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DRUŽBENOSTI

Original scientific paper
Izvirni znanstveni članek

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Tveganje družbe tveganja

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Povzetek

V zadnjih desetletjih je bilo razpravi o »družbi tveganja« namenjeno veliko pozornosti tako v socioloških študijah kot pri kritični javnosti. Članek obravnava družbo tveganja v parametrih totalizacije družbene subjektivitete, ki briše horizont sveta in se v svojem opolnomočenju izkaže za nihilistično. Družba kot samo-vzpostavljajoča se družba ne sledi samo toku modernosti, ki v svojem neusmiljenem drsenju ne pride nikamor, temveč ga v funkciji lastne totalizacije kot takega anticipira.

Družba tveganja kot »operativni koncept« predpostavlja aparat ekosociologije, ki v sebi povezuje eko-nomijo, eko-logijo, eko-religiologijo, eko-izobrazbo, eko-politiko, eko-vojskovanje, eko-tehnoznanost ter eko-inteligenco in je prevzel izvršilno funkcijo nadzora, tako da je vse postavljeno v moč funkcioniranja.

Ključne besede: družba tveganja, družba nadzora, modernost, totalizacija, nihilizem.

The Risk of the Risk Society

Abstract

In the recent decades, the discussion about "risk society" has received considerable attention both in sociological studies and among the critical public. The article examines the concept of "risk society" in terms of the totalization of social subjectivity that erases the horizon of the world and proves to be nihilistic in its empowerment. As a self-establishing power, society not only follows the relentless drift of modernity, which leads nowhere, but anticipates it as such in the function of its own totalization. The risk society as an "operational concept" presupposes the apparatus of ecosociology, which combines eco-nomics, eco-logy, eco-religion, eco-education, eco-politics, eco-warfare, eco-technoscience, and eco-intelligence, and has taken over the executive function of control, so that everything is put into the power of functioning.

Keywords: risk society, control society, modernity, totalization, nihilism.

Uvodoma je treba pripomniti, da formulacije »družba tveganja«, ki jo je kot prvi uveljavil Ulrich Beck v svojem delu *Družba tveganja. Na poti do neke druge moderne* iz leta1986,[1] ne moremo jemati kot izgotovljenega teoretskega koncepta,[2] četudi jo še desetletja po nastanku izdatno podpira sociološka in humanistična stroka, verjetno pa še bolj dandanašnja percepcija »družbene stvarnosti«. A hkrati oznaka »družba tveganja« ni zgolj krilatica, podobno kot to niso »družba znanja«, »globalna družba«, »informacijska družba«, »družba znanja« »družba spektakla« itn.; prav lahko bomo v zelo kratkem času morali dodati še »družbo agresije« ali kaj podobnega.

Morda je najbolje reči, da gre za *percepcijo*, ki diktira neko tematizacijsko izkustvo ob siceršnjem pomanjkanju učinkovitih družbenokritičnih receptov in formul. Vsekakor je določilno, da se element tveganja v oznaki »družba tveganja« ne povezuje s kakšnim človeškim delovanjem, marveč *s storilnostjo celotne družbe*. Prvi pomislek je, kako lahko to, kar po splošnem razumevanju in tako rekoč z najmanj tveganja in brez posebnega upravičevanja sprejemamo kot *družbo* vključuje tveganje, celo *megatveganje*, ki po svoji moči presega siceršnja »tveganja«, od »življenjskih« do »ekonomskih«, a tudi, kakor kažejo najnovejše pobude navijaških vojskovodij, »vojnih«? Kako se lahko »družba«

1 Prim. Beck 1986; slov. prevod: Beck 2001.

2 V zvezi s tem tudi Niklas Luhmann, ki se je sam obširno posvečal obravnavi družbe tveganja, pripominja: »Opisi sodobne družbe, ki se danes ponujajo, si ne prizadevajo več za teoretsko dodelanost. Poudarjajo posamezne pojave, ki so po njihovem mnenju še posebej vredni pozornosti, in pri tem tudi ostane. Celo izraz ‚kapitalistična družba' ni bil pokrit z ustreznimi ekonomskimi znanostmi in je zgolj sugeriral družbenozgodovinski opis nekega obdobja, tako rekoč narativ. To pomanjkanje teoretske analize je še bolj očitno v primeru ‚družbe tveganja' ali ‚družbe doživljanja'. Enako velja za ‚informacijsko družbo'.« (Luhmann 2005, 27.)

Besedilo je nastalo v okviru izvajanja raziskovalnega programa *Humanistika in smisel humanosti v vidikih zgodovinskosti in sodobnosti* (P6-0341), raziskovalnega projekta *Hermenevtični problem razumevanja človeške eksistence in koeksistence v epohi nihilizma* (J7-4631) in infrastrukturnega programa *Center za promocijo humanistike Inštituta Nove revije* (I0-0036), ki jih finančno podpira Javna agencija za znanstvenoraziskovalno in inovacijsko dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARIS).
Angleška različica teksta je bila v nekoliko modificirani obliki objavljena v reviji *Teoria* (prim. Komel 2024).

kot subjekt, v katerega zaupamo bolj kot v človeka, boga in svet, v procesu svoje subjektivizacije izkazuje kot »tvegana investicija«?

Danes se gotovo soočamo s pravim navalom najrazličnejših družbenih tveganj, sama družba pa brez najmanjšega zadržka drvi naprej in *mimo vsega tvega vse*, saj ji je *totalno vse razpoložljivo*. Mar ni formulacija »družba tveganja« potemtakem »trojanski konj« sociološke znanosti in celotnega znanstvenega aparata, ki totalizacijo družbene subjektivitete samo po sebi pušča nedotaknjeno oziroma jo postavlja v funkcijo lastne promocije? Pomisleke v tej smeri je seveda zlahka moč teoretsko odkloniti ali jih kako drugače zavrniti kot neustrezne. S tem se hkrati praktično zastre kritično zavedanje, kako je naše *obče razpoloženje glede stanja sveta* ter *javno mnenje* postalo sumljivo tvegano in se naznanja že onkraj normalne človeške občutljivosti in razsodnosti (Erzetič 2023). Ta abnormalnost, ki izdatno vpliva tudi na oblikovanje družbenih normativov in političnih imperativov,[3] terja, da prevladujoči diskurz družbe tveganja postavimo v kontekst današnjega *izbrisa obzorja sveta*,[4] ki ga lahko neposredno spremljamo na ekranih, družbene teorije

3 Primer za to je, recimo, današnje politično in znanstveno ustoličevanje jedrske energije kot »zelene«, ki pomeni obrat na celi črti glede na to, da smo od Černobila naprej (ki je tudi neposredno vzpodbudil instalacijo družbe tveganja) bili priča širokim političnim aktivnostim glede zapiranja jedrskih central itn. Da in kako je ekologija postala politična tema, ki ustvarja tudi svojo ekonomijo, terja poseben premislek funkcionalnosti in funkcioniranja evropskih in globalnih političnih inštitucij in forumov.
Drugi primer je spremljanje rizičnih vojnih razmer na različnih krajih sveta z bojaznijo, da se razširijo in preidejo v spopad večjih razmerij, morda celo spopad velesil, ki bi ob uporabi atomskega orožja lahko privedel do uničenja sveta, kar je seveda zlahka mogoče obrniti v prid pokončanja tistih, ki bi z atomsko bombo lahko potencialno uničili svet. Take licemerne bojazni hkrati dopolnjuje nenehno hujskanje k vojnim spopadom in konkretna pomoč v denarju, orožju in moštvu, kar napeljuje k ugotovitvi, da bi za današnjo vojaško, ekonomsko, tehnološko, kulturno in politično gnanje za prevlado nad svetom bila še *najbolj rizična vzpostavitev svetovnega miru*. Dokazov za to res ne manjka. In vsi tako zelo hočejo mir – da ga že v naslednjem hipu pregazijo. Danes bi namesto o »hladni vojni« lahko govorili o *ogrevani vojni*, da prinesemo notri še globalno segrevanje.

4 »V svetu, v katerem prevladuje spacialnost, ni prostora za kakršnokoli drugo pojmovanje časa ali kraja od modifikacij spacialnosti – ki je podvrženo številčnemu, merljivemu in izmerljivemu; v takem svetu je tisto, kar je zunaj objektivnosti spacialnosti in številčenja, lahko le subjektivno in tako konvencionalno – ali, lahko bi

pa se nanj bore malo ozirajo, kaj šele da bi ga vzele kot ključno predpostavko lastnega ukvarjanja z družbenostjo današnje družbe.[5] Namesto tega se iz teorije same ob vsestranski pomoči raznovrstnih medijskih hiš in mrežastih ohišij *dela teater*. Družba tveganja se še najbolje počuti v zadružništvu z *družbo spektakla* (Debord 1999, Gruneau 2018, Vuger 2023), v kateri na videz ne tvegamo ničesar, v resnici pa pravzaprav – ne da bi se tega sploh zavedali – *vse*. To je: *vserazpoložjivost*. Nasledek je lahko samo *kalkulacija*, ki opredeljuje sleherno možnost *komunikacije*, vključno z znanstveno ali religiozno. Povsod delujoča kalkulacijsko-komunikacijska *ekonomija rizičnosti*, s katero je raba besed »riziko« in »risk«, a fraza »to run a risk«[6] tudi prvotno povezana, je v skladu s ponudbo in povpraševanjem v strateški spregi z *ekologijo rizičnosti*, ki

rekli, ‚konstruirano'. A težava je v tem, da skoraj vse, kar se nanaša na človeka, spada na področje konvencionalnosti in tako nima notranjega temelja ali meje, hkrati pa je v celoti podrejeno domnevni objektivnosti, spacialnosti in številčenju. Sodobni kapitalizem, povezan z modernimi informacijskimi sistemi in utelešen v ‚trgu' (ki je sam tako informacijski kot ekonomski sistem), postane vseobsegajoč tehnološki ‚stroj', ki omogoča, da se spacializirana človeška subjektivnost oblikuje na področju objektivno kvantificiranega in oštevilčenega. Poleg tega se pred vseobsegajočim dometom tehnološke modernosti, vključno z njeno instantizacijo v sodobnem kapitalizmu, nikakor ni preprosto obraniti, saj tehnološka modernost zavrača samo idejo meje ali omejitve, od katere je takšna obramba nujno odvisna.« (Malpas 2018, 100–101; prim tudi Malpas 2024, Neri 2024, Fabris 2024.)

5 »S tem ko moč oddajanja in sprejemanja različnih signalov v realnem času odtujuje naravo časovnih razdalj, aktivna optika elektromagnetnih valov izkorišča globino polja, samo realnost našega sveta, ga reducira skoraj na nič, smer dosega katastrofičen občutek zaprtja neka človeštva, ki je dobesedno ostalo brez obzorja.« (Virilio 1996, 52.)

6 »[…], iz francoščine *risque* (16. st.), iz italijanščine *risco*, *riscio* (sodobno *rischio*), iz *riscare*, ‚drveti v nevarnost'), beseda je negotovega izvora. Poangleženo črkovanje je zabeleženo leta 1728. Špansko *riesgo* in nemško *Risiko* sta italijanski izposojenki. Poslovni pomen ‚nevarnost izgube ladje, blaga ali drugega premoženja' je znan do leta 1719; od tod tudi razširitev na ‚možnost, ki se pojavi v gospodarskem podjetju'. V paru z besedo *run* (v.) iz šestdesetih let 16. stoletja. (*Online Etymology Dictionary*, s.v. »risk«, dostop 23. novembra 2024, https://www.etymonline.com/word/risk.) *Slovenski etimološki slovar* za »tvegati« navaja, da je »verjetno nastalo iz **ot-vegati* *‚prenehati omahovati', sestavljenke iz **ot*, sloven. *od*, in *vẹ̑gati* v pomenu ‚omahovati'.« (*Slovenski etimološki slovar*, s.v. »tvegati«, dostop 23. novembra 2024, https://fran.si/193/marko-snoj-slovenski-etimoloski-slovar/4293220/tvegati?FilteredDictionaryIds=193&View=1&Query=tvegati.) Prim. tudi poglavje »Koncept tveganja« v: Luhmann 1993, 1–39.

je zadnja desetletja ubrala ne le katastrofične, marveč že kar apokaliptične tone (Dupuy 2022). *Racionalizacija*, *informatizacija*, *kapitalizacija*, *militarizacija* in *globalizacija*, na eni strani, ter *apokaliptičnost*, *katastrofičnost*, *rizičnost*, *teroriziranost* in *paničnost*, na drugi strani, se ponujajo kot določujoče *parakarakteristike* sedanje dobe in podobe človeštva, tj. (post)modernosti kot *Dvosmernega*? *Enosmernega?* ali pa *Brezsmernega! toka*.

Iz naslova Beckovega dela *Družba tveganja. Na poti v neko drugo modernost* je razvidno, da »družbo tveganja« strukturno opredeli kot *konsekvenco modernosti*, kar je še dodatno podkrepljeno s korekcijo »modernosti« v »drugo modernost«. V tej povezavi se kot referenčno delo navaja študijo Anthonyja Giddensa *Konsekvence modernosti* (Giddens 1990). Z Giddensovimi vpogledi je povezano tudi Beckovo nadaljnje strukturno določilo »druge modernosti« kot *refleksivne modernizacije*, ki vključuje tako (refleksivno) scientizacijo in kulturalizacijo kot politizacijo. Oznaka »refleksivnost«, ki ima svojo ekskluzivno in določujoče mesto znotraj oblikovanja novoveške filozofije in formiranja moderne subjektivitete, je tu uporabljena bolj v smislu tega, na kar se (refleksivno) *odzivamo*, kar velja tudi za aspekt *zavedanja rizičnosti*, ki karakterizira sedanji proces modernizacije v primerjavi s prejšnjimi.[7] Ta »refleksijska zareza« je, podobno kot »družba znanja«, konceptualno šibko zastavljena, vendar indikativna v pogledu tega, da *rizika*, ki naj se ga, ne šele naknadno, marveč *vnaprej* reflektira, ne producirajo kakšni posamezni družbeni subjekti, marveč sam *sistem produkcije in potrošnje v družbi, kot se (jo) danes reflektira*. »Vnaprej reflektirati« tako ne pomeni samo »odzivati se« kot »ozirati se na nekaj«, »biti pozoren«, marveč: »držati pod reflektorji« – *vršiti* in izvrševati *nadzor*. Družba, ki sebe reflektira kot rizično, se mora posluževati *metodologije nadzora*, ki hkrati služi kot njen *prevladujoči* (čeprav rezervni) *svetovni nazor*, bolje rečeno, *kot kamera in ekran*, ki lahko prezentirata za tvegano karkoli in vse, kar je, cel svet in še *najbolj svet*. Stadion sveta

7 »Medtem ko enostavna modernizacija na koncu umesti gonilo družbenih sprememb v kategorije instrumentalne racionalnosti (refleksije), ‚refleksivna' modernizacija konceptualizira gonilo družbenih sprememb v kategorije stranskega učinka (refleksivnosti). Zadeve, ki so sprva nevidne in nereflektirane, a so eksternalizirane, tvorijo strukturni prelom, ki razločuje industrijsko od ‚novih' modernosti v sedanjosti in prihodnosti. ‚Refleksivna' tako pomeni tudi refleksivno in hkrati zgodovinsko modernizacijo (ki jo je seveda, kot dokazuje pričujoči pojem, mogoče konceptualizirati, tj. reflektirati).« (Beck 1996, 45.)

se je skozi to prezentacijo pod reflektorji *neverjetno pomanjšal*. Zato je površno in neustrezno govoriti, kako se svet globalizira, marveč (se) globalizira družba kot subjektiviteta, ki je »ob spoštovanju načel prostega trga« prevzela prevlado nad reprezentacijo sveta in v svoji totalizaciji vrši totalni nadzor. Na podlagi tega vzpostavlja lastno *ekosociologijo*, s čimer ni več in sploh ne mišljena samo kakšna družbena teorija ali kritična refleksija. *Ekosociologija* (»eko-« je tu treba strogo razumeti kot sprego eko-nomije, eko-logije, eko-policije, eko-tehnike in – kar pride celo v prvi škaf – eko-religiologije) je v refleksivni modernizaciji postala ključen *medij* samo(re)*produkcije družbe same*, ki nima pod nadzorom samo različnih oblik produkcije in potrošnje znotraj družbe, marveč je vanjo satelitsko in seveda ob asistenci umetne inteligence *vklopljen sistem procesiranja družbe kot take*. To dokazujejo že proračunski stroški nabav institucij v sistemu. Družba v procesu svoje samo(re)produkcije, ki kot »refleksivna modernizacija« združuje družbo rizika, družbo spektakla in družba nadzora, ne funkcionira le kot subjekt ali celo eden od subjektov v določenem sistemu, marveč kot sistemljenje sistema samo(re)produkcijsko sintetizira tako funkcioniranje subjekta kot funkcijo objekta – je *Družba družbe*, kot je to v naslovu enega svojih najobsežnejših del to formuliral Niklas Luhmann (1997).

Luhmann je v okviru širše zastavljenega razvijanja teorije družbenih sistemov leta 1991 izdal tudi delo *Sociologija tveganja*, potem ko se je že prej udeleževal diskusije o družbi tveganja. Kot ključno nalogo sociološke znanosti predstavi socionomijo refleksivne modernizacije v smeri avtopoietične sistemske komunikacije:

> Predvsem je treba natančno opredeliti pojem tveganja in analizirati razloge, zakaj so to pojmovanje in dejstva, na katera se nanaša, v novejšem razvoju družbenega sistema postali vse pomembnejši. Na to vprašanje bomo odgovorili s tezo, da se je odvisnost družbene prihodnosti od sprejemanja odločitev povečala in danes tako prevladuje v predstavah o prihodnosti, da je bil opuščen vsak koncept »oblik bivanja«, ki – kot narava – notranje zamejujejo, kaj se lahko zgodi. Tehnologija in z njo povezano zavedanje o zmogljivostih sta zavzela ozemlje narave, pri čemer tako predvidevanja kot izkušnje kažejo, da se to prej izkaže za destruktivno kot za konstruktivno. Strah, da bi šlo lahko kaj narobe, zato hitro narašča, s tem pa tudi tveganje, ki se pripisuje odločanju. V tej analizi imata pojma odločitev in tehnologija (v smislu, ki ga je

> treba še opredeliti) pomembno vlogo. Zato je še toliko bolj potrebno že na začetku poudariti, da ne gre za duševne in materialne (strojne) pojave. Naša analiza družbe se ukvarja izključno s komunikacijami. Komunikacija ni nič drugega kot operacija, s katero se družba kot sistem proizvaja in reproducira z »avtopoiezo«. S tem seveda ne zanikamo, da okolje družbenega sistema vsebuje realnosti, ki jih opazovalec lahko opiše kot zavest ali kot stroj. (Luhmann 1993, XII.)

Luhmannova koncepcija avtopoietičnosti skuša preseči subjektivistično zastavljeno družbeno teorijo in *sistemsko fiksira* predstavo družbenosti družbe kot samo-vzpostavljajoče se subjektivitete v procesu refleksivne modernizacije. Z zaokrenitvijo od »družbe tveganja« k »sociologiji tveganja« Luhmann v ničemer ne omaje stališča, da so za zatečeno stanje rizične družbe krivi ekonomski, tehnološki, ekološki, populacijski, politični, kulturni in drugi procesi, ki se odvijajo znotraj družbe ali v konfliktu z njo, *ne pa družba sama*. Če sprejmemo, da fleksija modernosti narekuje proceduro refleksivne modernizacije, nastopi problem, kako naj steče in skozi katere kanale naj poteka komunikacija, ki jo Luhmann šteje za sistemski pogoj samoproizvajanja družbe, saj sicer ta očitno izgubi nadzor, kar predstavlja tveganje posebne vrste. Zato je treba kanale komunikacije speljati skozi informacijo, kar komunikacijo sámo napravi za *kanalizacijo informacije*.

Informacijska družba, ki ima moč uniformacije sveta, komunicira na način, ki odpravlja formo *tradicije*, kakor tudi formativa *communitas* in *civitas* (Božič 2023). To neposredno vpliva na institucijo *javnosti* in delovanje t. i. *civilne družbe*, ki se oglaša z najrazličnejši pozivi k večji družbeni odgovornosti, pametnim odločitvam, solidarnosti, spreobrnjenju človeka, a tudi k revolucionarnim spremembam družbenega reda. Vendar vsa etika, politika in družbeni aktivizem različnih porekel in usmeritev v tem pogledu ne morejo ničesar. Prišli smo celo do točke, ko militaristična opcija in strogo nadzorovana organizacija družbene baze, ki jo usmerjajo najvišje politični inštance, preostaja kot edina solucija, ki zbuja upanje, da smo še aktivni. Tako v novejši knjigi Slavoja Žižka *Too Late to Awaken. What Lies Ahead When There is No Future?* lahko preberemo:

> Situacija je podobna po vsej Evropi, od Nemčije do moje Slovenije. Da bi se spopadli z našimi nenehnimi, naraščajočimi krizami, od groženj našemu okolju do odvijajočih se vojn, bomo potrebovali elemente tega, kar v tej knjigi provokativno imenujem »vojni komunizem«: mobilizacije, ki bodo morale kršiti ne le običajna tržna pravila, temveč tudi uveljavljena pravila demokracije (uveljavljanje ukrepov in omejevanje svoboščin brez demokratične odobritve).
>
> Nedavno je izšla zbirka kratkih intervjujev in srečanj Bertolta Brechta (večinoma prezrtih ali pozabljenih) z naslovom *Naše upanje danes je kriza*. Bodimo dovolj pogumni, da v celoti podpremo to spoznanje: namesto da bi samo poskušali pobegniti, preložiti ali zmanjšati grožnjo, ki jo predstavljajo štirje novi jezdeci apokalipse; namesto da bi še naprej živeli v svoji melanholični apatiji in besno ne delali ničesar, se mobilizirajmo in se lotimo korenin naše krize, z vsemi tveganji, ki jih to vključuje. Kajti največje tveganje danes je, da ne storimo ničesar in pustimo, da se zgodovina odvija po svojem toku. (Žižek 2023, 148.)

Žižek, ki se v tem pogledu navezuje na svoje predhodne observacije glede »družbe tveganja« (Žižek 2011), apelira na to, da je nujno treba nekaj storiti, se aktivirati in mobilizirati, tudi v stilu mehkega ali trdega revolucionarnega prevrata, namesto da se lagodno prepuščamo toku zgodovine ter zraven še malo jamramo in bevskamo (nadaljevanje v: Žižek 2025). Pravzaprav ima prav. Vendar: kaj če se ključno nelagodje skriva prav v »*toku zgodovine*«, ki nas nezadržno odnaša in ne prizanaša ničemur? Zlahka ga prepoznamo kot »modernost«, težje pa je domisliti, kaj ga poganja, saj kakor da tu ni ničesar, nobene subjektivne ali substancialne podlage.

Morda pa moramo pomisliti, še preden karkoli storimo ali napravimo, kako prav *ta nič* poganja modo modernosti, ki v lastni ničevosti vseeno in naravnost z brezobrazno *vseenostjo uprizarja totalno mobilizacijo* in terja vedno več nadzora. To, česar tu bistveno ni, je *obzorje sveta*. Namesto sveta so tu nenehno v obtoku njegovi *mobili*, ki so povsem nadomestljivi in sploh uporabni kot nadomestilo za zgodovinski svet. Kolikor bolj se trudimo, da ta obtok razglašamo kot moderen, manj je v svojem potekanju zgodovinski: tem bolj se *družbeni pogon* procesira v *totalno mobilizacijo*, ki ji seveda lahko lepše rečemo »refleksivna modernizacija«. Ta v ničemer ne odpravlja nezadržne *fleksije modernosti*, marveč zgolj pripravlja moč upravljanja z njo, kakor pritiče samoupravljalni družbi (izraz po naključju ali ne sovpada z realsocialiteto, kateri smo se nekoč posmehovali). *Fleksija modernosti se sistemsko reflektira v totalizaciji družbene subjektivitete.*

Če se v zvezi s tem poslužimo Baumanove formulacije *liquid modernity*, »tekoča modernost«, nastopi vprašanje, kako ta vseskozi vzdržuje svojo *likvidnost*, a hkrati zapada v *delinkvenco*, poslužuje pa se tudi *likvidacij*. Tekočo modernost, ki drvi, kakor je pokazal Paul Virilio, s totalno hitrostjo in obenem nikoli ne pride nikamor, Bauman sicer prepozna kot moč, ki opolnomočuje samo sebe, a se pri tem izogiba, da jo opredeli kot moč opolnomočevanja *družbene subjektivitete*:

> Pogosto s precejšnjo tesnobo omenjamo in objokujemo razkroj socialne mreže in razpad učinkovitih dejavnikov kolektivne akcije, ki sta nepredvideni »stranski učinek« nove lahkosti in fluidnosti vse bolj mobilne, zdrsljive, spremenljive, zmuzljive in kratkotrajne moči. Toda socialni razkroj je prav toliko pogoj kolikor rezultat nove tehnike moči, ki kot svoji glavni orodji uporablja neangažiranost in umetnost bežanja. Če naj se moč svobodno pretaka, mora biti svet brez ograj, pregrad, urejenih mej in kontrolnih točk. Vsaka gosta in napeta mreža družbenih vezi – predvsem pa teritorialno ukoreninjena napeta mreža – je ovira, ki jo je treba odstraniti. Globalne sile so odločene, da odpravijo take mreže v prid trajne in vse večje fluidnosti tega glavnega vira njihove moči in zagotovila njihove nepremagljivosti. In prav razpadanje, drobljivost, krhkost, prehodnost, trenutnost človeških vezi in mrež močem omogočajo, da sploh opravljajo svoje delo. (Bauman 2002, 20–21.)

»Tekočo modernost«, ki gazi čez vse meje sveta in vendar ne pride nikamor, je treba pripoznati kot *nihilistično* v tem, da *izničuje obzorje sveta*. Izničevanje sveta mobilizira *subjektivizacijo družbe*, da tvega lastno totalizacijo v funkciji popolne prevlade nad svetom, v katerem funkcionira vse in hkrati nič. Svet je totalno razpoložljiv, hkrati pa se dozdeva slab in neprebavljiv. S tekočim izničevanjem sveta družba *iz niča* prejme moč subjektivitete nad vsem s tveganjem, da pade pod vse in poide *nazaj v nič*. Moč družbene subjektivitete zato ne trpi nestrpnosti nejevolje nad svetom in sploh ne prenese nobene volje, kaj šele smotrnega delovanja. Vse je na tem, da funkcionira in teče naprej, četudi ne pride nikamor ter je brez cilja in smisla, kar pa sploh ni noben problem, pravzaprav je s tem, da se iz vsega dela problem, izginilo vse, kar bi kakorkoli lahko še predstavljalo problem. Preostaja zgolj še brezciljno vrtenje s tveganjem vrtoglavice.

Nihilizem modernega obtoka ali, kar je pravzaprav vseeno, postmodernega stanja,[8] je prvi prepoznal Nietzsche, ki v enem od fragmentov iz leta 1887 zapiše:

> Očitno je, da pobijam ekonomski optimizem: kakor da bi z rastočimi stroški vseh morala nujno rasti tudi korist vseh. Zdi se mi, da je nasprotno res; *stroški vseh se seštevajo v skupno izgubo*: človek se *manjša* – tako da ne vemo več, čemu je sploh služil ves neznanski proces. Čemu? *Nov* čemu? – Človeštvu je ravno *ta* potreben. (Nietzsche 1989, 463; Nietzsche 1991, 490–491.)

Temu sledi nadaljevanje:

> »*Modernost*« pod prispodobo hrane in prebave. (Nietzsche 1989, 464; Nietzsche 1991, 50.)[9]

V obtoku modernosti, ki ga Nietzsche opredeljuje na podlagi primerjave s prehranjevanjem in prebavo, umanjkanje cilja ni nikakršna ovira, pač pa ga naravnost žene naprej. Nietzsche, s tem ko pobija »ekonomski optimizem«, v

8 »Paradoksalna posledica tega je, da je v tem primeru postmoderno treba označiti kot situacijo, v kateri je preživetje, reziduum, preostanek, arhaično, dokončno in brez sledi pometeno. V postmoderni je torej izginila sama preteklost (skupaj z znanim ‚smislom preteklosti' ali zgodovinskostjo in kolektivnim spominom). Kjer so še ostale njene stavbe, jih je mogoče s prenovo in restavriranjem v celoti prenesti v sedanjost kot tiste druge, zelo različne in postmoderne stvari, imenovane simulakri. Zdaj je vse organizirano in načrtovano; narava je bila zmagoslavno izbrisana skupaj s kmeti, malomeščansko trgovino, obrtjo, fevdalno aristokracijo in imperialno birokracijo. Naše stanje je bolj homogeno modernizirano; nismo več obremenjeni z zadrego nesimultanosti in nesinhronosti. Na veliki uri razvoja ali racionalizacije (vsaj s perspektive ‚Zahoda') je vse doseglo isto uro. V tem smislu lahko trdimo, da je za modernizem značilno stanje nepopolne modernizacije ali da je postmodernizem modernejši od samega modernizma.« (Jameson 1991, 309–310.)

9 »Die ‚*Modernität*' unter dem Gleichniß von Ernährung und Verdauung.« Upoštevan je redosled fragmentov v izdaji: Nietzsche 1988, 464.

ničemer ne spodbije opolnomočenja družbene moči v celotni prehranjevalni verigi. Tudi občasne prebavne motnje ji na tem pohodu ne škodijo, vse dokler v celoti vzdržuje permanentni nadzor, in sicer tako, da, kakor nakazuje že Nietzschejeva diagnoza nihilizma, vse *pade pod nivo*. Družbena moč refleksivne modernizacije se poslužuje nivelizacije sveta (Prole 2024) in vsega bivanja na čelu s človekom v funkciji obvladovanja in lastne totalizacije. Ta moč družbene subjektivitete ni Nietzschejeva volja do moči, saj jo Nietzsche dojema kot imanentno svetu samemu, ne pa kot njegovo izničevanje (Barbarić 2024). Nihilizem, ki zaznamuje totalizacijo družbene moči, v svojem izhodišču in izhodu ni uničevalen, marveč *izničevalen*. Poglavitno tveganje »družbe tveganja« je *izničevanje obzorja sveta*. S tem je nikakor nočemo razbremeniti soudeležbe pri različnih pojavih uničevalnega nasilja in grožnji svetovnega uničenja, kvečjemu nasprotno. In seznam je karseda dolg in se iz dneva v dan daljša. Vendar predpogoj teh uničevalnih učinkovanj tvori *izničevanje obzorja sveta*, ki je stalno in neprenehoma pod nadzorom, da lahko poteka v nedogled.

Ali in koliko je Nietzsche sam že zmogel prepoznati *nihilistično mahinacijo v totalizaciji družbene subjektivitete*, tu ni toliko pomembno. Vsekakor so ga z njo bili primorani soočiti tisti, ki so ga s kritičnim prosvetljenskim kladivom ali kakim drugim orodjem obdelovali v svoji delavnicah. Kolikor so se seveda sploh uspeli navezati na njegovo »filozofsko tveganje« – uganko prihodnosti, ki jo obrača kolo večnega vprašanja enakega.[10]

Naj spomnimo na zastavek *biopolitike* pri Michelu Foucaultu (Foucault 2015, Esposito 2015) s prognozo nove oblasti družbe nadzora. Učinke in učinkovitost biopolitičnega upravljanja z življenjem je v kontekstu sprejemanja

10 »Vi drzni okoli mene! Vi iskalci, skušnjavci in kdor od vas je z zvijačnimi jadri odplul na neraziskana morja! Vi ugankarji!
Uganite mi torej uganko, ki sem jo takrat gledal, razložite mi torej prikazen najbolj samotnega!
Bila je namreč prikazen in predvidenje: – *kaj* sem takrat videl v prispodobi! In *kdo* je ta, ki more nekoč še priti?
Kdo je pastir, ki mu je kača tako zlezla v goltanec? *Kdo* je človek, kateremu bo tako najtežje, najbolj črno zlezla v goltanec?« (»O prikazni in uganki«; Nietzsche 1999, 185). Prim. k temu še Heidegger 2003. O hermenevtični karakteristiki uganke glej Wohlleben 2014.

ukrepov za zajezitev pandemije COVID-19 vzel v kritični pretres Giorgio Agamben:

> Z izrazom »biološka varnost« lahko opišemo oblastni aparat, ki ga sestavlja ta nova religija zdravja, združena z državno oblastjo in njenim izjemnim stanjem – aparat, ki je verjetno najučinkovitejši te vrste, kar jih je poznala zahodna zgodovina. Izkušnje so dejansko pokazale, da so ljudje, ko obstaja nevarnost za zdravje, pripravljeni sprejeti omejitve svoje svobode, ki jih prej nikoli ne bi prenesli – niti tekom dveh svetovnih vojn niti v totalitarnih diktaturah. (Agamben 2012, 9.)

Tu ni toliko pomembno, koliko se ali ne strinjamo z Agambenovo kritiko spoprijemanja s tveganji, ki jih je pandemija prinesla s seboj. Seveda je mogoče navajati tudi drugačne argumente (Nancy 2020, Sabeva 2021), predvsem pa se vprašati, kaj se tu ponuja kot alternativa in ali sploh še preostaja kakšna alternativa. Ali pa je treba pripoznati, da je *kooperativa oblasti tehnike in tehnike oblasti* v procesu totalizacije družbene subjektivitete brez alternative.

To kooperativo danes operativno jamči *umetna inteligenca*, ki se je takoj izkazala za skrajno tvegano orodje ali orožje, ki pa se mu že zaradi dobičkonosnosti nihče ne bo odpovedal, kvečjemu se bo poskušalo normativno formulirati pogoje njegove uporabe, skoraj tako, kakor da bi šlo za nekakšno *secret intelligence service*. A do kdaj?

The Doomsday Clock, »ura sodnega dne«, model katere je leta 1947 ustvarila umetnica Martyl Langsdorf in kakršna od tedaj na pobudo znanstvenikov, ki so sodelovali pri izdelavi atomske bombe v okviru *Projekta Manhattan*, simbolično meri, koliko časa še preostane človeštvu do vsesplošnega uničenja, se je v letu 2024 ustavila 90 sekund pred polnočjo. V izjavi *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, ki vzdržuje merilne kapacitete ure, je med drugim zapisano:

> Eden najpomembnejših tehnoloških dosežkov v zadnjem letu je bil velik napredek generativne umetne inteligence. Zaradi očitne izpopolnjenosti klepetalnikov, ki temeljijo na velikih jezikovnih modelih, kot je ChatGPT, so nekateri ugledni strokovnjaki izrazili zaskrbljenost zaradi eksistencialnih tveganj, ki bi jih povzročil nadaljnji hiter napredek na tem področju. Drugi pa menijo, da trditve o eksistencialnem tveganju odvračajo pozornost od resničnih in neposrednih groženj, ki jih umetna

> inteligenca predstavlja danes (glej na primer »Razvijajoče se biološke grožnje« zgoraj). Ne glede na to je umetna inteligenca paradigmatska prelomna tehnologija; nedavna prizadevanja za globalno upravljanje umetne inteligence je treba razširiti.
>
> UI ima velik potencial, da krepi dezinformacije in pokvari informacijsko okolje, od katerega je odvisna demokracija. Dezinformacije, ki jih omogoča umetna inteligenca, bi lahko bile dejavnik, ki bi svetu preprečil učinkovito reševanje jedrskih tveganj, pandemij in podnebnih sprememb. (Doomsday 2024.)

Vprašanje je, koliko *Doomsday Clock* meri čas in kateri čas, še posebej pa, ali meri zgodovinski čas ter na kakšen način prizadevanje, da se vzpodbudi zavedanje o globalnem stanju človeštva, kar sicer lahko pozdravimo, posega v družbeni čas in prostor, in predvsem, ali upošteva, da subjektiviteta družbe razprostira svojo moč čez vse, brez česar se ne bi mogla povseeniti in izkazovati kot prelomna njena UI. Točka preloma, ki preti kot mesto poloma človeštva, je predvidena v samem procesu razvijanja UI; po *teoriji tehnološke singularnosti* naj bi zagotovo, ni sicer gotovo točno kdaj, nastopile razmere, ko bo UI prevladala nad človeškim intelektom in prevzela vse nadzorne funkcije.

To bi lahko razumeli takole: za totalizacijo družbene subjektivitete ne bo nobenega tveganja več, saj bo odpravljeno še zadnje tveganje, ki zadeva položaj človeka v svetu. No, če si dovolimo drobno opazko: ako umetna inteligenca lahko neskončno prehiti naravni človeški intelekt,[11] bi morda kazalo *upočasniti čas*, *dati času čas*, *najti prostor za čas*, *sprostiti čas*, tako kot se je, dolgo časa nazaj, za filozofijo zavoljo čudenja temu, kar je in ima svoj čas, sprostil v *schole*. *Schole* ni nekakšen čas za oddih, marveč *dih časa* samega.

11 »Ključna zmogljivost v 30 letih bo povezava zgornjih delov našega neokorteksa z oblakom, kar bo neposredno razširilo naše razmišljanje. Tako umetna inteligenca ne bo naša konkurenca, temveč bo postala podaljšek nas samih. Ko se bo to zgodilo, bodo nebiološki deli našega uma zagotavljali tisočkrat večjo kognitivno zmogljivost kot biološki deli. Z eksponentnim razvojem bomo do leta 2045 svoj um razširili za več milijonkrat. Prav ta nepojmljiva hitrost in magnituda preobrazbe nam bosta omogočili, da si iz fizike izposodimo metaforo singularnosti, s katero bomo opisali našo prihodnost.« (Kurzweil 2024, 18.)

V tem ne gre prepoznati toliko kakšnega poziva k umiritvi razmer in pomiritvi duhov, marveč prav *mir* sam. »Mir« izvorno pomeni svet in, tako kot *kosmos*, neki red dobrega. Ko pozivamo k miru, pozivamo k boljšemu svetu.

