April of the same year, which clearly suggests that the exiles, under uncertain circumstances, arrived in Dubrovnik and sought financial support from the local authorities.⁸⁰ This indicates that the exiles had to rely on the support of other cities and rulers to survive in

⁷⁶ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 12.

⁷⁷ Gunjača, *Codex XVII*, doc. 107, p. 144; Lucio, *Memorie*, 338–339.

⁷⁸ See the King’s letter in: NAS-OIL, vol. 540, fol. 227–227v; Smičiklas, 1981, doc. 154, pp. 207–208.

⁷⁹ Lucio, *Memorie*, 349–350.

⁸⁰ Cf. Dinić, *Odluke*, 508–509. This had been already noticed in historiography: Lučić, *Povijesna*, 129–130; Janeković Roemer, *Okvir*, 271.

the new environment. Besides that, the leader of the Cega faction, Casotus, son of Augustin, was attested in a verdict given by the judges of the Zadar Merchant and Maritime Court (*Curia consulum et maris*) on 5 March 1391, which means that at the time he was present in Zadar. However, it is hard to ascertain when he came to Zadar.⁸¹

Although the royal authorities made a shift in their treatment of the Trogir exiles and the existing political order in Trogir in June 1389, the situation changed significantly again the following year. Ironically, Trogir officially surrendered to the rule of the Bosnian king in early July 1390, after Split and Šibenik (*Scibenicum, Sebenico*) had already done so.⁸² This means that the Vitturi faction, as a political group more inclined towards the Neapolitan supporters and the Bosnian king, actually remained loyal to King Sigismund longer than other cities. By acknowledging the authority of the Bosnian king, the Trogir authorities lost every support from King Sigismund. Subsequently, the Trogir exiles under the leadership of Casotus once again came to the forefront. This means that the faction that was previously more inclined towards King Sigismund now turned to the Bosnian king as their ally and protector. King Stephen Tvrtko I died on 10 March 1391 and was succeeded on the Bosnian throne by Stephen Dabiša. However, it became apparent that Stephen Dabiša lacked the necessary political skills to maintain the acquired territory. As a result, in June 1392, the authorities of Trogir recognized the authority of King Sigismund once again.⁸³ This shift in allegiance demonstrates the fluidity and complexity of the political situation in the region during that period.

Furthermore, when seizing positions of power, it is crucial to preserve them, and through this simple prism we should understand all past and future political decisions of the Vitturi faction, including their leaning towards one or the other side during turbulent years. This especially applies during this period, unlike the beginning of the 14th century, when political loyalties were more clearly defined. We should recall the connection between Marin, son of Andrew, and the Croatian Ban Mladen II, and the alignment of podesta Matthew, son of George, with Venice. However, during the 1380s and 1390s, due to the general political conflict within the Kingdom, loyalties became clouded, less defined and more prone to frequent changes in political direction, which could have further radicalized the dynamics of factional conflicts in Trogir. The fact that the Vitturi faction assumed power after targeted executions of leaders from the opposing faction speaks volumes about the changes in the political culture that led to a further intensification of political violence and its more ‘liberal’ use.⁸⁴

Indeed, this change in allegiance only spurred the exiles to take urgent action, as they became politically irrelevant to the Hungarian authorities in the altered

⁸¹ DAZD-AZ-CCM, vol. 2, fasc. 1, fol. 8v.

⁸² Rački, *Notae*, 249.

⁸³ Rački, *Notae*, 249.

⁸⁴ About violence as a sub-topic *inter alia* cf.: Muir, *Mad Blood*; Meyerson et al., *Introduction*, 1–10; Povolo, *Feud*, 195–244; Brown, *Violence in Medieval*; Tilly, *Collective Violence*; Bowman, *Violence in Identity*, 26–46; Ricciardelli, *Episodes*, 41–65.

circumstances. On 11 July 1392 – as narrated by Paul de Paulo – the Trogir exiles entered the city discreetly at exactly noon, using four fishing boats. Subsequently, they caught and executed Lompre, son of Micacius, the leader of the Vitturi faction, at the city square and seized power.⁸⁵ The aftermath represents the well-known medieval factional scenario, which involved the banishment of the defeated faction and the establishment of a new regime. Thus, the fickle medieval *rotae fortuna* turns again, but this time to the detriment of the Vitturi faction. Unfortunately, there is almost no data about the situation in Trogir prior to January 1395. Namely, in 1395 the warring Trogir factions came to terms with each other through the arbitration of the Dalmatian-Croatian Ban Nicholas Garai the Younger and concluded a peace agreement, which had great influence on the internal social and political relations within Trogir in the upcoming decades.⁸⁶