Nemara bi bilo, če se že postavljamo na stran miru, treba upoštevati, da sta vojna in mir danes zamenjali strani, v skladu s čimer bi kazalo naslov znamenitega Tolstojevega dela *Vojna in mir* danes spreobrniti v *Mir in vojna*, saj brezpogojnost vojne določa pogoje miru in manipulacije z njim (Komel 2024a). Podobno bi verjetno morali v naslov Kantovega filozofskega načrta *Večnega miru* vpisati »vojno« namesto »mir«. Vendar nas to ne obvaruje pred nelagodjem, da se je filozofija nemara znašla v položaju, ko nima več kaj dosti pristojnosti, tudi ne intelektualne in humanistične, da bi se vpletala v institucije odločanja o miru in vojni danes. Seveda lahko kdo ugovarja, kako se je filozofija s podobno situacijo izrinjenosti iz družbenega dogajanja soočala že v preteklosti, kar je morda tudi res, vendar nam to ne prihrani današnje diskusije. Ako je seveda že vnaprej ne usmerimo v obračunavanje s sedanjostjo, ki nasploh odlikuje reflekse (odkimavanje in prikimavanje) tekoče filozofske refleksije aktualnosti sveta pod pretvezo bolj ali manj pokončne kritične drže. Za óne bolj ključene pa še kako pride prav, kot nekaka interpretativna proteza, tudi nenasitno obrekovanje in zmerjanje tako nekdanjih kot sedanjih filozofskih avtoritet: a. r. e t. e.

Filozofija danes, skupaj s politiko, znanostjo, tehnologijo, ekonomijo, ekologijo, religijo, kulturo, edukacijo, mediji in vojaško industrijo stopa, tudi če je ne zastopa, na stran vojne, ne miru. Ker je samo še rezervni del družbenega aparata, ki prevzema oblast nad svetom. Vsa zadovoljna, če ji kdo nameni kakšno stransko vlogo, sploh če ji podeli nalogo javnega trobila.

Družba tveganja je obračun s sedanjostjo postavila v okvire preračunavanja prihodnosti, glede katere nihče od velikih protagonistov – predvsem pa ne »znanost o družbi« – noče polagati računa. Ekologija miru ne pomiri ekonomije vojne. Oboroževalna tekma je v polnem razmahu, tako da opazno primanjkuje vojnih stadionov, v sili pridejo prav tudi vaška igrišča, ki se nato razmahnejo v zastrašujoče vojne poligone. Mahajo pa tudi militaristične navijaške skupine. In če kaj od tega morda sproži zgražanje, je odgovor bolj ali manj isti: »Dajte nam že mir!« Pa se beseda spet sprevrne.

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Carl Schmitt and Simone Weil
Philosophy and Naked Force

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Abstract

The paper is conceptualized on the premise that modern discourses on violence can be read within two fundamental paradigms: the paradigm of force (Simone Weil) and the paradigm of domination (Frankfurt School and its followers). While the first half of the 20^{th} century can be viewed as the exemplification of force, after WWII we are instead faced with violence understood as domination. However, it seems that the 21^{st} century begins with a return of force in a new form. The aim of the paper is to read Carl Schmitt's political theology as an illustration and extension of Simone Weil's analysis of force in "*The Iliad*, or the Poem of Force." The essay is devoted to an analysis of Schmitt's fundamental political-legal categories, such as sovereignty, decisionism, and friend–foe opposition as modern translations of force in Weil's conceptualization: as invasions of brute force into the human order.

The paper wishes to be not only an historical-philosophical analysis, but a contribution to the modern project of antifascist education, insofar as the modes of contemporary European authoritarianism (e.g., in Hungary and Poland) more or less overtly refer to the Schmittian legacy. Thus, the contribution aims at an intellectual depotentialization of this legacy and mitigation of the impact of its renaissance.

Keywords: Homer, Adorno, Horkheimer, Weil, Schmitt, force, violence, domination.

Carl Schmitt in Simone Weil. Filozofija in gola sila

Povzetek

Prispevek je zasnovan na domnevi, da moderne obravnave nasilja lahko beremo znotraj dveh temeljnih paradigem, in sicer paradigme sile (Simone Weil) in paradigme dominacije (frankfurtska šola in njeni nasledniki). Medtem ko lahko prvo polovico 20. stoletja vidimo kot ponazoritev sile, se po drugi svetovni vojni soočamo z nasiljem kot dominacijo. Vendar se zdi, da se 21. stoletje začne z vrnitvijo sile v novi obliki. Namen sestavka je interpretacija politične teologije Carla Schmitta kot ilustracije in razširitve analize sile v eseju Simone Weil z naslovom »*Iliada* ali pesnitev o sili«. Članek je posvečen razgrnitvi Schmittovih temeljnih politično-pravnih kategorij, kakršne so suverenost, decizionizem in opozicija prijatelj–sovražnik, kot modernih raztolmačenj sile s konceptualizacijo Weilove: kot vdorov brutalne sile v človeški red.

Članek ne želi biti samo zgodovinsko-filozofska analiza, ampak prispevek k modernemu projektu antifašističnega izobraževanja, kolikor se oblike sodobnega evropskega avtoritarizma (denimo na Madžarskem in Poljskem) bolj ali manj odkrito sklicujejo na Schmittovo dediščino. Slednjo želi besedilo intelektualno depotencirati in oblažiti vplive njene renesanse.

Ključne besede: Homer, Adorno, Horkheimer, Weil, Schmitt, sila, nasilje, dominacija.

Introduction

From a metatheoretical perspective, the following article is a contribution to what Zbigniew Kwieciński called "discreet pedagogy" or "implicit pedagogy" (Jaworska-Witkowska and Kwieciński 2011, 28): it has no straightforward educational or scientific-pedagogical ambitions. It is futile to look into it for immediate connections between theory and practice, let alone projects to be applied "in the classroom." This does not mean that this analysis is not pedagogical—it is such precisely in an implicit manner: its premise is that *thinking* alone about our human condition, *understanding* the human world, and *making sense* of them is essentially pedagogical. This does not necessarily mean that such an approach, so to speak, dissolves education or educational thinking into a kind of philosophy. The above-mentioned words *thinking*, *understanding*, and *making sense* are not used in the widest possible sense as is often the case. Here, behind those terms there is a strong assumption that even the most unapproachable, elusive, or traumatic phenomena can and should be understood or made sense of, or, even better, that ethics *demands* that we make them intelligible (Neiman 2015, 8). This, of course, also means "graspable" in discursive language. I am not naive enough to claim that such a translation is always possible or that it does not distort experience in any way. Rather, I understand it as a postulate: we must at least try to understand and never surrender in the face of what is at first sight seemingly incomprehensible (Arendt 2005).

This means that no philosophical phenomenon we have in our tradition is intrinsically pedagogical, but only those ones are, which are fueled with an urge to understand. Therefore, we can think of philosophy that is explicitly educational (e.g., referring to the care of others), and implicitly non-educational (withdrawing from this postulate of understanding): I dare to say that the great works of Søren Kierkegaard, Emmanuel Levinas, or the "post-turn" Heidegger are of this sort, while Hannah Arendt's thought is the opposite: explicitly rarely educational, implicitly powered with the pedagogical and ethical urge to understand.

According to these premises, this attempt is part of a wider project aimed at rereading a variety of modern discourses on violence by putting them in the context of the two fundamental patterns of critical thinking about the phenomenon at stake: the pattern of force and the pattern of domination.

Both patterns cover two different, perhaps even opposite aspects of violence. Nevertheless, they show some formal affinities, suggesting their complementarity: (1) both more or less overtly refer to the terror of the 20th-century World Wars, and both are predominantly interested in grasping the human condition within the context of current historical development; (2) precisely for the sake of understanding the present, they nevertheless dig very deeply into prehistoric spiritual sources of the West, namely Homer.

The pattern of domination can be easily identified as being launched by the Frankfurt School (mostly Horkheimer and Adorno) and their critique of instrumental reason. After the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and its reading of the *Odyssey* (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002), many authors connected (instrumental) rationality with violence understood as domination (among others, Heidegger's powerful concept of calculative thinking, Bauman's analyses of bureaucracy, or Foucault's interconnections between power and knowledge). These ideas reverberated later in the so-called critical or radical pedagogy focused on emancipation from power relations, cultural reproduction, and domination in education. On the margins of this analysis, I give in to the temptation of saying that critical pedagogy understands violence too widely, often conceiving the asymmetrical relationship between teacher and student as violent *per se*, no matter how this relationship is shaped (e.g., in American radical pedagogy any transmission of culture and knowledge is conservative and violently imposes the past on the new generation).[1] My proposal here is to focus on a different conception of violence, much narrower and more specific. This gesture is dictated by a deep conviction that thinking about education automatically in categories of violence distorts our understanding of both education as well as violence.

1 The newest version of this approach in Poland is Piotr Zamojski's most inspiring book *Edukacja jako rzecz publiczna*, where the author reads education (the transmission of knowledge) through the Aristotelian division of people into masters and slaves, where students are slaves and teachers are masters, and where masters always maintain their superiority (Zamojski 2022, 19). The most legitimate criticism of inequalities in the political sphere is automatically translated into education: while superiority in politics tends to be permanent and is always condescending towards the uneducated, the very essence of education is to abolish inequality.

Now, identifying the pattern of force is a more difficult task, since it is much less prevalent in (post)modern thought. My analysis is based on the premise that it was Simone Weil who not only delivered a profound phenomenological description of violence understood as immediate force in her analysis of *The Iliad* (Weil 1965), but also that this analysis can offset the overwhelming impact of the Frankfurt School. One thing is clear though: Simone Weil did not have the followers that they did. Nevertheless, I assume that she can also be read as a paradigm for modern reflection on violence in more than one way. In this essay, I would like to outline one of them: to read the conceptual frameworks of modern political theories that somehow repeat and support the rules of war violence as described in Weil's essay. An exemplification of the affirmation of force against "reflection, justice, and prudence" (as Weil put it), incorporated in the modern history of thought, can be found in the German political and juridical discourse of the Weimar Republic, inspired by Georges Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, early Walter Benjamin, and, foremostly, Carl Schmitt.

While the first half of the 20th century, haunted by WWI, is a conceptualization of force (Sorel, Schmitt, Benjamin, but also Max Weber to some extent), after WWII, philosophy is instead concerned with various unmaskings of domination. This is also connected with the change of attitudes towards political myths (Cassirer 1946). Nevertheless, Andrzej Leder demonstrated how the 21st century begins with the return of force in new forms: of suppressed contempt, hatred, and naked violence (Leder 2018). Symptomatically, we simultaneously encounter an increased interest in Carl Schmitt who seems to have gained a political impact no weaker than in the 1920s, especially in the new European authoritarianism.

Thus, if my project of deconstructing Schmitt by Simone Weil is feasible, the latter analyses of force turn out to be at least as relevant for the first three decades of the 21st century as those of poststructuralists. Even so, one thing is clear: reading Schmitt as an approximation of Weil's analysis of *The Iliad* is far from being unproblematic. History and developed civilization modified, sublimated, and mediated this pattern so that it cannot be simply copied in modern discourses. But one can read these discourses as reminiscent of the archaic sources, even if this reminiscence is blurred.

Simone Weil: The mythical symmetry of force

Simone Weil's treatise on *The Iliad*, composed on the basis of her school lectures of 1937/38 in 1940 after the capitulation of France, is apparently reminiscent of the hopelessness of WWI, and implies a premonition of the hecatomb to come in the years that followed.

Nevertheless, the essay is clearly very far from purely historical or literary interest. Rather, Weil delivers a phenomenological description of immediate physical violence, i.e. force:

> For those dreamers who considered that force, thanks to progress, would soon be a thing of the past, *The Iliad* could appear as a historical document; for others, whose powers of recognition are more acute and who perceive force, today as yesterday, at the very center of human history, *The Iliad* is the purest and the loveliest of mirrors. (Weil 1965, 5.)

At the same time, this phenomenological description is not an immediate eidetic analysis, but is the outcome of mediated interpretation of symbols, myths, and literary sources. In other words, it is also hermeneutics.

Paul Ricoeur showed how philosophical reflection has nothing to do with immediate consciousness or intuition. Instead of being given, reflection emerges from the task of interpretation of symbols. If symbols refer us to at least a double meaning, then myths can similarly be considered to be symbolic systems that require interpretation. But there is more to it: symbolic structures require not only interpretation (as an explanation of this duality of meanings present in language), they also call for thinking and philosophic reflection whose task it is to re-cover their meaning for our own existence: "I cannot grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the world." (Ricoeur 1970, 46.) This is exactly what Simone Weil (or, differently, the Frankfurt School) does: her account of Homer can be read as a mediator or reminder of this sign of our existence, and strives at "recovering something which has first been lost" (Ricoeur 1970, 45).

What kind of reflection can we see in this "mirror"? What is force? What does force do to us? Weil's hermeneutical phenomenology of force can be grasped succinctly in three entries: (1) reification, (2) symmetry, and (3) blind mechanisms.

(1) Reification: Foremostly, subjection to force or physical violence turns a human being into a thing. In Weil's essay, we can grasp at least three modes of reification:

(a) Literal killing, turning a living body into a corpse.

(b) The petrification of spirit in the brief moment of awaiting certain death, in the "not-yet." The figure of Lycaon begging Achilles for life is a paradigm of a person who "becomes a corpse before anybody or anything touches him" (Weil 1965, 7). Other examples include Priam beseeching Achilles to hand over Hector's body and Achilles treating Priam as an inert object.

(c) The prolonged "not-yet" present in slavery, as an effect of brute force. The paradigmatic figure here is Briseis, a slave concubine of Achilles. She laments and grieves over her master's friend Patroclus instead of her family, slaughtered by Achilles himself. Her own feelings are replaced and she "loses her own inner life" (Weil 1965, 11).[2]

(2) Symmetry: In truth, nobody is spared from suffering, pain, fear, and misery in *The Iliad*. The favors given to one side would mask the symmetry of force, pitilessly shown in the epos. According to Simone Weil, the greatness of *The Iliad* (and contrary to other great books of Western and Jewish civilization), is its neutrality: "One is barely aware that the poet is a Greek." (Weil 1965, 26.) What is decisive is that reification, obviously inflicting the victims, concerns and intoxicates also those who are *by chance* in power.

This random character of force is crucial here, as it makes the symmetry of reification visible on several levels. On the level of events, each crowing hero at a certain moment becomes a victim of force, even Achilles. But symmetry has another dimension: each character using force simultaneously undergoes its reciprocal power, which reifies him even before the change of roles. By reifying others, a hero is also reifying himself: he believes he is the one who uses force, while it is force that overwhelms him: his deeds and reactions become predictable.

2 At this point, it is important to mention Pat Barker's novel *The Silence of the Girls*. The book is told from Briseis's perspective and widens the scope of Simone Weil's arguments (see Barker 2018).

(3) Mythical blindness: The symmetrical character of force eventually creates the illusion that it is given by destiny, that it is beyond human powers and overwhelms humans. The warriors of the Trojan war behave, with no exception, as if they were caught in a blind mechanism. They reject any reasonable voice that mitigates the use of violence and further fighting (Thersites), they prevent the war from finishing, as if they were programmed to proceed towards the final destruction: "What they want, in fact, is everything" (Achaeans: to see Troy in ruins; Trojans: to see the Achaean ships in flames).

All this comes to a fallacious understanding of force by those who exercise and suffer it: force is conceived as an individual attribute only at the beginning, until it reveals its symmetrical and mechanical character. Later, it is understood as natural or divine, but not as human power. At the end of the day, man is only a marionette in the hands of destiny, nature, or gods. "Thus violence obliterates anybody who feels its touch, it comes to seem just as external to its employer as to its victim. And from this springs the idea of a destiny before which executioner and victim stand equally innocent." (Weil 1965, 17.)

All this excludes moderation in the use of force. The symmetrical, blind, and seemingly natural character of reification forfeits any reflection or mediation that would mitigate violence. This makes the boys slaughtering each other in the mud of Flanders in 1917 so similar to mythic Achaean and Trojan warriors. After the first childish embrace of war as a game, there comes a day of fear. They feel condemned, by Zeus, or the hand of necessity, or in a more modern manner, by history. Any reflection or moderation "would expose their mind to suffering so naked, so violent that it could not be borne" (Weil 1965, 20). Their blindness secures them and haunts them at the same time: "the conquering soldier is like a scourge of nature. Possessed by war, he, like the slave, becomes a thing." (Weil 1965, 22.)

It is important to note the role of myth in the symmetrical and blind mechanism of war. Both the initial irrational trust in being chosen by the gods and the later illusion of force, being the overwhelming and impersonal mechanism, are clearly distortions of the human perspective. A good example is the scales of Zeus, by which the god examines the verdicts of Moira—the highest and irrevocable voice of destiny.

Schmitt read through Weil

It is not an accident that the advocates of immediate force connect their interpretation of violence with myth. The first was George Sorel. In his *Reflections on Violence*, Sorel sought a new, radical mythical opening for the revolutionary faction of the 19th-century syndicalism and constructed a radical left-wing myth of the general proletarian strike:

> Appeal must be made to collections of images which, taken together and through intuition alone, before any considered analyses can be made, are capable of evoking the mass of sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of socialism against society. (Sorel 1999, 113.)

Sorel's idea is aimed at the opposite of classical political myths whose purpose was to conserve power relations: it is aimed at total destruction of the given political order. In this way, Sorel set up a pattern for rehabilitation of force in politics. He strongly inspired not only revolutionary Marxist works (like Benjamin's essay on violence), but also many on the opposite side of the political scene.

On the left, it was Walter Benjamin who knew how to develop Sorel's ideas. In his *Critique of Violence* of 1921, he undermines the traditional opposition between violence and law. Law is not a negation of violence, but a monopolization of it. Through law, state power secures the monopoly of enacting violence and makes sure not to leave any possibility of violence outside its scope (Benjamin 1996, 238–40). Violence and law are interconnected in a double way. Violence either makes new law or preserves the existing law, but in both cases, it supports it. The violence of law refers to mythical violence and is its manifestation. There are only two ways of possible escape from this circular interdependence of myth, law, and violence. One of them is the Sorelian anarchistic proletarian general strike, conceived by Benjamin as pure means (Tyson Lewis applied this motive, in order to outline a project of non-instrumental pedagogy; Lewis 2020). Its clearly destructive character severs bonds with existing law and order, and has no external instrumental purpose. "[T]he proletarian general strike sets itself the sole task of destroying state power." (Benjamin 1996, 246.)

The classical examples of the modern discourse on force are the basic political concepts of Carl Schmitt. It is not an accident that in the young Weimar Republic it was the conservative, right-wing jurist who referred to Sorel, and beyond a doubt was also influenced by Benjamin's essay. By no means did he need to support Sorel's proletarian revolutionary approach, in order to use his arguments in his attack on public debate and parliamentary democracy. He entirely supported Sorel's agonistic understanding of myth, which "gives the strength of martyrdom as well as courage to use force" (Schmitt 1992, 68). "Whatever value human life has does not come from reason; it emerges from a state of war between those who are inspired by great mythical images to join the battle." (Schmitt 1992, 71.)

Thus, Sorel's analysis, deprived of its radical leftist content, but maintaining its logic, supported the main features of Schmitt's political philosophy: anti-liberalism and anti-parliamentarianism.

Nevertheless, the most representative categories of Schmitt's political thought cannot be fully understood without Benjamin's influence. As Giorgio Agamben rightly notices, the key concepts of *Political Theology* of 1922 (Schmitt 1985), the concept of decision and the concept of sovereignty, emerge from his effort to lead the Benjaminian anomic violence "back to juridical context" (Agamben 2005, 54).

Schmitt's sovereignty and decisionism can be read as a modern translation of force in Weil's conceptualization. This becomes clear, when we read the famous opening sentence of political theology: "Sovereign is who decides on the exception." (Schmitt 1985, 5.) Situating an individual (a sovereign king) or a group (a sovereign people) beyond the legal order and giving them the right to suspend the law and announce the state of exception means the subordination of the measure of existing public law, its rationality, and democratic political debate under the external, war-like anomic rules, where legal measure, moderation, and reasonable balance of contracts lose their meaning. In this sense, power emerges from the state of nature, and manifests itself in the political order as brute force.

Seen from this point of view, the state of exception, decision, suspension of law, and sovereignty are not miracles, as Schmitt interpreted them according to his political theology, but an invasion of violence, brute force into the human order, being an exemplary application of Weil's analysis. The primary key concepts of the Schmittian political thought only corroborate this tendency: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy." (Schmitt 2007, 26.) Putting politics on the foundation of enmity leads to a truly agonistic and military understanding of public human relations.

As early as the 1960s and long before we realized the bubble-like structure of social media and the role of search algorithms in polarizing societies, Jacques Ellul noticed a phenomenon that lets us understand the easy transition from radically leftist to radically right-wing political myths: the logic of propaganda, autonomous from any particular ideology:

> [T]he more propaganda there is, the more partitioning there is. For propaganda suppresses conversation; the man opposite is no longer an interlocutor but an enemy. And to the extent that he rejects his role, the other becomes the unknown whose words can no longer be understood. Thus, we see before our eyes how the world of closed minds establishes itself, a world in which everybody talks to himself, everybody constantly reviews his own certainty about himself and the wrongs done [to] him by the Others—a world in which nobody listens to anybody else, everybody talks and nobody listens. (Ellul 1973, 213–14).

This makes easy ideological transitions more fathomable. It is the logic that stays the same, not so much the content. That is why it was possible for Schmitt to be more inspired by revolutionary Marxists than conservative thinkers of his time. And that is why the Schmittian-like conceptualizations of the political as *agon* (the battle) are as popular on the right of the political scene as they are attractive on the left; the most prominent example of the latter being Chantal Mouffe *et consortes* (Mouffe 1999).

While I definitely agree with Mouffe that Schmitt is "an important political thinker whose work it would be a great mistake to dismiss merely because of his support for Hitler in 1933" (Mouffe 1999, 1), it is this "merely" that I have doubts about. The post-war writings of the German jurist, although more careful than those of the 1930s, give away the same logic as the earlier works. *Nomos der Erde* (*The* Nomos *of the Earth*) of 1950 is a paradigmatic example here. Although

Schmitt's work is concerned solely with modern international law, the author refers to the Greek word *nomos*, in order to step beyond legality, the existing legal order. In Schmitt's exegesis, *nomos* originally is not a norm and not an opposite to *physis*, but a description of the first colonization and land appropriation. The fundamental sense of law is of spatial connotation and connects order with orientation (*Ortung und Ordnung*). *Nomos* refers to *nemein*, meaning both division of the earth and pasture. "Thus, *nomos* is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people—the initial measure and division of pastureland, i.e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it and following from it." (Schmitt 2006, 70.) Strictly speaking, *nomos*, the essence and source of law, is not law itself, but measure, border, or wall of the city, conditioning legality within it. In fact, the establishment of legal order on the act of asportation or takeover is, whilst against Schmitt's intention, fundamentally imperialistic. As Hannah Arendt argued, the annexation of land as an act of force cannot be a source of justice and law. As in the German formulation we have a double entendre, which completely disappears in the existing English translation, I will quote the German formula: "Dass die Juristen nicht wissen, was Recht ist, gibt Schmitt nicht das Recht, Unrecht mit Recht-Setzung zu identifizieren." (Schmitt and Arendt n.d., 50.; cf. Jurkevics 2016, 11.)[3]

However, what is perhaps even more important in the outlined context of this paper is the deeper background of the agonistic polarization. On the one hand, one can, with Susan Neiman (Neiman 2015, 333), identify Schmitt with pre-Socratic standpoints (virtue is a matter of helping your friends and hurting your enemies, as Trasimach preaches in Plato's *Republic*). On the other, one notices that the apparent imbalance of polarization obscures the genuine nature of agonistic politics: the common denominator of symmetrical force. In fact, both parties of antagonized society, "friends and enemies" or "enemies and friends," fall under the same mythical illusion of the fundamental imbalance of social relations and their own superiority. This, in my view, justifies reading Schmitt's theory as a non-critical and mythical repetition of the symbols of *The Iliad*, ingeniously deciphered by Simone Weil.

3 "That jurists do not know what justice is does not give Schmitt the right to equate injustice and lawmaking." (As trans. in: Jurkevics 2017, 7.)

That is why I find the contemporary resurrection of the Schmittian concepts, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and recently also other, "more Western" countries; the former Polish government constantly referred to sovereignty and enmity in the Schmittian sense), alarming and demanding of philosophical deconstruction in the name of justice and measure, as called for by Simone Weil, despite the academic interest in them, which of course is legitimate.

Weil's pattern of understanding violence as force appreciates reason and rational measure as an antidote to the seemingly unlimited, mythical power of force. This is, I believe, one of the rationales why she sounds more outdated than the various critiques of reason in the second half of the 20th century as launched spectacularly by Horkheimer and Adorno. Still, the fundamental problem with the critique of reason is that it leads to the rejection of reason (Leder 2018, 146). As Leder writes on Kafka: where thought falls apart, it is not nothingness that looms up. Rather, a space for regressive forms of humanity opens up with all its monstrosities (Leder 2018, 163). Tribal politics is one of them. Institutional inequality is another. Both can be "the fundamentals of social structure and legitimize the political order, what Carl Schmitt expressed theoretically" (Leder 2018, 158). Therefore, the present poses a pedagogical-philosophical task in front of us: how to reinforce reason, enlightenment, measure, and the fragile equilibrium of justice and law. And this without falling back onto the narrowly understood rationality of technological instrumentalism, legitimately questioned by the Frankfurters, Heidegger, Foucault, and critical or post-critical educators.

Conclusion

Simone Weil, whose voice reverberated in a much less strong and impactful way than that of the Frankfurt School, convincingly showed that non-instrumental violence (which she calls force) can be more penetrating than domination limited by the means–ends logic. Unlike Adorno, who concentrated on the adroit and manipulative Odysseus, Weil showed non-instrumental, endless, and unlimited force in the Achaeans (after all, they do not want their instrumental goals, that is, Helen and her treasures, they want everything, they desire to see Troy in ruins and ashes). By the same token, the modern paroxysms of violence cannot be fully explained within instrumental rationality. Instrumental reason is not enough, when we think of bloody wars of attrition, like the fronts of WWI or even the concentration camps of WWII. Neither can it explain September 11 and its aftermath in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and, even less, the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

There is a possibility that the discourse on instrumental domination, which dominated our understanding of violence, apart from all its intellectual merits and invaluable insights, or maybe precisely because of them, started to function as a mask of the discourse of non-instrumental, endless, and unlimited force, or, to refer to a different vocabulary, of deeper thanatoid powers that revealed themselves in the 20th and 21st centuries. In this respect, I believe, it would also be a great intellectual and practical challenge for philosophers of education, first and foremost for the author of this essay, to reconsider instrumentalism's paradigm in their struggles with old and new fascisms, and to rehabilitate enlightenment and reason, without falling into the trap of reducing their minds to behavioristic instrumental rationality. This would require a harking back to critical and post-critical pedagogies as well as stepping beyond them, as both, apart from deep differences and oppositions, succinctly conceptualized and expressed in *The Manifesto for Post-Critical Pedagogy* (Hodgson, Vlieghe, and Zamojski 2017), and most recently developed in Morten Korsgaard's ingenious and beautiful book *Retuning Education* (Korsgaard 2024), seem to have a common denominator and common focus in the comprehensive rejection of instrumentality, which sometimes touches upon a rejection of rationality.[4]

4 For example, where the authors of the *Manifesto* try to avoid instrumentalization and contextualization of education by a quasi-Heideggerian gesture of drawing upon the somewhat mystical term "The educational" (Hodgson, Vlieghe, and Zamojski 2017, 84); where Korsgaard too sweepingly criticizes the Enlightenment and the ideal of *Bildung* as being within the logic of progress and violent instrumentalism "through the acquisition of reason" (Korsgaard 2024, 40–48).

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Phenomenology and Action Art

A Special Contribution to Phenomenology from the Czechoslovak Environment

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Abstract

The aim of the contribution is to present one of the distinct examples of the development of phenomenological philosophy in Czechoslovakia against the background of dissident activities of intellectuals and artists in the second half of the 20th century. Although the situation in the Czech and the Slovak environments differs, some common tendencies involving phenomenology in the interpretation of artistic production can be seen; specifically, this concerned action art, performances, and happenings. In the text, I trace two areas of investigation. Firstly, we can find a range of common features between the phenomenological and the artistic practices that emerged in this period, concerning the exploration of the Self as well as issues of historicity. Secondly, the texts of the Czech philosopher and student of Jan Patočka Petr Rezek lead us to a phenomenological interpretation of these artworks. His contributions, dating from 1976 to 1981, can be counted among the very original and still today rare discussions of action art from the phenomenological perspective.

Keywords: Petr Rezek, action art, Czechoslovak environment, phenomenology, exploration of the Self, historization.

Fenomenologija in akcijska umetnost. Poseben prispevek k fenomenologiji iz češkoslovaškega okolja

Povzetek

Namen prispevka je predstavitev enega izmed odlikovanih primerov razvoja fenomenološke filozofije na Češkoslovaškem na ozadju disidentskih dejavnosti intelektualcev in umetnikov v drugi polovici 20. stoletja. Čeprav se situacija znotraj češkega in znotraj slovaškega okolja razlikuje, je mogoče razločiti nekaj skupnih tendenc, ki se tičejo fenomenologije pri interpretaciji umetniške produkcije, zlasti akcijske umetnosti, performansov in happeningov. V besedilu začrtam dve področji preučevanja. Prvič, najdemo lahko vrsto skupnih potez med fenomenološko in umetniškimi praksami, kakršne so se pojavile v tem obdobju in so zadevale raziskovanje Sebstva in probleme zgodovinskosti. Drugič, besedila Petra Rezeka, češkega filozofa in učenca Jana Patočke, nas pripeljejo do fenomenološke interpretacije takšnih umetniških del. Njegove prispevke, napisane med letoma 1976 in 1981, je mogoče prišteti k zelo izvirnim in še doslej redkim obravnavam akcijske umetnosti s fenomenološkega vidika.

Ključne besede: Petr Rezek, akcijska umetnost, češkoslovaško okolje, fenomenologija, raziskovanje Sebstva, historizacija.

"It is the author's wish that these texts evoke in everyone such questions that correspond to their current situation, thus resonance, not resignation."
Petr Rezek: *Tělo, věc a skutečnost*

I. Introduction

The intertwining of phenomenology and art, the phenomenological analysis of artworks, creativity, and expressivity has, since its beginning, undergone intense developments and taken on distinctive forms, as the works by phenomenologists of all generations indicate (Sepp and Embree 2010). In the present text, I want to focus on a specific segment of this discourse, which is the contribution that emerged under the complicated circumstances of the development of phenomenology and free artistic activity in the former Czechoslovakia during the communist regime. Specifically, I will address action art as well as the situation of its emergence that placed both phenomenologists and artists from this period together in the unofficial sphere and in the search for alternative activities. I will thus trace the question: to what extent were these artists' achievements close to phenomenology and how can this art be interpreted phenomenologically?

In the first part of the text, I focus on the shared historical context of phenomenology and artistic creation, and on their intersections in this period within this milieu. The affinity and synergy of phenomenology and art that developed in the Czechoslovak space is represented by distinct achievements. In addition to the comprehensive contributions to phenomenology and art made by Jan Patočka in several volumes of his collected writings and their contemporary interpretations,[1] there are, for example, works focused on the synergy of phenomenology and structuralism, as in the case of Zdeněk Mathauser and Fedor Matejov in the field of literary science, or the work of Marie Bayerová and Tomáš Vlček in the case of the phenomenological interpretation of cubism.[2] In this discourse, a particular position is occupied by original analyses focused on the phenomenological interpretation of the art

1 Cf. works of I. Blecha, M. Šefčík, D. Blahutková, J. Josl, and others.
2 I have dealt with these themes in: Vydrová 2016 and 2024.

of the 1960s and 1970s, such as pop-art, land-art, body-art, and happenings, written by Petr Rezek (1948–2022), one of the most prominent figures of the Czech dissident milieu. The second part of the text focuses on the phenomenological possibilities of interpreting action art as elaborated in the collection of his texts from the years 1976–1981.

The aim of the text is to follow selected examples of artistic work and phenomenological topics and analyses in Czechoslovakia of this period, which offer both historical material as well as their own philosophical treatments. The paper does not aspire neither to provide an "art-theoretical" or "art-historical" analysis of action art nor a comparative analysis of the specificity of the development of phenomenology in the Central and Eastern European context. On the other hand, we can see that there have been individual achievements and intersections whose circumstances of origin, motivations, and forms make an original contribution to the development of phenomenology in this space.[3] These initiatives were linked together not only by a common historical context, but also, as I will try to show, by some fundamental overlaps and starting points.

II. Remarks on the historical background

When the exhibition *Jan Patočka – Philosoph und Staatsfeind* (*Jan Patočka—Philosopher and Public Enemy*)[4] was held at the Czech Centre in Vienna in late 2022 and early 2023, its conception was based primarily on the last period of Patočka's life, connected with "Charter 77" and the tragic events that led to his death on March 13, 1977. In addition to Patočka's texts devoted to the care of

3 Research into the specific development of phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe has been progressing in recent years, gaining new insights and methodological results. They point to the specificity of the phenomena of Central and Eastern European intellectual history, one which should not be seen only in relation to the Western European tradition, but one which to some extent lost the possibility of direct contact with it and free space of development with institutional support due to historical circumstances, at the same time creating distinctive local narratives (Ivančík 2023, 3–4; Kundera 2023, 29 f.). On thematic, methodological, historical, and political backgrounds see: Płotka and Eldridge 2020; Varga 2023, Gubser 2014; Tucker 1996; D. Želinský 2020, and others.

4 Tschechisches Zentrum Wien, 15. 9. 2022–2. 12. 2022. The exhibition was curated by Lenka Kerdová and co-organised by Ludger Hagedorn and Jan Frei.

the soul and the idea of Europe, examples of art from the 1970s, such as works by Václav Havel, Jan Mlčoch, Milan Knížák, Věra Nováková, Jindřich Přibík, and Petr Štembera, were exhibited. The beginning and the end of the exhibition were accompanied by performances of the contemporary artists Tomáš Vtípil and David Helán. Although Patočka was not involved in this kind of art, did not focus on it theoretically, or extensively followed such artistic production at that time,[5] this connection presented at the exhibition did not seem accidental, but, conversely, was significant in several ways.

Philosophy was very close to the artists' work during this time, and so we see similar tendencies here. This period is divided into two stages, the "Golden Sixties" (1961–1968) and the normalization and rebuilding period (1969–1989),[6] and was marked at first by a burst of creativity, but then by its limitation, causing a gradual or sudden transfer of actors from the official to the grey or unofficial sphere. Here, people from different fields, ideological platforms, and genres came together, and different kinds of contrasts and synergies emerged, creating a strange plurality that was intrinsically productive. There were environmentalists, writers, poets, philosophers, and painters who were linked by where they found themselves. These forms of thought and creation were in sharp contrast to official production, which was subject to institutional censorship, prescribed writing (in the case of philosophy) and production (in the case of art), according to the expected uniform criteria of both ideas and forms, which thus required a self-censorship of the author. In contrast, there

5 A reference to this topic can be found in Josl's article (2024, 58, 65) who mentions Patočka's reflection on the exhibition of American painters against the background of Josl's phenomenological analysis of pop-art. He refers also to a reading of P. Rezek, whom I will follow in the second part of my text. Pop-art as well as action art points to specific or exemplary appearance of the things, showing and addressing everydayness, not only as its critique, but revealing structurally much more (Rezek 2010, 20).

6 The used periodization divides the period 1945–1989 into the following phases: the three final years of the democratic Czechoslovak Republic (1945–1948), the building of the bases of the communist regime (1948–1953), the softening and the new firming up (1953–1960), and the two phases mentioned above in the text. Cf. Passia, Barborík, *et al.* 2023, 113. Conceptually, there is a distinction between alternative creation for works before 1972 and unofficial creation, when after this year artists could no longer create freely, but found themselves in the forbidden zone (cf. Bartošová 2011, 321–322).

were examples of diversity and creativity in the unofficial sphere with the so-called "suitcase" exhibitions and happenings as well as *samizdat* writings. As an example among many initiatives, we can mention the magazine *Kontakt*, whose summer supplement *Contact to Water* in 1981 published Erazim Kohák's text "On Life in Truth," Robert David's experimental poetry, and an anonymous excerpt from the prose of the later well-known Slovak writer Pavel Vilikovsky's *Forever is Green*. Issue 4 published Patočka's text "The Spiritual Man and the Intellectual."[7]

It must also be mentioned that the situation in the Slovak and the Czech environments was different. While in the Czech environment there were distinct philosophical initiatives—Jan Patočka was a student of Edmund Husserl and developed his own phenomenological philosophy, which may have been followed by other scholars—, in the Slovak environment art theory, artistic production, and later ecological themes prevailed, and some initiatives were also based on religion. Phenomenology in the 1970s and 1980s in our countries developed either in the unofficial sphere, in seminars in the flats of philosophers, in texts that were kept hidden, or in other areas, which were not, so to speak, exposed to the public eye. For example, it penetrated literary science and appeared in implicit forms in the works of artists (painters, sculptors, writers). There also existed a mobility between the Czech and the Slovak environments, which contributed not only to the exchange of ideas, but also to the formation of the local environments themselves.[8] However, the exchange of ideas was often done through personal contacts rather than

7 Cf. Pastierová 2022, 35–36, 42.

8 For our topic it is interesting, for example, that the sculptor Marie Bartuszová, who lived in eastern Slovakia, repeatedly visited Prague and, among other things, attended Petr Rezek's lectures on phenomenological aesthetics. Her works can be interpreted phenomenologically, because they share with phenomenology explorations of bodily experiencing, especially connected to touch or breathing. Heidegger was read at flat seminars of forbidden Slovak intellectuals and artists (Kralovič 2017, 53). In the Slovak context, it is also relevant to mention O. Čepan and I. Mojžišová, who deepened the possibilities of the phenomenology of perception and corporeality in the analysis of artworks; there were attempts to bridge phenomenology and structuralism; phenomenology appears within literary studies in the works of Z. Mathauser, F. Matejov, P. Zajac, and others supported by mutual exchanges between Czech and Slovak milieu.

by any theoretically elaborated affinities. Thus, we can find here specific marginal or local phenomena, distinct philosophical practices and positions of intellectuals.[9] Among these initiatives action art had a special position.

III. Possibilities of rapprochement

Action art[10] is oriented to the process, its flow, the physical act. It is directed towards pure action, its distinction, release, and performance. It breaks out of the expected, presupposed forms of art and thinking, it thus is not restricted to anything, and creates its own field of expressivity, brings its own examination of the action. However, it has to be connected with some specific performance of action, in order to distinguish this action as art. The affective situation, in which the actors find themselves, participates in this action. Here, we could speak of the presence of contents and forms (of a very diverse nature) that, in interplay with the living presence of the actor, transform affective relief and result in action.[11]

Some rapprochements between phenomenology and this kind of art at their core can be preliminarily observed, which means the living presence of subjectivity as a starting point, to see/make an action itself, artwork in its original being. Similarly, the artist encourages an original and new contact with the artwork by making the action. Both for phenomenology as well as action art during the communist regime there was a kind of commitment to action itself as expression of free thought and agency. This is apparent in Rezek's approach, too, who does not draw on chosen phenomenological aesthetic texts to interpret this art, but is concerned, in accordance with the

9 Cf. Želinský 2020.

10 The art of action and performance was initiated by A. Kaprow's work. This is often connected with related art forms—such as body-art, land-art, conceptual art, etc.—, photography, music, plays, and takes on very different forms. It was developed especially around the 1960s, but had built on earlier performance initiatives as well.

11 By the examination of the action we can refer to the insight into the course of the act, the concrescence, the motivational circumstances as analyzed by Husserl, for example, in his texts on active and passive syntheses: "the affective relief can arch out more prominently or become more flattened depending upon the alterations of the living present"; "within every present there are relative differences of vivacity, differences of more or less affectively efficacious data" (Husserl 2001, 216, 217, etc.).

phenomenological attitude, with the experience and action itself, with what is really at stake in making them happen. However, this is still an overall statement that needs to be examined in greater detail.

Let us look again at some motives in the background, from which this affinity might grow in a specific way here. Marginalization, to which they were subject, affected the form of production and influenced distinctive ways of thematization. We can find here two areas of rapprochement: these are reflection on the creative Self and its relation to historical situatedness. The first of these was a question of subjectivity and problematization of authorship addressed on a scale, reaching from erasure, anonymization, writing "for the drawer" (i.e., to be hidden), and the ephemerality of creation to autobiography and self-thematization, to an archaeology of the Self. The first-person perspective was present here as in-depth studies of subjectivity and its experience were manifested in all its breadth and complexity, for example, in "the unconscious and conscious processes of perceiving, imagining, dreaming, hallucinating, reflecting and acting in […] shifts and transformations, but also in the radical fractures of life, in all its contradictions, heterogeneity, disparity, discontinuity […]" (Zajac 2020, 196).[12] On this basis, e.g., the literary scientist Peter Zajac developed his thinking about a distinctive poetics of creation, which culminated in his book *From Aesthetics to the Poetics of Trembling*. The distinct topic represents issues of perception, body, movement, gestures, and their observations in achievements. Implicitly as well as intentionally, there is a space for phenomenological analyses, as artists often invited theorists to interpret their actions. This has given rise to various typologies and distinctions, such as total action, open action, action with a shift in meaning, action and pseudo-action, individual and collective action, etc.[13]

In the second case, it was a specific self-historicization (here, we can refer to the Slovenian curator and art historian Zdenka Badovinac, who dealt specifically with the relationship between historicity, preservation, and the self-thematization of the artist in marginalized spaces).[14] A distinct materiality

12 Cf. Grúň 2011, 79.
13 Cf. Rusinová 2001, 10 f.
14 Cf. Grúň 2011, 69.

emerges as expressivity and performativity are accompanied by an awareness of one's own historicization: the tension between big and small histories (Milan Šimečka), reflexions of meaning in history, and the symptomatic emergence of the themes of the philosophy of history (Elena Várossová, Jan Patočka).[15] These tendencies appeared in various forms much earlier, as well. It can be said that work with subjective temporality and historicity is intrinsically linked to avant-garde and neo-avant-garde initiatives, which appear here not only as historical examples, but have a wider significance for the actualization of/in creation as the re-framing of programmatic goals, the need for constant renewal in creation, deconstruction, and construction.[16]

How can we interpret these findings in connection with phenomenology further? From the above-mentioned perspective, the exhibition on Patočka can be seen through the lens of this intrinsic interplay of divergent milieus, linked by performativity and the interconnectedness of phenomenology and art, which shared interest in the creative possibilities of the Self, its analyses, and experience. That also became a subject of interest from a phenomenological point of view in Petr Rezek's studies, as we will see in the next part of this paper. The theoretical background for his contribution and overview in art is wide—from psychology and philosophy to art. He also dealt with various artworks, genres, and initiatives in art of the 1960s and 1970s: land-art, body-art, happenings, pop-art, photography, document, kitsch, and especially

15 One concrete example is the text "The Machine of Time," where the writer and translator Marta Frišová-Šimečková returns to Asimov's "The Last Trump" and problematizes the passage of time in relation to thought, happiness, and pain: "We are powerless against the passage of time and perhaps that is why it is the most real reality for us." (1988, 41.)

16 We can point to artistic as well as theoretical connections. On the one hand, the exhibition in Bratislava City Gallery in 2024–2025 entitled "Haptic Echo. Nature, Body, Politics and Art in Former Yugoslavia" presented a shared transregional phenomenon: "Parallels and mutual exchanges are presented in thematic cross-sections beginning with localities, enabling us to confront specific elements: for example, Belgrade /SRB/, Bratislava /SK/, Brno /CZ/, Liptovský Mikuláš /SK/, Košice /SK/, Kranj /SI/, Lyublyana /SI/, Novi Sad /SRB/, Olomouc /CZ/, Prague /CZ/, Subotica /SRB/, Šempas /SI/, Zagreb /HR/, among others." (Grúň 2024, 12). On the other hand, a deep theoretical analysis of modernity and the avant-garde in philosophy and science, anchored in the first half of the 20th century in Czechoslovakia, is elaborated, e.g., in: Bakoš 2006.

sculpture.[17] He was led by different motivations, but concentrated on the artwork itself and wanted to learn to see what is at everybody's disposal.[18] Thus, the essential question arises: What do these kinds of art, of artistic performance, really convey?

IV. Phenomenological interpretation by Petr Rezek

In the texts of Petr Rezek, we find thematically and methodologically insightful and innovative contributions to this topic. He had already started writing about action art in 1976, although it can be said that phenomenological texts on this subject have still not been extensively elaborated within the phenomenological discourse.

Rezek draws on short reports regarding performances, conversations with the actors, or his own participation in happenings, to which he was invited. The first thing that can be observed is that the performances make a strange, disturbing impression when one is present at them; when one reads the accounts of the performances, too—they are only a strict record of the event, verbally modest and contain nothing more; the action only happens, but its "why" is not justified or it simply does not arise from the context of everyday life.[19] They thus act as a strange redirection of expectations in the flow of ordinary experience. It should be pointed out that what is at stake here is not a definition of this art as such, but the interpretation or, better, the manifestation that the events themselves call for, thus their primary description—the first phenomenological step can be captured here. Unlike the art theorist, who starts from the fact of the work, which he or she analyses and defines, the phenomenologist, according to Rezek, should uncover or open up and not presuppose, not bring anything to the analysis, but start from the experience

17 Among other contributions, in his book *On the Theory of Plasticity*, Rezek discusses Patočka's text about Read's book on sculpture and develops a deep analysis of touch, material, and an echo of the world presented in the work of artist: "The becoming of the statue is an image of the becoming of the world." (Rezek 2011, 64.) This text was written in 1992 and published in: Rezek 2011, 55–64.

18 In the motto to his book, he refers to Gadamer.

19 Rezek confesses: "It took me two whole years to understand this strange kind of narration." (2010, 119; cf. 124.)

of the work, which is both irreducible and unique. This primary analysis may repeat itself, but it can look different each time. However, unlike Walter Biemel, with whom Rezek otherwise shares the distinction between primary and secondary descriptions of the work of art (2010, 14), in pop-art, for example, Rezek does not base his analysis of the natural world on the critique of it ("averageness," repetition, stereotyping), but rather on experiencing—specifically, the experience of fascination with the natural world as a special opening up of presence, of the thing announcing itself in its various kinds of presenting and showing. Thus, instead of criticism (of consumerism, for example), this kind of art lets the thing appear in its "how." In Oldenburg, it is the monstrosity as the presence of the object. "We are fascinated by the strange presence of things." In Lichtenstein, for example, Rezek sees the revealing of the essence of the whole, aptly described as *the uncovering concealment and the concealing uncovering*, as selected and enlarged parts of the comic shows (2010, 23). Rezek also writes:

> We find that the fascination that dominates in pop-art demands that the natural world should be conceived in a deeper way than as a mere set of references [...] From the insight of the anchoring of the human natural world in something even deeper, then, follows the turn in art to the elements (e.g., in land-art), to that which gives all things. (2010, 32.)

Action art and performances were distinctly developed genres in the Czechoslovak environment. Let us mention a few examples from the Slovak environment to complement examples of artists mentioned by Patočka's exhibition in Vienna,[20] such as the events *Bratislava Championship in the Shifting of the Artefact* (1979–1986), that focused on the reinterpretation of the artefact by actively entering into the experience of communication with prominent artists. In the words of Vladimír Kordoš, the initiator of these events, the idea was to pay respect, but at the same time not to take oneself too seriously; great art does not have to be a closed affair, but can find itself in a living communication between artist and artist. Other distinct performances included the *The School of Athens* (which took place in 1981 in the lobby

20 For Czech action art cf. Morganová 2014a and 2014b.

of the art school in Bratislava, and in which Kordoš's colleagues and pupils arranged in such a way so as to correspond to figures in Raphael's fresco; he let them identify with the School of Athens, saying nothing more and leaving the "piece" to spontaneously disintegrate) and *Hommage a Messerschmidt* (1989; three interpretations assisted by a hairdresser, ammonia, mimics, and sneezing powder). Playful elements of this works help to manifest experience in its evolution—manifestation of the exposed gestures in their ambivalence, the joy of creating a scene, the re-creation of the situation of the artwork.[21] Phenomenological description can thus take place repeatedly in contact with a work of art; the experience is unique in its course.

However, participation in artwork, presented experiencing is not simple here. In a 1979 text "Naked Presence (Prolegomena to Performance)," Rezek (2010, 145–154) points out that what is at stake is a specific presence, the bare presence of the situation, which, in the case of performance, shows itself, but apart from that nothing else, and does not allow the other to enter into its flow, to actively participate in the situation. The bare presence of a body, a gesture, an action, a movement, or a thing point to the rupture of ordinary life mediated by art through showing that it is a thing and nothing else, a thing in its appearance, and only in its appearance. The performer or artist is the performer of this rupture, which, according to Rezek, bisects reality into the ordinary and the exceptional. Here, as in his other texts, Rezek also draws attention to the riskiness of this art, which may become merely an ordinary movement, without becoming or achieving art. According to him: "The presence we call bare/naked cannot be found simply and at once." (2010, 151.)

Performance brings a very strong experience, such as that of precariousness, of the intensity of a presence that usually passes us by—but performativity can return us to the present as a non-trivial expressive experience of the moment, of the Self, of the event. The intervention in time that it causes makes it a historical event. In this way, it presents historicity, the passing, the being in time—both the experience of temporality of the subject as well as of historicity

21 We can point to some other significant pieces: Caravaggio/Kordoš: *Boy Bitten by a Lizard and Boy with a Basket of Fruit*, as well as Rembrandt/Kordoš: *Return of the Prodigal Son.*

itself. Rezek points out that here, performance acts in the same way as a mask or a festivity, where the mask conveys an intense gaze without the possibility of reciprocation, or is a mediator of another world in its otherness, which we cannot grasp in our imagination; at the same time, though, we are, in a special way, "there" in the performance. Festivity points to the possibility of its re-living—it is present only in it (Rezek 2010, 124). This statement has perhaps a more universal validity, concerning art as realization, action as creativity.

We can mention one more example referred to in Rezek's text: he (2010, 117 ff.) interprets the performance through Medard Boss's interpretation of dreams[22]—this idea was initiated by the artists Jan Mlčoch and Petr Štembera, who asked Rezek for help to understand and to interpret a dream, which was in fact a real-life action called *Hanging—The Big Sleep*.[23] The use of Medard Boss turns out to be appropriate here, because Boss rejects symbolic interpretations. In Rezek's words:

> One thing does not represent another, but from *what* and *how* it appears it is possible to see what the dreamer is open to, what possibilities his world is constituted by. […] First, then, it is necessary to know what makes the thing that the dreamer encounters… that thing… to find substantive essential references. (2010, 119.)

In the case of this action, Rezek interprets the essential characteristics of the loft, in which the artist's performance took place as follows: the loft is the place that the house encloses, covers, and at the same time connects it to the sky—connects the inside and the outside; the loft is not inhabited, but rather is a shelter for play, a hiding place for lovers, for those who want to find a retreat. By being in the action of hanging in the air, without contact with the floor, it is a kind of being out of place, a particular here that is actually nowhere and represents the opening up of the world as a whole. The performance ends with the announcement of pain in the hands and thus returns to bodily situatedness.

22 Petr Rezek is also an author of distinct works in the field of phenomenological psychology. Besides his *Phenomenological Psychology* (texts from 1971–1977 published in one volume in 2008), his translation of Erwin Straus's *Psychiatry and Philosophy* from 1973 (2023) has also been published.
23 Cf. Morganová 2014a, 129–131.

Here, Rezek's interpretation stops, because to continue, as he states, would already be an intervention into intimate realms. Rezek learned that it was a real action only after his interpretation. The brief record of the performer, which makes understanding difficult, sometimes even impossible, was thus complemented by a phenomenological explanation.

Rezek's interpretations are often critical, pointing out that art does not have to take place, that averageness remains averageness, or that the specificity of the situation does not reveal any essential phenomena. However, considering these examples, we could say that action art here has relevance for phenomenology: as the material for phenomenological interpretation and as a certain fundamental insight into the reality and the course of experience. As with the phenomenological procedure of uncovering layers of experience, action art opens up reality in its unfolding by shifting from the factual, by suspending everyday occurrences, and at the same time opening up that reality in its structure and in its presence for the experiencing. And it is an experience of a special kind, a modified, significantly purified one, open to things in their bare appearance. In other words, in a phenomenological way, it means to be without supplements, derivations, and secondary meanings, but in the manner, for example, of pure movement. Although this is an experience of the impossibility of participating in a work or action, which is either too strong and forceful or too minimal in terms of agency, of an intense presence/absence, it does not go against the principles of phenomenology. On the contrary, it points precisely to the unfolding of the action, on the one hand, and to a position similar to Husserl's uninterested observer, to shifting the natural and phenomenological attitudes, on the other. Action art redirects the focus of time and space, and thus turns out to be an effort to return to things, to the events themselves, similar to the way that a phenomenologist always looks anew into the structure of experience, reflecting on the stream of consciousness and intentional curvature. What happens in actions, then, does not represent or mediate some other, secondary meanings or notions, but simply shows.

V. Conclusion

For Husserl, as he states in *Ideas I*, the realms of fantasy, variations of imagination provide a fertile ground for phenomenology, which is sufficiently free from transcendent obscurities and layers of meaning, dealing with various states of reality and reference. There are several possible starting points through analysis of the intertwining of phenomenology and art.[24] That which is close to Rezek, is present also in H. R. Sepp and his analyses of what is going on in cubist paintings, which likewise deconstruct representations and "modify" how we think about objects and appearances. As he states, both the phenomenologist and the artist face the same problem: "How do things (in their being-perceived) appear in the medium of an image?" (Sepp 1995, 303.) In this context, Rezek can follow up with action art, because it offers "the shift from the imaginative reality of the classical image to the real reality" (2010, 70).

However, action art is very complex, manifold, and risky, and places great demands not only on its author, but also as on its audience, requiring them to free themselves from expectations, which are, however, often influenced by presuppositions. To be prepared to perceive such art means to change one's attitude. It also places great demands on the artist who may be able to create an artwork, but may also not be so successful and may produce only an ordinary action or replace pure action with other meanings and representations, even achieve simply nothing. According to Rezek, for example, pop-art was not successful in the Czech milieu.[25] But it turns out that both action art as well as phenomenology, which emerged historically together and appeared in the same milieu, also share thematically and programmatically to some extent the same questions. Both initiatives were intended to be an active return to things, the Self, to movements, and to events.

24 Cf. Embree 2010.
25 Cf. the particular part of his text "Excursion about Pub, or Pop-Art in Bohemia" (2010, 30 f.).

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The Moment of Surprise and Dialogical Play

A Hermeneutical Inquiry into the Interhuman

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Abstract

The contribution investigates the relationship between dialogue, time, and surprise. My proposal is that, in the case of dialogical face-to-face encounters, one ought to speak about a creative temporality. Such creative temporality is achieved by virtue of the moment of surprise, as it was thematized in the works of Martin Buber and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Although the two authors did not concern themselves necessarily with the issue of the temporality of dialogue, Henri Bergson's scattered remarks on time and creativity might provide sufficient ground to delve into the question of the temporality of dialogue. In the present paper, I start with Claude Romano's contemporary framework of "evential hermeneutics," in which the author tackles the relation between temporality and surprise. The main aim of this article is to prove how dialogue, thanks to its playful character (Gadamer), renders possible the moment of surprise, and thereby, enables a deeper understanding to occur between I and Thou (Buber).

Keywords: dialogue, temporality, hermeneutics, surprise, play.

Trenutek presenečenja in dialoška igra. Hermenevtična raziskava o medčloveškem

Povzetek

Prispevek obravnava razmere med dialogom, časom in presenečenjem. Pokazati želim, da je v primeru medosebnega dialoškega srečanja potrebno govoriti o ustvarjalni časovnosti. Takšno ustvarjalno časovnost je mogoče doseči s posredništvom trenutka presenečenja, kakor sta ga v svojih delih tematizirala Martin Buber in Hans-Georg Gadamer. Čeprav se avtorja nista posebej ukvarjala s problemom časovnosti dialoga, nam razpršene opazke Henrija Bergsona o času in ustvarjalnosti lahko priskrbijo zadostno oporo za razmislek o vprašanju časovnosti dialoga. V pričujočem besedilu pričnem s sodobnim okvirjem »dogodkovne hermenevtike«, znotraj katere se Claude Romano spoprime z odnosom med časovnostjo in presenečenjem. Poglavitni cilj članka je pokazati, kako dialog zaradi svojega igrivega značaja (Gadamer) omogoča trenutek presenečenja in s tem poglablja razumevanje med Jazom in Tijem (Buber).

Ključne besede: dialog, časovnost, hermenevtika, presenečenje, igra.

Introduction

Although recent philosophical literature concerning the phenomenological and hermeneutical thematizations of surprise is very rich in content and can be applied to contemporary topics in the humanities (Maldiney 1991; Dastur 2000; Nancy 2000; Romano 2009; Romano 2014; Depraz and Steinbock 2018; Depraz and Celle 2019), the issue of the moment of surprise in the case of dialogical face-to-face encounters seems to be left untouched. Therefore, this paper gathers resources from both the philosophy of dialogue (Buber) and from hermeneutics (Gadamer), in order to prove how the moment of surprise functions in the case of the encounter between I and Thou. Buber's remarks on the issue of temporality seem to be rather scattered,[1] while Gadamer focuses more on the notion of dialogical play, leaving aside a possible reflection onto its temporal features.[2] Henri Bergson is the philosopher who paradoxically came closest to the thematization of the temporality of surprise, when he discussed time and creativity, employing the notion of absolute newness, i.e., the unforeseeable novelty. Thus, one main activity of this paper will consist in interpreting surprise under the heading of unforeseeable novelty via the contemporary thematizations of the notion of *kairos*, i.e., the opportune moment. The contemporary French phenomenological author Claude Romano also discusses the connection between temporality and surprise in an original attempt to define the temporality of that which he calls "event." Romano will be my starting point, because he is one of the phenomenological authors who explicitly connect the issue of temporality with surprise, while also alluding to Bergson's absolute newness.

The present paper is divided into several sections, each investigating the theory of one of the abovementioned authors. Therefore, the first chapter sets up the framework of the discussion by analyzing the relation between time

1 Nonetheless, Buber's remarks about the relation between the presence of the other and the present moment seem to point towards our direction of inquiry (cf. Buber 2013, 9–10).

2 Gadamer's theory of dialogue is, however, built on the idea of a historically embedded consciousness (cf. Gadamer 2013, 311).

and surprise in the case of "evential hermeneutics."[3] From there onwards, I present the perspectives of both Buber and Gadamer concerning the notion of dialogue. If the former was in his later work interested in "the ontological presupposition" of dialogue, namely in the moment of surprise, for the latter surprise arises in the case of the dialogical play between I and Thou as a sort of buoyancy and excess of meaning. Buber also spoke about musical or even floating relationships in the case of the psychotherapeutic encounter (cf. Agassi 1999, 236–237). By comparing the accounts of Buber and Gadamer, I aim to show their similarities and their differences, which leads me to Bergson's analysis of time and creativity from his lectures, in which he discussed the issues of change, possibility, and reality. Finally, after investigating the core concepts of the four abovementioned authors, I attempt to draw an original conclusion regarding the relation between dialogue, time, and surprise. Thus, we find out that surprise is a manifestation of what has in the philosophical tradition been called *kairos*, i.e., the opportune and decisive moment of choice and change.

Romano on the relation between event and surprise

Before providing an analysis of the dialogical theories, which concern the issue of surprise, we ought to tackle the concept of surprise in the hermeneutical and phenomenological framework, in order to establish a certain ground, upon which we can build our argumentation. Thus, starting with Claude Romano's thematization of surprise, as it can be found in *Event and Time*, it can be circumscribed how evential hermeneutics can be the starting point of an analysis concerning the relation between time and creativity.[4] Although Natalie Depraz provided an account of the temporality of surprise throughout her work (Depraz and Steinbock 2018; Depraz and Celle 2019), in my analysis I investigate the hermeneutical function of surprise, as it is described by

3 Evential hermeneutics is the framework, within which Romano's thinking unfolds. It represents the specific type of hermeneutics, where understanding is achieved by appropriating the events that occur to us (Romano 2009).
4 For Romano, the event is inextricably linked with time, especially the future vista, but also with surprise in the guise of unforeseeable novelty (Romano 2014).

Romano, because I consider that it is pivotal for interhuman understanding,[5] as can be described by referring to the works of Buber and Gadamer. We soon notice that surprise is not only a temporal phenomenon *par excellence*, but it also plays a very important function in the economy of the event of encounter.

From the very beginning of the chapter concerning the phenomena of expectation and surprise, Romano holds firmly that the two should be treated in relation to the future vista,[6] as he calls it. Hence, we are informed that the vista of the future, within which an event happens, can give rise to the feeling of surprise (cf. Romano 2014, 172).

Romano identifies two meanings of the word surprise. First, it denotes an unmet expectation, and here surprise can be related to the notion of astonishment. The surprising manifests itself as the unexpected, and its temporality pertains to the notion of the sudden.[7] Surprise thus contradicts expectation. From a phenomenological standpoint, this contradiction to what is usually expected refers to the impossibility of fulfilling the intentional horizon, which pertains to protention. The real exceeds any forecast, because it appears to us, the adventants,[8] as a sort of shock. Akin to the thematization of Depraz (cf.: Depraz and Steinbock 2018, 27; Depraz and Celle 2019, 48), for Romano, surprise affects our body, so the surprise can also be related to the phenomenon of embodiment (cf. Romano 2014, 172). One can suppose that, for Martin Buber, the moment of surprise affects our entire being before the split between the body and mind phenomena, i.e., what he calls the unconscious.[9] We must always bear in mind that Buber confessed to his

5 Romano's whole purpose of evential hermeneutics is to determine and demonstrate the way, in which understanding happens, insofar as the advenant appropriates the events that befall him and responds to them (Romano 2009).
6 Contrary to Heidegger, Romano does not speak about temporal ecstases, but rather about vistas.
7 For Maldiney, on whom Romano draws, the sudden represents the very occurring of the event, and can thus give rise to a certain transformation of our being in the world, even to a metamorphosis (Maldiney 1991).
8 The advenant is the title that Romano ascribes to the human being, insofar as the human being is open to events and change (cf. Romano 2014, 57).
9 The unconscious is for Martin Buber exactly the moment, in which time and the body phenomena do not evolve separately, but conjointly (cf. Agassi 1999, 227). Buber thus came close to the notion of embodied subjectivity in an original attempt to

student, Maurice Friedman (cf. Friedman 2013, 108), that at the time when he was thinking about this notion, he did not have the adequate vocabulary to describe it, thus he proposed the notion of the unconscious in an attempt to "destroy" the metaphysical tradition of this concept, i.e., in an effort similar to that of Heidegger from *Being and Time* (cf. Heidegger 1996, 17).

Returning for the moment to Romano, the astonishing is thereby shocking, because it represents the *pathos* of the contradiction between what is expected and the actual. Hence, surprise is associated with novelty in a meaning close to Bergson's thematization (cf. Romano 2014, 172). Therefore, we can already suppose that surprise designates the possibility of a creative dialogical exchange between I and Thou.

But Romano asks further whether surprise can be reduced merely to a contradicted expectation or not? He also asks whether the newness of the astonishing only closes the possibilities of imagination or not? His answer is that surprise is the phenomenon, which surpasses the resources of imagination. He thus somehow comes close to the Kantian thematization of the sublime.[10] Henceforth, the second meaning of surprise refers to the wonder at the circumstance that things are, which comes close to the thematizations of Plato and Aristotle. Wonder becomes a sort of astonishment that does not cease, even when novelty fades away. Moreover, surprise is linked to the famous "there is," of which Levinas speaks on several occasions.[11] An event elicits surprise, because in the first moment, when the advenant finds himself surprised, there is a certain suspension of every "grip"[12] by way of the sudden occurring of the event (cf. Romano 2014, 173). This suddenness is also present in Henri Maldiney's theory of the event, on which Romano himself draws.

Surprise designates a temporary suspension of every com-prehension[13] in a sense close to Maldiney's terms. This means that surprise puts us in front

overcome the body–soul dualism.

10 For Kant, the sublime consists of a sort of shock of our imagination, in the case of which its limits stretch endlessly, because, for him, the sublime is the absolutely great, i.e., that in comparison to which everything seems small (cf. Kant 2007, 78).

11 See, for example: Levinas 1978; Levinas 1987.

12 In the French language: *sur-prise*.

13 Also in the French language, but also according to Maldiney, *com-prehension* (cf. Maldiney 2012, 61).

of the radical incomprehensibleness of the event. Surprise functions in every experience that concerns feelings, because it attunes us with the world. Surprise thus becomes the root for virtually every feeling. This is why the surprise is the very opposite of despair,[14] a state, in which the advenant finds himself devoid of virtually any possibility. The key term that Romano borrows from Bergson, in order to describe this form of event, is the unforeseeable (cf. Romano 2014, 144).

The relation between the advenant, the vista of the future, and the event is characterized by availability towards surprise. Availability becomes thus an exposition to the impossibility of ourselves (cf. Romano 2014, 175).

On the basis of the presentation of the fundamental tenets of Romano's thematization of surprise, we can move towards the dialogical perspectives, which shall guide us to the creative temporality of face-to-face exchanges. As we are going to notice soon, this creative temporality is manifested precisely in the moment of surprise, when an excess of meaning, or even of affectivity, occurs between I and Thou.

Buber on dialogue and the moment of surprise

According to Martin Buber, dialogue takes place in the *in-between,* a sort of sphere, where both I and Thou engage in a mutual face-to-face exchange. From the very beginning, Buber stresses that the *in-between* is constantly reconstructed, according to what happens between the two interlocutors. This constant reconstruction and reorientation of the dialogical realm, or sphere, is called the unfolding; hence, we notice a sort of music-like metaphor in Buber. The father of dialogue is also very careful in describing this interhuman happening as a sort of mutual surprise, while the term event might seem too strong for Buber's overall thematization. Thus, we focus on the concept of happening, in order not to mistake it for the rather strong sense of the event,

14 Romano somehow continues Kierkegaard's thematization of despair in an original attempt to prove how "sickness unto death" represents the impossibility of virtually every possibility. Thus, the advenant who finds himself in despair does not have any possibility to project unto the future or to choose, not even death, as Romano puts it (cf. Romano 2014, 101).

as it is employed by Romano. Although the term "event" might not apply to Buber's notion of happening, Waldenfels argues for a sort of intermediary event (cf. Waldenfels 2007, 56) or, simply put, an event, which occurs between myself and the other. Throughout his work, Waldenfels employs the issue of responsibility and responsivity, while Buber pays more attention to the possible transformation, which might be triggered between I and Thou in the case of the mutual surprise.[15] Waldenfels insists on the notion of happening, in order to describe how responsibility vis-à-vis the other becomes operative (cf. Junglos 2017, 734). While Waldenfels describes the relation of the interhuman happening with the concept of responsivity, in a letter written to Ludwig Binswanger, Buber directly associates dialogue with the unforeseen and with the possibility of mutual surprise (cf. Agassi 1999, 190). Although both Buber and Waldenfels discuss the notion of interhuman happening, in order to describe the relation with alterity, the latter is more interested in how the stranger can trigger our responsibility towards them (cf. Waldenfels 2011, 35), while the former pays more attention to the mutual sharing in knowledge that can happen between I and Thou (cf. Agassi 1999, 107). Moreover, Buber even asserts that change and transformation pertain to the realm of the interhuman, because only by the "ontological presupposition" of dialogue, i.e., the moment of surprise, can enable a genuine decision and thus responsibility to take place.

In the text, where Buber proposes the moment of surprise as the "ontological presupposition" of dialogue, he alludes to the poet who, for example, receives his creative force from his partner in dialogue (cf. Buber 1965, 111). This statement points once again to the creativity implied in the dialogical exchange between I and Thou. The dialogical event or happening between I and Thou comprises both the I and the Thou, but nonetheless it

15 It is debatable whether Buber's happening might function as an event in Romano's sense. For Romano, the event is utterly impersonal, while for Buber everything that happens in the in-between takes place between I and Thou, i.e., in the interhuman or interpersonal realm. Nonetheless, for both authors, whether we are talking about an event or a happening, these occurrences might produce a change or a transformation, in the case of the advenant's selfhood or between I and Thou. Although the two positions might seem at first irreconcilable, Waldenfels's notion of the intermediary event provides a space for a possible conjunction between the works of Buber and Romano.

transcends the mere psychical or physical phenomena, which occur between the two interlocutors (cf. Buber 1965, 112). As Buber suggests, this happening has no clear-cut (temporal or spatial) landmarks (cf. Buber 2013, 23), because once we engage in a dialogue, we do not know anymore, where the soul ends and the world begins.[16] Buber's next remark is rather a bold one, because he holds that the human being's dialogue with himself or herself is possible only by virtue of the initial dialogue with others. Buber even introduces the notion of "internalization" to describe this process.[17] Buber also advances another complementary concept, which makes this "internalization" possible, namely the atmosphere of confidence (cf. Buber 2002, 127). In the next section, we demonstrate how Gadamer comes close to Buber's thematization, when he describes how the dialogue between I and Thou has a decisive consequence for the inner life of the human being, namely the possibility of building-up an infinite dialogue within oneself.

Concerning the moment of surprise, Buber states that the human being is not unpredictable to itself as he or she is to his or her partner.[18] This means that the human being always and already has some fore-knowledge and fore-understanding about himself or herself. Another rather puzzling remark is advanced forth by Buber, when he declares that language never existed before any address. In his book concerning the problem of the call and the response, Jean Louis Chrétien cites Heidegger's saying that the human being begins to speak only, insofar as he or she listens to the address of the other (cf. Chrétien 2004, 6). By the same token, and as Paul Mendes-Flohr suggested, the meeting between Buber and Heidegger, which was supposed to concretize in a

16 This observation leaves some space for a possible comparison with Buber's thematization of dialogue and Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh.
17 From the standpoint of cognitive psychology, Vygotsky was one of the first authors to suggest that higher-level mental functions represent the internalized early relationships with the others.
18 Here, a critique might prove itself to be useful, considering namely the question whether the infinite dialogue with ourselves is a unique chance for a sort of the moment of self-surprise, for example, when a novel idea (self-understanding) emerges during this kind of inner speech. Thus, there exists the possibility of a moment of self-surprise, in the case of which the inner dialogue awakens a novel idea, i.e., a new form of self-understanding. This infinite dialogue with ourselves proves once again to be creative.

conference on language, suggests that the two philosophers were familiar with each other's ideas (cf. Mendes-Flohr 2014, 2).

Another key point in Buber's thematization of dialogue is the metaphor of the game. In his discussion with psychiatrist Carl Rogers, Buber compares the authentic dialogue between I and Thou with a chess game, in which both players are unaware of the other's next move (cf. Buber 1965, 178). The moment of surprise is once again addressed in the seminar on the unconscious, in which Buber suggests that the ideal therapist should be open and available to surprise, coming from the patient.[19] This does not involve any sort of passivity on the part of the therapist, but rather a sort of bracketing, in which the therapist suspends his beliefs and presuppositions, even his prejudgments or interpretations, in order to let the patient be, and manifest himself or herself as he or she appears to the therapist.[20] Therefore, we might even notice a sort of conscious effort, coming from the therapist. This basic attitude is by Buber called "the conscious liberation," which is opposed to "the unconscious imposition" (of the theories of the psychiatric school, to which the therapist belongs; cf. Agassi 1999, 239–240). Of course, Buber suggests from the very beginning that a therapist without a school or a method is a dilettante, nonetheless, there exists certain "moments of meeting,"[21] in which the two of them (the therapist and the patient) meet in their peculiar uniqueness. Moreover, this bracketing is the *sine qua non* of the real meeting between two unique human beings. This also involves a risk, namely that of change, transformation, or even metamorphosis.[22] Here, we could recall Maldiney's and Romano's notion of event, and the link they make to the issue of the genuine encounter.[23] On the other hand, this bracketing, which

19 Again, Buber's statement resonates with Romano's overall theory of the relation between surprise and availability.
20 This very useful therapeutic idea was developed further by Giovanni Stanghellini (cf. 2017, 11).
21 In the sense, which was employed by Daniel Stern (2004).
22 Buber is skeptical towards the notion of receptivity, as the *Unconscious* seminar testifies; nonetheless, he is in the search for a better notion, which could exactly be the concept of passibility. See, for example, Thoma 2019.
23 Maldiney explicitly analyzes the relation between the event and the encounter (1991), while Romano suggests that the encounter is a peculiar example of the event, in which a mutual metamorphosis might take place.

makes room for the moment of surprise, might bring along insight and, most importantly, a deepening of the interhuman field, in which both the therapist and the patient learn something very important about the cure itself, i.e., about perpetual mutuality and openness. More exactly, this moment of meeting has an essential role in change and understanding, and the term "insight" might once again prove itself to be decisive. As Buber explains, if the therapist takes the patient's *psyche* as an isolated entity and analyzes it accordingly by means of objectification, healing might take place or even an improvement of the patient's state. Nevertheless, if existential healing is to take place, then we cannot speak solely of the patient's *psyche,* but rather about such a unique meeting between two unities. This is the reason why Buber employs the notion of "the unconscious" to describe the state of the human being, in which soul and body phenomena do not evolve separately, but are rather merged into a unitary whole, which is exactly the uniqueness of the patient.[24] Hence, Buber states that the interhuman might have a more striking effect in the case of therapy than the psychical realm alone. This could be the equation of what Buber calls healing through meeting (cf. Agassi 1999, 17). Already in *I and Thou* (Buber 2013, 8), Buber emphasizes the risk, which the I assumes by entering into relation with a Thou, but he also uses the term "sacrifice."[25] This sacrifice might once again point towards bracketing, namely to the therapist's capacity of withholding his or her prior interpretations, in order to meet the patient as he or she appears. Heidegger called this peculiar mode of approaching the world, and the other, "letting-be" (cf. Heidegger 2001, 223–224).

Now that we delineated the basic tenets of Buber's theory of the relation between dialogue and surprise, we are ready to move towards Gadamer's thematization of the dialogical play. We have already given hints and clues towards a certain similarity between Buber's conceptualization and that of Gadamer, thus we are ready to analyze the latter's standpoint, and compare it to Buber's.

24 As Buber explicitly states in the afterword to *I and Thou* (2013), the therapist must help the patient to regenerate the atrophied core of his being, which Buber calls the microcosm.

25 Very interestingly, both Buber and Gadamer compare the I–Thou relation with the encounter with the work of art.

Surprise in Gadamer's dialogical play

Gadamer's main claim departs from the subjective considerations of play, as they are found in the works of Kant and Schiller.[26] There exists a certain level of seriousness of play,[27] as Gadamer points out; play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself or herself in the play itself. Gadamer already alludes to his notion of ecstatic self-forgetting, which he describes later on in *Truth and Method*. Moreover, play has its own essence, independently of the ones who are engaged in it. Play reaches its presentation through the players. Peculiar to play is the to-and-fro movement, which characterizes it (cf. Gadamer 2013, 107–108).

Therefore, Gadamer acknowledges the primacy of play over the consciousness of the players who are engaged in it. The structure of play absorbs the players into itself and thus frees them from the burden of initiating the play. A striking similarity between the theories of Buber and those of Gadamer can be found, when the latter asserts that the game itself is a risk for the player. One can only play with serious possibilities.[28] Playing necessarily entails the fact of being-played. In other words, the fascination of the game absorbs and even masters the players. Human play requires a so-called field, which is exactly the *in-between*.[29] Play is self-presentation. Nonetheless, every self-presentation can be a representation for someone (cf. Gadamer 2013, 109–110).

In another of his works concerning the problem of self-understanding, Gadamer endeavors to prove once again the existing relation between understanding, dialogue, and play. The conclusions he draws are of great importance for the concept of dialogical play, because in this text, Gadamer touches upon the element of surprise involved in this sort of interaction. Therefore, and alongside Buber, we can consider surprise to be once again

26 These two theories of play considered it to be a sort of play of our faculties See, for example, Kant 2007.

27 Gadamer departs also from the theories that are found in child psychology, which state that play is the work of childhood only.

28 As we are going to see soon, the moment of surprise in the case of dialogical play points exactly towards the possibility of unfolding our possibilities.

29 When focusing on the the fusion of horizons between the familiar and the strange, Gadamer calls the *in-between* the object of study for hermeneutics.

the "ontological presupposition" of dialogue. Gadamer himself did not use the phrase "dialogical play," but certain scholars, such as Monica Vilhauer provided clues towards this concept (Vilhauer 2010), inspired by Gadamer's overall thematization of understanding. Before inquiring into Gadamer's rather short, but insightful text, we ought to mention another occurrence of the term surprise in Gadamer's work. In his paper on "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics," Gadamer analyzes the relation between the work of art and surprise. Thus, he writes that when the excess of meaning, which the works of art provide, overwhelms us, everything that is familiar is shattered.[30] This is the proper meaning of what Gadamer's has in mind, when he thinks of disclosure, namely the discovery of something, which was previously concealed (cf. Gadamer 1976, 101).