The ‘Last Dance’ of the Factions and the Venetian Takeover (1395–1420)

The final chronological phase examined in this article covers the period from January 1395, and the aforementioned peace agreement between the feuding factions of Trogir, to June 1420 and the establishment of the Venetian rule in Trogir. The agreement was apparently designed to last and ensure the stability of the political order in Trogir. It consisted of eight provisions, the first of which dealt with the necessity of introducing official forgiveness for all committed offenses on both sides.⁸⁷

However, the key element of the agreement was to deliberately shift all blame for the unrest in the city since 1386 onto the common people. In this sense, three or four commoners were singled out as the main culprits for the executions of the three noblemen (presumably referring to Augustin de Casotis, Stephen, son of Duimus de Cega, and Peter, son of Joseph de Cega, in December 1387), and their fate was left to the justice of a special court composed of selected nobles from Zadar, Split, and Šibenik. They were supposed to decide whether the common culprits should be banished from the city or not. This reflects an additional element of expanding the sphere of responsibility for pacifying the conflict in Trogir to other Dalmatian cities, as peace in Trogir indirectly reduced the possibility of unrest in Split, Šibenik, Zadar, and generally in Dalmatia.⁸⁸

From 1395 onwards, we can observe a process of stabilization of the internal affairs in Trogir, primarily within the nobility, which can be observed on three levels. Firstly, it is evident from the accounts of Paul de Paulo that certain Trogir nobles were sent into regulated political exile, without open conflicts. This suggests that tensions were being channelled through formal political mechanisms, without escalating into fierce and irreconcilable disputes. Secondly, the stabilization of the relations between the noblemen can be traced through an analysis of judicial and rector mandates from 1395 and 1402 until 1420. These records indicate certain

⁸⁵ Šišić, *Ljetopis*, 16.

⁸⁶ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 200.

⁸⁷ Rendić Miočević, *Codex XVIII*, doc. 3, pp. 3–7.

⁸⁸ Rendić Miočević, *Codex XVIII*, doc. 3, pp. 5–6.

patterns and the continuous representation of members from both factions in positions of power. Rectors were elected for each month or several months, while the composition of the Curia (seat of judicial and political power in the town) changed regularly every three months from at least June 1402 onwards, meaning that a larger number of nobles could rotate in these positions. In other words, the more rapidly and frequently they changed on the most important political positions, the more flexible the distribution of power became – drastically reducing the need for factional conflicts. Thirdly, the war with Venice played an important role, as the appearance of an external enemy led to a united and defensive stance from the nobility. This ultimately resulted in the formation of the faction led by the war captain Micacius de Vitturi as the ‘core’ political group, embodying the relative majority within the nobility, with support from the bishop, some commoners, and other individuals within the city.⁸⁹

Certainly, Micacius primarily enjoyed political support from the Vitturi-Andreis-Sobota faction, but due to the specific circumstances he gained the backing of some other nobles and followers among commoners. He also hired mercenaries, with whom he conducted corsair operations and maritime attacks on Venetian citizens and their ships in the central Adriatic during the Venetian-Hungarian War (1409 – 1420/1433), all under the blessing of King Sigismund and with the support of the powerful Count of Cetina – Ivaniš Nelipić. The status of Micacius increased further after the five-year truce was broken (1413–1418) and continued to rise until 1420. However, on the night before the entry of the Venetian army into the city on 22 June 1420, Micacius and Bishop Simon de Dominis fled from Trogir. Nevertheless, he continued his subversive actions with the support of King Sigismund and Count Ivaniš, aiming to obstruct the establishment of Venetian authority in Trogir and other cities. In that capacity, he is mentioned in the first half of the 1420s, whereupon his effective presence in historical sources disappears.⁹⁰ His corsair activity is attested also in the minutes of the Dubrovnik Senate (Consilium Rogatorum), as he plundered some silver pertaining to the Dubrovnik Commune.⁹¹ It is important to note how Dubrovnik received two letters from the king intended separately for the Trogir Commune and for Micacius personally.⁹²

The importance of the individual factor is excellently observed throughout all the analysed factional conflicts in the 14th century, and now with Micacius as well. King Sigismund, due to his inability for direct engagement, was forced to appoint various trusted individuals with military authority. In other words, there was a process of informal localization of political power, which primarily accumulated

⁸⁹ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 232–233.