Returning to his paper on self-understanding, Gadamer reiterates his main thesis from *Truth and Method,* in which he stressed that the back-and-forth movement of play does not derive from human game, but that the case is rather the opposite. Furthermore, Gadamer introduces one of the main notions of his text, namely ecstatic self-forgetting. This concept denotes the absorption in the game, which is experienced not as a loss of self-possession, but as free buoyancy and elevation (cf. Gadamer 1976, 55).[31] Moreover, another key point, which is advanced by the author, consists in the way, in which dialogue is treated in conjunction with understanding and playing. Hence, we are informed that dialogue between men presents a lot of similarities with the two abovementioned phenomena. For example, Gadamer mentions the risk, which is also present in Buber's account, of putting forth a word or keeping it to yourself, or provoking a word from the other person and receiving an answer from them, or giving an answer oneself. Therefore, every word comes into play naturally, by anticipating the next one and by keeping in mind the

30 This statement points once again to the *in-between* as the playfield, in which the to-and-fro movement between what is familiar and what is strange takes place.

31 The notion of ecstatic self-forgetting might bear certain therapeutical values in Buber's sense, because, thanks to it, the human being who is absorbed in the dialogical play, loses themselves, only to find themselves changed after the interaction has taken place. As Paul Ricoeur writes, we find ourselves only by losing ourselves (cf. Ricoeur 1981, 106).

last one (cf. Gadamer 1976, 56). We are already on the way to demarcating the thesis of the Husserlian time-consciousness as we proposed in connection with the instantaneous and opportune moment of surprise.[32]

For Gadamer, life of language consists in playing along or playing further the game, in which we are thrown from the very moment, when we first begin to speak. The dialogical play or game consists in giving and taking, in an almost rhythmical manner.[33] This perpetual interchange between I and Thou soon arrives at the moment of surprise, when both I and Thou are somehow puzzled to learn something radically new about each other, something which was not present before, i.e., the radically new, which is, nonetheless, something that shatters the overall familiarity of understanding, introducing us to the strangeness of alterity. This bursting forth of meaning is precisely the moment of surprise under the guise of the excess of sense, which gives rise to mutual understanding. Thus, the finality of dialogue consists in mutual enrichment, in the case of which we become more aware of ourselves. By the same token, and as Buber clearly emphasized, the limits of dialogue are the limits of becoming aware (cf. Buber 2002, 12). This is the peculiar function of ecstatic self-forgetting. Through every dialogue, something different, and, as it could be added, something new, comes into being, thus paraphrasing Gadamer's last observations from this text (cf. Gadamer 1976, 58). We must nonetheless remember that when Gadamer calls the *in-between* the true place of hermeneutics, he refers to the interplay between what is familiar and what is strange. Last but not least, Gadamer considers that after the dialogical event fades away, the dialogical trace is carried further by both partners in dialogue, in a sort of mutual enrichment, and, as we may add, as a desire to reengage into dialogue. This represents exactly how one can surprise himself or herself, namely by continuing the infinite inner dialogue with oneself.

32 Husserl describes time-consciousness to consist of an original impression, which is linked to the retention of the lived experience and with the anticipation of the next one, which he calls protention (cf. Husserl 1991, 33). While Husserl's account is rather linear and involves continuity, the experience of the instant, as we shall soon notice, consists in an occurrence without any intrinsic past or future moment within it.
33 Drawing on empirical studies of his time, Gadamer emphasizes even the rhythmicity of our understanding with the others and with the world.

The temporality of surprise: The kairotic instant

The final section of our essay tackles the issue of the temporality of dialogue by recalling the perspectives of Romano, Buber, and Gadamer, which we treat in conjunction with Bergson's idea of the unforeseeable novelty. In his lecture on "The Possible and the Real," Bergson emphasizes how creative time functions and the way, in which it produces this unforeseeable novelty (cf. Bergson 2002, 232). Although he was points towards the being of the universe and the evolution of species, we could also argue that this creative temporality applies to dialogue too. Claude Romano describes how surprise functions in the economy of the event, considering it the *sine qua non* of the temporality of the event, which is oriented towards the future. Romano alludes in certain passages to the work of Bergson, from whom he borrows the idea of the unforeseeable novelty. This is the peculiar function of surprise in the economy of evential hermeneutics. Moreover, Romano dedicates the first three chapters of his book *Event and Time* to the analysis of the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine (Romano 2014), where the authors concern themselves with the notion of the instant. The instant, as it appears in the works of these authors, is related to the opportune moment, i.e., the moment of action and decision. Returning to Bergson, we can connect with his thoughts also Levinas's argument that the instant means an interruption of duration (cf. Levinas 1978, 86), in which something new might occur. Without naming it as such, i.e., the instant, Bergson has in mind the possibility of a radical change in the economy of the universe, as he puts it. But what if this change can occur at the level of one's being-in-the-world?

With Buber and Gadamer, the unforeseeable novelty of dialogue, namely its creative temporality, operates on another level. This is precisely the interhuman field. While Buber stresses the structure of dialogue as a sort of unfolding game (cf. Buber 1965, 82), Gadamer explicitly links understanding with playing and dialogue (cf. Gadamer 1976, 44). Therefore, we can insist that by virtue of the dialogical play, which encompasses both I and Thou, and thanks to the implicit buoyancy and elevation, surprise might emerge. As Buber asserts, I always have some sort of self-understanding (cf. Buber 1965, 113), while the spontaneity of the other might prove itself to be overwhelming, hence the risk and the sacrifice of dialogue. The question is whether we can anticipate ourselves, if the possibility of the creative temporality provided by the infinite dialogue with ourselves, in which something new appears, seems to lean towards the option, in which we actually can surprise ourselves. On the other hand, Gadamer employs the notion of play, in order to describe how a mutual enrichment between I and Thou occurs. Simply put, by playing along the dialogical game, the unforeseeable novelty seizes us in our entire being, bringing forth a new understanding with the world (cf. Agassi 1999, 175), of the other, and of ourselves. Once again, the dialogical play between I and Thou involves two free human beings, bearing alongside their uniqueness and specific spontaneity. The unforeseeable novelty might appear alongside a word uttered or even by a gesture, in which I and Thou both understand each other, by virtue of a moment of meeting. Furthermore, the consequence of the dialogue between I and Thou for the human being is that he or she can "internalize" this conversation and continue it on his or her own. But where does surprise appear in this context? Once again, if we consider the infinite dialogue with ourselves to be the "internalization" of the dialogue with others, then the surprise, which was experienced between I and Thou, might also take place in the case of the self that continues the conversation on its own. We have already indicated above that this surprise might consist in the unforeseen novel idea, which seems to appear from nowhere, i.e., as a new form or self-understanding, but which is nonetheless a result of this infinite dialogue with ourselves. Hence, not only dialogue, but also creativity seems to be a relational phenomenon, and we can remember Buber's account of the poet who gathers his or her creative possibilities from the encounter with otherness (cf. Buber 1965, 118).

Before concluding our essay, we ought to present more of the internal economy of the moment of surprise and its relation to the instant. We dealt with the concept of surprise throughout our essay, and now we can focus on the notion of "moment." As child psychologist Daniel Stern has demonstrated, there is a certain difference between time as succession and time as an instantaneous occurring (Stern 2004).[34] The moment of surprise involves precisely the instant,

34 Daniel Stern alludes also to the theories of Husserl and Bergson.

under the guise of a kairotic moment or, simply put, of *Kairos*.[35] *Kairos* differs completely from *chronos*, because while the latter represents the succession of time and its flow, the former represents the instantaneous occurring of a specific moment, which is called opportune, i.e., the instant. The opportunity proves itself to be decisive for the philosophy of dialogue and for hermeneutics, because not it not only provides a new form of understanding between I and Thou, but also has ethical consequences regarding choice, decision, and action.

As the French phenomenologist Henri Maldiney held, for example, the real is that, which we do not except, and, moreover, we are passible for the unforeseeable (Maldiner 1991). Thus, summing up our discussion concerning the kairotic moment of surprise, it involves two key components, which were already present in the work of Maldiney and which were borrowed from him by Romano too. Needless to say, Maldiney is himself a theoretician of surprise and of the event (cf. Maldiney 1991, 251). He nonetheless connects these two concepts of surprise and event with the instant that does not contain any intrinsic past and future within it. Maldiney also describes a certain psychopathology, which can be linked to the notion of instant, and with regard to which he insisted on the sudden change triggered by the moment (cf. Maldiney 2003, 20). This sudden change from one state to another might also be triggered by an interhuman encounter. Therefore, we can insist on a sort of "dialogical passibility," in the case of which the I has to be receptive and available, in order to welcome and to appropriate the surprise, and integrate it in the overall economy of dialogue, keeping themselves open to change and insight. As Michel Bitbol emphasizes, transpassibility, the key notion of Maldiney's phenomenological theory, represents exactly the possibility of welcoming surprise (cf. Depraz and Celle 2019, 16). On the other hand, the "dialogical possibility"[36] implies taking advantage of the kairotic moment of surprise, thus resolving the crisis (the decision) instantiated by the moment of meeting. This act of "passibilization" as "possiblization" might be accomplished

35 Henri Maldiney (1991) and Giorgio Agamben (2005) are two contemporary philosophers who describe the relation between the instant and *kairos*, the former being a manifestation of the latter.

36 Of course, the notions employed mirror Maldiney's transpassibility and transpossibility (Maldiney 1991, 361).

by what Buber called confirmation. Thus, when surprise occurs in the case of the dialogical play and of the interhuman encounter, this might provide itself to be the opportune moment to confirm the other in his or her uniqueness, leading to the dynamic unfolding of his or her possibilities. Buber calls this phenomenon the dynamic confirmation of the other's potentialities, and its relation to surprise appears in the dialogue with Carl Rogers (cf. Buber 1965, 178). Therefore, by confirming the other according to the opportune moment, a sort of horizon of new possibilities paradoxically awakens in the person of the other. Nevertheless, this involves the other's passibility too. Moreover, by virtue of the other's passibility, "dialogical possibility" might emerge, which results in mutuality. In summary, the dialogical passibility refers to the possibility of appropriating the surprise and taking advantage of it by confirming the other (the possibilization). Furthermore, in this specific case, confirmation proves to be an adequate response to surprise. The moment of surprise does not only prove to be an opportunity for mutual understanding, but also for mutual bonding[37] and deepening of the interhuman field by virtue of confirmation. We must nonetheless remember that Buber insists on the value of confirmation in becoming self with the other (cf. Buber 1965, 71). Moreover, this becoming self with the other involves also mutual understanding, which becomes the *sine qua non* of the unfolding of possibilities. Maldiney in turn paradoxically describes the instant to be operative both in the genesis of psychosis, but also in the event of interhuman encounter, which was of utmost interest to us throughout this paper. He deliberates on how we can cope with this overwhelming event by being open, receptive, and responsive to alterity. However, whereas Maldiney describes the instant of sudden change as a sort of trauma, this being the case wherein the subject is not receptive and responsive, we discussed the, so to speak, fortunate situation of the interhuman encounter, namely the possibility of mutual understanding, enrichment, and confirmation.

37 As it was described by Patočka in the case of the first movement of existence (cf. Patočka 2016, 166).

Conclusion

We began this essay by sketching out a possible appraisal of Claude Romano's hermeneutics of surprise, in order to establish a firm ground, upon which our argumentation could unfold. Secondly, a comparison between Buber's perspective on dialogue and the thematization of Gadamer proved to be necessary, because in both views surprise plays a major role, despite being virtually only a metaphor. Thus, we argued that dialogical play and mutual understanding can be achieved by virtue of its "ontological presupposition," namely the moment of surprise. Next, we ventured into the realm of temporality, seeking a clue that would fit the temporal features of surprise. We found Bergson's thematization of creative temporality or the unforeseeable novelty to be just the specific argument we were looking for, but we nonetheless complemented his view with the aid of the theory of *kairos*, namely the right moment for choice, decision, and action, i.e., the instant. We therefore linked *kairos* with the opportunity left open by surprise, which is precisely the interhuman confirmation. Henceforth, we argued that surprise might mark the right moment for the confirmation of otherness; thus, the unfolding of the other's possibilities and potentialities can become a certainty or something actual. We can just imagine a simple dialogical scenario, in which dialogue itself unfolds by virtue of the perpetual interplay of the two interlocutors, until the moment, when one of them or even both realize something decisive about the whole situation, in which they find themselves, i.e., mutual understanding. That is a surprise. Mutual confirmation proceeds naturally from this sort of relationship.

The tasks we attempted to tackle throughout the paper were numerous, but nonetheless interrelated. Firstly, the general aim of the paper was to set up the thesis concerning the dialogical hermeneutics of surprise, which was followed by the affinity of the thinking of both Buber and Gadamer. The paper ended with an inquiry into the temporality of the moment of surprise, in the case of which we interpreted surprise as the Platonic instant of opportunity,[38] decision, and action. We have provided an appraisal or even an elaboration of

38 For example, in Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*.

Maldiney's notions of transpassibility and transpossibility (cf. Maldiney 1991, 361–362) in an endeavor to reveal their dialogical function in the economy of everyday face-to-face exchanges. Furthermore, we alluded to the twofold possibility of the encounter with the instant of surprise, which might result either in a trauma (as Maldiney has conceived of this instantaneous change) or in a fortunate change of our being-in-the-world that refers to mutual enrichment between I and Thou. The next possible step, which ought to be taken in future research, is that of applying our current results of the dialogical moment of surprise to the field of psychopathology, because whereas we have just alluded to this unfortunate possibility, further research might attempt to prove how the twofold possibility of encounter with the moment of surprise results in either trauma or enrichment, depending on our transpassibility and transpossibility. Anticipating, and following Maldiney's claim, the participation in the disclosure of the event, conceived as an interhuman happening, involves both transpassbility and transpossibility that are triggered by the moment of surprise (cf. Maldiney 2001, 103–104). Finally, we proposed the notions of dialogical passibility and dialogical possibility, in order to emphasize the way, in which bonding, change, and even understanding between I and Thou might occur, also alluding to the psychopathology, or, as we called it, the unfortunate outcome of the experience of the overwhelming event. While the event has often been interpreted as a sudden change of our being-in-the-world, resulting in trauma (cf. Romano 2014, 202), our purpose throughout this paper was that of establishing how mutual becoming, alongside the unfolding of our possibilities, can be rendered possible by the moment of surprise.

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Testimony as a Co-Existential Extension of Deliberative Practices

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Abstract

The article focuses on the relevance of testimony for deliberative practices, which can be observed to have been insufficiently emphasized in previous discussions on deliberative communication. This seems important not only when it comes to considering deliberative practices in relation to historical time and its aftermath, but also directly in terms of their contemporary application. Indeed, testimonies can assume a key communicative role in different life situations by appearing in various contexts, and in this way allow for the existential and coexistential extension of deliberative practices. First, I address the issue of conceptualizing the phenomenon of testimony and the relationship between the contexts of witnessing and the conditions of truth-telling, drawing in particular on the considerations by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Klaus Held, Bernhard Waldenfels, and Giorgio Agamben's discussion of testimony and truth in *Quando la casa brucia* (2020). I conclude the paper by describing a concrete case of the extension of deliberative practice in relation to the testimony of Marijan Rogić, a former convict in the concentration camp on the island of Goli otok [Barren Island].

Keywords: testimony, deliberative practices, communication, Agamben, Rogić.

Pričevanje kot ko-eksistencialna razširitev deliberativnih praks

Povzetek

Članek se osredotoča na relevantnost pričevanja za deliberativne prakse, kjer lahko ugotovimo, da je bila ta téma v prejšnjih razpravah o deliberativni komunikaciji premalo poudarjena. To se zdi pomembno ne samo, ko gre za obravnavo deliberativnih praks v povezavi z zgodovinskim časom in njegovimi nasledki, temveč tudi neposredno z vidika njihove sodobne aplikacije. Pričevanja lahko namreč s tem, da se javljajo v različnih kontekstih (osebnih in medosebnih, dokumentarnih, literarnih, pravnih, zgodovinskih, religioznih itd.), prevzamejo ključno komunikativno vlogo v različnih življenjskih situacijah in na ta način omogočajo eksistencialno in koeksistencialno razširitev deliberativnih praks. V članku se najprej zadržim pri problemu konceptualizacije fenomena pričevanja ter pri razmerju med konteksti pričevanja in pogoji izražanja resnice, pri čemer se opiram zlasti na obravnave Hansa-Georga Gadamerja, Klausa Helda, Bernharda Waldenfelsa ter na Agambenovo razpravo o pričevanju in resnici v knjigi *Quando la casa brucia* (2020). Prispevek sklenem z deskripcijo konkretnega primera razširitve deliberativne prakse ob pričevanju Marijana Rogića, nekdanjega kaznjenca v koncentracijskem taborišču na Golem otoku.

Ključne besede: pričevanje, deliberativne prakse, komunikacija, Agamben, Rogić.

In deliberative practices, *the field of communication* (Habermas 1984, 1987; Rinke 2016; Cattani and Mastroianni 2021; Mercier Ythier 2022; Maia, Hauber, and Choucair 2023) certainly occupies a central place, though it has repeatedly proved to be *an open problem* under the influence of various social factors. Nowadays, it seems that we can even speak of a *crisis* in its definition and understanding, which may lead to the dissolution of the very meaning and relevance of the interpersonal communication that grounds deliberative practices, as well as the broader possibility of social and political impact.

Today, *information-guided and distributed communication* is emerging as a superior form of communication that can subsume all others. At the same time, however, informational communication is subject to manipulation for the purpose of disseminating misinformation, and it serves as a means of controlling not only the public, but also us as individuals.[1] Reducing communication to information, including the potential for manipulation and control, has a definite impact on the deliberative practices, which are based on the free expression of views, opinions, arguments, definitions, and decisions, and cannot be dictated by any higher authority or by instant communication.

Deliberative practices are in danger of losing their persuasiveness and truthfulness. The dominance of information over other forms of inter-human communication and coexistence fundamentally dissolves the space and time, in which deliberative practices can be realized. It dissolves the world, in which we live and work.[2] Today, while there is a great deal of reporting and debate in

1 See Komel 2023.
2 See Neri 2024.

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various forums about global problems, this tends to skip over concrete living situations, even when it comes to the unbearable conditions experienced by those affected.

This often triggers protests and other forms of resistance from the public directly or indirectly involved, who have little, if any, space to present their situation. Moreover, it seems that, due to the dominance of informational communication, the public space itself increasingly functions only as a zone, which is itself enclosed in the statistically measurable effects of information or misinformation. Furthermore, this displaces and nullifies *the discursive openness* for the free expression and encounter of views and opinions.

The question is what deliberative practices can propose to combat the reduction of communicative space and time? How can they extend it without this extension taking place only in the form of the diffusion of information that fills the space of the public and of individuals in such a way that everything is of equal importance and none? Our proposal would be that this communicative extension should be carried out on *an existential or co-existential level*. That is to say, deliberative practices should intensively incorporate those possibilities of inter-human communication that directly relate to the existential and co-existential situations, with which we are dealing with in and are affected by the life-world. As some previous studies on deliberative practices have already noted, one such existential form of interpersonal communication is *witnessing and testimony*:

> Stories, narratives, or testimony can often play a powerful role in ordinary political discourse, campaign advertisements, and media coverage of political events. The prominence of testimony seems to rise specifically around issues of marginalization and structural injustice, which might be harder to perceive otherwise. (Chick 2022, 94.)

Every situation of witnessing is about experiencing an event that can be communicated and shared with others. In this way, witnessing an event can open up the historical horizon of a shared world. However, the presence at the event, as well as the recollection of it, for example through diary entries, could have explicit personal-biographical significance. In this case, we are not talking about a personal history, but *a life story*. The Slovenian word "priča" means *witness*, while the Croatian word "prića" means *story*. The element of "story" and the elemental nature of "narrative" as such already condition the difference between *historic*, *religious*, *legal*, and *literary testimony*. Somehow, *biographical* testimony, which can be memorial-documentary or given in a literary or aestheticized form, is placed between the two. The same applies to pictorial, photographic, filmic, or theatrical forms of providing testimony. Testimonies mediated by media[3] can generally be taken as being documentary, but it should be emphasized that here, one of the central forms of testimony is the *interview*, which as such points to the dialogic nature of the witnessing experience and its delivery.

At the same time, all documentary, biographical, historiographical, media, artistic, and intellectual "sources" of one kind or another can subsequently receive the value of testimony and attestation.[4] This includes the broad topic of *the witness archive*,[5] or *the archival* in general,[6] which, following Foucault's footsteps, for example, Agamben tackled when considering the question of "what remains after Auschwitz."

> Foucault gives the name "archive" to the positive dimension that corresponds to the plane of enunciation, "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (Foucault 1972: 130). […] In opposition to the *archive*, which designates the system of relations between unsaid and the said, we give the name *testimony* to the system of relations between the inside and the outside of *langue*, between a potentiality and an impossibility of speech […]. The archive's constitution presupposed the bracketing of the subject, who was reduced to a simple function or an empty position; it was founded on the subject's disappearance into the anonymous murmur of statements. […] Testimony is a potentiality that becomes actual through an impotentiality of speech; it is, moreover, an impossibility that gives itself existence through a possibility of speaking. […] From this perspective, Auschwitz represents the historical point in which these processes collapse, the devastating experience in which the impossible is forced

3 See Frosh and Pinchevski 2009.
4 See Däumer, Kalisky, and Schlie 2017.
5 See Jong 2018.
6 See Derrida 1996.

> into the real. Auschwitz as the existence of the impossible, the most radical negation of contingency; it is, therefore, absolute necessity. *The Muselmann* produced by Auschwitz is the catastrophe of the subject that then follows, the subject's effacement as the place of contingency and its maintenance as existence of the impossible. (Agamben 1999, 143–148.)

Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account *digitized forms of testimony*, which redefine the possibilities of documentation and archiving, the public nature and privacy of information, authorship and authorization. Digital memories are changing our perception of memory and remembrance, which affects both the role and the very validity of transmitted testimonies. With virtual reality, the problem of *authenticity* and *credibility* of testimony is triggered in a new way.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the truth and untruth of testimony has central validity not only in theory, but also in the actual *practice* of testimony. As Agamben points out in his recent study, "Testimony and Truth" in *When the House Burns Down*, testimony that turns out to be untrue in some way cannot be said to be testimony at all. Agamben justifies this by stating that testimony does not have the character of *apophansis*, a statement about something:

> The truth of testimony has nothing to do with its semantic content; its truth does not depend on what it says. To be sure, testimony can take the form of a proposition but, in contrast to what happens in legal testimony, what it says cannot be submitted to verification—it cannot be true or false. Testimony is not an *apophantic logos* in the Aristotelian sense, a discourse that says something about something. Neither is it a prayer, an invocation or a command. In so far as it is not defined on the basis of what it says, testimony is always true: it simply either is or is not. (Agamben 2023, 16.)

We find something similar in Waldenfels's description of testimoniality in his book *Globalität, Lokalität, Digitalität*:

> Testimony generally finds its place at breaking points of experience, which are characterized by an ethical surplus. A witness who gives false

> testimony not only makes a mistake, but also commits an injustice by violating claims to truthfulness, doubly so, on the one hand, with regard to claims on the part of the witnessed victim, and on the other hand, with regard to claims on the part of the recipient of the testimony. This is the reason why testimony has been ritually protected since time immemorial. (Waldenfels 2022, 214.)

Following Waldenfels, the question arises as to whether Agamben does not isolate the experience of testimony in terms of its truthfulness from the world horizons in which it appears and could be verified or falsified. Furthermore, witnessing, whether our own or someone else's, can lead us to begin to question the truth and seek answers, which opens worldly horizons that were previously withdrawn.

In this respect, we refer to Gadamer's text *What is Truth?* (1975), where he points out:

> If one wants to grasp its truth there is no proposition that can be comprehended solely from the content that it presents. Every proposition is motivated. Every proposition has presuppositions that it does not express. Only they who comprehend these presuppositions can really judge the truth of a proposition. Now I maintain that the ultimate logical form of such motivation of every proposition is the question. It is not the judgment that has logical priority but the question as is historically attested by the Platonic dialogue and the dialectical origin of Greek logic. The primacy of the question over against the proposition implies, however, that the proposition is essentially an answer. There is no proposition that does not represent a type of answer. Therefore, there is no understanding of any proposition that does not take its exclusive criterion from the understanding of the question that it answers. When one articulates this it sounds like a self-evident claim and it is known by everyone from their life experience. When someone puts forth an assertion that one does not understand, one seeks to make clear how he came to it, which question he asked himself, to which his assertion is an answer. And when it is an assertion that is supposed to be true, one must test it itself with the question for which it intends to be answer. It is certainly not always easy to find *the* question to which an assertion is really the answer. It is especially not easy on this account because even the question is not in turn a simple first that we can shift to at will.

> For every question is itself an answer. Such is the dialectic in which we are entangled here. Every question is motivated. Even its meaning is never totally encountered in it. When I alluded above to the problem of Alexandrianism, which threatens our scientific culture, inasmuch as the primordiality of the question is made more difficult by it, I was alluding to the root of the matter. The decisive factor that primarily makes someone a researcher in science is the ability to see questions. Seeing questions means, however, to be able to break through that which controls our entire thinking and knowing like a closed and impermeable layer of smoothed-over opinions. The researcher is constituted by this ability to break through, and in this way new questions are seen and new answers are made possible. Every proposition has its horizon of meaning in that it originates in a question situation. (Gadamer 1994, 42.)

It is this *dialogical openness*, which poses questions that both demand and point in the direction of an answer, addressing our "responsiveness"—to use Waldenfels's concept—, which also encompasses responsibility in truth-telling and in communication in general. It is important to emphasize that also the dialogicality of public argumentation is not only the interpersonal exchange of arguments, but is also preceded by the giving of reasons, the *logon didonai*, which brings into communication the quality of value, that which counts and cannot be quantitatively reduced.

The German philosopher Klaus Held, who has devoted much of his research to the relationship between modern phenomenology and the beginnings of philosophy and democracy in Greece, in his essay *The Ethos of Democracy from a Phenomenological Point of View* states:

> What we understand today by the word democracy is not univocal. But one basis of modern democracy, "human rights," is recognized worldwide, at least verbally. One can, of course, dispute which rights are meant for particular situations, but such a dispute would not be possible if the validity of one human right was not considered self-evident: the right to the free expression of one's own opinion. This right accords with the basic significance of freedom of speech already operating in history's first democracy with the Greeks. According to Aristotle, humans are meant to live together in a democratic polis because they possess the capacity to reciprocally give accounts (λόγον διδόναι) of their dealings,

> and these accounts are carried out in speaking freely with one another. So one can say that since antiquity, democracy is fundamentally founded on the respect for freedom of opinion.
>
> Political opinions always refer to the way in which matters are to be treated in a shared, political life-space. But because in this life-space decisions need to be made, controversy can arise among opinions. This controversy, however, will only be highlighted as controversy if the speakers do not talk past each other. Therefore, in the controversy concerning possibilities for action, something common or shared is needed so that one may meet another in speaking; one needs a basis for mutual understanding. The only possible basis is that of shared standards counted as unquestionably self-evident, for it is through these standards that it is decided in advance which possibilities for action can at all appear as open to discussion. Even when a fundamentally new possibility for action is championed, this can only be justified in connection with those standards already accepted by all; otherwise, one would at the outset fall upon deaf ears. Each involved party must be allowed to justifiably assume that all others are convinced of the binding force of shared standards; otherwise, controversy cannot occur. (Held 1998, 193.)

The formation of philosophy in ancient Greece is paralleled by the opening up of the public sphere and what, on the basis of the *logon didonai*, is established as public argumentation, represented above all by the skill of rhetoric. In terms of what is *asserted as truth* in argumentation, this comes into conflict with philosophy, especially with Socrates and Plato. What does it mean to speak the truth?[7] Is truth in words alone or in things themselves, how does the "logos" mediate between one and the other?

Gadamer's hermeneutic model of *dialogic interpretation*[8] can help us to a large extent, insofar it proposes open intermediality and the mediation of

7 See also Foucault 2001.

8 "What characterizes a dialogue, in contrast with the rigid form of statements that demand to be set down in writing, is precisely this: that in dialogue spoken language—in the process of question and answer, giving and taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each other's point—performs the communication of meaning that, with respect to the written tradition, is the task of hermeneutics." (Gadamer 2004, 361.)

question and answer as a *hermeneutic methodological imperative*.[9] We have to take the label "methodical" with a grain of salt, because, from a hermeneutic point of view, it is essential to leave an open *path* (*hodos* and not *methodos*) for what it addresses as a question. In this respect, we can further draw on Waldenfels's *hermeneutics of responsiveness*,[10] which he developed within the broader project of *the phenomenology of the alien*.

> The alien is a limit phenomenon par excellence. It arrives from elsewhere, even when it appears in our own house and own world. There can be no alien without an alien place. How much weight is given to the alien will thus depend on the kind of order in which our life, our experience, our language, our acts and deeds take shape. When the order becomes transformed, there is also a transformation of the alien which is as multifaceted as the orders which it transcends. The expression "the alien" is no less occasional than the expression "the ego." The limit zones which expand between and beyond the orders are the breeding grounds for the alien. (Waldenfels 2011, 5.)

Waldenfels also draws attention to the anchoring of *the existential demand* to *being-witness* between domesticity and alienness, between one's own self and the presence of others, between remembering and forgetting:

> Forgetting begins now and here, alienness lurks in the midst of the present. This is precisely why we need witnesses and testimonies that allow us to see with other people's eyes, to hear with other people's ears […]. (Waldenfels 2007.)[11]

"Seeing with other people's eyes and hearing with other people's ears" does not only mean opening one's own eyes and ears for dialogue with a witness and her or his testimony. The *dialogic moment* is not only present in the way

9 See Heiden 2014, 426–444; see also Heiden 2019.
10 See Waldenfels 1994.
11 "Das Vergessen beginnt jetzt und hier, die Fremdheit sucht uns heim inmitten der Gegenwart. Eben deshalb brauchen wir Zeugen und Zeugnisse, die es uns erlauben, mit fremden Augen zu sehen, mit fremden Ohren zu hören […]." See further Waldenfels 2022, 219–226.

that one's testimony is received and acknowledged by others, but rather in how one who has to witness *responds* to the situation of *being a witness*. In this case, the presupposition of some subjective appropriation of the role of witness is not sufficient, since such appropriation is marked by the alienness introduced into the witness by the situation of witnessing itself. This is again possible due to (co)existential situatedness in the world, and not on the basis of some prior subjective competence of the witness.

In this context, *the hermeneutics of testimoniality*[12] does not focus solely on the epistemological problem of explaining and defining the structure of witnessing and testimony. Rather, it recognizes that testimoniality itself, in the various contexts of its performance and mediation, contributes to *an understanding of the meaning of human existence*, and as such *constitutes a distinctive human experience of the world*.[13]

Therefore, the hermeneutics of testimoniality does not provide any pre-prepared answers to the questions raised by the individual situations of witnessing, as well as the mediation of testimony to and for others, insofar as it is first of all the witness himself or herself, by being a witness, who is confronted with the question of the meaning of his or her own existential situation and dwelling in the world in co-existence with others.[14] The fact that a witness is faced with the existential demand to be a witness can provoke a traumatic experience.[15]

If we understand a witness only as a subject who endures psychological trauma in relation to what has been witnessed and tries at all costs to free himself or herself from it, then we miss the point that being-witness is an existential condition of traumatic experience itself, which can of course be further exacerbated by external pressures. Being-witness puts the witness in front of him- or herself, which means confronting him- or herself as a witness. This confrontation evokes a sense of alienation within oneself and from the world, which problematizes the dialogicality of testimony, without eliminating it.

12 See Erzetič 2018; see also Erzetič 2014, 2023a.
13 See Heiden and Marinescu 2025. See also Erzetič 2023b, 2023c.
14 See Erzetič 2024.
15 See Gilmore 2023.

In conclusion, considering the dialogical context of testimony, I describe an episode, in which I had the opportunity to meet and talk with a former inmate of the Yugoslavian concentration camp on Goli Otok [Barren Island] who experienced both—the confrontation with himself in *the situation of being a witness* and the confrontation with the situation of *what it means to be a witness*, which marked him for the rest of his life.[16]

I was faced with the extensive issues of the testimonies of prisoners in the former Yugoslav concentration camp on Goli Otok within the framework of study workshops, conferences, and discussions around the publication of a thematic collection.[17] Officially, the reason for the creation of Goli Otok and its women's section on the island of Sveti Grgur was Tito's dispute with Stalin in 1948 and the threat of an attack by the Socialist bloc countries on Yugoslavia. However, it was not just supporters of Stalinism who were interned in, and it should be emphasized that the methods of its operation have to this date not been fully clarified in detail, nor was the methodology of the intimidating effects of Goli Otok throughout the entire existence of socialist Yugoslavia. None of the convicts on Goli Otok had the opportunity to appear as a witness in court, since no legal framework was ever established that would allow such a thing, but instead legal decisions were made *ad hoc*, on the basis of which general apology was given to the affected persons and exceptionally meager compensation for their suffering. For this reason, there is no accurate data on the number of people deported to Goli Otok. According to the information of the former Yugoslav secret service, about 60,000 people were arrested on Tito's orders from 1948 to 1963, and about 17,000 of them were sent to Goli Otok. We have to bear in mind that many persons who had previously endured the torments of Nazi concentration camps were interned on Goli Otok (it is said that while serving their sentences on Goli Otok, around 500 people died on the island, and according to some other data, as many as 4,000), which led some of the victims to unbearable circumstances and another trauma after surviving Nazi's concentration camp again. The number of direct victims of internment on Goli Otok, as well as the psychological and social condition

16 See Erzetič 2021b, 105–128.
17 See Erzetič 2021a.

of the convicts after their release, cannot be verified with certainty.[18] This was directly contributed to by the strict ban on any public testimony regarding what happened in the camps, under the threat of being returned there (for which the term "two-wheelers" was used). The first testimonies in the mid-1980s were thus given semi-illegally, and they are still labeled as something obscure, which was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that almost everyone who lived in Yugoslavia was afraid of Goli Otok; even in the 1980s, the name "Goli Otok" served as the main intimidating method of the party in power. Accordingly, it is understandable in itself that the rehabilitation of the victims of Goli Otok, both during Yugoslavia and afterwards, took place only on a general declarative level; there has never been a trial, in which, on the basis of the testimonies of the prisoners, those guilty of inhumane acts were identified and convicted.

Due to the upper description of the complex situation in the Yugoslavian witnessing cases about Goli Otok it is worth to draw attention to Fricker's two varieties of epistemic injustice (testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice) in De Brasi and Warman's study:

> Since the testimonial strain of epistemic injustice is more relevant to our project, we will focus on that aspect of Fricker's view. In Fricker's words, "testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word" (2007, 1). Broadly speaking, testimonial injustice occurs when one person, the speaker, tries to tell another person, the hearer, that *p*, but the hearer does not accept the speaker's testimony, and in particular, because they, the hearer, possess prejudicial stereotypes about the speaker's social identity according to which the speaker is not a credible source of testimony. How does this come about? It is a fact of our epistemic lives that we are dependent on one another. We rely for a great deal of our beliefs, among other things, on the testimony of others. In a perfect world, this would make things straightforward. But this is not a perfect world: some people are incompetent, some are insincere, and some are both. We need to be able to determine who is a good informant, that is, someone who is both competent and sincere. (De Brasi and Warman 2023, 12.)

18 See Erzetič 2021a.

The issues in the cases concerning Goli Otok extended beyond the personal level to the interpersonal level, as they had to confront and deal with untruthful statements by the political authorities, as well as being stigmatized and ostracized by society. Their situation did not change after the Yugoslavian dissolution into democratic republics in the 90's, and the co-existential crisis continued also in democratic systems. This contributed to the fact that Jovo Kapičić, who was appointed as the administrator of the camp on Goli Otok, was able to publish an interview,[19] in which he declared himself the only victim of Goli Otok.[20] Considering his life story, which is marked by assuming a very responsible position in the resistance drive during and in law enforcement after the Second World War, one might even believe him, but he himself was not prepared to give any testimony, instead insisting that he was merely following the orders of higher authorities. Although "storytelling has an important normative and institutional role in public deliberation and show that its applied version could overcome epistemic injustices and lead to better public policies" (Fragoso Pitasse 2022, 268), the testimony—which is according to Agamben always truthful or it is not a testimony at all—opens a direct path to a mode of communication that not only creates or intensifies epistemology role, but plays an important chain for justice and fairness for deliberative democracy.

According to De Brasi and Warman article, based on Ficker's theory, many of these indicator properties themselves rely on "stereotypes about social identity" or "whether a speaker is credible."

> However, these indicator properties—or rather, our reliance upon them—also leave us vulnerable to several types of error. Sometimes people possess indicator properties but lack competence or sincerity. In other words, some people who are not good informants are nevertheless regarded as if they were. This can lead us to form beliefs on the basis of the testimony of people who are ill-informed or insincere. This is undesirable.
>
> But perhaps the more pernicious variety of error is that which occurs when someone who is both competent and sincere is not

19 NTV Montena 2008.
20 Lovćenske Straže 2010.

> recognised as such. In cases of testimonial injustice, a speaker's testimony is not accepted by her hearer because, according to negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes held by the hearer, the speaker is either incompetent or insincere. (De Brasi and Warman, 13.)

In the case of Goli Otok in a demonstrable way, aspects of the personal, historical, political, literary, artistic, documentary, legal, and media aspects of testimony are permeated by the absent testimony itself and the avoidance of testimony relating *to the same event*, to something that happened like *Goli Otok*. The sign "Welcome to Goli Otok," which first greets a visitor of the island today, has a sarcastic impact, since it incidentally reminds one where they have come, and that Goli Otok is not a geographical marker, but the name of a frightening event.[21]

Marijan Rogić endured severe trauma in his life, which was triggered by his internment on Goli Otok as a high school student under the charge of inciting Croatian nationalism—about which he then had to keep silent on the island, otherwise he would have risked even worse torture. In 2004, he self-published a testimony about serving his sentence on Goli Otok, but under an alias, Kreša Mirčetić.[22] At first, my assumption was that the reason for this was his still-present fear of "law enforcement," which was visible upon his return to Goli Otok, where he suspected that agents of the former security service were present among the participants of the conference. Only later did it become clear that Rogić's permanent sense of trauma was not only connected to the torture he received as a prisoner on Goli Otok, and the social isolation that followed after his release, but was initially *dictated by his own confrontation with being a witness* to what happened to him on Goli Otok. At a conference, shortly before his death (2020), he described his experience as follows:

> A mental crisis gripped us: we became something there that we could not understand ourselves. We moved mechanically, thought mechanically; mindless without content! We expected something

21 "Where testimonial injustice presents an obstacle to equality among formally and epistemically enfranchised citizens, the injustices identified in this paper present obstacles to inclusion in the deliberative process." (De Brasi and Warman 2023, 22.)
22 Rogić 2004.

> constant, or—what!?! … Some time ago, while I was still on Goli Otok, the following thoughts came to me: "*I speak, I think, I talk to myself and I see: Someone, something guides me, protects me everywhere, even in everything, especially in such life-threatening danger. The Catholic in me responds to the Spirit of God… Suddenly, almost at the same time—in my thinking—another thought flew in from somewhere, which seemed to say to me: And you, as if you were standing next to all that, all those things, all the events, letters and you read—you stand, next to yourself, as if none of this concerns you. Is it you, or the other you, or maybe—who knows what!?!*"
>
> Yes, everything was possible on Goli Otok, and above all the impossibility of human reason! "*I didn't feel anything. Very strange (unusual), such that you can see and feel nothing. It seems impossible to understand and register evil of such magnitude (Größenordnung). Feeling is turned off, if certain limits are exceeded, transgressed.*"
>
> "*I continue to reason, I can't settle down: I stood, therefore, as I said a little while ago, next to myself: it was neither me, my person, nor any other essentiality known to me. Who then, I often wondered in the anthill of Goli Otok. The soul used often to cry—very quietly—, but no tears, no sighs, far less moans. It went on without will, without consciousness, so even composure was not manifested during it. A human being could not and should not show the will to live; not a trace of joy and happiness—neither in me, nor in the one next to me. There is no talk of any defense, any protection. Oppose… —whom, I'll beg!? Movements, feelings passed me by—mechanically, according to legal provisions, according to prison rules. I—myself—disappeared in the workshops, dormitories of the "rooms" of Goli Otok from number 1 to 6; while the number 7 (seven) was outside the "Wire" and was known as the number of "free men!", who had reformed, revised their attitude with their own blood. I disappeared on the karst of Goli Otok, and to this day I am gone, so gone!*" (Rogić 2021, 27–28.)

The experience of being-witness has somehow split Marijan Rogić's self-perception in two, resulting in a latent sense of living in a semi-world with an indefinite hope for a different and other world. What the semi-world means phenomenologically is an important and far-reaching question in itself, which cannot be satisfactorily developed in this context. The semi-world of witness is not simply an abnormal or unreal world; one's relationship with others, one's agency in it, one's valuing, feeling, and thinking may be quite normal, but they are pervaded by a certain detachment that can be experienced as traumatic.[23]

The traumatic is related to the return of *the existential demand to being-witness*, and can only be resolved in favorable circumstances by testifying to one's own confrontation with the situation of being a witness *to* and *for* others, which makes possible the awareness that the world, even if only as a semi-world, *is shared with others*. It is important to stress here that testimoniality encompasses not just one, but several forms of mediation, which we have mentioned above, from the personal, documentary, literary, social,[24] and historical to the media, legal, and religious, which in itself opens up different experiential horizons of the world.[25] Perhaps it is enough for a witness, as has been shown in the case of Marijan Rogić and as is seen today in the case of many victims of war, ideological, social, or interpersonal violence, that at least some horizon of the world has been opened up to him or her *possibility of testifying and conversation with others.*

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23 The relevant role in detraumatization process is certainly played by the possibility of dialogue and communication with the other(s), which must not, however, be reduced simply to combining "the main items of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI), such as 'Level of justification,' 'Content of justification,' and 'Respect,' into a single variable" (Nakazawa *et al*. 2024, 2) as described in terms of the broader discourse of deliberative practices in the article "An Effect of Storytelling on Attitude Changes in Deliberative Mini-Publics."

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Community Ending Phenomenologically Explained

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Abstract

When it comes to the concept of community in phenomenology, possibility holds a higher value than reality. The author emphasizes that a community becomes more attractive to its participants the broader the range of possibilities, which can be realized within it. On the other hand, the dynamic of a community is determined by the degree of alignment or misalignment between the changes of individuals and of their habitual patterns, and the habitualness of the community. When the two habitual patterns—the one of the community and the one of its participants—reach an irreconcilable antagonism, the end of the community is inevitable. Paradoxically, the ideal community is precisely the one whose members can relatively easily accept its dissolution. Unlike totalitarian forms of sociality, in which only the possibilities of the community are realized, but not those of the individuals, members of the ideal community manage to maintain awareness of their own possibilities, recognizing that no community is in the position to completely exhaust an individual's potential. In the second part of the paper, the author presents three types of potential community dissolution, which arise from varying degrees of attachment to the possibilities that the community is capable of realizing.

Keywords: phenomenology, community, possibility, dissolution, habituality.

Konec skupnosti, fenomenološko razjasnjen

Povzetek

Ko gre za pojmovanje skupnosti znotraj fenomenologije, ima možnost višjo vrednost kakor resničnost. Avtor poudari, da skupnost za njene udeležence postaja privlačnejša, kolikor širši nabor možnosti je mogoče uresničiti znotraj nje. Na drugi strani dinamiko skupnosti določa stopnja ujemanja ali neujemanja med spremembami posameznikov ter njihovih habitualnih vzorcev in habitualnostjo skupnosti same. Ko habitualna vzorca – vzorec skupnosti in vzorec njenih udeležencev – dosežeta nepomirljiv antagonizem, je konec skupnosti neogiben. Paradoksalno je idealna skupnost natanko tista, člani katere lahko relativno zlahka sprejmejo njen razkroj. V nasprotju s totalitarnimi oblikami socialnosti, v katerih se uresničujejo samo možnosti skupnosti, ne njenih posameznikov, člani idealne skupnosti zmorejo ohranjati zavedanje o lastnih možnostih, s tem ko pripoznavajo, da nobena skupnost ne more popolnoma izčrpati posameznikovega potenciala. V drugem delu prispevka avtor predstavi tri tipe potencialnega razkroja skupnosti, kakršni izhajajo iz različnih stopenj navezave na možnosti, ki jih je skupnost sposobna uresničiti.

Ključne besede: fenomenologija, skupnost, možnost, razkroj, habitualnost.

In the present article, we begin from the thesis that the advantages of the phenomenological approach to community, in comparison with philosophical anthropology or social psychology, lie in the ontological claim that possibility takes precedence over actuality, as well as in the specific phenomenological concept of habituality. The first insight of the Husserlian phenomenology of intersubjectivity is that we become who we are thanks to the communities, in which we participate. This means that our personal boundaries are also the boundaries of our interactions with others. If that is the case, transcendence can only be achieved in the realm of human relationships, *entre nous*. It is as if the field, usually understood as fixed by mutual power relations and constrained by adopted routines, turns out to be the greatest promise for subjectivity. For only in this area can we change; only through communal relationships can we shift our own boundaries.

Husserl recognizes the constitutive element of subjectivity not only in the real, but also in the possible, proposing for this purpose the neologism "All-community" (*Allgemeinschaft*). This concept is conceived by him as the foundation of the lifeworld, which includes both existing customary institutions and traditions, as well as takes into account possible institutions and traditions. A possible community is inseparable from the actual community. Moreover, even in the phenomenological encounters with the phenomenon of togetherness—it still holds true that possibility is higher than reality. Its higher ontological status lies in the fact that a community should be understood as a horizon of the realization of possibilities. Therefore, the range of the realization of possibilities represents the key criterion, upon which a community is evaluated and assessed.

For a phenomenologist, to think about the community means to step out of the concrete experience of community, that is, to include in it all the variations of the potential forms of community. In other words, this means that in the constitution of individual thinking and action, not only the forms of community known to my language, my people, and my cultural heritage participate. This circumstance does not concern mere traditionalism, because to discover a community, my gaze does not need to be directed towards the past. Likewise, it is not hidden neither in external reality nor in the people or institutions surrounding me. Self-inspection is quite sufficient. Reflection upon ourselves reveals the sources of our personality in social acts or in relations with others: "What man is and means beyond his animal existence is determined solely by the social *Milieu*." (Litt 1926, 204.)

We will define the concept of community in the broader sense of the word based on the Husserlian concept of the state as *a conscious organization of will* (cf. Husserl 2006, 52). When it comes to the individuals who make up a community, a sense of mutual belonging is necessary among them, along with a certain degree of agreement and harmony, which is important to achieve through free will of the participants, rather than being dictated externally or from the top of a hierarchy.

Furthermore, it is essential to distinguish between egoistic desires and achievements, aimed solely at fulfilling personal demands and satisfactions of community members, and the common purposes and achievements. Husserl emphasizes that common purposes have a different spiritual meaning from any individual act as well as from the actions of individual subjects as parts of the community.

It should also be noted that the demands of an ideal community in reality encounter their limits due to the imbalance between the realities of the participants in the community and their possibilities. We may agree with Edith Stein when she claims:

> […] we know that the lifepower of a community doesn't exist independently and alongside of its components, but rather coalesces from the power of the single [members]. However the individuals don't contribute their full, undivided power into the community, but [contribute] only insofar as they are living as members of the community. (Stein 2000, 233.)

An ideal community would thus be one that leads its members to the fulfillment of all their possibilities. However, such an outcome is not possible, because the range of possibilities we possess is neither fully determined and defined, nor is it precisely limited in advance. Consequently, there is a potential for a certain degree of dissatisfaction with the community when its participants, despite everything they have achieved within it, become aware of some possibilities that remain unrealized. The birth of discomfort is expected as soon as one has realized that some possibilities cannot be achieved within the given community. The dynamic and unpredictable gap between the realized and the possible represents a permanent source of crisis within a community that cannot be fully overcome or eliminated. Thus, it is necessary to agree with the thesis regarding the limitations of every form of community:

> No natural, spiritual, or psychological [seelische] connection to a community is so strong that it is able to break free from the region of possibility. All life with others carries the germ of the capacity of dissolution because souls are more than what they factually are. (Plessner 1999, 105.)

On the other hand, every desire and action of an individual member of the community can be reflected in relation to the supra-individual desires of the community. These leave their mark on the community's interest by either strengthening the community, contributing to its maintenance, or weakening its connective tissue. Besides the communal perspective, it is necessary to pay attention to the internal view, that is, the way, in which the relationship to the community constitutes its participants. Despite the Husserlian emphasis on *the particular importance of common purposes*, it seems that phenomenological approach is more productive through reflecting *the mutual interactions of individual participants within the community*, and that its methodology is more suitable for illuminating the "'internal constitution' for the member, which means for the conscious subject who feels connected with other subjects in a social community, who feels like a member of that community" (Walter 1923, 17).

The dissolution of community: The conflict of habitualities

Phenomenology does not consider individual subjects within a community as completed, once-and-for-all determined agents. Rather, an individual is understood as a person undergoing constant change. The changes experienced by individual participants in a community are never completely aligned, nor do they occur in the same way or direction. Hence, the community is not a mere fusion, in the same way as love is not simply a merging. Among community members, no matter how successful the community is, the presence of otherness is necessary—an irreducible otherness that is always accompanied to some extent by "tensions and ambiguities" (Guibal 2009, 17).

Where all community members are the same, where they have somehow become indistinguishable from one another, there is a caricature of community. The fundamental test of community must affirmatively respond to the question about difference and otherness among its members. To the objection that differences introduce divisions into the community, which follows the model of St. Paul and his famous call for being "perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment," it must be countered that *the absence of difference points to forms of community where individuals are deprived of realizing their own possibilities*. The unanimity of a community convincingly testifies that only the possibilities of the community are being realized, not personal possibilities. Establishing a total agreement is inconceivable without the colonization of necessity where space was once reserved for possibilities. Finally, it is perverse to have a relationship with other human beings that tend to eliminate their otherness: "A perverse world is a world without the other, hence a world without the possible. The other is the one who enables. A perverse world in which the category of necessity has completely replaced the category of possibility." (Deleuze 1969, 372.)

This inherent variability of the actors inevitably reflects within the community. We cannot assume the whole to be stable and permanent where its constituent parts are subject to constant change. Therefore, a community is fundamentally unfinished: "the community is essentially unfinished, that its incompleteness is its essence; the essence, which is precisely and necessarily defective, of its existence, of its being simple existence" (Esposito 2010, 95). Additionally, every intersubjective community is characterized by a common surrounding world, or "common habitualities" (Husserl 1973, 230), as well as by "common effects." From this perspective, the dynamics of a community are determined by the degree of alignment or misalignment between the changes of individuals and of their habitualities, and the habitualities of the community. A consciously organized collective will enters into crisis primarily due to the changes in its actors or the changed circumstances, in which they function together. Viewed from the perspective of its participants, the horizon of possibilities that the community is able to fulfill plays a special role in the crisis of the community.

When a community provides no opportunity for the fulfillment or realization of its participants' possibilities, it is perceived as static and overly passive. Inevitably, the motivations for participating in such a community gradually weaken. Moreover, a community that leaves its participants' possibilities unfulfilled irresistibly closely resembles a prison cell with its rules and authorities. The awareness of unrealized possibilities that can only be achieved within a community, but certainly not within the current one, naturally fosters a negative attitude towards the community. This negativity can only be overcome, if the community itself changes. On the other hand, those communities that present a boundless and inexhaustible field of possibilities, no matter how difficult their realization might be in reality, appear promising and attractive. Hence, the key to increasing the attractiveness of a community lies in offering possibilities that once seemed unachievable, but are now within reach. Communities also appear attractive when they significantly expand possibilities that previously existed only in much more modest forms.

From the community's perspective, a crisis appears as an expression of disloyalty, selfish indifference to communal matters. This is especially evident in those types of communities, which are not taken for granted and for which one must fight. When indifference towards the community is demonstrated, instead of readiness to fight for its maintenance, the question of its dissolution becomes merely a matter of time. One thing is certain—when the habituality of the community and of its constituents reach an irreconcilable antagonism, the end of the community is inevitable.

We observe two extremes, in which the dissolution of a community reveals its character. Namely, where the community is understood as constitutive for its members and decisively shapes their self-awareness, reactions against the mere possibility of the community ceasing to exist are inevitably intense and violent. In such contexts, the dissolution of the community is simply not accepted. Individuals who largely identify with the community will react to the very possibility of its end with maximum discomfort and will do everything to prevent it. Those who do not hesitate to resort to violence, in order to preserve a community, typically do so, because their identity is so intertwined with the idea of the community that for them, it becomes impossible to consider themselves as being outside of it.

Moreover, the phenomenon of violently preserving a community indicates the abolition of difference, where the personal, the individual, is virtually lost in the communal. It is important to note that the merging of the personal and the communal is not only a desire of totalitarian systems or merely the result of various forms of collective subjugation of the individual. This merging might also occur thanks to free will of the community's participants. Simply put, such a will could be characterized by the identification of the personal with the communal. Drastic examples of this can be found in diverse communities. In many manifestations of love, the personal is lost in the idea of the loving community; numerous communities function as based on the voluntary or calculated subjugation of the individual will to the collective will embodied in the figure of a leader, chief, commander, abbot, and so on. In such cases, a crisis in the community is experienced as a radical questioning or existential threat to those participants who find it extremely uncomfortable to envision themselves outside the community.

The phenomenon of war represents the pinnacle of community domination. A state of war is the ideal medium for establishing the primacy of the collective and of the communal over the personal and the individual. The paradoxical dialectic of war speaks to a time of destruction and devastation, annihilation of life that promotes itself as a fantastic opportunity for the ultimate liberation and for the establishment of an authentic community. What manifests in reality as desolation, devastation, and collapse is presented in the realm of possibilities, which imply freedom, purification, and authenticity:

> […] the most important concept that determines the meaning of such war events, namely the concept of "liberation" (often conjuring in the popular mind images of shackles breaking, removing the yoke of foreign occupation, escaping from a "dungeon of peoples," and the like), creates the illusion of returning to an original and perennial ethnic form. (Vlaisavljević 2022, 42.)

Therefore, the polarization in a state of war takes on the most drastic forms—examples of sacrifice for the community and the willingness to give up one's life for the common good are highlighted as models. The figure of the hero represents the archetype, providing a source of self-confidence and enhancing the combat readiness of the community. The next level of positive exemplars is found in the traditional virtue of courage. War events require not just a sense of belonging to a common cause, but also courage, an active readiness to confront those who threaten the community.

Conversely, negative patterns are primarily seen in traitors of the community, those who place their personal well-being or the preservation of their lives above the interests of the community. The figure of the traitor inevitably faces symbolic ostracism from the community. Once it distances itself from the traitor, the community reconstitutes and mobilizes itself in a renewed form—demonstrating that the figures of traitors also possess an integrative power for a community, similar to the power mediated by the figures of heroes who have sacrificed themselves for the community. The figure of the coward represents the next level of negative exemplars, since the community of cowards is inconceivable as a fighting community. Due to the critical nature of courage in a community, reactions to instances of cowardice are almost as severe and rigorous as those directed at treason. Both cowardice as well as betrayal threaten the integrity and survival of the community, warranting strict measures to address them.

Three possibilities for community dissolution

1. Independence and Detachment. In scenarios where a sense of independence prevails, regardless of whether it is justified or false, the dissolution of the community will not provoke many negative reactions. Members who do not feel a strong connection to the community may perceive their association with it as a burden they are eager to shed. Emphasizing their distinctness from the community can serve as a justification for leaving it. The modern crisis of community is characterized by the increasingly accepted possibility that one can leave a community altogether, a civilizational development that was unimaginable for many centuries and millennia. Today, where the common denominator between a community and its members are lost for any reason, there is little effort made to maintain it.

2. Attachment and Resistance to Dissolution. In contrast, where the community is seen as constitutive of its members' identities and decisively shapes their self-awareness, reactions to the possibility of its end are intense and violent. Members who cannot imagine themselves outside of the community will resist its dissolution with great discomfort, even resorting to violence, in order to preserve it. This reaction stems from the intertwining of personal identity with the idea of the community, where the personal is almost lost within the communal. This merging can result from the totalitarian systems or from the voluntary will of the community's participants, leading to the identification of the personal with the communal.

3. Conflict and Divergent Valuations. The third possibility lies somewhere in between the two extremes. Conflicts over the community's dissolution or survival arise when participants significantly differ in how they assess and value its importance and its role in their self-understanding. It is difficult to avoid conflict when one side cannot imagine themselves outside of the community, while the other associates a more fulfilling future with life beyond the existing community. An idealized form of community would imply consensus with regard to its dissolution. In such cases, all interested parties independently recognize the realm of possibilities outside the community. Paradoxically, the ideal community would be the one whose members can easily handle its dissolution.

These scenarios illustrate the complex dynamics and potential outcomes related to the dissolution of communities, reflecting both the individual as well as collective dimensions of such transitions. This does not concern neither a frivolous disregard for the community nor an ease of leaving the community, which would inevitably suggest that there was never a serious sense of belonging to it. Rather, it concerns the maintaining of an awareness of possibilities, the fact that no community can fully exhaust the possibilities of an individual.

The first and third options for ending a community imply some form of conflict, while in the case of the independence of members from the community, one can expect a quiet and peaceful separation. Does conflict say anything about the quality of the community? Specifically, is it expected that a high-quality community that provides certain benefits to all its participants, making life within it far better than without it, can also have a dignified breakup, during which the former participants treat each other with great respect? These general problems are going to be solved by means of the attitudes of individual actors regarding the end of their shared life.

There is an impression that does not corroborate the equation, according to which a bad community would necessarily mean a turbulent, unpleasant breakup, while the highest forms of community would necessarily result in an unselfish and noble end to the community. We record examples of bad communities where relations among the actors drastically improved after the community ended, with the breakup itself proceeding as good as possible. Simply put, when participants in a community become aware that their community is not good for them, change seems promising. When the community no longer supports the realization of the possibilities of its members, but instead suppresses and prevents them, separation seems beneficial and potentially allows relations to become better than they were during the community's existence. Additionally, there are examples of excellent communities that had a beneficial effect on their members, but ended in the worst imaginable way. The reason lies in the attitude towards the end of the community, specifically in the immeasurably different significance the community had in the self-awareness of its actors. When harsh differences emerge among the actors of a community, especially where some actors do not want to see themselves deprived of the community, while others primarily want to leave the community, some form of violence ensues, the extent of which was unimaginable at the time when all actors expressed similar interest in remaining in the community.

A phenomenological view of modernity would not fail to point out the genealogy of contemporary subjectivity responsible for the weakening of community and communal bonds. However, the impression is that modernity is not characterized by conflicts or desires to confront the community, but rather by disinterest or a dispirited attitude towards it. The former power of the community, which members could not even think of leaving, has today been replaced by impotence, the other extreme, which is widely reflected in indifference towards forming communities. This is not solely due to the democratization of community in terms of the possibility of leaving it and the consequent awareness of the limitations and finiteness of every community. The forms of personal fulfillment or interaction with others that could once be found only in a community are now offered by the simulacra of the virtual worlds and various forms of interaction via social networks. The causes of the twilight of contemporary forms of community, such as friendship, joint political action, or spontaneous forms of association, are recognized in the absence of a need for them. Today, community is lacking, because substitutes are massively found elsewhere. There are countless substitute versions of immediate interaction. These usually take place in the comfortable security of the virtual community, where the risks of various forms of conflict and misunderstandings that occur during direct encounters are almost nonexistent.

The phenomenon of degenerated nationalism

Phenomenology does not wish to expand and internationalize the community as much as possible, but attempts to include in our concept of the communal everything that encompasses not only the real and former, but also potential intersubjectivity. To put it more precisely, such a community would necessarily be pluralistic, because it would include idealized forms, patterns, and symbols of exceptionally successful types of community, as well as those forms of imbalance between the interests of the community and the organization of will that lead the community to disintegration. Husserl's personal and philosophical experience with the community, unfortunately, in his later years, was primarily confronted with a community in disintegration:

> That skeptical pessimism and shamelessness, which have prevailed in the political sophistry of our time, which uses socio-ethical argumentation only as a cover for the political purposes of completely degenerate nationalism, would hardly be possible if the naturally formed concepts of community, despite their naturalness, were not burdened with dark horizons, intricate and hidden mediations, whose elucidation far exceeds the capacities of uneducated thought. (Husserl 1989, 5.)

According to Husserl, contemporary sophists are politicians who work to achieve the aims of degenerate nationalism. Written in the early 1920s for the Japanese readers, the "Five Articles on Renewal" mention a sort of fiasco of the community that is, on one hand, natural, but on the other, blurred by dark horizons, that is, intricate and hidden mediations. Husserl refers to the "naturalness" of a national community of one culture, language, and tradition. Such a community becomes "unnatural" when it sees itself as higher, more valuable, and more significant than other communities.

The horizon of self-awareness thus becomes dark; since it is filled with awareness of what the nation is not, it is composed of fictions about itself. A community that has projected itself into what it is not appears powerful to its members, because it promises the realization of possibilities that are not self-evident and whose realization is very difficult to expect. Moreover, we interpret hidden mediation as false mediation, as mediation, in which the current moment of the community is projected into a future moment of achieved dominance over other communities:

> A different idea is formed, a national idea, but not as a general idea of culture, but as a ruling idea that has spread within every nation: the national idea as an egotistical idea of power and as an egotistical idea of elevated self-valuation. This idea acts contagiously […]. (Ibid., 121.)

The next prerequisite for the phenomenological thinking of community lies in implementing a neutralization in the sense of suspending the validity of the existing community. Only when the awareness of the existence of relations with a community is relativized by adopting the possibility of their radically altered validity, do we approach the threshold of neutralization. The work of neutralization, however, is not reducible to creating apathetic subjectivity. It does not involve severing everyday emotional and existential connections with the community. A neutralized view is simply not neutral in the usual sense of the word. It does not signify impartiality, nor does it aim for a lack of personal interest in the community. On the contrary, it involves examining the present from the perspective of its absence:

> […] when I practice on the ground of nothingness, I simultaneously subject the real to the epoché. […] If I remain in the same attitude, I always repeatedly go through nothingness, always repeatedly through annulled being… (Husserl 2008, 416.)

It seems that the experience of community is particularly illuminated thanks to the shift, in which nothingness seizes us. Beside the many possibilities of communal existence, its ultimate possibility points to negation, to the cessation of communal life. This is not to say that the end of communal life represents its essence, but rather that the essence of the community cannot be phenomenologically comprehended if this ultimate possibility is omitted. The manner and character of a community's dissolution, in any case, represent an experience that more eloquently testifies to the specific form of communal life than mere natural existence within it. While the natural attitude, on the one hand, implies the existence of some form of community and takes it for granted, the phenomenological assessment of lost or interrupted communal life yields multiple results. Above all, the experience of a negated community potentially creates in us a devastating sense of temporariness. Since individuation is conceivable only as an intersubjective process that occurs within and thanks to the community, its loss causes a disruption, a loss of the links that weave temporal threads into a unified whole. Structurally akin to the experience of shock, the loss of community cannot simply be integrated with the previous experience, during which the community existed. As we become who we are through interactions within a community, its cessation results in a break in experiential continuity, creating a radical gap between being-in-community and being outside of it. Individuals deprived of community are unable to reconcile with the idea that this is now a permanent state, nor can they give up the expectation that they might achieve something better. The traumatic effect of losing a community is reflected in confronting nihilism, the nothingness of broken interpersonal bonds. The experience of that kind of nihilism is contrary to the idea of the subjects as the masters of their possibilities.

The disintegration of a community takes away possibilities and therefore always entails a certain form of desubjectivation. The subject loses themselves to some extent; hence, the rhetoric of losing and disappearance of some form of communal life is associated with impoverishment, with the mute experience. In other words, it involves the impossibility of a linguistic articulation of the experience. Losing community is structurally akin to the loss of freedom, as it introduces powerlessness where a sense of power once appeared. Hence, the different degrees of attachment to the community that is no longer are directly reflected in incomparable intensities of the need to compensate for its disappearance. Where communal life represented a source of personal identity, where it was intimately appropriated, the loss takes on the form of a trauma, a dramatic experience that demands to be replaced by some alternative form of community.

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Gnosis and *Pistis* in Tillich's and Kierkegaard's Philosophical Theology

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Abstract

The article analyzes and compares the philosophical theology of Kierkegaard and Tillich. They are usually represented as exponents of the same (existentialist-Protestant) tradition, but a different perception of the main questions and possibilities for philosophical theology to answer them guides these philosophers to radically different conclusions regarding the philosophy of religion. A closer look at how they understand faith (*pistis*) unlocks new possibilities to interpret the ideas of Kierkegaard and Tillich rather than to accept "chrestomathic" analyses. Tillich's implicit loyalty to Platonic and Hegelian ideas subordinates the existential aspects of his system to answers, which can be described as a "gnostic" understanding of faith and knowledge. This violates the limits for theoretical knowledge set by Kierkegaard. Such a Tillichian ontological loyalty explains that an ontological search is implicated in every religious experience. This basic presupposition of interaction with the sacred for Tillich lets us view Kierkegaard's famous interpretation of biblical myths critically, and to argue that these stories do not mean that the only possible faith is "blind" faith. This opens a path for Tillich to rationalize every aspect of Christianity and to talk about "true God," God beyond the gods of actual religions.

Keywords: Paul Tillich, Søren Kierkegaard, faith, knowledge, religious experience, theology.

Gnosis in _pistis_ v Tillichovi in Kierkegaardovi filozofski teologiji

Povzetek

Članek analizira in primerja filozofsko teologijo pri Kierkegaardu in Tillichu. Navadno oba razumemo kot predstavnika iste (eksistencialistično-protestantske) tradicije, a različno dojemanje poglavitnih vprašanj in možnosti, da filozofska teologija odgovori nanje, je oba misleca vodilo k radikalno drugačnim zaključkom glede filozofije religije. Natančnejši vpogled v to, kako razumeta vero (*pistis*), razpira nove možnosti interpretacije Kierkegaardovih in Tillichovih idej, namesto da bi preprosto sprejeli »hrestomatične« analize. Tillichova implicitna zvestoba platonskim in heglovskim idejam eksistencialne vidike njegovega sistema podreja odgovorom, ki jih je mogoče opisati kot »gnostično« razumevanje vere in védenja. To prekoračuje meje teoretskega védenja, kakor jih je začrtal Kierkegaard. Takšna Tillichova ontološka zvestoba pomeni, da sleherno religiozno izkustvo vključuje ontološko iskanje. Po Tillichu tovrstna temeljna predpostavka interakcije s svetim omogoča kritičen pogled na Kierkegaardovo znamenito interpretacijo bibličnih mitov in omogoča zagovor mnenja, da »slepa« vera ni edina možnost njihovega dojetja. S tem se Tillichu odpre pot k racionalizaciji slehernega vidika krščanstva in h govoru o »resničnem bogu«, bogu onkraj bogov dejanskih religij.

Ključne besede: Paul Tillich, Søren Kierkegaard, vera, védenje, religiozno izkustvo, teologija.

Systematic and philosophical theology

Paul Tillich is known as the most influential creator of systematic theology of the last century. However, "system" is not simply a feature of Tillich's philosophizing or a way of presenting it; we cannot say that this philosophical theology is such and such, nor is it systematic. There is no "also," because it is a thinking in a system. The extent, to which the concept of a system dominates his work, is something Tillich himself admitted in the introduction to the first volume of *Systematic Theology*: "I have never been able to think theologically in any other way than systematically. The smallest problem, if taken seriously and radically, led me to all the others, anticipating the whole in which these would find their solution." (Tillich 1951, vii.)

Indeed, Tillich's works are remarkable for their unity, and the English version (written after his emigration in 1933) can be considered as one large treatise. It is a thinking that emphasizes the whole, a single basic model that can explain all the components, a general principle, around which all the differences are gathered. If Tillich were only concerned with the coherence of propositions, with logical coherence, he would simply be a "systemic thinker," but what makes him a thinker in a system is his principled refusal to satisfy his intellectual passion with anything less than the whole. All problems must be solved by absorbing them into a unified arch-schema.

Tillich was convinced that thinking inexorably leads to the discovery of ultimate truths and that constructing systems is very much a part of human nature: "the history of human thought has been and is now the history of great systems" (Tillich 1951, 59). In making this declaration, Tillich risks approaching the stylistics of traditional metaphysics, a position that few theologians or philosophers have held since Hegel (with the exception of the neo-Thomists). Thus, by equating thought with systematicity, Tillich argued that both philosophy and theology must appear in a system, and he himself became one of those rare philosophers of religion who, in the post-Hegelian era, constructed a system of philosophical theology, in which the answers to fundamental existential questions were presented in the form of traditional Christian symbols. Such an idea immediately raises the question of whether systematic thought and the existential nature of faith are compatible. If so, is this perhaps embodied in Tillich's system?

Tillich argued that systematicity is only a form that does not distort the content of the teaching, especially when each part of the system begins with a section on existential analysis. However, the myth of existential analysis without assumptions has long since collapsed, so we can conclude that the hermeneutics of symbols (theological answers) in Tillich's system is dependent on existential analysis (the questions raised by the human situation). At the same time, it is unconvincing that a system as a form of teaching is necessary. Just as Kierkegaard observed, a system as a form does not necessarily have to present a complete position, so it is not always necessary to write systems (Kierkegaard 2000, 8).

It is noteworthy that Tillich's system stems from the distinction proposed by Hegel himself between the concept of "religion in general" and "concrete, existing religions." The latter are the first historical expressions and progressive manifestations of religious experience. Hegel clearly wanted to emphasize that the abstract concept of religion is something different from concrete religions. For Tillich, "religion" in a broad sense meant a certain "depth" in every aspect of human activity, cultural or mental, theoretical or practical. In this sense, religion is the experience of the unconditional, which Tillich would later replace with the ultimate concern. In a narrower sense, "religion" is a specific socio-cultural sphere that exists alongside other spheres. As Clayton notes, the root of this dualism can be found in Hegel's philosophy. In his lectures on the philosophy of religion, Hegel distinguishes the concept of "religion in general" from "concrete, existing religions" (Clayton 1980, 91). As mentioned, the latter mark the first historical expressions and progressive manifestations of religion. Using his favorite metaphor of the tree, which was used by ancient thinkers, Hegel argues that the history of religion is potentially given in the abstract concept of religion, so this history is the development of the latter. Every religion, even the most imperfect one, contributes to the development of the perfect religion.

Inspired by these ideas, Tillich distinguishes Christianity from its "foundation." Like Hegel, he believes that "the tendencies inherent in other cultures and religions anticipate and are fulfilled in the Christian response"

(Tillich 1951, 15). Thus, in Christianity the "religious principle" or the "idea of universal theology" is most successfully manifested. However, this means that Christianity as a religion in the narrow sense is not as fundamental as its foundation. Even the attributes traditionally attributed to the Church—holiness, monolithicity—, according to Tillich, "can only be applied to the foundation" (Tillich 1963, 337). The only distinctiveness that elevates Christianity above other religions is the superiority of its foundation (the Christological event). Thus, paradoxically, no particular religion (not even Christianity) can be fundamental in the absolute sense, although if any religion can supplant Christianity, it is only a more perfect form of Christianity itself. When theology is understood in a universal sense, as an interpretation of religion in general, the theologies of various religions in a narrower sense become subtypes of this knowledge. Similarly, Christian theology can provide deeper knowledge than one could achieve without it, but it is only one of the "information channels of holiness."

So, there is one thing that Tillich certainly does not mean when he speaks of Christianity: its unparalleled authority, that is, the unconditional acceptance of knowledge. This attitude stems from philosophical theology as a project of uncommitted, independent thinking. Thus, Tillich is not inclined to quickly accept the postulates of faith, but rather to analyze the conclusions of knowledge first. Where a believer speaks of the knowledge of God, Tillich sees rituals, symbols, and myths, and asks: what is the substance of these manifestations? Christianity is characterized by religious substance (truth), but only a universal philosophical theology can reveal this truth.

However, if the superiority of Christian theology (over other confessions) is the ability to fully and definitively express the idea of theology itself, this presupposes that we already have knowledge of what constitutes the idea of theology and can interpret a specific theological tradition from the perspective of universal knowledge. This relationship between concept and symbol is reflected in Tillich's statement: "Without a corresponding understanding of 'being' and 'the power of being' it is impossible to speak meaningfully about grace." (Tillich 1957, 125.) It is clear that the basis of universal theology is a certain worldview of speculative ontology.

Incorporating Kierkegaard's ideas into a system

We have mentioned that such a fostering of metaphysical systematicity as we find in Tillich's system has rarely been found in philosophy since the time of Hegel. As is known, Hegel's most ardent opponent was Kierkegaard (Westphal 1997, Lippitt 2003). Of course, there were other critics of Hegel, but their critiques ended with the proposal of a supposedly more perfect system (Hannay and Marino 1997, Conway 2002). By contrast, Kierkegaard radically questioned systematic thinking itself, or rather, "thinking in a system." In the name of the Christian faith, he rejected not just certain elements of Hegel's thought but the very concept of "system."

In the case of Tillich, we have an ambiguous situation. He often criticizes Hegel on the basis of Kierkegaard's ideas and also gives meaning to the concept of "existence," so it may seem (as is often uncritically and positively stated) that Tillich unconditionally follows the "father of existentialism" (Tillich 1948, 98). Yet, in defending the necessity of a system in theology, Tillich takes the opposite side of the barricades to Kierkegaard. This ambiguity encourages us to treat Tillich's existentialism in an original way.

Tillich, although he derived existentialism from the ideas of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Marx, sought parallels in the 20th century in the works of Heidegger and Sartre, which have been recognized as "one of the main influences on his thinking" (Kegley and Bretall 1952, 11). Tillich sought the roots of his existential philosophy both in the works of Schelling and in the philosophy of Hegel: "the revolt against Hegel's essentialist philosophy was embodied by using Hegel's own existentialist elements, albeit in a subdued form" (Tillich 1999, 100). This quotation is significant, because it reveals Tillich's attitude towards existentialist philosophy. He is often called a Christian existentialist, but this label requires so many qualifications that it quickly becomes meaningless. First of all, Tillich never thought that the existentialist treatment of the world could be sufficient. On the contrary, existentialist elements must inevitably be linked to their opposites, essentialist elements, because "they themselves ultimately make a negative contribution to knowledge" (Tillich 1951, 154). It is also worth noting his comments made in the article "On the Boundary Line": "I have never been an existentialist in the sense that Kierkegaard or Heidegger are. All meaningful existential statements are based on their opposites, essentialist insights." (Tillich 1960, 437.) In this piece, Tillich emphasized that a well-founded existentialist philosophy relies on implicit essentialist elements, which in the case of a theological system are not only inevitable, but must also be stated out loud.

Here, he calls his research essentialist, which allows him to criticize Hegel's ideas on the basis of Kierkegaard's criticism. Kierkegaard's entire doctrine emphasizes the impossibility of uniting Christianity and speculative philosophy. The title of the book *Either/Or* (1992) is a body and a practical program. It is a demand for self-determination, action, and a leap of faith, a call for the individual to decide for himself, and not to try to justify existential self-determination by appealing to the laws of the intellect or the nature of the objectively perceived universe. In short, Kierkegaard believes that man's relationship to his own existence requires unconditional recognition of the supremacy of the authority of faith over reason. And in Tillich's view, essentialist philosophy can include a discussion of existence, and it can also find a place for faith.

The most obvious "gaps" in the system of thought occur, when Tillich "borrows" an idea from Kierkegaard and immediately transforms it. For example, in the following passage, he discusses the formal criteria of (universal) theology: "The object of theology is that which is of ultimate concern to us. Only those propositions are theological which discuss their object insofar as this can become the object of ultimate concern to us." (Tillich 1951, 12.) Tillich links the concept of "ultimate concern" to Kierkegaard's "infinite passion and interest," undoubtedly drawing on the Dane's description of Christianity as "a maximally personal, infinite, passionate concern for one's own eternal happiness" (Kierkegaard 1941, 261). But are the concepts used by these thinkers synonymous? Although they are not contradictory, the contexts, in which they are used, vary significantly. Tillich implements what Kierkegaard singled out as a manifestation of essentialist thinking, that is, the "immanent transition of speculative philosophy" (Kierkegaard 1941, 33). The transition occurs, when the statement (in Tillich) is declared general, establishing a universal class of theological statements. Kierkegaard, by contrast, assumes a distinction. Although he also seeks to define, he defines a certain specific

"Christian religion." He also does not draw any universal conclusions, and the word "personal" disappears in Tillich's version. Tillich's second formal (universal) theological criterion states: "The ultimate concern is that which determines our being and non-being. Only those statements are theological which concern the object insofar as it can become for us a matter of being and non-being." (Tillich 1951, 14.)