⁹⁰ Bećir, *Plemstvo*, 257–258. Micacius acquired a *salvus conductus* from Venice to freely reside in Trogir between 1426 and 1428, after which the trail goes cold. Cf. Ljubić, *Listine* VIII, 145.

⁹¹ Cf. DADU, Consilium rogatorum, vol. 2, fol. 66, 67–67v, 69.

⁹² (In margine: *pro argentos per Tragurinos acceptos*). *Prima pars est de mittendo Nicolam Bratossalglich Tragurium cum duabus copiis litere nobis transmisso per nostrum serenissimum dominum, videlicet vnam dandam comunitati Tragurii et aliam Michacio Buturovich (!) ...* (In margine: *captum per XXIII, contra VII*). Cf. DADU, Consilium rogatorum, vol. 2, fol. 69.

within the faction led by Micacius and the Trogir Bishop Simon de Dominis.⁹³ This is actually a classic method of governance in premodern conditions – the ruler cannot always and everywhere control the situation through his ‘bureaucratic apparatus’ (if he even possesses one), and thus must delegate authority to individuals or groups on the ground where the need arises.

Therefore, the King extensively delegates authority to specific individuals (in this case, including influential commoners) on the ground to try to strengthen the city’s defence, since he himself cannot provide more concrete assistance nor manage the situation from Hungary, which requires speed and resourcefulness in military practice, and individuals with adequate experience and knowledge of the local situation. Moreover, the ruling noble group in the city, led by the royal corsair Micacius and Trogir’s bishop Simon de Dominis, accumulates even more political and social power in these extraordinary circumstances. To such an extent that in some Venetian chronicles, Micacius is referred to as the ‘lord of Trogir’ (*Michatio, che era sta fatto Signor de Trau*) and the ‘lieutenant of the Hungarian King’ (*lo Gouernador del Re d’Ongaria nominato Michazo*).⁹⁴

Although significant political changes and different developments in factional relations in Trogir can be observed at the beginning of the 15th century with the Micacius and his faction, the existing patterns are still very evident, which indicates long-term continuity in the political practice of the Trogir noblemen and other political actors. In the early 15th century, especially after the Venetian conquest of Šibenik in October 1412 and the redirection of military interest towards Trogir, a ‘central’ faction of the aforementioned Micacius began to take shape. The core of the faction was made out of other members of the Vitturi, Andreis, and Sobota families, along with followers from other individuals and groups (commoners or clerics). However, the sources do not allow for the tracing of any effective political opposition, as even those who might be expected to hold opposing positions based on previous historical experience are listed alongside Micacius. This includes, above all, Andrew, son of Ciga (Cega), and Donatus, son of Casotus (Casotis). The whole situation from the beginning of the 15th century provides us with numerous other facts for a more detailed and extensive historical reconstruction, but that I leave for another occasion.

Concluding Remarks

The examples presented have indeed shown that informal political factions existed in Trogir as a Dalmatian type of city-commune between 1280 and 1420, and they served as dense ‘clusters of social capital’ that were the fundamental drivers of political processes and events in the city – despite them not having any kind of formal structure or organization. As in various Italian Communes in the late medi-

⁹³ Cf. the many geographical and political limitations of ruling, which medieval and premodern rulers encountered all the time in: Crone, *Pre-Industrial*, 33, 39–40, 45; Aylmer, *Centre*, 59–75; Descimon, *Prince*, 101–122.

⁹⁴ For Micacius’s titles cf. Lucio, *Memorie*, 425.

eval period, the urban factions in Trogir functioned as heterogeneous and volatile political coalitions that were maintained by common interest. Due to their volatile nature, factions regularly changed their composition in accordance with changes in political, social, business or familial relationships. The example of the Trogir factions has also demonstrated how it is possible to simultaneously trace continuities within the core of the faction, as well as changes among factional peripheries.

The factions were not only informal but also highly personalized groups that largely depended on the actions of their faction leader. This was particularly evident in some cases, such as with the factions of podesta Matthew, archdeacon Jacob or the royal corsair Micacius. Hence, their factions could be perceived as highly personalized. On the other hand, the factions of Marin, son of Andrew, Joseph, son of Stephen, brothers Lompre and Luke (Lukša) de Vitturi, Casotus, son of Augustin, and Ciga, son of Joseph, appeared as groups in which the faction leader acted as an intermediary between various family branches that constituted the faction core. In other words, Matthew, Jacob, and Micacius surrounded themselves with specific individuals, who may or may not have been related to them but were chosen based on certain specific and *ad hoc* characteristics. In contrast, the other factions operated more like a conglomerate of different family branches united within their own kinship structures, with certain nobles serving as the *primi inter pares* of the coalition.

Factions inherently engage in conflicts, competing for control over public institutions and striving for political power (which entails control over material, symbolic, and human resources) that can open doors to achieving all their other political, social, and material interests. It is a political culture that does not see sense in formalized opposition, and therefore factional conflicts often unfolded in an ‘all or nothing’ manner, where the victors would gain everything, and the losers would be left with nothing. This is most evident in the established pattern of sending the defeated into political exile, far from their family estates and possessions tied to their noble status. As such, the exiles had no choice but to opportunistically serve stronger patrons in hopes of overcoming their adversaries in the city and reversing their roles – the exiles becoming the new rulers, and the former rulers becoming the exiled.

All of this is a scenario that is observed in Trogir throughout episodes of escalating open hostilities (1310–1322; 1357–1358; 1387–1395) or ultimately as a result of Micacius’s group defeat in the war with Venice (1420). However, it is important to emphasize that conflicts were not always just open; they were primarily latent, meaning they were conducted through other mechanisms as long as possible or until the political situation reached a phase of radicalization of relations that escalated into open conflict. Such conflicts were subsequently resolved through intervention by central authorities or those who sought to assume power (e.g. Venice, Croatian Ban Mladen II, Hungarian kings, or various claimants to the Hungarian throne).

The study into the factional relations in late medieval Trogir has also shown us how seemingly generic terminology conveys, in fact, specific and situational ‘factional’ meaning, as is the case with terms like *complices*, *sequaces*, *socii*, *amici*,

adherentes, pertinentes, attinentes, seruitores or *comitua* (as in *retinue*), which have been attested in this case-study and which corresponds to terminology used in other Dalmatian cities or in the Italian communes. The factional events in the Trogir case study correspond to the political context of numerous north and central Italian communes, allowing us to speak of a shared type of political culture in both Dalmatia and the Italian communes. Further research focusing on factional groups in other Dalmatian towns is necessary to develop a more comprehensive and comparative understanding of these political phenomena.

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P O V Z E T E K

Sledenje frakcijam in spopadi za oblast v poznosrednjeveškem Trogirju

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Glavni namen članka je ponuditi sintetičen pregled politike frakcij v Trogirju (Trogirium, Traù) v pozrem srednjem veku, kar predstavlja vzorčno študijo za boljše razumevanje določenih vidikov politične kulture dalmatinskih mest v tem obdobju. Glavni poudarek članka je na kolektivnem delovanju plemstva iz Trogirja v pozrem srednjem veku ter njihovih podpornikih iz drugih družbenih skupin v obdobju med letoma 1280 in 1420. Srednjeveški Trogir je deloval kot majhna komuna v srednjeveški Dalmaciji, regiji, ki je zajemala obsežno območje od Kvarnerskega zaliva do mesta Drač (Durachium, Durrës) – geografska oblika, ki se je vseeno razlikovala od antične rimske province Dalmacije. V poznosrednjeveški realnosti je območje med Kvarnerskim zalivom in Kotorskim zalivom predstavljalo posebno regijo z mnogimi podobnostmi v kulturi, jeziku, razvoju prava in komunalnih institucijah ter v družbeni in politični organizaciji teh lokalnih skupnosti, ki je temeljila na hegemoniji plemiških rodbin. Čeprav je bila poznosrednjeveška Dalmacija mozaik različnih komun in lokalnih jurisdikcij, je bila hkrati zgodovinska in kulturna regija z močno kulturno povezanostjo z Italijo. Dalmatinska mesta-komune so si večinoma delila istega političnega gospodarja – bodisi kralja Ogrske bodisi Beneško republiko.