Such an analysis of ultimate concern does not coincide with Kierkegaard's "infinite, personal, passionate interest." For Kierkegaard, interest is infinite, when the individual is confronted with Christian truths and must decide for himself about them. The individual can discover infinite interest perhaps, because Christianity is precisely the promise of infinite happiness:

> Christianity offers to grant infinite happiness to the individual man, thus foreseeing the infinite interest of such happiness as the conditio sine qua non; an interest for which the individual does not hate father and mother, and therefore definitely rejects speculative systems and the outlines of universal history. (Kierkegaard 1941, 19.)

In such a context, it is meaningless to talk about deciding for something abstract, say, in terms of such a universal concept as "Being." The addition of "my being" does not change the situation and seems dramatic, because, in this case, such a type of being is still envisaged, which universally characterizes such a being as a human being (no one has ever met him anywhere), and this Tillich defines as "the totality, structure, meaning and purpose of human reality"—a definition, for which a speculative system is necessary to illuminate. So, instead of the individual person, focusing on his or her own infinite happiness, Tillich offers speculative claims about the meaning of existence itself.

Theological criteria are not the only examples of Tillich's free play with Kierkegaard's ideas. Usually, the same system is in operation: first, the "existentialist" idea of Kierkegaard is presented, then it is transformed and included in the system. However, the example of criteria is quite radical, because here Tillich, by formalizing Kierkegaard's thesis that the individual can be infinitely concerned with his infinite happiness, "gets rid" of both the individual and his interest in his happiness. Here, an ultimate concern is raised, without any specific content. This allows us to move on to a completely different object than in Kierkegaard's case, namely, to being or non-being (the birth of a system). According to Hamilton, Kierkegaard emphasizes that the systematic thinker does not have to resort to faith as a source of truth (Hamilton 1963, 48). The system itself brings truth into being. The most that such a thinker can do is to recognize that faith is a necessary element (alongside knowledge) on the path to truth. However, only the authority of the system decides, where truth is and where it is not. From this point of view, all religions include both truth and error, and the system is the agency that separates the wheat from the chaff. Only on the basis of authoritative knowledge can the system serve the Christian faith. Kierkegaard denies that the individual can sum up the whole of reality in a system. This is how he treats the limits of human knowledge:

> Since it is impossible to think existence, but nevertheless the existing individual still thinks, what does that mean? This means that he thinks with interruptions, that he thinks before and after. His thinking cannot achieve absolute continuity. Only in a fantastic way can the existing individual be constantly sub specie aeterni. (Kierkegaard 1941, 207.)

This is Kierkegaard's version of Spinoza's concept, which expresses the fundamental error of systematic thinking—to treat life "from the standpoint of eternity," ignoring existential conditionality.

Question and answer: How unfortunate is love?

Kierkegaard asks whether truth can be learned. In other words, is truth given and we need only to discover it, or are we unable to do it ourselves and as such must turn to an external source (Christian revelation)? To revelation as an incomparable authority or to Christ as a "teacher" Kierkegaard opposes the Socratic position. If the student is self-sufficient in a certain sense, then the teacher is merely an aid, a stimulus.

It is precisely the Platonic position (which states that if you ask a question, you already have a partial answer) that underlies Tillich's philosophical theology. The questioning presupposes an a priori unity, the longing of which the question reveals. The metaphor of question–answer, illustrating the methodological foundation of Tillich's philosophical theology, also presupposes another typology of "unhappy love" presented by Kierkegaard. For the latter, the inequality of God and man is "unhappy love," but not in the case, when lovers cannot (yet) be together, but when love is separated by such a difference that "mutual understanding is impossible" (Kierkegaard 2000, 13).

Tillich represents the second version of unhappy love, which, in Kierkegaard's view, is only relatively, not absolutely, "unhappy." The discussion of love does not actually affect, but rather underpins, the understanding of faith itself in Tillich's systematic theology. This analysis is important, as it forms the basis for merging Tillich's system with Christian knowledge and traditional theology. This topic is also a kind of indicator, revealing whether Kierkegaard is right in stating that all existential decisions in the system are conditioned by metaphysical speculations. After all, faith is so closely connected with individuality that any system that analyzes it must inevitably reveal the fundamental statements characterizing human existence. At first glance, Tillich's cherished "ultimate concern" corresponds to the existential formulation, since the system itself clearly states what true faith is, that is, what most concerns a person. However, it does not ask what John or Peter believes in faith. The existential basis of faith is reduced to a generalized formula of faith. Although Tillich makes considerable efforts to restore the authentic meaning of the term "faith," he himself puts forward a related concept, which, according to him, much more directly expresses "true reality," surpassing "preliminary faith." This concept is "love."

As is known, more than one interpretation of love (*eros*, *philia*, *agape*) has been presented in the discourse of the philosophy of religion. According to Tillich himself, "faith, as a state of ultimate concern, implies love, or rather, the desire to unite what is separated" (Tillich 1999, 100). Let us note that Tillich is not in a hurry to identify faith with love. The whole procedure initially defines faith in terms of ultimate concern and only then notes that such a situation presupposes love. Let us recall what the second formal criterion of theology says: man is most concerned with nothing other than his own being and non-being. Man's true concern is that infinity, on which he originally depends, from which he is separated, but which he eventually longs for, and this longing grounds love. Thus, recalling Kierkegaard's lamentations, existence is taken to heaven.

The concept of separateness reveals an ambiguous situation: man is both separated from the whole and essentially belongs to it and therefore is not essentially separate. However, this definition contradicts that tradition of religious philosophy that has tended to distinguish between *agape* and *eros*, for where we find *eros*, there cannot be a free expression of love for the other, such as God's *agape* for fallen humanity in Jesus Christ. Love that seeks ultimate unity for the sake of the other does not ultimately turn to the other; it seeks unity. Then the existent man is loved not as existing, but as Being, that is, for what he potentially, not actually is. Consistently developing Tillich's argument, it turns out that God loves Himself; after all, what else is there to love, but Being Itself, which is God. This is not the biblical love of God for the one created in His image and fallen into sin, when He loves His eternal image in man. Such love becomes "eternal self-love." Thus, in the system, eras reign in terms of love, and love in terms of faith. Everything, as Kierkegaard warned, is decided from beyond. The meaning of Tillich's definition of faith, then, is as follows: faith is the ultimate concern, and the ultimate concern coincides with the desire to overcome existential alienation. Thus, faith does not point to the existence of the individual, but is the "wisdom" of discovering the hidden potentialities within oneself and perceiving oneself as a part of divine reality.

"God of the system": gnostic or pistic?

For Tillich, "standing on the edge" gives the opportunity to see that truth is a whole. Also, such a position shows how the biblical and Protestant concepts of trust in a forgiving God are encompassed and transcended in the concept of the eternal unity of God and man. The last statement is not unexpected. After all, if, as we have mentioned, the system provides its own revelation, it is natural that it must also name its God. The descriptive name of the God of the system is "that which is unconditional." However, such a name does not yet distinguish Him from other gods, and this gap is filled by the concept of "God above God." This God is real, because He transcends any symbols of personalistic religions, so the system gives God a true name.

However, a person immersed in existence cannot do without symbols. The search for divinity in the depths of the human soul is possible only thanks to the historical religions of mankind and their symbols. Thus, Tillich chooses the God of the system ("God above God"), not in order to give Him a suitable name, but rather to show the relationship with the God of a specific faith. The God of the system cannot be worshiped in the same way as other gods; he cannot be given a name like the gods of world religions. The believer cannot address him directly. He who knows that there is only one true God can address him by a name that is established in the tradition of religious faith, knowing that his true devotion transcends addressing a nameless finality. Thus, a person can accept Christian symbols as his ultimate concern and still not be a believer. He knows that the highest reality lies beyond any specific faith and is not to be found in the God proclaimed by any particular religion.

Religious faith is not the same as absolute faith, which finds a God above God. It is not worshipful, everyday faith. In this, Tillich also achieves a paradoxical result: although he very much does not want anyone to kneel before this (religious) God, he leaves no possibility of choosing religious practice, and such a situation can lead to a renewed return to the confession of traditional religions. At the same time, Tillich establishes an absolute faith in immediate experience, thus inevitably laying the foundation for his symbolic language (since reality appears to finite being through symbols). Therefore, when Tillich speaks of the "finiteness that is self-contained in Being," he acknowledges that this is a "highly symbolic language" (Tillich 1999, 139). In this way, the purpose of the system, "to interpret the content of Christian faith," becomes a methodological translation of the symbols of revelation into the symbols of the system, which localizes truth within the system itself. In other words, Tillich fails to take into account that by giving God a name, a new faith is proclaimed, in this case, a faith in the symbolic statements of the system, when it is believed that they are the best possible explanation of the symbols of religious faith; hence, belief in the system.

Tillich's "God above God" is based on the axioms of the system. This means that, although it is as sound as the arguments supporting it, it is also just as weak as those arguments are. The weak point of Tillich's system is the solution to the question of God's existence: "The question of God's existence can neither be asked nor answered," because "it is a question that by its very nature lies beyond existence" (Tillich 1951, 237). Such a non-existence of God means that, instead of participating in a truly divine power, man must rise above existence. The New Being overcomes the ambiguities of existence only by withdrawing man from the existential dimension.

The God of the system is the God of everything except the individual who exists. Let us recall Kierkegaard: "Immanently (in the fantastic meditation of abstraction) God does not exist, he is only God, who exists only for the existing man, that is, he can exist only in faith. Providence, resurrection exist only for the existing man." (Kierkegaard 1941, 71.) From the point of view of the system, the discovery of oneself is the discovery of God, and vice versa, so the fulfillment of human being merges with the basis of Being: "faith is not an opinion, but a state" (Tillich 1999, 130). However, it is impossible to get rid of individuality as a garment, in order to discover divinity. Man remains an existing being even when deeply immersed in speculative thought, therefore, his actual fulfillment cannot be a state (albeit an eternal one, but covered by the difficulties of existence); it is a relationship. Although God is eternal and therefore "does not exist," He nevertheless exists for man in Jesus Christ, thus confirming the possibility of a relationship. This is precisely the absolute paradox, accessible only to faith, which the system, guided by the pursuit of rationality, resolves by interpreting symbols according to its postulates.

The system's "God above God" is true and the only one sufficient for human needs. However, it can satisfy only the needs of man himself at that hour, when traditional symbols have truly lost their power and are meaningless, and the individual is concerned with his true being, balancing on the edge of the human situation. However, such a God is powerless to help man in his individuality, in his personal hopes and fears, which do not touch on man's own questions about reality itself.

Tillich did not learn from Kierkegaard to deny that truth can ultimately be personal. Contrary to Tillich's universalism, Kierkegaard's interiority requires risk (Lowrie 1968, Pattison 2005), which for Tillich is only a temporary companion of existential conditionality. True (absolute) faith depends only on eternal power, about which we cannot be mistaken, because its nature transcends existence. Faith is "based on a foundation that is not a risk: it is the awareness of the unconditional element in us and in our world" (Tillich 1959, 28). Those believers who rely on interiority remain open to the risk of losing their faith, never discovering the "God" who appears when the anxiety of doubt drowns God (Tillich 1999, 140).

Kierkegaard categorically denies that an existing person is capable of acquiring the wisdom of eternal truth, of transcending the limit of finitude, which can only be approached, so we must live on the basis of the authority of faith, not by objectively justifying it, but by subjectively trusting it. To speak from the standpoint of existence about something that encompasses all of human existence is fantastical and absurd; it is like being both inside and outside at the same time, like trying to meet oneself around the corner. However, can we reasonably explain unequivocally how Kierkegaard understands faith as an experience of paradox, a blind action? If we characterize Tillich's religious thinking as *gnosis*, then let us also expand on the sense, in which we could attribute *pistis* to Kierkegaard's thinking.

This Greek term for faith in the New Testament has specific connotations that allow us to look at Kierkegaard's understanding of faith in a different way (Wyschogrod 1954, Evans 1996). In the Greek worldview, there was a deep awareness that it is impossible to exist without *pistis* in something. For example, when getting out of bed in the morning, one may confess *pistis* in the sense of believing that the floor will not slip. Thus, *pistis* is a faith that requires an act of trust. Such a requirement involves risk; it is practical knowledge recognized in the *episteme*. Thus, *pistis* is not conviction, but fidelity, even loyalty. Faith, then, is not a feeling, but an action in another ancient sense—service to the master, the customer (whom his clients or servants usually did not see), who gives gifts. In this sense, the model of a personal relationship with God, or the concept of Jesus Christ as a good friend, is very modern.

When seriously ill characters in the biblical stories waited for Christ, they experienced a suffering based not on blind faith, but on evidence (previous miraculous events). A person experiencing suffering does not ask God for something that He does not want to give, which is against God's will (instructions on how and what to ask for are given in prayers). Recall Kierkegaard's view that a person can believe or not believe, but they cannot believe based on reason. The famous interpretation of the myth of Abraham illustrates faith in the face of the absurd, beyond the ethically seeking experience. However, we can ask whether Abraham really experiences the absurd. Or, perhaps he is just loyal, and his trust is based on previous manifestations of God's omnipotence and loving-kindness (his wife Sarah gives birth at a very advanced age). If so, Abraham can reasonably expect that God will stop the cruel process or resurrect Isaac (which is what happens). These considerations raise the main question: is Abraham's action irrational? If we answer in the affirmative, we must also abandon Kierkegaard's idea that there can be only one (blind) faith, and thus we come closer to Tillich's position that true unbelief is to cover up moral contradictions with prior loyalty. In other words, the only difference is that Tillich's own loyalty is based on ontological assumptions—by rejecting blind faith, he approaches ancient thinking, which treats faith not as a request for "forgiveness," not emotionally, subjectively, but as a desire to regain the original, true state of man.

Conclusions

The paradoxical nature of religious language in Tillich's philosophical theology does not mean that reason is suspended. Tillich believes that man must strive to understand himself as *sub specie aeterni*, which is the task of philosophy (and every man is potentially a philosopher). Such a goal is based on essentialist thinking, which, after significant modifications, also includes the statements of existentialists. In Tillich's philosophical theology, subjectivity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for authentic religiosity. Tillich rejects Kierkegaard's belief that truth can ultimately be personal. Contrary to Tillich's universalism, Kierkegaard's interiority is essentially unprotected from the risks that, for Tillich, are merely a temporary companion of existential conditionality.

To the concept of faith as paradoxical thinking (Kierkegaard), Tillich opposes a worldview guided by the era's concept of love and outlined by the doctrine of logos. In such a context, the method of correlation, originally intended to maintain the status of mutually influencing, but independent elements of Christian knowledge and existential analysis, can be understood as a methodological presentation of an essentialist worldview that presupposes a fundamental identity of philosophy and theology. From this, we can conclude that correlation in Tillich's philosophical theology can be interpreted as the subordination of *pistis* (faith) to *gnosis* (knowledge).

As such, recognizing the ability of Christian philosophical theology to fully express the Idea of theology itself (which takes the form of formal theological criteria), Tillich presupposes such knowledge that constitutes the core of a universal theological idea, independent of specific historical religions. At the same time, the affirmation of the theological norm in an ontological dimension allows us to view revelation as a symbolic system, explicable by certain ontological criteria.

In Kierkegaard's thought, the relationship of man to his own existence presupposes the unconditional supremacy of the authority of faith over reason. From the perspective of the system, essentialist philosophy can encompass the discussion of existence and also find a place for faith. Yet, if we interpret the Abrahamic myth based on the concept of faith as trust (*pistis*), Kierkegaard's explanation of the paradoxical situation of myth as blind faith is opposed to a certain knowledge-based, loyal trust. Therefore, Abraham's action should be considered rational, which is supported by the postulates of Tillich's system.

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The Latent Implications of Husserl's *The Idea of Phenomenology*

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Abstract

The paper analyzes what new perspectives Edmund Husserl's famous work *The Idea of Phenomenology* discloses for philosophical thought. I attempt to explain that the phenomenological *epoché* is not only a theoretical operation; epoch*é is, first of all, an existential act of a cardinal character*; it denotes a crucial change, which concerns me, in particular, as the person who enters the unique space of phenomenological thinking. I accentuate Husserl's reasoning regarding the so-called issue of obviousness (evidence) that is of key importance in phenomenology. Obviousness is not my subjective emotional attitude towards something; it is the self-givenness of the object, the direct grasp of the object in pure seeing. The interpretation shows that the method of phenomenological reduction excludes the main paradigm of our thinking: *the subject–object split.* Phenomenology deals neither with the consciousness of the subject nor with the factual objective reality, nor with their interrelationship, but with the field of pure self-givens. *Within this field the self-constitution of the so-called external reality and of essential universals happens, as well as the self-manifestation of my subject or person.* However, this field is within a certain totality, which limits it as a horizon: the happening (the event)—*das Ereignis*—of *worldliness*.

Keywords: self-givenness, self-constitution, obviousness, happening.

Latentne implikacije Husserlovega dela *Ideja fenomenologije*

Povzetek

Prispevek analizira, kakšne nove perspektive za filozofsko misel razpira znamenito delo Edmunda Husserla *Ideja fenomenologije*. Skušam razložiti, da fenomenološka *epoché* ni samo teoretska operacija; epoch**é** *je predvsem eksistencialno dejanje odločilnega značaja*; zaznamuje poglavitno spremembo, kakršna me posebej zadeva kot osebo, ki vstopa v edinstven prostor fenomenološkega mišljenja. Poudariti želim Husserlovo razmišljanje o t. i. problemu očitnosti (evidence), ki je ključnega pomena za fenomenologijo. Očitnost ni moj subjektiven, čustven odnos do nečesa, temveč je samo-danost objekta, njegovo neposredno zajetje s čistim zrenjem. Interpretacija pokaže, da metoda fenomenološke redukcije izključuje osrednjo paradigmo našega mišljenja: *razcep subjekt–objekt.* Fenomenologija se ne ukvarja ne s subjektovo zavestjo ne z dejansko objektivno realnostjo, niti z njunim medsebojnim razmerjem, temveč s polje čistih samo-danosti. *Znotraj tega polja se dogaja tako avto-konstitucija t. i. zunanje realnosti in bistvenih univerzalij kot tudi avto-manifestacija subjekta ali osebe*. Vendar se to polje nahaja znotraj določene totalitete, ki ga omejuje kot njegovo obzorje, in sicer znotraj dogajanja (dogodka) – *das Ereignis* – *svetovnosti*.

Ključne besede: samo-danost, avto-konstitucija, očitnost, dogajanje.

I. *Epoché* as a cardinal existential act

Our task is to analyze and show what new perspectives Edmund Husserl's famous work *The Idea of Phenomenology* discloses for philosophical thought. In particular, I have in mind the five lectures that Husserl gave at the beginning of the summer semester in Göttingen in 1907. Much has been written and said on this topic, but it is necessary to carry out a number of other reflections, in order to realize this more clearly and herewith in a new dimension. Namely, I will try to show the reader that the radically innovative way of philosophical thinking established by *The Idea of Phenomenology* often remains for us wrapped in the traditional forms and concepts of thought, because of which, on the one hand, the essence of phenomenology seems to be easier to understand, but, on the other hand, this very cardinal innovation of the way of thinking is lost and hidden. Partially, the reason for this is given by the character of a series of judgments developed by the author, including the raising of the question itself regarding the subject of his philosophical research, which, certainly, remains within the framework of traditional forms, concepts, and their relevant linguistic expressions. *Nevertheless, the development of the reflection produced by Edmund Husserl as a whole opens up a previously unknown "space" that requires a different way of thinking and a different language.* However, in the later period of his work, Husserl to some extent departs from the original intention of phenomenology and, accordingly, from this completely new way of philosophical thinking; namely, when he develops and firmly establishes the so-called concept of transcendental egology.

A clear and scrupulous explication of all of the above will help us to rethink the initial project of phenomenology, to free ourselves from the usual stereotypes of its interpretation, and to reveal its yet not completely disclosed, unrealized intentions. For this purpose, let us go through the text of *The Idea of Phenomenology* in detail and consistently, and try to reach important conclusions through proper interpretation and analysis. Thus, we begin by recalling and explicating the key passages of the first lecture of this work, then we move on to the second, third, and so on. At the same time, based on all this, we attempt to unfold reasonings to make appropriate conclusions. A summary of the work we have done will give us an answer to the initial question: *what does this completely new space of thinking mean?*

Husserl writes:

> Ich habe in früheren Vorlesungen unterschieden zwischen natürlicher und philosophischer Wissenschaft; die erstere entspringt aus der natürlichen, die letztere aus der philosophischen Geisteshaltung. (Husserl 1950, 2.)

> In earlier lectures I distinguished between science of the natural sort and philosophic science. The former originates from the natural, the latter from the philosophic attitude of mind. (Husserl 1973, 13.)

In what, very generally, does this fundamental difference between the natural and the philosophical mind-attitude consist? Husserl notes that the former is alien to criticism of cognition. Namely, in the natural mind-attitude we are contemplatively and cogitatively disposed to things, which are given as something self-intelligible, although in different forms and in different ways of being (*das Sein*), depending on the source and level of cognition. These things are visibly given to us within the world, which in turn is always partly given in perception and partly in the interrelation of memories, from which it extends into indefinite and unknown realms. It is to this world that our judgments about things, their relations, their changes, functional dependencies, and so on, relate. We express what our experience directly dictates. The author points out that, following the motives of experience, we make certain inferences directly from what is given in experience to what is not yet experienced, that is, we generalize, and then, on the contrary, we again transfer general knowledge to individual cases, and in this way we deduce new universals from general knowledge in analytical thinking.

> Erkenntnisse folgen nicht bloß auf Erkenntnisse in der Weise der bloßen Aneinanderreihung, sie treten zueinander in logische Beziehungen, sie folgen auseinander, sie "stimmen" zueinander, sie bestätigen sich, ihre logische Kraft gleichsam verstärkend. (Husserl 1950, 2.)

> Isolated cognitions do not simply follow each other in the manner of mere succession. They enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from one another, they "cohere" with one another, they support one another, thereby strengthening their logical power. (Husserl 1973, 13.)

So, Husserl continues with a very general, though brilliant, characterization of the so-called natural cognition, which includes natural sciences, mental sciences (psychology, sociology, history, etc.) and mathematical sciences as well. In particular, he examines the essential features and characteristics that penetrate the immanent dynamics of such cognition.

According to the great German philosopher, we oppose this natural attitude of thinking with the so-called philosophical attitude. Namely, what is self-understandable to thinking with a natural disposition turns into a mystery for philosophical reflection; yes, if cognition is self-understandable for the former, in philosophical reflection, this is a big question mark.

> Wie kann nun aber die Erkenntnis ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den erkannten Objekten gewiß werden, wie kann sie über sich hinaus und ihre Objekte zuverlässig treffen? (Husserl 1950, 20.)

> But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? (Husserl 1973, 15.)

By asking this fundamental question, a peculiarly philosophical disposition of thought is awakened, whereby we begin to march into a dimension that is completely contrastive to natural cognition.

As we can see, Husserl opens the door of phenomenology by asking a question that undoubtedly belongs to the paradigm of European thinking of the new time. This is a question about the possibility of cognition: how can cognition go beyond itself and reach objective reality?! This is a paradigm of critical thinking, and there is nothing new in the author's thought process. But this is only the beginning! This is the first step, the helping action, allowing us to step into a whole new dimension of thinking, indeed.

Thus, through philosophical reflection, we get to firmly stand on the ground of a radical critique of cognition, a critique that must clarify the question of the relationship between cognition, its sense (*der Sinn*), and its objectivity (*die Gegenständlichkeit*). It is this radical criticism that forms the first and main part of phenomenology. But phenomenology, as a completely definite science, at the same time and above all, represents a certain attitude and method of thinking: this is a philosophical attitude and method, which, according to the author, is not based in any way on the methodological achievements of natural sciences, but furthermore has nothing to do with them.

And on the basis of these routine reasonings in the theory of cognition, Husserl suddenly makes a sharp move in a completely unexpected direction and tells us:

> Es bedarf einer Wissenschaft vom Seienden in absolutem Sinn. (Husserl 1950, 23.)

> We need a science of being in the absolute sense. (Husserl 1973, 18.)

This science or a new type of metaphysics can grow only from the soil of radical criticism of cognition or from phenomenology. *Therefore, it is phenomenology that leads to the true understanding of being (*das Seiende*), and namely, to such an understanding, which remains hidden from the sight clouded by natural attitude.*

In the second and third lectures of *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl develops the most important doctrine of the phenomenological ***ἐποχή*** and of the reduction based on it. Very generally, the *epoché* means the suspension of my natural disposition; more specifically, it means the following: we do not allow ourselves to assume any existence as *already given*. Why? Because accepting the pre-given contains in itself non-clarity, ambiguity; accepting the pre-given is nothing but an act of transcendence of cognition: we assume that there are things (in the broadest sense) and that we can comprehend these objective circumstances, although they are not given immanently or with absolute immediate clarity. Transcendent is everything that is not given with immediate clarity and that we still mean as existing; to which we say: that is! All our natural knowledge, both pre-scientific and scientific, is based on this transcendence. Therefore, the *epoché* is a fundamental abstinence from such a natural point of view and therefore from a natural disposition. Proceeding from this fundamental self-restraint, we are obliged to carry out a sequential operation of reduction: to disable any transcendence or any provision about the transcendent from the game; let us not deny or prove, but simply ignore them, i.e., let us assign a zero index to them and consider them invalid for our cognitive research. Thus, all our knowledge of the world, of physical and mental nature, of our own human self, of society, etc., is thrown out of play by the *epoché* and reduction. All the sciences relating to these objectivities are, Husserl tells us, also subject to exclusion.

All of the above is, of course, well known to any person who has an insight into phenomenology, but without recalling it, it is impossible to follow a consistent course of explanation. First, we would particularly like to make some conclusions regarding this key concept of *The Idea of Phenomenology* regarding the *epoché*.

The phenomenological *epoché* is not only a theoretical operation. Such a conventional understanding of it is superficial, trivial, and fails to grasp in depth the great innovation that Edmund Husserl proposes. Epoch*é is, first of all, an existential act of a cardinal character*, whereby I turn off the natural attitude, upon which not only our natural cognition is based, but also our daily human life; thus, I leave the ground of this human life, and the phenomenological attitude begins to work in the process of carrying out philosophical reflection. Yes, it means a disconnection from the usual mode of being and a switch to another mode of being. Thus, I perform the theoretical operation of reduction, insofar as I make a leap into the mode of being itself: the theoretical action is based on the existential act itself.

The *epoché*, therefore, notifies a cardinal change, which concerns me, in particular, me as the person who enters the unique space of phenomenological thinking. More specifically, what kind of change is this? In very general terms, this is a turning-off of my identity. I am usually aware of myself as a person—i.e., Irakli Batiashvili with his appearance, build, character, habits, skills, inclinations, interests, with his biography, with his family, with his native environment, his social status and activities, etc. I realize myself as a self, a subject, with its empirical consciousness or transcendental structures; I realize myself as a unique center and at the same time as one of the human subjects of this world among others. Epoché *means turning off all of this, i.e., making* *invalid the consciousness of one's own identity.* This is undoubtedly a big leap, a big change! Indeed, we must, as it were, lose ourselves, in order to gain the truth; as if this would echo the wonderful words of the Savior: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it." (Matthew 16:25.) Here, I think it is necessary to reconsider in such a way this grand innovation by Husserl regarding the *epoché*, and such a rethinking is deeper and more adequate.

II. *Cogitationes* as self-givens and the specific character of their phenomenological research

Again, in the second lecture, Edmund Husserl already talks to us about those phenomena, which our philosophical reflection guided by the method of reduction will discover and establish at the first stage as absolutely clear givens and, therefore, immanent in the full sense. These givens are my experiences (*die Erlebnisse*) or conscious acts, i.e., *cogitationes*. He writes:

> Jedes intellektive Erlebnis und jedes Erlebnis überhaupt, indem es vollzogen wird, kann zum Gegenstand eines reinen Schauens und Fassens gemacht werden, und in diesem Schauen ist es absolute Gegebenheit. Es ist gegeben als ein Seiendes, als ein Dies-da, dessen Sein zu bezweifeln gar keinen Sinn gibt. (Husserl 1950, 31.)

> Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure "seeing" and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this "seeing." It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted. (Husserl 1973, 24.)

As the author notes, the existence of a *cogitatio* and, therefore, the existence of the cognitive act itself is absolutely infallible, that is, it is free from the riddle of transcendence. *These* cogitationes *are directly given to us in pure seeing as self-givens, and thus he calls them pure phenomena.* It is the latter that at first present us the vast field of absolute immanent givens, where then we will find many other things besides *cogitationes*.

It is necessary to strictly distinguish between the pure phenomenon of cogitatio, *i.e., the pure phenomenon of experience (*das Erlebnis*), and the so-called* *psychological phenomenon, which is the object of research in one of the branches of the natural sciences—psychology. Psychology deals with the experiences of a human subject, a person; for example, with the perception experienced by a person, which is part of the world, is present in its space and measurable time, is influenced by an external reality, interacts with other people, etc.* The experience understood in this way is a psychological fact and, therefore, it is also one of the data placed in the objective chronometric time. By contrast, our philosophical reflection, guided by phenomenological reduction, deals with the pure phenomenon of experience, free from any attachment to the human self. This is how we enter the proper field of pure phenomena, which is the field of research of a certain science, in particular, phenomenology.

In connection with all of the above, the question arises: what different results does the study of experience as a pure phenomenon produce as opposed to its psychological study? This is a very important question, insofar as it concerns the fruitfulness of the phenomenological method, when the subject of our knowledge at first is only experience. And I would like to clarify this question even more: when I carry out a phenomenological reduction and no longer attribute my experiences to my own human subject and, accordingly, no longer consider them in any relation to external or intrinsically real factors, then what different results can the description of these pure phenomena give me in contrast to the merely descriptive work conducted by the psychological researcher, namely, by the researcher who acts in a natural disposition and therefore considers these experiences as certain facts belonging to the real world? Let us say this concerns a kind of *suffering*; what does it matter what *status* I describe this with—as a phenomenologist or as a psychologist? At first glance, it seems as if it would not matter, when we just have to superficially characterize this feeling, say, according to its quality, intensity, extensiveness, and other similar parameters. But here, its characterization as a unique *being* (*das Seiende*) is only the prerogative of the phenomenologist. A suffering as existing in absolute mode: what does this tell me, what does it show me? Therefore, the phenomenologist has to describe and explicate it precisely in the ontological perspective, in addition to describing this feeling according to the superficial characteristics, which the descriptive psychologist would be perfectly fine with. *How does this presence itself notify itself in the suffering* *as in something existing? We can say, with all acuteness, with the highest of intensity; and at the same time, it makes itself known to me as completely unacceptable, unbearable, oppressively faceless, senseless (however, in special cases, this unacceptability can become strangely precious); and it is in this unbearable intensity that being declares its absolute authenticity. Here, the rich explication of the pure phenomenon conducted in such an ontological perspective tells us something completely different than the work done by the psychologist. In this respect, phenomenology can sometimes be closer to poetry, where an experience can be disclosed precisely with a deep ontological aspect.* And here I am reminded of Byron's amazing stanzas that convey the suffering of "The Prisoner of Chillon" in the poem's climax:

> I had no thought, no feeling—none—
> Among the stones I stood a stone,
> And was, scarce conscious what I wist,
> As shrubless crags within the mist;
> For all was blank, and bleak, and grey;
> It was not night—it was not day;
> It was not even the dungeon-light,
> So hateful to my heavy sight,
> But vacancy absorbing space,
> And fixedness—without a place;
> There were no stars, no earth, no time,
> No check, no change, no good, no crime
> But silence, and a stirless breath
> Which neither was of life nor death;
> A sea of stagnant idleness,
> Blind, boundless, mute, and motionless! (Byron 1998, 326.)

So, only that which we comprehend in pure seeing or that which is pure self-givenness exists in an absolute form. This is how we enter and move, in the words of the philosopher, into the field of pure phenomena, which is more precisely, the eternal Heraclitean flow of phenomena. But apart from singular experiences, what else can be revealed to us as absolute self-givenness? And Husserl's subsequent considerations are devoted to this very issue.

III. Essence as self-given and the non-subjective character of obviousness

Every cognitive act and, more broadly, every *cogitatio* is essentially characterized by *intentio*—this is what Husserl tells us in the fourth lecture. Yes, every *cogitatio* is directed to an object, even if this object is outside its limits, i.e., it does not belong to the content of *cogitatio*: this is the intentional nature of experiences. Here, Husserl makes a very important distinction between the reel immanent and the immanent in general. Namely, something may not be reel immanent, but it may be immanent in general, i.e., immanent in the proper sense, if it is given to us in direct pure seeing, if it is given to us as a self-givenness. Reelly immanent is what belongs to the experience, that is, what is its constituent moment or component. And everything that is absolute self-givenness is immanent in its own sense. Therefore, the reelly immanent is at the same time immanent in the proper sense, since the experience with all its belonging composition is an absolutely clear given. But the immanent in proper sense may also be something, which does not belong to experience, but we can grasp this something only in direct pure seeing. What we are talking about now as being "immanent" is equivalent to "the transcendent." Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish here between the two meanings of the latter: "transcendent" in the narrow sense and "transcendent" in the general or proper sense. The first meaning of "transcendent" intends everything that does not reelly belong to experience; the second means everything that we assumed as existing, although it is not an absolutely evident givenness. Thus, an object may not belong to the composition of experience, and we thus can call it "transcendent" in the narrow sense, but at the same time it may not be transcendent in the general or proper sense, if we comprehend this object as an evident self-givenness.

Yes, the phenomenologist, by consistently expanding research, discovers the various types of objectivities (*die Gegenständlichkeiten*), with which this or that experience is in an intentional relationship, although they do not belong to the composition of the experience itself, and which, nevertheless, are immanent in the general (proper) sense, that is, they appear as absolute self-givens. What kind of entities are these? First of all, the research conducted in *The Idea of Phenomenology* discovers the kind of objectivity that is called *the universality or essence grasped in the direct pure seeing and, accordingly, is called the essential objective circumstances (*die Sachverhalte*).* And Husserl gives an excellent example of the comprehension of the so-called essence of red color. He writes:

> Ich habe eine Einzelanschauung, oder mehrere Einzelanschauungen von Rot, ich halte die reine Immanenz fest, ich sorge für phänomenologische Reduktion. Ich schneide ab, was das Rot sonst bedeutet, als was es da transzendent apperzipiert sein mag, etwa als Rot eines Löschblattes auf meinem Tisch und dgl., und nun vollziehe ich rein schauend den Sinn des Gedankens Rot überhaupt, Rot in specie, etwa das aus dem und jenem herausgeschaute identische Allgemeine. (Husserl 1950, 57.)

> I have a particular intuition of redness, or rather several such intuitions. I stick strictly to the pure immanence; I am careful to perform the phenomenological reduction. I snip off any further significance of redness, any way in which it may be viewed as something transcendent, e.g., as the redness of a piece of blotting paper on my table, etc. And now I fully grasp in pure "seeing" the meaning of the concept of redness in general, redness in specie, the universal "seen" as identical in this and that. (Husserl 1973, 44–45.)

This is how, according to Husserl, red is constituted as an essence or universality in pure seeing. *And this objectivity certainly does not belong to the composition of the* cogitatio*; it is beyond it, and yet it is immanent, insofar as it is absolutely self-evident.* Husserl christens this comprehension of essence, i.e., universality and the corresponding universal objective circumstance, with the term ideation, and concludes that it is the procedure of pure seeing and ideation within the strictest phenomenological reduction that is the unique property of phenomenology; this is its specific philosophical method, insofar as it essentially deals with the sense of the criticism of cognition and also with metaphysics.

In the same lecture, the author puts a very important emphasis on the following circumstance: any *cogitatio*, as an intentional act, means (*meinen*), presupposes the existence of things. But objectivity, which we only mean, assume, and nothing more, is by no means an infallible given; and objectivity, which I mean intentionally, and is at the same time directly and clearly given to me in pure seeing, is exactly such an objectivity that is an unmistakable given for the phenomenologist. *Yes, the intentional implying or assumption of the object must at the same time be its evident self-givenness, and only in such a case it is constituted as existing in an immanent and absolute mode.* As we have seen, it is to this kind of objectivity that the essence or the universality, which we constitute in pure seeing of ideation, belongs.

For now, we are following the train of thought presented in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, in order to move on to the main point, which is to show what innovations of special, cardinal importance have been opened up for us as a result of the previous argumentation. But, before that, I would like to emphasize the special importance of the ideation procedure within the phenomenological method by considering the following key point: it lies in the circumstance that this procedure strictly protects us from the dangerous concomitant tendency of generalization. Of course, scientific thinking, and especially philosophical thinking, is inconceivable without generalization; but the latter, precisely in philosophy, can easily turn into baseless speculations, when thinking is given to its own self-indulgence and flutters in the space of senseless, groundless abstractions. Here, the ideation protects us from just that as it requires the following. A generalization must always maintain a solid, clear phenomenal ground, since it arises from the obviousness and eventually regains obviousness in pure seeing. Its result is not only a formal notion or reasoning, a word denoting generality, or a sentence with a quantifier of generality, but a clearly seen and expressed universality or universal objective circumstance. *The procedure of ideation is the main guarantor of accuracy, rigor, and clarity of philosophical thinking, which remains a serious problem, because verbiage is not only the illness of classical metaphysical systems, but also of the most modern concepts, which are very far from any kind of metaphysics.* Thus, I tried to explain the special importance of ideation from a purely scientific point of view and without any platonic or mystical associations. Yes, it is Husserl's method that is the main guarantee of the scientificity of philosophical cognition, and not only the logical analysis of language, as Wittgenstein thought; but we will not elaborate on this issue in this paper.

Here, in the fourth lecture, Husserl develops reasoning upon the so-called issue of obviousness (evidence), which leads to an ingenious find. This latter turns out to be another important element of the whole innovative vision, which opens the way to a new space of philosophical thinking. Namely, we have seen that for cognition, guided by the phenomenological method, only that which is given with absolute obviousness is true. But what is this *obviousness* (*Evidenz*) itself? Is it a special feeling, as an empiricist may claim or as Descartes himself might have thought? The author clearly shows that obviousness has nothing to do with any feeling; we need to strictly distinguish these between the two. *Obviousness does not mean that I evidently or clearly feel this is so; it is not my subjective emotional attitude towards something. Obviousness is only the self-givenness of the object, which is equivalent to the direct grasp of the object in pure seeing.* Yes, "self-givenness" and "grasping in pure seeing" have absolutely identical meaning for Husserl, and are devoid of any subjective sentimental character. We will soon see that this insight of the great German thinker is indeed one of the orientations towards *the new space.*

IV. Wider sphere of self-givens as the sphere of constituted external objectivity

I will now turn to the consideration of some of the most important aspects of the fifth or last lecture, the task of which is to expand the field of self-givenness. Here, Husserl first very generally analyzes the consciousness of time, which he presented extensively and in detail in his relatively early work *The Lectures on Internal Time-Consciousness* (1905), which was published only later in 1928 by Martin Heidegger and the philosophical significance of which is very great. We will not delve into this topic at present, but will only briefly summarize the author's thoughts on this issue.

Husserl shows that an object given in retention, i.e., in the so-called primary memory, we also grasp as an absolutely evident givenness in pure seeing. Namely, it is constituted in retention as something absolutely evident, but existing beyond the experience. For example, I now hear a tone and immediately reflect on it; this means that I momentarily recall some tone that has just resounded, and the latter is presented to me with absolutely immediate clarity as it would just exist in the actual *now*, although it has already went over in the past and therefore is already beyond auditory perception. *Therefore, the object given in retention cannot belong to the experience; no, it is the self-givenness of the object itself, it is the object itself, which is constituted in the act of retention.*

The same situation can be observed when we deal with the duration of something, for example, the duration of a tone: in this case, too, we must distinguish between the object (tone), which continues and is not part of the experience (hearing), and its appearances in each given present-moment, which reelly belongs to this hearing. In this case, the object or the long tone is given directly to us in an absolutely evident seeing too, i.e., it is a self-given as is the tonal hearing given in each now-moment. Husserl writes:

> Und wenn der Ton nicht aufhört, sondern dauert und während seiner Dauer sich inhaltlich als derselbe oder inhaltlich als sich verändernd darstellt, ist da nicht, daß er dauert oder sich verändert, mit Evidenz (innerhalb gewisser Grenzen) zu fassen? (Husserl 1950, 67.)

> And if the tone does not cease but continues, and during its continuation presents itself as the same in content or else as changing content, can we not grasp this fact—that it remains the same or changes—evidently (within certain limits)? (Husserl 1973, 52.)

The long tone is beyond auditory perception, and yet it is intentionally constituted in this perception as an absolutely self-evident given. I directly hear what is now, and this belongs to my sense of hearing; but to this latter does not belong what was before, even recently. But the sound that continues, was and is, and therefore it cannot belong to experience, and yet I perceive it with immediate clarity: I do not think about the duration of the sound, but I clearly perceive it. Here are Husserl's ingenious findings in the dimension of inner consciousness of time, which will be the subject of many more serious studies in the future.

Finally, we will also focus on that very important kind of self-givenness, which Husserl calls the givenness of the thing in external perception. He writes:

> In der Wahrnehmung eines äußeren Dinges heißt eben das Ding, sagen wir ein vor Augen stehendes Haus, wahrgenommen. Dieses Haus ist eine Transzendenz und verfällt der Existenz nach

> der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Wirklich evident gegeben ist das Hauserscheinen, diese cogitatio, im Flusse des Bewußtseins auftauchend und verfließend. In diesem Hausphänomen finden wir ein Rotphänomen, ein Ausdehnungsphänomen usw. Das sind evidente Gegebenheiten. Ist es aber nicht auch evident, daß in dem Hausphänomen eben ein Haus erscheint, um dessentwillen es eben eine Haus-wahrnehmung heißt; und ein Haus nicht nur überhaupt, sondern gerade dieses Haus, so und so bestimmt und in solcher Bestimmtheit erscheinend. (Husserl 1950, 72.)
>
> In the perception of an external thing, just that thing, let us say a house standing before our eyes, is said to be perceived. The house is a transcendent thing, and forfeits its existence after the phenomenological reduction. The house-appearance, this cogitatio, emerging and disappearing in the stream of consciousness, is given as actually evident. In this house-phenomenon we find a phenomenon of redness, of extension, etc. These are evident data. But is it not also evident that a house appears in the house phenomenon, and that it is just on that account that we call it a perception of a house? And what appears is not only a house in general, but just exactly this house, determined in such and such a way and appearing in that determination. (Husserl 1973, 57.)

In this way, the thing given in external perception is also an undoubted self-givenness, but not as a thing, really existing by itself, but as constituted in this perception or even in the whole complex of feelings attached to it and, in particular, constituted as a certain meaning-wholeness.

V. Conclusion: Destruction of the paradigm subject–object

Now, let us turn to the explication of everything mentioned above and draw appropriate conclusions, in which manner it will become clear what completely new space of thinking is opened for us by *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Phenomenology deals with being (*das Seiende*) in absolute form, that is, with absolutely reliable being, and such is only the so-called *phenomenon*. The latter means a completely evident given. Therefore, the method of phenomenological reduction excludes, that is, puts in brackets, everything that lacks obviousness, but, first of all, excludes the main paradigm of our thinking: *the subject–object* *split.* I (subject) and object as its opposition are turned off, i.e., are subjected to the operation of reduction. *Phenomenology is not the study of the subject–object relations, as many may imagine. It studies phenomena, and this is its primary field of research.* For this initial project and intention of phenomenology, it should be quite logically unacceptable to talk about the so-called realm of *the transcendental I* as a point of departure, towards which Husserl will turn firmly later. Why? Because *the transcendental I* is by no means a pure self-givenness, and it may have an even more transcendent character than *a real I*, i.e., a person. Thus, it is necessary to clearly see how the project of philosophical thinking, which is rooted in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, is somewhat different from the system that Husserl develops later.

Now, let us clarify the meaning of *evidence* once again, so that we can get rid of the ghost of subjectivity in this case as well. Obviousness or the evidence of something does not mean the feeling of obviousness; no, it only implies the self-givenness of something, and here it is important to appeal to the Heideggerian definition: a phenomenon is something that shows itself through itself. *Therefore, a phenomenologist does not deal with the subject and its own consciousness, with the factual objective reality, or with their interrelationship, nor does he deal with some kind of totality (in the Schellingian or Hegelian version), but with a field of pure self-givenness.* As we have already seen, research conducted by the phenomenological method discovers various types of self-givens. Namely, one of the types of the latter is the so-called *cogito* (experience), which should in no way be understood as an experience of the subject. It is appropriate to talk about the *cogito*, the continuous flow of the *cogito*, which is consciousness in its primary form, and that is it; there is no need for additional expressions about the subject, its own consciousness, etc. Among other important types of self-givens the so-called essence (*das Wesen*) is presented to us; another specific type is objectivity given in the duration of time (for example, a tonality); finally, we focused on the type, which we call a thing that is perceived: the intentional object of a certain experience (in particular, perception), which is self-constituted in the corresponding appearances that draw up the contents belonging to this experience. Therefore, the perceived thing as self-constituted is self-given, too.

A number of Husserl's expressions in *The Idea of Phenomenology* can mislead us into believing that this research concerns the subject's consciousness; but, in order to dispel this illusion, it is enough to look at the detailed elucidations of the author himself and, most importantly, at the specific essence of the phenomenological method underlying such research. For example, we may turn to such an illusion, when Husserl talks about the phenomenon of pure seeing; yes, we can think that we are dealing here with the subject's pure seeing of something. But the author elucidates right there that the phenomenon of pure seeing means nothing but the pure self-givenness of an object. In the same illusion, we may turn to the connection with the phenomenon of obviousness, which we have already talked about. Finally, Husserl's expressions about the correlation of the act of cognition and the object can also be the cause of an analogical illusion. Such expressions of the German philosopher and his frequent operating with traditional paradigms can be due to two circumstances: a) he has not yet properly elaborated and mastered the language, in which the new discourse dictated by the phenomenological method should be expressed; b) Husserl consciously operates with such paradigms, in order to make things easier for the reader accustomed to traditional thinking so as to enable the reader a comprehension of the gist of his discourse, in a flawed or distorted way, but nonetheless essentially.

One more thing is necessary, in order to see clearly the great innovation that *The Idea of Phenomenology* offers us. This particularly concerns the appropriate elucidation of the concept of constitution. First of all, we need to mention the following: *The concept of constitution for Husserl unambiguously means self-constituting. For instance, the expression "the constituting of a thing in this or that intentional experience" does not mean that "I (the subject) constitute the thing." No, it means the self-constitution of the thing through its appearances, which are presented as the contents of the corresponding intentional experience; and this is at the same time the process of the self-constitution of the real subject as the bearer of this intentional experience.* For example, *I* do not constitute in *my* perception and in the accompanying feeling of admiration a snowy sky; but this snowy sky is self-constituted in the appropriate complex of experiences with its appearances—whiteness, vastness, multitude of tiny forms, beauty… And in this process, my self-constitution as the bearer of this perception and this attached feeling also takes place.

Let us now more precisely explicate the meaning of *constitution*. This is very important, because, firstly, the mentioned concept with its dryness and formalism may cause some dissatisfaction in the reader; secondly, this expansion and specification further reveals to us the scope of the innovation mentioned above. To constitute something means to demonstratively set up something as a certain meaning-wholeness; namely, it means to give a meaning to something and constitute evidently its being, particularly, its being of a certain way. For example, when I say: "This leaf is dry," I thereby make obvious and establish: this leaf, which is characterized by the property of dryness, exists, and exists in original mode. When I speak of an imagined dried leaf, then I constitute the mode of its representative presence. In this manner, we deal with constituting different modes of being (*das Sein*). *But what does this phenomenon of the constitution of being denote for us more by way of content? It means the manifestation of existence, i.e., it means to bring the existence of something out of concealing into the "sunlight."* As we can see, we quite justifiably must appeal to Martin Heidegger and, particularly, apply the concept of concealing, in order to perfectly interpret the meaning of *constitution*. But is the concept of constitution understood unambiguously by Husserl as *self-constituting?!* Accordingly, "the constitution of a thing in one or another intentional experience" means *the self-manifestation of the existence and meaning-wholeness of the thing through its appearances, which appear in the form of contents, belonging to the corresponding intentional experience.*

Thus, the phenomenon, i.e. being (*das Seiende*), is self-givenness in the absolute sense. The latter is both an experience (*das Erlebnis*) and a self-manifested objectivity in its intentionality. There undoubtedly exists only this field of self-givens, and nothing more. Yes, within the field of self-givenness happens the self-manifestation of the so-called external reality and of essential universals, as well as the self-manifestation of my subject or person. Therefore, everything that I naively recognized as a real entity in my natural attitude—this computer, this room, the street and cars, this sky, the stars, other people, and myself as a human subject, etc.—obviously exists only in the constant self-manifestation or self-constitution of its meaning and being. *However, the field of phenomena does not have a mosaic-like and chaotic character, but initially exists within a certain totality, which as horizon limits it. This whole structure* *is worldliness or the self-manifestation of the world in the initial experience.* The whole process of diverse self-givenness and self-constitution takes place within this overall structure. It is true that this aspect is not specifically mentioned in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, but it is clearly implied in Husserl's judgments, and it is not difficult to decipher it.

The initial and founding provisions of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ingenious work are as follows:

> 1. Die Welt ist alles, was der fall ist.
> 1.1. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge. (Wittgenstein 2020, 49.)

> 1. The world is all that is the case.
> 1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (Wittgenstein 2002, 5.)

These provisions, now at the level of refined neopositivistic formulation, express the age-old paradigm, upon which our natural as well as scientific and philosophical way of thinking was based before Husserl's phenomenology. In particular, our thinking always proceeded from the latent or conscious prerequisite that the world is a whole complex of existing (things) or objective situations, i.e., a complex of facts.

Husserl makes a radical transformation of our way of thinking: the world is seen not as a whole complex of beings or facts, but as an act, a happening. Yes, both the self-givenness as well as the self-manifestation of the being of something is an act, a happening, but one that has nothing to do with the real act or occurrence, say, the strike of employees or a lightning strike. *The worldliness, i.e., the self-manifestation of the world (as the horizon) in the primordial experience is a fundamental ontological act; this is the primary happening, the* arché, *with which philosophical research deals and to which only the phenomenological method leads.* It opens up a truly new space for our vision and thinking; it allows us to understand *Being* (*das Sein*) not as being within the subject–object relationship, but as *the Event* (*das Ereignis*)*—the happening of worldliness.* This is how phenomenology introduces us to fundamental ontology.

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Early Heidegger and Biology

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Abstract

In the paper, the author problematizes the attempt to aprioritize empirical sciences as well as the reduction of theoretical capacities of biology in the famous work by young Martin Heidegger *Sein und Zeit*. For this purpose, the relations between his *Daseinsanalytik* and the research findings of biology are examined. The author ties in with the criticism of Heidegger's theses by Julius Kraft and Hans Albert. The apriorization of everyday thinking as well as the claim of the a priori primacy of the lifeworld over the research findings of empirical sciences are rejected. Likewise, Heidegger's thesis is rejected that biology does not give us an answer to the question, what is man, and that a crisis of fundamentals is allegedly at work in it. As Heidegger's critique of biology may be misguided in terms of scientific theory, he may be suspected of a veiled anthropocentrism.

Keywords: apriorization, existential analysis, *Dasein*, scientific knowledge, biology, antinaturalism, lifeworld.

Zgodnji Heidegger in biologija

Povzetek

Prispevek problematizira tako poskus apriorizacije empiričnih znanosti kot redukcijo teoretskih zmožnosti biologije v znamenitem delu mladega Martina Heideggra *Bit in čas*. Avtor zato prouči razmerja med njegovo *Daseinsanalytik* in raziskovalnimi rezultati biologije, pri čemer se sklicuje na kritiko Heideggrovih tez pri Juliusu Kraftu in Hansu Albertu. Članek zavrne tako apriorizacijo vsakdanjega mišljenja kot zatrjevanje apriorne prednosti življenjskega sveta pred raziskovalnimi rezultati empiričnih znanosti. Obenem zavrne tudi Heideggrovo misel, da nam biologija ne daje odgovorov na vprašanje, kaj je človek, in da je znotraj nje na delu kriza temeljev. Kolikor je Heideggrova kritika biologija morda napačna glede na smisel znanstvene teorije, mu je mogoče prisoditi prikrit antropocentrizem.

Ključne besede: apriorizacija, eksistencialna analiza, tubit, znanstvena vednost, biologija, antinaturalizem, življenjski svet.

In memory of my colleague
Axel Bühler (1947–2024)

"Wer groß denkt, muß groß irren."
Martin Heidegger

The anti-naturalistic approach is widespread in modern philosophy; often, it is accompanied by traditional prejudices about the theoretical potential of natural sciences, such as biology. At the same time, it goes together with outdated accounts of natural reality and relationships between it and (human) culture. In this part of the world, this was relatively recently authoritatively advocated by the Yugoslav *praxis* philosophers. However, anti-naturalistic radicalism is present in an even more peremptory form in a whole series of modern European philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger and others. The attempts to aprioristically establish the sciences about reality (in opposition to formal sciences, such as logic and mathematics) lost their credibility in the middle of the last century. So, nowadays this is less common among scientists themselves; however, such views are still present among certain economists who follow the methodological ideas of L. von Mises. Nevertheless, certain philosophical tendencies towards the placement of apriorism in the cognitive structure of the sciences about reality still exist. In recent times, e.g., in the form characteristic of the late phenomenological thought of E. Husserl, and of the derived thesis about the so-called "a priori of the lifeworld." This tendency is also visible through the specific formulations and peculiar jargon of his student M. Heidegger. In the present text, we comment on his point of view from the early stages of his work as presented in the famous book *Being and Time* (1927),[1] which simultaneously to a certain degree also announced his later controversial theses about the sciences and scientific knowledge of reality, denoting his later writings.

First of all, I would like to establish that the anti-naturalistic starting point of this author is distinctly hinted at as part of his total explication of the thesis

1 All the translations of Heidegger's theses from (the 12th edition of) *Being and Time* are the work of the author of the paper.

that "man has his environment [Umwelt]," whereby he lays claim that his famous "existential analysis of *Dasein*" and the clarification of the question of what man is, which it offers, "*lies before all psychology, anthropology, and especially biology* [*erst recht Biologie*]" (Heidegger 1972, 45; my emphasis).

With this formulation, which does not express just a locational determination, but is also imbued with a value ranking of what is before and what is after, he hints at his unappreciative view of biology—even in the context of a comparison with other positive sciences. (In this manner, the special allocation of a particular science undertaken here, for which no rational explanation is stated, in all probability simply represents an almost instinctive reaction, driven by a general anti-naturalist background position.) Heidegger has the ambition to be able to philosophically fix "the a priori of the thematic subject of biology," which consists of the structure of "*having* [the surrounding] 'world'" (ibid, 57–58). However, the structure itself can only be philosophically explicated, "if it is previously conceived as a structure of *Dasein*." The latter should manifest itself exactly in that "having," according to its possibility, is founded in the "existential organization of being-in [des In-Seins]." For in such mode the "substantially existent," that is, *Dasein* (i.e., man) can "explicitly discover the environmentally encountering being, know about it, dispose of it, *have* a 'world'" (ibid.).

Heidegger believes that "even biology as a positive science can never find and determine that structure." In contrast, he thinks that it necessarily "assumes it and constantly utilizes it"—this is precisely that, of which the "a priori" of her research object consists of. But what does Heidegger actually prove with such a conspicuous philosophical inference? Little, in fact, to cover his hardly sustainable pretensions of a far-reaching submission of biology to the authority of existential philosophical analysis. Namely, Heidegger tries to elevate relatively simple statements, concerning the relation of man to his natural environment as that relationship occurs in the everyday experience of ordinary people, to the pedestal of a priori assumptions in the subject of research in biology as a developed empirical ("positive") science. Biology purportedly cannot break through to such assumptions by itself, but they must be provided to it from the outside, namely from the *Dasein* analytics. The latter, in turn, remains framed by a special kind of anthropocentrism in the form of the thesis that man has the world and disposes of it, which is not considered valid for any other living being. However, it may be an unacceptable assessment that biology supposedly must assume a thus one-sided starting point, in order to be able at all to build its theories and explanations. One such—not particularly informative—assumption is not the necessary theoretical prerequisite for the building of biological theories, which can easily be carried out, without operating with it. Because, from the point of view of the biological science, it is of the same relevance that a person "has" an environment as that the environment "has" a person (in other, but no less relevant and important modes). And, analogously, that (natural) being is in man, as much as man is (existentially) in being. Starting from a trustworthy natural scientific perspective, it is difficult to assign a kind of privileged (and even determining biological a priori knowledge) status to the first relation in comparison with the second relation. Finally, Heidegger's subsequent thesis that life "a peculiar kind of being, but essentially accessible only in *Dasein*" (ibid.) thus points to a very anachronistic, unrealistic, and inappropriate view of the abilities and capacities of animals when compared to humans in the wake of scientific findings in biology and sociobiology. Yet, why should life (not only the individual, but also the social) in completely relevant forms not be available to, say, higher primates? The findings of contemporary studies of animal behavior provide sufficient corroboration in this sense.

It can be said that here, too, we encounter a kind of anthropocentrism—admittedly, not directly on the level of a general worldview level, but primarily within the framework of the theory of living beings, inhabiting our planet, and their inherent capacities, that is to say, within the thematic subject of research in biology as a science. But such a reduced form of anthropocentrism, which does not immediately appertain to the general cosmological worldview structure, is likewise not much less harmless.[2] Equally, in some of his later writings, Heidegger steadfastly adhered to the thesis about the privileged

2 As is known, in the later phase of his intellectual evolution, Heidegger tried to move away from anthropocentrism, in order to get out of its shadow, which was present, for example, in the conception that the total understanding of Being should be explained through the concern (*Sorge*) of *Dasein*. There is a difference of opinion among the interpreters of his work, whether the attempt was carried out consistently to the end.

position of man; namely, that he is the “place of the truth of Being [Ortschaft der Wahrheit des Seins],” to which the well-known metaphor about man as “shepherd of Being [Hirt des Seins]” can be added.

As problematic can also be viewed the emphasis that biology (as well as anthropology, psychology, etc.) “lacks an unequivocal, ontologically sufficiently explicated answer” to the question about the kind of being that man is, and that “the structure of those sciences today is entirely doubtful.” Such theses can be interpreted as being extremely pretentious; moreover, they seem dubious on their own, since they lack sufficient argumentative support.[3] For it is true that biology (and not much less other sciences, which deal with man) certainly has its own well-founded answer to the question of what kind of being man is (for instance, already within the framework of Darwin’s classic idea of man as “social animal”). And biology can offer this answer to anyone who recognizes the approach, cognitive goals, and methodology of a developed empirical science, such as it is; certainly, within the framework of the kind of ontology that is precisely purposeful and sufficient for the research program of biology. In contrast, the existential ontology that Heidegger has in mind is in fact theoretically not very relevant for the construction of biological theories. Finally, in order to question the structure of any science, it must first be comprehended. However, within the relevant reasonings in this work, the understanding of biology as an empirical and nomological science is not recognizable at all.

Heidegger’s insistence that biology as a science of life is “grounded in the ontology of *Dasein*” is exaggerated and unsustainable, although, admittedly,

3 Heidegger was simply poorly informed about the state of contemporary natural sciences, as well as, especially, about the methodology of science and modern logic. However, instead of the advisable restraint in such cases, he promulgated very categorical judgments and evaluations concerning these disciplines of scientific research. He himself was solidly familiar with classical philology, history and theory of culture, and, to some extent, theology, that is to say, with the scientific disciplines primarily from the domain of the so-called “sciences of the spirit” (*Geisteswissenschaften*). In such a state of affairs, his underrating evaluations, according to which sciences “do not think,” can be somewhat understandable, as can be comprehensible also his objections to philosophers’ “running after the sciences,” which he considered allegedly ridiculous and miserable (cf. Heidegger 2014, 71).

formulated with a small enigmatic, unexplained admonition that this grounding is not complete and exclusive. At the same time, he hardly explains what kind of "grounding" it would actually be, which would be non-exclusive and only partial. It seems that this would be an exotic type of combined founding, which raises the question of whether Heidegger himself was at all completely clear with regard to what kind of thesis he actually advocated here. It seems that it implies the possibility of a combined foundation of a particular science, while it remains unexplained and enigmatic with what else its insinuated additional grounding would be realized. If we were dealing with such a heterogeneous factor concerning the existential ontology of *Dasein*, like the empirical data of natural sciences and the picture of the world formed upon its findings, that would open up serious methodological issues of mutual compatibility and parallel functioning of two thus diverse foundations. As Heidegger's reasonings do not offer any reflections on the matter, not even in indication, let us not dwell further on such a possibility.

Simultaneously, the point of view is put forward by Heidegger that "positive research" of biology, as well as of other life sciences, supposedly "does not see these foundations," while they form their basis. Existentialist ontology of human existence as exemplified by his *Daseinsanalytik* is, however, of relatively limited scope and relevance for the explanatory questions that biological scientific theories pose and attempt to solve—if it can be considered relevant at all, concerning the cognitive approach and research program of biology. Therefore, its own foundations can hardly be placed on the same level and identified at the same time as the foundations of biological research itself, even within the framework of Heidegger's methodologically mysterious thesis of non-exclusive and incomplete grounding. Moreover, with the conceptually vague findings of such existential ontology, poorly equipped with informative content, these theories have little to begin with. Their heuristic significance is actually negligible within the standardized biology research programs.

Therefore, it could be said that the empirical consequences of the fundamental insight of *Dasein* ontology, that, namely, man has a world, are so scarce they can hardly contribute anything more significant in comparison with the level of research and explanation of relevant aspects of reality already reached in biology. Returning biology to insights, which Heidegger refers to, would thus practically mean a cognitive regression with regard to the achieved level of research—and not the invoked reappraisal of the true (and a priori binding) foundations of biological scientific knowledge as such. Karl Löwith, the thinker's former student, rightly stated that nature is missing in Heidegger's philosophy, namely nature "around us and within ourselves."[4]

Hans Albert, building on Julius Kraft's criticism of "the apriorization of the empirical" in the phenomenological school, claims that the a priori character of the findings of the analysis of *Dasein* is extremely problematic; namely, it results in „an apriorization of everyday thinking," which "actually only serves to isolate" appropriate assumptions about psychological, linguistic, biological, etc., research. Such assumptions are treated as the acknowledged essence of the given phenomena before the research itself and are not subject to corrections. In this way, through the theoretical and empirical results of such research, the findings of the analysis of *Dasein* cannot be questioned at all. Albert, therefore, notes that Heidegger's approach tends to obtain an a priori validity to certain statements so that they are no longer exposed to any competition from theoretical sciences. Besides that, Albert also believes that the very a priori nature of the given assumptions, as indicated by Heidegger, cannot be convincingly and plausibly demonstrated. On the contrary, the subject matter concerns "reformulations of known factual situations of everyday living and experiencing," albeit rendered in "a very unusual jargon," i.e., with the use of "an archaic way of speaking." (This had been, as I would like to admonish, critically pointed out already long ago, back in the 1950s, by Ernst Topitsch.)

However, in contrast to Albert's criticism, I would like to note that the transcendental procedure of a certain pre-structuring of scientific knowledge through the so-called a priori of the lifeworld as a pre-theoretical a priori is nevertheless a philosophically legitimate enterprise. Simultaneously, looking at things from the perspective of the lifeworld, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, from the perspective of constructed theoretical sciences are in fact two different, despite certain potential points of contact mutually irreducible

4 I am indebted to Hans Albert for the reference to this remark by Löwith, which he formulated in the essay "Zu Heideggers Seinsfrage: Die Natur des Menschen und die Welt der Natur." For Löwith's further critical reflections with regard to Heidegger's history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) cf. Löwith 1953.

spheres of cognition. However, specific limited correlations can be determined between them. The explication of such correlations can sometimes also bring about interesting findings. Another issue, however, is the somewhat peculiar performance of the transcendental procedure by Heidegger himself. First, it shows a misconception with regard to the emphasized relationship between the one and the other, insofar as it tries to reduce the foundations of scientific theories to certain lifeworld insights. Consequently, such reasoning further involves a certain epistemic dogmatism, which does not recognize the methodological background and risks of the procedure itself, as Albert also clearly and rightly points out. At the same time, it positions the statements made within the framework of the theoretically extremely limited horizon of average human everyday life as direct essential insights into the subject area of scientific research, which then supposedly can create commitments for all kinds of scientific explanations of reality. Such a transcendentalist procedure today has the status of a particular philosophical attempt to interpret the sciences and is generally only sustainable with the principled openness of lifeworld assumptions to the relevant findings of the developed sciences, such as biology. However, it must assent to corrigibility, that is, accept its susceptibility to corrections. Furthermore, its ultimate reach with respect to directing the research practice of the sciences must be seen as significantly more modest than Heidegger's ambitions contentions.

In my last book (cf. Jakovljević 2021, 7 ff.), I already emphasized the dubiousness of an a priori alignment of the opinion of everyday life with scientifically based knowledge, and the risks it entails. In particular, it opens the question whether representations and assumptions that aim at the orientation of man's way of life in everyday practice, and his immediate life goals, without further ado simultaneously claim such an epistemic authority that they can also be valid for us as unique a priori foundations of both our everyday knowledge as well as of scientific knowledge. That this leveling can lead to serious fallacies and delusions becomes clear, for example, when we compare opinions about nature from everyday life with the knowledge that developed natural science theories have reached about it. And precisely here the limits and risks of otherwise philosophically attractive attempts to ground scientific knowledge via the "a priori of the lifeworld" can be shown.

Contrary to the appreciation of such indispensable methodological considerations and questions, Heidegger, however, without any hesitation, enthusiastically proclaims—explicitly referring to his teacher, E. Husserl—, that "apriorism" is simply "the method of every scientific philosophy, which comprehends itself" (Heidegger 1972, 50, footnote). The latter, in this regard, most likely follows the classical rationalist-aprioristic tradition in the interpretation of scientific knowledge, especially as it had culminated in Kant and his programmatic fundamentalist insistence that natural science, which deserves that name, "first assumes the metaphysics of nature" (Kant 1911, 371). In relation to such Kant's strategy of the metaphysical foundation of scientific knowledge in the manner of an aprioristic rationalism, the shift was made only to the extent that "categories" were replaced by "existentials," the metaphysics of nature by the analysis of *Dasein*, and the place of a priori forms of general causation, substance, etc., by the forms of "the a priori of the lifeworld [das lebensweltliche Apriori]," such as the notion of "the possession of the surrounding world" (by *Dasein*). However, the underlying strategy remained basically the same.

The question, however, remains to what extent Heidegger, who was insufficiently familiar with scientific methodology, understood the needs of arguing for, as well as the relevant consequences of, apriorism. In my opinion, his scanty attempts at argumentation in support of the attempted apriorization of empirical sciences also remained unsatisfactory. For example, his emphasis on the circumstance that "positive research does not see its own foundations and considers them to be self-evident," but that this by no means proves "they do not lie at its basis" (Heidegger 1972, 58). Here, Heidegger practically moves in a circle, assuming as proven that which must still be established as proof. For he must, first of all, convincingly prove that the given a priori "groundings" are indeed incorporated into the foundation of scientific knowledge itself as its universally obliging assumptions, before he can state that positive scientific research may not "see" them, i.e., that it overlooks their givenness.

The critique of Heidegger presented here also contains certain ambiguities, which were probably generated against the background of the thinker's precarious movement within the field of the theory of science. Thus, he states that, with reference to the "absence of an unequivocal, ontologically sufficiently grounded answer to the question about *the way of being* of the being, which we are ourselves, in anthropology, psychology, and biology, no judgment can be made about the positive work of those disciplines" (Heidegger 1972, 50). However, then there cannot be entirely clear what the point of his criticism is, i.e., what does he actually want to object to with regard to the given scientific disciplines, when he underlines the alleged crisis of their foundations. (It would seem that Heidegger had heard something about the so-called "dispute over the foundations"—the famous *Grundlagenstreit*—in the domain of mathematics and he rushed to impose a similar "crisis" onto other sciences, a crisis, from which his existential analytics should and could rescue them, offering an archaically formulated ontological foundation as a basis for knowledge.) If, on the other hand, he wants to primarily say, in a very indirect, non-explicit, convoluted manner, that the scientific disciplines mentioned may be doing their job well, but their results do not correspond to the needs of his existential analytics, then this could be considered to be a somewhat pretentious stance. Neither anthropology, psychology, biology, nor any other positive, methodically and cognitively developed science is required to fit into any philosophical conception, to adapt and adjust to the particular assumptions and theorems of a specific philosopher.

Empirical sciences, such as biology, cannot be expected to be dedicated to the specific work of philosophical anthropology, despite the significant occasional cross-contact points. Likewise, the meaning of Heidegger's thesis that the "missing ontological grounding" cannot be replaced by "integrating anthropology and psychology into one general biology" is also not entirely clear (Heidegger 1972, 49). Firstly, such a thesis is hardly something more than a postulate, based on a previously adopted and poorly explained assumption that the required ontological grounding can only be provided by the existential ontology of *Dasein*. Additionally, the implicit hierarchy of scientific disciplines (in terms of the degree of their inherent generality), from which Heidegger starts, is quite unusual here. Perhaps it would be, considering the recognized character of the given disciplines, more plausible to ponder the possibility of biology and psychology being incorporated into general anthropology (if one is ready to speculate about the possibility of "embedding" some disciplines into others and to start from the thematization of the human phenomenon).

For the possibility of taking Heidegger's attempt as a viable option, it would, on the contrary, be necessary for him to provide the expected argumentation. This would entail delving into the body of knowledge of modern biology, drawing comparisons with the corresponding findings of his analysis of *Dasein*, and then concretely demonstrating what would actually be obtained by the systematic incorporation of the existentials into, for example, the Darwinian paradigm of the theory of evolution. In other words, it would be necessary to show to what possible cognitive shifts, and to what kind of progress of the biological knowledge this would lead. With the somewhat characteristic philosophical-aprioristic peremptoriness, Heidegger claims to be able to make far-reaching judgments about biology from the point of view of his existential ontology, without citing and analyzing any current biological theories, without considering any particular biological theses, etc.

Instead, Heidegger is predominantly concerned with the aprioristic claims of his ontology, on which modern biology should be founded, in order to gain the appropriate ontological grounding it now supposedly lacks—and because of this lack it can be considered to be in a state of an alleged crisis. It is not necessary to emphasize the unrealistic nature of such philosophical pretensions. In how deep of a fundamental crisis biology was, was best demonstrated by its subsequent development during the 20th century, in the course of which it gained the reputation of one of the most developed and successful scientific disciplines.

The endeavored discussion can therefore be concluded with the claim Heidegger's youthful and eager attempt to teach biology may be a failure. It also represents one of the weakest theoretical segments of his highly influential work *Being and Time*. This failure is all the more disappointing, as it is precisely modern biology that has a significant role in the building of the general worldview. Insofar as philosophy likewise aspires to assume such a role, a more profound observation of their mutual relationship would be all the more welcome and expected. However, (early) Heidegger's thoughts on biology can be viewed as an unsuccessful interpretive attempt based on dogmatic apriorism and anti-naturalism, lacking insight into the features of the functioning of scientific knowledge of reality and the structure of scientific theories.

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Über die Brunnentiefe eines Rätsels

Anmerkungen zur Frage nach der Tiefe des menschlichen Daseins im Denken Martin Heideggers

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On the Well Depth of an Enigma. Notes on the Question of the Depth of Human Existence in Martin Heidegger's Thought

Abstract

Heidegger did not conceive a "theory" of depth, but his ways of thinking may be characterized by his own withdrawal into the unimaginable, which is attempted to be understood as a move into the "depth." The essay seeks to take up Heidegger's hint to pay attention to the path and not the content. Is this a possible methodological approach to self-revealing as self-concealing? It requires us to think with the concept against the concept: because although thinking needs the concept, the conceptual is beyond the concept—it is "before" comprehension. At the same time, the treatise remains a torso, because every step on the way to thinking the depth is one too much and at the same time one too few. What opens up is an enigma. But perhaps in this way the basic idea of *Being and Time* can nonetheless be touched upon.

Keywords: enigma, depth, vastness, withdrawal, the unimaginable.

O globini vodnjaka uganke. Pripombe k vprašanju o globini človekove tubiti v mišljenju Martina Heideggra

Povzetek

Heidegger ni zasnoval nikakršne »teorije« globine, a njegove miselne poti odlikuje njemu lastni odteg proti nenadmisljivemu, ki ga tukaj skušamo razumeti kot poteg v »globino«. Prispevek želi slediti Heideggrovemu namigu, da je potrebno biti pozoren na pot sámo in ne na vsebino. Bi to lahko bil metodični pristop k sámo-kažočemu-se kot k sámo-skrivajočemu-se? Zahteva, da se s povprašanim misleč spoprimemo, da s pojmom mislimo zoper pojem: čeprav mišljenje potrebuje pojem, je tisto pojmovano onkraj pojma – je »pred« pojmovanjem. Pri tem razprava ostane nekakšen torzo, saj se sleherni korak na poti mišljenja globine izkazuje obenem kot korak preveč in kot korak premalo. Kar se razpira, je uganka. A morda se tako vendar lahko dotaknemo temeljne misli *Biti in časa*.

Ključne besede: uganka, globina, širjava, odteg, nepredmisljivo.

„Die Welt ist tief –: und tiefer, als je der Tag gedacht hat.“
Friedrich Nietzsche: *Also sprach Zarathustra*

„Sterben wirklich die meisten Menschen, ohne gelebt, ohne das Leben in seiner Tiefe gelebt zu haben?“
Ferdinand Ebner: *Das Wort ist der Weg*

Einleitung: Heideggers Blick in die Tiefe

Über Thales von Milet wird erzählt, er sei, nach oben in die Tiefe des Kosmos blickend, in einen Brunnen gefallen und von einer Thrakerin verspottet worden.[1] Auch Heidegger wird, Jahrtausende später, sein Blick *in* die Tiefe der Welt zu einem Blick *aus* der Tiefe umwandeln, denn er blickt nicht nur von oben in die Tiefe, sondern wagt einen Sprung, öffnet sich ihrer Erfahrung. Sein Denken verdankt sich diesem *Ur*-Sprung. Aus dieser Erfahrung entfaltet sich das späte Ereignisdenken und sein zentraler Begriff des Gevierts, doch Heidegger springt schon früher: *Sein und Zeit* erschließt das Da als jene Tiefe des Daseins, in und aus der wir ek-sistieren. Die Existenzialien des Daseins entspringen unserem Bezug zur Tiefe.

Ernten spätestens seit Thales Philosophierende auch *immer wieder* Hohn und Spott,[2] so hat schon Platon im *Theaitetos* in seinem Kommentar zu dieser Anekdote es gerade als eine Auszeichnung der Philosophierenden verstanden, die Tiefe zu berühren und aus dieser Erfahrung das Wesen des Menschen zu erfragen (Platon 1958, 174a). Heidegger würde dem wohl zustimmen, schreibt er doch in *Grundsätze des Denkens*: „Sterbliches Denken muß in das Dunkel der Brunnentiefe sich hinablassen, um bei Tag den Stern zu sehen.“ (Heidegger 2006a, 138.)[3] So könnte wohl auch Platons Höhlengleichnis, in dem sich

1 Zur verschlungenen Rezeptionsgeschichte des Textes und der Frage, wer ihn ob seines Missgeschicks verspottet habe, ob eine Frau, eine Magd oder eine Ausländerin vgl. Blumenberg 1987.

2 Bei allen Differenzen zu Thales teilt Heidegger mit ihm das Schicksal, verspottet zu werden. Vielleicht gründet mancher Spott darauf, sich gerade nicht von der Frage Heideggers in Anspruch nehmen zu lassen, gewissermaßen eine Abwehr gegen das philosophisch Herausfordernde. Paradigmatisch für diesen Umgang mit Heidegger sei genannt Fischer 2016.

3 Daran knüpfen sich viele Fragen, etwa die: Ist Heidegger sein Blick in die Tiefe zum

Tiefe und Höhe zusammengefunden haben, in seiner doppelten Bewegung in mancher Hinsicht als „Vorlage“ für Heideggers Denken des Gevierts angesehen werden – ohne hier in verkürzender und verrechnender Weise das Spezifische seines Denkens einebnen zu wollen. Denn in seiner Nietzsche-Vorlesung begreift er das Denken der Tiefe jenseits der Metaphysik: „Das Wesen der Metaphysik reicht tiefer als sie selber, und zwar in eine Tiefe, die in jenen anderen Bereich gehört, so daß die Tiefe nicht mehr die Entsprechung zu einer Höhe ist.“ (Heidegger 1997a, 371.)