Na podlagi antropološke in zgodovinsko-primerjalne literature članek politične frakcije obravnava kot nestabilne in volatilne politične koalicije, sestavljene iz plemičev, meščanov in drugih akterjev družbenega in političnega življenja Trogirja v obdobju obravnave, ki so se borili za politično moč znotraj meja trogirske komune. Boj za oblast je igral ključno vlogo v političnem, družbenem in gospodarskem življenju srednjeveških mest, vključno z majhnim mestom Trogir, kot tudi drugih dalmatinskih komun in mest. Dolgotrajna politična tekmovanja so pogosto povzročila eskalacijo latentnih družbenih konfliktov v odkrite frakcijske spopade. Te eskalacije so bile neposredno pogojene z geopolitičnimi spremembami znotraj kraljevine Ogrske ali Benetk na eni strani ter s političnimi odnosi med ogrskim kraljem ali predstavniki ogrske kraljevske oblasti na območju poznosrednjeveške Dalmacije-Hrvaške in Benetkami na drugi strani. Z drugimi besedami, pojmi moči in časti vključujejo boje za prevlado med frakcijskimi bloki, ki temeljijo na političnih, družinskih ali gospodarskih povezavah in jih vodijo vplivni plemiči ali plemiške rodbine. Ti plemiči so bili ponosni na svoje naslove, posesti in privilegije, pri čemer je bilo ohranjanje osebne in družinske časti ključno za ohranjanje vpliva in moči znotraj lokalne skupnosti in zunaj nje. Za zagotovitev svojih položajev so plemiške družine pogosto sklepale zavezništva z drugimi plemiškimi družinami in skupinami znotraj večinskega prebivalstva ali z

zunanjimi silami. Vendar so bila ta zavezništva pogosto nestabilna in so lahko hitro razpadla, kar je samo še povečevalo spletke in negotovost v političnem življenju. Intenzivna politična rivalstva so lahko pripeljala do odkritih konfliktov in bojev za nadzor nad mestom.

S teoretičnega in metodološkega vidika lahko frakcije opredelimo kot navpične meddružbene skupine. To pomeni, da so to skupine, sestavljene iz članov različnih družbenih slojev, čeprav imajo vlogo voditeljev praviloma člani družbene in politične elite, kot so frakcijski voditelji pri vplivnih plemiških rodbinah iz Trogirja. Morda je bolje takšne skupine razumeti kot nekakšno »kopičenje ali skupek družbenega kapitala«, z besedami Pierra Bourdieuja, znotraj katerih posamezniki vlagajo svoje vire in vpliv za doseganje skupnih interesov. V tem smislu uspeh ali neuspeh frakcije v veliki meri temelji na sposobnostih njenih posameznih članov. Frakcije kot take imajo vsaj jedro in obrobjе, pri čemer jedro sestavlja voditelji, obrobjе pa sodelavci ali zaveznički vodstva, ki vsi zasledujejo isti cilj ali interes v določenem trenutku. V tem smislu lahko govorimo o političnih koalicijah različnih skupin iz različnih družbenih slojev pod vodstvom članov družbene elite. Zato se frakcijski konflikti odvijajo med nasprotnimi piramidalno strukturiranimi političnimi mrežami, ki vse zasledujejo isti cilj: pridobiti politično moč, da bi vzpostavile nadzor nad materialnimi, simbolnimi in človeškimi viri svoje skupnosti.

Članek je razdeljen na štiri tematske enote, pri čemer so kronološko na kratko obravnavana tri obdobja odkritih frakcijskih vojn: med letoma 1310 in 1322, kratko obdobje med letoma 1357 in 1358 ter daljše obdobje med letoma 1386 in 1395. Zadnja tematska enota obravnavava obdobje med letoma 1395 in 1420, ko se običajni konflikti med frakcijami niso izrazito manifestirali, vendar so se napetosti med plemiči in meščani zaostrike. Ogrsko-beneška vojna za nadzor nad vzhodnim Jadranom je privedla do oblikovanja konsolidirane vladajoče skupine v Trogirju, ki je uživala (relativno) večjo podporo znotraj skupnosti v primerjavi s frakcijami iz 14. stoletja.

Prvo obdobje med letoma 1310 in 1322 je bilo ključno za nadaljnji razvoj frakcijskih in političnih odnosov v Trogirju, zato predstavlja verjetno najpomembnejši primer frakcijskega konfliktja v 14. stoletju. Z drugimi besedami, dejanja frakcij pod vodstvom Marina, sina Andreja (iz plemiške družine Andreis), in Matea, sina Zoreja (iz plemiške družine Cega), so oblikovala neformalni okvir »politične arene« Trogirja za prihodnja desetletja, v katerih so bili najbolj očitni odprtji ali latentni konflikti med temo dvema frakcijskima blokoma ponovno oživljeni. Jedra teh frakcij so ostala kompaktna in so bila skoraj izključno definirana znotraj istih vplivnih plemiških družin. Konkretno, jedro frakcije Marina so sestavljali člani družin Andreis in Cazarica, s podporo posameznikov iz družine Vitturi. Po drugi strani je frakcijo Matea sestavljala družina Cega, skupaj s člani družin Lucio, Cipiko in Casotis ter drugimi posamezniki, ki so imeli osebne povezave z Mateom. V drugem obdobju eskalacije med letoma 1357 in 1358 so jedra ostala skoraj nespremenjena. Frakcijo nadarjenega Jakoba, sina Petra (Vitturi), so vodili člani plemiških družin Vitturi in Andreis, skupaj z osebnimi zaupniki in sorodniki nadarjenega. Na drugi strani je frakcijo Jožefa, sina Štefana (Cega), vodil on sam ter njegovi bratje in sinovi iz različnih vej družine Cega. V tretji fazi politične eskalacije med letoma 1386/1387 in 1395 sta frakcijo Cega-Casotis vodila Casotus, sin Agostina (Casotis), in Jožef, sin Štefana (Cega), skupaj s člani družine Cipiko. Nasprotni blok so vodili člani družin Andreis in Vitturi, skupaj z njihovimi osebnimi zaupanjima in sodelavci. V času frakcijskih konfliktov so se posamezni člani teh političnih koalicij spremenjali.

Čeprav so se na začetku 15. stoletja v Trogirju z Micacijem in njegovo frakcijo pojavile pomembne politične spremembe in drugačen razvoj frakcijskih odnosov, so obstoječi vzorci še vedno zelo očitni, kar kaže na dolgoročno kontinuiteto politične prakse trogirskega plemičev in drugih političnih akterjev. Na začetku 15. stoletja, zlasti po beneški osvojitvi Šibenika (Sebenico) oktobra 1412 in posledičnem preusmeritvi vojaškega interesa proti Trogirju, se je začela oblikovati „centralna“ frakcija že omenjenega Micacija. Jedro te frakcije so sestavljali člani družin Vitturi, Andreis in Sobota, skupaj s podporniki izmed drugih posameznikov in skupin (meščani ali kleriki).

Raziskave o frakcijah v Trogirju in o bojih za oblast med 13. in 15. stoletjem so pokazale, da so jedra frakcij ostajala dosledna znotraj istih plemiških družin, medtem ko so se obrobjе frakcij spremenjala glede na spremenjajoče se okoliščine in nove izbruhne odprte frakcijske nasilnosti.

Po drugi strani so dogodki, povezani s frakcijami, neposredno vplivali na institucionalno in normativno oblikovanje trogirskega komuna, kar se ujema z družbenimi in političnimi razmerami v italijanskih komunah poznega srednjega veka. Pomembno je poudariti, da konflikti niso bili vedno očitno izraženi. Večinoma so bili latentni, kar pomeni, da so se vodili skozi druge mehanizme, dokler je bilo to mogoče, ali dokler politična situacija ni dosegla stopnje radikalizacije odnosov, ki je privedla do odprtega konflikta. Takšne konflikte so nato reševale osrednje oblasti ali tisti, ki so si prizadevali pridobiti oblast (na primer Benetke, hrvaški ban Mladen II., ogrski kralji ali različni pretendenti na ogrski prestol). Potrebne so nadaljnje raziskave o frakcijskih skupinah v drugih dalmatinskih mestih, da bi razvili bolj celovito in primerjalno razumevanje teh političnih pojavov.