Aber zumindest dies sei damit angedeutet: Heideggers Blick in die Tiefe ist kein Alleinstellungsmerkmal seiner Philosophie. So ist etwa Nietzsches Zarathustra vielschichtig getragen von der Erfahrung der Tiefe, und nicht zuletzt Heideggers Nietzsche-Vorlesungen machen diesen Grundzug seines Denkens sichtbar: Tiefe ist hier ein auffallend häufig verwendeter Begriff und lässt Nietzsches und Heideggers Verständnis von Tiefe ineinanderfließen. Auch in den Schriften der Mystiker, bei Paul Celan oder Hölderlin wird Heidegger immer wieder einem Denken der Tiefe begegnen und dies auf seine eigene Frage hin aufgreifen.[4] Paradigmatisch kann auch Heideggers Vorlesung zu Leibniz’ *Der Satz vom Grund* genannt werden, die nicht nur eine Reflexion über diesen Satz, sondern ein „Satz“ *in* die Tiefe ist.

Mit dieser – unzureichenden – Vorbemerkung soll die Frage nach der Tiefe eröffnet werden und damit von vornherein dessen eingedenk sein, dass diese

Verhängnis geworden – hat er einen Sprung gewagt, der zu tief war? Unvergessen ist der Brief Hannah Arendts an Jaspers, vom 29. 9. 1949: „Was Sie Unreinheit nennen, würde ich Charakterlosigkeit nennen, aber in dem Sinne, daß er buchstäblich keinen hat, bestimmt auch keinen besonders schlechten. Dabei lebt er doch in einer Tiefe und mit einer Leidenschaftlichkeit, die man nicht vergessen kann.“ (Arendt und Jaspers 1993, 178.) Dieser moralisierenden Kritik an Heideggers politischem Engagement in Verbindung mit Tiefe kann hier nicht nachgegangen werden. Wenn weiters Karl Löwith in seiner Biografie von einer Zweideutigkeit spricht, die eine Lektüre der Heidegger’schen Texte hinterlässt (Löwith 1989, 32–42), so könnte diese Zweideutigkeit auch aus der Frage diskutiert werden, inwiefern Heidegger der Rückweg aus der Tiefe gelungen ist. Jenseits einer Kritik an Heidegger wäre es vielleicht auch nötig, nach dem Verhältnis von Tiefe und Ethik zu fragen (vgl. dazu Vorlaufer 2024).

4 So könnte Heideggers Interpretation, dass Tiefe als Höhe verstanden werden kann, eine mögliche Quelle im Denken des von ihm geschätzten Meister Eckehart haben (vgl. dazu den Hinweis von Wucherer-Huldenfeld 1993, 10).

Frage zutiefst verwoben ist mit dem Wesen des europäischen philosophischen Denkens. Mag die Frage nach der Tiefe tief in der Geschichte philosophischen Denkens verwurzelt sein, so formt Heideggers eigenes Denken die Frage nach ihr aber doch in einer spezifischen Weise, und dem soll im Folgenden nachgefragt werden: Kann Heideggers Denken, zumal *Sein und Zeit*, aus diesem Geschehen des Blicks in die Tiefe verstanden werden?

Wenn Heidegger auch keine Abhandlung über den Begriff der Tiefe geschrieben hat – allerdings geht er vor allem in seiner Heraklit-Vorlesung (Heidegger 1994) auf den Begriff selbst wegweisend ein –, ist er dennoch in unterschiedlichen Kontexten seines Werkes präsent und mit seinem Denken engstens verwoben. An mehreren Stellen seiner Werke verwendet Heidegger die Alltagsbedeutung, spricht etwa vom „tiefen Humor" (Heidegger 2000b, 497), einer „tiefen Dankbarkeit" (Heidegger 2000b, 443) oder er fragt nach einer „tiefere[n] Weisheit" (Heidegger 2000b, 473). Wenn Heidegger im philosophischen Kontext vom Schweigen spricht, verknüpft sich das Alltagsverständnis von Tiefe mit dem zentralen Anliegen seines Denkens:[5] So wie Heidegger an entscheidenden Stellen seines Denkens von Stille spricht, z. B. vom stillen Licht der Lichtung (vgl. Heidegger 2000a, 259), spricht er auch von Tiefe in philosophischer Intention, wenn er vom Rätsel des Seins spricht. So sagt Heidegger in seinem Vortrag *Logos*, das Denken bedenkend: Das Wort des Denkens verändert „die Welt. Es verändert sie in die jedesmal dunklere Brunnentiefe eines Rätsels, die als dunklere das Versprechen auf eine höhere Helle ist." (Heidegger 2000a, 234.) Ohne diese kurze Textstelle überinterpretieren zu wollen, sei es unterstellt, dass sie die Motive und die Bewegung des Heidegger'schen Denkens versammelt. Das Rätsel, von dem Heidegger spricht, ist ja kein zu „lösendes" Kreuzworträtsel, sein Rätselhaftes trägt das „In" unseres In-der-Welt-seins.

In vier Schritten sei versucht, dem Rätsel der Tiefe zu entsprechen, sich ihrem Fragwürdigen zu öffnen und in wenngleich torsohafter Weise einen Gedanken zu entfalten. Im ersten Schritt soll gezeigt werden, dass eine

5 Etwa: „Ist Schweigen nur etwas Negatives, das Nicht-Sprechen und lediglich das Äußere, die Lautlosigkeit, die Stille? Oder ist das Schweigen etwas Positives und Tieferes, alles Sprechen aber das Nicht- und Nicht-mehr- und Noch-nicht-Schweigen?" (Heidegger 2001, 106.)

Hermeneutik der Tiefe nur als ein Sich-in-den-Entzug-ziehen-Lassen möglich ist. Anschließend soll in Hinblick auf *Sein und Zeit* das Verwurzeltsein unseres Daseins in der Tiefe skizziert und in einem dritten Schritt Dasein als Weg-sein begriffen werden. Hier soll aus der Struktur der Sorge die zeitliche Dimension unserer Existenz – v. a. in Hinblick auf Tod und Augenblick – als (Ent-)Zug in eine Tiefe verstanden werden. Der vierte Teil sucht die Weite unseres Daseins zu bedenken und versteht sie als ein Geschenk der Tiefe. Abschließend sei ein kurzer Rekurs auf die Leiblichkeit unseres Existierens versucht und das Atmen als Einübung in die Erfahrung der Weite der Tiefe skizziert.

1. Hermeneutik der Tiefe als ein sich in den Entzug ziehen Lassen

Wenn Philosophierende sich auf die Frage nach dem Wesen der Tiefe einlassen, ist nicht auszuschließen, dass sie den Begriff der Tiefe nicht verbal, sondern substantivisch zu verstehen suchen, sich in Gedankenkonstruktionen oder Theorien verfangen, die das Phänomen ver- und überdecken. Denn das Schreiben über Tiefe ist ähnlich verfänglich wie das Sprechen über das Schweigen und kann unversehens zu einem „Geschreibe“ werden, das nur um sich und seine Entwürfe kreist, ohne sich vom Phänomen ansprechen zu lassen und es aus seiner Erfahrung zu denken. Deshalb sind die mahnenden Worte Theodor W. Adornos zu beachten: „Der Begriff der Tiefe selbst ist nicht unreflektiert zu bejahen, nicht, wie die Philosophie es nennt, zu hypostasieren.“ (Adorno 1977, 701.)[6] Die Hypostasierung einer abgründigen Erfahrung würde das Erfahrene der Erfahrung zerstören. Heideggers Blick in die Tiefe kann als dieser Maxime folgend verstanden werden: Sein Blick ist „mehr“ als ein theoretisch-erkennender, er vollzieht sich als Sprung. Dass dieses „Mehr“ zugleich ein Weniger ist, bezeichnet Heidegger mit dem schlichten Wort „Armut“ des Denkens – und dieses wird zunehmend tautologisch.

6 In seiner *Philosophischen Terminologie* merkt Adorno an, dass der Begriff der Tiefe dennoch notwendig sei: „Am Begriff der Tiefe ist trotzdem soviel zu retten, als er wesentlich zum philosophischen Bewußtsein hinzugehört, das sich nicht dummachen lassen will. […] den universalen Zusammenhang der Verblendung zu durchbrechen.“ (Adorno 1973, 131.)

Damit ein tautologischer Satz sich in seiner Denkwürdigkeit erweist und sich nicht einem Sinnlosigkeitsverdacht ausgesetzt erfährt, muss das Erfahrene der Erfahrung von Tiefe aufgewiesen werden. Daher ist eine Hermeneutik unabdingbar, um das zu Denkende vor einem Gerede und Geschreibe zu schützen, und ein Blick in die Alltagssprache mag hier hilfreich sein: Von Dingen wie, z. B., einem Meer oder einem Wald ebenso wie von Menschen, Erfahrungen oder unserem Denken sagen wir manchmal, dass sie „tief" sind. Von der Tiefe selbst aber können wir nicht einfachhin sagen, was sie ist, nicht einmal dies, dass sie „ist". Dennoch gibt sie sich zu erfahren: sie wird *mit*-erfahren. Was dies meint, sei so zu benennen versucht: Die Rede von der Tiefe spricht vom Seienden, zugleich spricht sie aber gerade nicht vom Seienden, sondern vom Sein des Seienden. Denn vom Sein des Seienden kann sie nur sprechen, wenn sie vom Seienden spricht – diesen in sich widersprüchlichen Satz gilt es durchzuhalten, ja, den Satz selbst in einen Sprung zu verwandeln. Genauer müsste man so formulieren: Die Tiefe als *mit*-erfahrene lässt sich nicht von ihrem „Mit" trennen.

Tiefe nicht zu hypostasieren impliziert, dass sie nicht Objekt einer Gegenstandserkenntnis sein kann. *Die* Tiefe „gibt es" nicht – in Heideggers früher Terminologie gesprochen: Sie ist nicht vorhanden. Diese Ausgangssituation, das denken zu müssen, was sich allem Denken entzieht, ist für die Philosophie seit jeher elementar – man denke etwa an Kants berühmt gewordenes Diktum in der „Vorrede" zur ersten Auflage der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: „Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung der Erkenntnisse: dass sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann." (Kant 1956, A VII.) *Sein und Zeit* bzw. Heideggers Ereignisdenken können so verstanden werden, dass die Frage nach der Tiefe sich nicht abweisen lässt, weil der Grundvollzug unserer menschlichen Existenz einer ist, der von der Tiefe beansprucht und in diesem Sinne angesprochen ist – zumindest aber zutiefst in dieser Möglichkeit steht. Zudem wäre die Last der „Belästigung" selber bedenkenswert. Die von Kant angesprochene Situation ist jedenfalls zwar nicht neu, erfordert aber je immer neu, sein eigenes Denken zu bedenken. Denn die Konsequenzen sind für jedes philosophierende Nachdenken je immer neu *tief*greifend: Der Begriff der Tiefe begreift „nichts" – er *begreift*, dass sein Begriffenes nichts zu Begreifendes ist, nicht definiert und nicht in einem Griff gefasst werden kann.

Weil Tiefe kein Gegenstand einer Erkenntnis ist, ist alles, was wir von ihr oder über sie schreiben können nicht tief genug, um ihrem Wesen zu entsprechen. Das hermeneutische Problem versammelt sich in dem Satz: Tiefe „ist" – in gewisser Weise – „nichts" – und über sie zu schreiben ist nicht zuletzt für die Lesenden eine Zu-Mutung. Wenn das Schreiben über Tiefe sich ihr verstehend nähern möchte, müssen wir in die Vielfalt ihrer Erfahrung zurückfragen: Wie ist uns das gegeben, was wir mit Tiefe benennen? Denn ungeachtet der begrifflichen und logischen Problematik einer Undefinierbarkeit von Tiefe *erfahren* wir sie und, wie unsere vieldeutige Rede dokumentiert, bestimmt sie unsere Alltäglichkeit und ihre Sprache in vielfältiger Weise, ohne zumeist ausdrücklich bedacht zu werden: Wir sprechen etwa von der Tiefe eines Waldes, einem tiefen Gespräch oder von einem tiefen Schweigen; oder aber wir sind selbst tief verwurzelt in Traditionen, haben tiefe Gedanken und Gefühle. Wir können uns aber auch in der Tiefe der Nacht in ein Buch vertiefen und ein tiefes Verständnis erlangen ebenso wie eine tiefe Überzeugung – oder aber in einem tiefen Schlaf von Träumen in eine andere Dimension unseres Daseins getragen werden. Wenn wir etwa „tief" Luft holen, ist dies mehr als ein biologisch-organischer Vorgang, es betrifft unsere Weise, in der Welt zu sein. Manchmal werden wir „tief" berührt: Stimmungen wie Freude, Trauer, Liebe, Hass oder Angst berühren dann die Tiefe unseres Daseins. Die zumeist „unreflektierte" vielfältige Alltagsrede von Tiefe ist von der Philosophie nicht nur nicht wegzuwischen, denn in ihr verbirgt sich schwer zu Benennendes.

Tiefe denken heißt: gegen sich selbst denken. Phänomenologie ist der Versuch, mit dem Begriff gegen den Begriff zu denken, um sich auf das Erfragte denkend und erfahrend einzulassen. Ein solches Denken versucht, als hörendes sehend zu werden, Unvordenkliches zu vernehmen. Zwar braucht das Denken den Begriff, aber das Begriffene ist jenseits des Begriffs – es ist „vor" dem Begreifen. Denn der Genitiv in der Formulierung „Denken der Tiefe" meint nicht einen schlichten *genitivus objectivus*, sondern eher einen *genitivus subjectivus*: Hermeneutik ge-*hört* der Tiefe, ist ein hörendes Entsprechen.

Sein und Zeit ist ein Entwurf einer solchen Hermeneutik, die Fundamentalontologie könnte man deshalb als „Tiefenhermeneutik"[7]

7 Der Begriff der Tiefenhermeneutik wird hier in einem weiten Sinn verstanden und

verstehen, und dies bedeutet, dass sie sich als eine Hermeneutik der Tiefe vollzieht: Sie muss sich selbst in die Tiefe ziehen lassen, den Begriff loslassen, um sich in das Erfahrene ursprünglicher Erfahrung ziehen zu lassen. Die Tiefe der Hermeneutik ist so die Hermeneutik der Tiefe: Destruktion, wie Heidegger sie als Grundvollzug seiner fundamentalontologischen Auslegung begreift, kann dann verstanden werden als ein Sich-in-den-Entzug-ziehen-Lassen, ein Loslassen vorgestellter Begriffsinhalte und Denken als ein sich Einlassen in das – Unvordenkliche. In den *Beiträgen* skizziert Heidegger das seinsgeschichtliche Denken aus diesem Bezug zur Tiefe:

> Es bleibt in der eigenen Tiefe verborgen, aber jetzt nicht mehr, wie seit dem ersten Anfang des abendländischen Denkens während der Geschichte der Metaphysik, in der Verhüllung seiner Verschlossenheit im unerbrochenen Ursprung, sondern in der Klarheit eines schweren Dunkels der sich selbst wissenden, in der Besinnung erstandenen Tiefe. (Heidegger 1989, 431.)

Wer immer also versucht, Heideggers Denken als Denken der Tiefe zu verstehen, muss ihre spezifische Phänomenalität beachten: dass sie nur aus dem Entzug ihrer selbst verstanden werden kann. Anders formuliert: Wir müssen uns auf ihre Erfahrung einlassen, um das eigentümliche Lassen der Tiefe begreifen zu können. Dies ist auch deshalb unumgänglich, weil Heidegger nicht nur dort von Tiefe spricht, wo er sie explizit thematisiert. Eine Hermeneutik der Tiefe wird dadurch fragil, und ein Hinweis in den *Schwarzen Heften* steigert dieses Fragile und Frag*würdige* noch: „Das Denken ist nur tief, solange es ab-gründig bleibt und dabei jedes Wort über den Ab-Grund vermeidet.“ (Heidegger 2020, 42.)[8]

nicht in einem spezifischen Sinn, wie er etwa in den Texten von Paul Ricoeur entfaltet wurde.

8 Heideggers Denken ist keine Theorie der Tiefe, sondern es ist getragen von der Erfahrung, die mit dem Begriff des Ent-*zugs* benannt werden kann. Dies hat Konsequenzen auch für eine Hermeneutik der Texte Heideggers: Achtet die Auslegung seiner Texte gemäß seiner Aufforderung auf den Weg, dann muss sie sich in den Entzug ziehen lassen, sich auf den Zug des Entzugs einlassen. Erst dieses Lassen ermöglicht

2. Menschliches Dasein: Verwurzelt in der Tiefe

Auch dort, wo Heidegger den Begriff der Tiefe nicht explizit verwendet, begleitet und trägt der Zug und Entzug des *Wesens* der Tiefe sein Denken. In *Sein und Zeit* hat es Heidegger vermocht, das Einfache und Gewöhnliche des alltäglich Begegnenden „neu", d. h. aus seiner Tiefendimension sehen zu lassen. Seine Analysen unseres alltäglichen Hantierens mit Werkzeug etwa sind weder eine Gebrauchsanweisung noch eine Theorie, die feststellt, wie ein Subjekt mit einem Objekt etwas bewirkt, keine Beschreibung, wie die Dinge Widerstand leisten oder mit Härte und Gewicht etc. ausgestattet sind. Im Gegenteil: Wollen wir den Hammer als Hammerding verwenden, d. h. *praktisch* verstehen, müssen wir seine Gegenständlichkeit gerade in eine Ferne loslassen, die Subjekt–Objekt-Dichotomie gleichsam vergessen, um aus dieser Ferne der Dienlichkeit des Werkzeugs, seinem Sein-für-uns, d. h. seiner spezifischen Nähe, entsprechen zu können. In-der-Welt-seiend, etwa besorgend und hantierend, bestimmt uns so eine Nähe und Ferne zu den Dingen.[9] Sie sind uns aus einem Unvordenklichen, d. h.: aus der Tiefe der Welt, zur Hand, und dieses Unvordenkliche – „vor" unserem Denken liegende – zeigt sich dann in unserer Lebenswelt etwa als Bewandtniszusammenhang.

Wenn dies zutrifft, ist Tiefe für Heidegger schon in der Fundamentalontologie das eigentlich Denkwürdige. In ihr ist auch grundgelegt, dass Heidegger späterhin immer wieder und sich selbst radikalisierend nach dem Heiligen und Göttlichen bzw. dem Gott fragt und fragen kann (vgl. Wucherer-Huldenfeld 1997). Eine Bemerkung in der kleinen Schrift *Der Feldweg* ist hier aufschlussreich und wegweisend: Heidegger schreibt, in Erinnerung an die Spiele seiner Kindheit, von einem Glanz, „der auf allen Dingen lag" (Heidegger 1983a, 88). Dieser Glanz aus der Tiefe ist mehr und anderes als ein psychologisches Phänomen, ein Relikt einer verklärt erinnerten Kindheit.[10]

ein Hören auf das Gesagte seiner Texte.

9 Wesentlich schwieriger und über Heidegger hinausgehend ist im fürsorgenden Mitsein die Erfahrung von Ferne und Nähe zu verstehen (vgl. dazu in Ansätzen Vorlaufer 2018).

10 Im Gegenteil: man könnte vielleicht davon ausgehend die Lebensphase der Kindheit neu sehen lernen. Zur Frage der Lebensalter vgl. Schopf 2014.

Er begegnet Heidegger auch an gänzlich anderen Denkwegen, etwa im Ding-Aufsatz, wo Heidegger nach dem Wesen eines Kruges fragt (Heidegger 2000a, 165–187), oder wenn im Vortrag *Bauen Wohnen Denken* (Heidegger 2000a, 145–164) Heidegger eine Brücke über den Rhein bedenkt und auf den Brückenheiligen verweist – damit ist angedeutet, dass sogar bei einem technischen Bauwerk noch etwas ganz anderes aufblitzen kann (vgl. Thurnher 2008). Dieser Glanz kann durch keinen Baumeister produziert und durch kein Hochglanzpolieren bewirkt werden, im Gegenteil: Der „bewirkte", auf Ästhetik getrimmte Glanz verwandelt die Welt gerade in Kitsch (vgl. Griesz 1994). Glanz *aus* der Tiefe meint, dass Tiefe Dinge in besonderer Weise erscheinen, sich zeigen *lässt*: Tiefe ist frei-gebend.[11]

Wir selber aber zeigen in vielfältiger und nicht in intentionaler, sondern in existenzialer Weise – in dem Maße, als wir aus dem „Ek-" der Eksistenz existieren – in die Tiefe: Befindlichkeit, Verstehen und Rede als Grund-Vollzüge unseres Daseins schöpfen ihr uns Menschen Auszeichnendes aus der Tiefe des Da. In Hölderlins Vers „Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören können von einander", ist dieses Anliegen Heideggers in dichtester Weise versammelt und präsent (vgl., v. a., Heidegger 1981, 33–48): Ein Gespräch ist Heidegger nicht bloß ein Informationsaustausch, Hören kein Wahrnehmen von Lauten. So wie Sprache nicht von den Schallwellen her verstanden werden kann, so auch unsere Hand nicht aus ihrem Organ-sein, denn bis in unsere Leibhaftigkeit hinein sind wir Zeigende, unsere Gebärden Weisen des einander Tragens (vgl. Vorlaufer 2020 und Baur 2013). Die Daseinsanalyse ist deshalb keine Anthropologie, sondern der Versuch eines Aufweises, dass unsere Existenz aus dem Bezug zum Sein zu verstehen ist, dass unser Selbst-Verstehen nur möglich ist aus diesem Bezug.

Leibhaftig in die Tiefe zu zeigen, vermögen wir nur, weil wir selbst aus der Tiefe *sind*: wir *ek*-sistieren. Das „Ek-" der Ek-sistenz ist in einem doppelten Sinn zu verstehen – nicht nur als ein Hinaus-Stehen, sondern auch als ein Herein-Stehen (vgl. Heidegger 2010, 310). Nun wird der Begriff der Tiefe in *Sein und Zeit* zwar nicht explizit erörtert, doch im § 60, einem Schlüsselabschnitt mit dem Titel „Die existenziale Struktur des im Gewissen bezeugten eigentlichen

11 Der für den Kunstwerk-Aufsatz (Heidegger 1977b, 1–74) zentrale Begriff der Erde findet hier seinen Anhalt.

Seinkönnens“, spricht Heidegger in aufschlussreicher Weise vom Gewissensruf des Daseins in die „Stille seiner selbst“ (Heidegger 1977a, 393): Dort, wo Dasein in eigentlicher Weise *ist*, wo es seine Möglichkeit *selber* zu sein ergreift, ist es still. In der Stille versammelt sich unser Dasein: Sie ist der Ort, uns selbst aus der und als Möglichkeit zu begreifen, von der Heidegger im Anschluss an Aristoteles sagt, sie sei höher als die Wirklichkeit (vgl. Heidegger 1977a, 51 f.). Stille und Tiefe stehen so in einer Zusammengehörigkeit. Nicht zuletzt am Beispiel von Sprache und Gespräch können wir auch alltäglich erfahren, dass die Tiefe eines Gesprächs mit Stille verwoben ist: Wenn es still ist, beginnen wir zu horchen, d. h. uns der Tiefe zu öffnen. Man könnte den dialogisch-dialektischen Satz formulieren, der als „Aussagesatz“ die Grenze des Absurden berührt: Die Tiefe der Stille „ist“ die Stille der Tiefe. Absurd ist der Satz nur dann nicht, wenn er tautologisch verstanden wird.[12]

Von unserem Bezug zur Tiefe spricht Heidegger in unterschiedlichen Zugängen und unterschiedlichen Begriffen. Mehrfach zitiert Heidegger den Dichter Johann Peter Hebel, etwa in seinem Vortrag *Hebel – der Hausfreund* aus dem Jahr 1957: „Wir sind Pflanzen, die – wir mögen's uns gerne gestehen oder nicht – mit den Wurzeln aus der Erde steigen müssen, um im Äther blühen und Früchte tragen zu können.“ (Heidegger 1983a, 150.) Hebel ist ihm ein Dichter, der seinem Denken des Gevierts nahe ist. Für unsere Fragestellung ist Hebels „Bild“ der Pflanzen, die verwurzelt sind, mehr als eine „Metapher“ oder ein Bild im Sinne einer einge*bildet*en Vorstellung: Ihr Wachsen und unser Existieren sind in einer abgründigen Weise miteinander verwoben. Auch wir „müssen“, um blühen und Früchte tragen zu können, aus der Erde steigen, zugleich aber auch verwurzelt sein. Verwurzelt zu *sein* meint aber nicht bloß, Wurzeln zu *haben*, meint keine Bodenständigkeit im Sinne einer geschichtslosen Unbewegtheit, sondern muss im Sinne einer „radikalen“ Ethik des Werdens verstanden werden: Wir können nicht in der Tiefe „verharren“, sondern müssen in das Un-heimische, ins Lichte, auch in die „Fremde“ gehen.[13]

12 Im Negativen sind weder Stille noch Tiefe ein pejoratives Nichts, kein Mangel, sondern, um ein bei Heidegger häufiges Bild zu gebrauchen: eine Quelle.
13 Vgl. dazu Heideggers Hölderlin-Auslegung „*Andenken*“ (Heidegger 1981, 79–151).

Wir sind somit in der Tiefe verwurzelt, in Heideggers späterer philosophischer Terminologie könnten wir auch sagen: Wir sind in sie eingelassen. Denn sie ist kein Konstrukt vorstellenden Denkens, sondern ein konstitutives Moment unserer Praxis.

3. Da-sein als Weg-sein, oder: Sorge als (Ent-)Zug des Daseins in seine Tiefe

Mag der Begriff der Tiefe in *Sein und Zeit* auch nicht explizit erörtert werden, so führt die temporale Analyse Heidegger in ihren entscheidenden Stellen wiederholt vor eine abgründige Tiefe, so vor allem in den Fragen nach Augenblick oder Tod.[14] In diesen zeitlichen Analysen wird manifest, dass Heideggers philosophischer Weg zwar von der Erfahrung und vom Begriff des Daseins getragen ist, dass *Da*-sein aber auch *Weg*-sein heißt. Dies wird schon in der Formel für die Sorge sichtbar und fundiert die zeitliche Analyse des Daseins: Das Sich-vor-*weg*-sein der Sorgestruktur sagt, dass das Dasein als in der Welt und bei innerweltlich begegnendem Seiendem sorgend all-täglich zwischen Geburt und Tod verlaufend stets über sich hinaus ist. Im *Sich*-vor-weg-sein des Sich-vor-*weg*-seins als ein Über-sich-hinaus-*sein* waltet so ein Sich-selbst-ent*zogen*-sein: ein Entzug als Zug einer abgründigen Bewegung.

Sorge meint keine Zusammenstückung der vulgär verstandenen Module Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, sondern nennt ein *einheitliches* Ganzes in seinen auseinanderstrebenden Momenten, in dem die Zukunft allerdings eine Priorität besitzt: Diese wird nicht aus dem Noch-nicht-Jetzt gedacht, sondern aus dem *Zurück*-Kommen: Im Sich-vor-*weg*-sein kommen wir jeweils auf uns selbst zurück. Die formale Struktur des Sich-vor-*weg*-seins ist damit die Voraussetzung dafür, dass wir uns selbst zur Frage werden können, dass wir *selbst* als Da-Seiende eine Frage und uns selbst ein Rätsel sein können: In der Frage, die wir nicht nur stellen, sondern die wir – in Heideggers früher Terminologie: „geworfen" – *sind*, geht es um das Ganze unseres Daseins

14 Eine der einprägsamsten Erörterungen zur Frage der Tiefe unserer Zeiterfahrung außerhalb von *Sein und Zeit* findet sich im vierten Kapitel der Vorlesung *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* in der Erörterung der „tiefen Langeweile" (Heidegger 1983b, v. a. 199–238), der Tiefe der langen Weile.

– und entsprechend lautet der überlieferte Spruch Perianders μελέτα τὸ πᾶν in Heideggers Übersetzung: „Nimm in die Sorge das Seiende im Ganzen." (Heidegger 1996, 421, und 1997b, 3.)[15]

In den *Beiträgen* heißt es rückblickend, Dasein auf sein äußerstes Wegsein im Tod beziehend: „Zum Da gehört als sein Äußerstes jene Verborgenheit in seinem eigensten Offenen, das *Weg*, als ständige *Möglichkeit das Weg*-sein; der Mensch kennt es in den verschiedenen Gestalten des Todes." (Heidegger 1989, 324.) Die Gestalten des Todes – nicht nur der Exitus, sondern auch etwa Abschiede, Lebensabschnitte, Trennungen oder Lebensumstände – sind mit dem chronologischen Zeitbegriff nicht zureichend zu verstehen: In ihnen wird ein Fehlen erfahrbar und ein Fehlendes sichtbar, zugleich aber auch eine Rückbewegung in unseren Anfang, in der sich die abgrundtiefe Frage, die wir selber *sind*, öffnen mag. In der Rück-Frage an uns selbst zeigt sich, dass das Wegsein nicht eine einfache Feststellung eines Nichtvorhandenseins meint, sondern einen Zug in das Nicht(s).[16]

Im Sichvorweg-sein, wie es im Tod in äußerster Weise geschieht, waltet, verborgen in der Rückfrage an uns selbst, auch und wesenhaft ein Rückgang in unseren Anfang. Denn so wie Ferne Nähe erfahren lässt, lässt der Tod erfahren, was mit uns – etwa in einer menschlichen Beziehungsgeschichte – angefangen und sich ereignet hat: Das Weg des Todes bringt – wie augenblicklich auch immer – ans Licht, was im Getriebe der vulgären Zeiterfahrung sich nicht zu zeigen vermag.[17]

15 Dabei betont Heidegger (vgl., z. B., Heidegger 1998, 123): „die Sorge aber ist der Wahrheit des Seyns. Solche Sorge ist abgründig verschieden von jeder trübselig-jämmerlichen Bekümmernis." Und auch: „[…] die Sorge, nicht als kleine Bekümmernis um Beliebiges und nicht als Verleugnung des Jubels und der Kraft, sondern ursprünglicher denn dies Alles, weil einzig ‚umwillen des Seyns', nicht des Seyns des Menschen, sondern des Seyns des Seienden im Ganzen" (Heidegger 1989, 16).

16 Zur wesentlichen Erfahrung des Wegseins zählt etwa auch Kranksein als Privation der Gesundheit (vgl. Wucherer-Huldenfeld 2007). In den Zollikoner Seminaren erörtert Heidegger das Wegsein am Beispiel der Leiblichkeit (vgl. Heidegger 2006b, 244).

17 Das Nicht(s) aber gibt sich in einer Vielfalt zu erfahren. So muss der im Tod sich zeigende Entzug nicht als Zerstörung etc. verstanden werden, er kann auch im

So wie der Tod in Heideggers Denken kein punktuelles Ereignis am Ende einer als Zeitlinie vorgestellten Lebenslinie ist, ist auch der Augenblick kein messbares, gegen Null tendierendes Vorkommnis. Durch den Rückbezug des Wegseins in unseren Anfang mag uns im und für einen „Augenblick" Gegenwart anders gegeben sein denn als das Nichts zwischen zwei Nichtsen: etwa als Fülle. Wenn Heidegger seinen frühen zentralen Gedanken, in dem sich Grundbegriffe der Daseinsanalyse finden, formuliert: „Entschlossen hat sich das Dasein gerade zurückgeholt aus dem Verfallen, um desto eigentlicher im ‚Augenblick' auf die erschlossene Situation ‚da' zu sein" (Heidegger 1997a, 328), so verweist der hier verwendete Begriff des Augenblicks, dessen Mehrdeutigkeit durch die Apostrophierung angezeigt wird, über seine mögliche chronologische Interpretation hinaus auf ein existenziales bzw. ereignishaftes Verständnis.

Heideggers „Definition" „eigentliche Gegenwart nennen wir den Augenblick" (Heidegger 1997a, 338) könnte, um das Gemeinte stärker zu betonen, so umformuliert werden: Die Präsenz des Präsenten ist uns nur augenblicklich gegeben. Gerd Häffner verfolgt in seinem Buch *In der Gegenwart leben* den Gedanken der Erfahrung von Präsenz und schreibt: „Gegenwart kann so unerträglich sein, daß wir uns dadurch vor einer Verletzung schützen, daß wir ihr zu starkes Licht zu brechen versuchen, z. B. durch eine Vermittlung durch die beiden anderen Zeitmodi." (Häffner 1996, 147.) Die Gegenwart, als jenes, was alles Gegenwärtige gegenwärtig sein lässt, ist zwar immer mitgegenwärtig, doch die Gegenwart der Gegenwart selbst zu vernehmen ist vergleichbar einem starken Licht, das zu viel für uns ist. Das Zuviel wäre auch ein Zugang, um den Entzug des Augenblicks in eine Tiefe zu verstehen. Ein Moment im Entzugsgeschehen der Tiefe der Zeit ist, dass auch Tiefe selbst sich entzieht. Heidegger selbst verweist auf Heraklits „Blitz", um den Entzug, der zugleich ein Bezug ist, sprachlich zu fassen. Von dieser Erfahrung wird eine Anmerkung Heideggers in *Zum Ereignis-Denken* trotz ihrer sperrigen

Rückbezug auf den Anfang oder als Erfahrung von Tiefe ausgelegt werden. Und so ist auch nicht die Angst die das Denken des Todes leitende Befindlichkeit, sondern auch die Gelassenheit. Denn der Tod lässt etwas sich zeigen: im und durch den Tod wird etwas sichtbar, d. h. „im Licht" des Dunkels des Todes. Fridolin Wiplinger hat dies in seinem Todesbuch (1980) als Sinn und Widersinn des Todes zu entfalten versucht.

Formulierung zugänglich: „Die Leuchte des großen Augenblicks, der alles in die einfache Helle der Wesung des Seins sammelt. Dieser Augenblick ist der Blitz in das Nichts." (Heidegger 2013, 172.) Findet in dieser augenblicklichen Gabe Heraklits Blitz aus seinem Fragment 64, mit dem das Heraklit-Seminar Heideggers mit Eugen Fink eröffnet wurde (vgl. Heidegger 1986, 11–29), einen Ort ursprünglicher Erfahrung? Versteht man Augenblick aber nicht nur nicht aus dem vulgären Zeitbegriff und seinem nichtigen Nichts, sondern – wie es Heidegger zwar nicht entfaltet, aber grundlegt – aus dem personal verstandenen Augen*blick*, dann wird das mit dem Zug der Tiefe zu Benennende lebensweltlich erfahrbar.

In der Erfahrung des Todes ebenso wie in der des Augenblicks wird nicht nur ein Nichten und ein Nichts von Zeitlichem erfahren, sondern „zugleich" auch die das Zeitliche zeitigende Zeit selbst als ein eigentümliches „Nichts", denn: „Die Zeit ist nicht" (Heidegger 2007, 20), wie Heidegger in *Zeit und Sein* formuliert, und d. h. in unserer Fragerichtung: Sie entzieht sich in ihre eigene Tiefe. Flüchten wir nicht vor dieser Tiefe der Zeit, dann kann das Nichts ihres

Nicht-seins als ein gebendes Nichts erfahren werden, ein Nichts, das uns trägt und uns tragend zieht. Wohin trägt uns dieses ihr Nichts?

4. Das Geschenk der Tiefe: Weite des Daseins

Die Tiefe der Zeit lässt uns ein uns tragendes Geschehen erfahren: Tiefe hält nicht fest, sondern gibt frei. Dies, dass die Gabe dieser Freigabe als Weite eines Zeitspielraumes erfahren werden kann, soll nun bedacht werden. Im Bild gesprochen: Tiefe ist kein Sumpf, der nach unten zieht und uns erstickt, sondern, um noch einmal an Hebel zu erinnern und zugleich ein Wort aus dem Geviert aufzugreifen, tragende Erde: Tiefe gründet abgründig, ihr „Wesen" ist es, ins Freie zu geben. Ihr gründendes Tragen ist jenes Lassen, aus dem Anwesendes anwesend sein kann.[18]

Oberfläche, die ohne Bezug zu Höhe und Tiefe, d. h. ohne tragenden Grund und ohne das Erhabene des Erhobenen erfahren wird, kann in unserem

18 Vielleicht könnte aus der Erfahrung der Weite der Zeit auch Hans Blumenbergs These: „Die Enge der Zeit ist die Wurzel des Bösen", neu diskutiert werden (Blumenberg 1986, 71).

Alltag zum Oberflächlichen werden, das unser Dasein belastet. Augustinus Karl Wucherer-Huldenfeld entfaltet dies in seinem Beitrag „Die Weite des menschlichen Da-seins in ihrer Bedeutung für die Psychotherapie“:

> [Bloße] Weite der Oberfläche, der die tragende Tiefe abgeht, hat etwas Erschreckend-Beängstigendes, wie das zum Beispiel aus agoraphoben Erfahrungen bekannt ist, während Verschließung im Tragenden, Tiefe, die nicht in die Weite zu führen vermag, wie in klaustrophoben Beeinträchtigungen beengt. Die offene Weite des Auseinandergehenden beruht auf dem Zusammenhalt in der Tiefe, die Unermesslichkeit des Da-seins verdankt sich ihrem Ursprung, Anfang und Grund. (Wucherer-Huldenfeld 1993, 10 f.)

Darauf, dass die Ab-Gründigkeit der Tiefe nicht eindimensional aus dem nach unten gerichteten Blick zu verstehen ist, verweist schon die Sprache: Das griechische Wort βαθύς meint nicht nur tief, sondern auch hoch – Heidegger weist wiederholt darauf hin[19] und spricht z. B. von den „Tiefen der Höhe“ (Heidegger 1983a, 74, und, z. B., auch 2000b, 530). Tiefe hat aber im Denken Heideggers noch eine andere, wesentlichere Dimension: Weite. Davon spricht – in der Auslegung Heideggers – Heraklit, wenn er in seinem Fragment 45 von der ψυχή des Menschen, unserem Sein, sagt: ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν · οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει. In der Übersetzung Heideggers: „Der Seele äußerste Ausgänge auf deinem Gang nicht wohl kannst du sie ausfinden, auch wenn du jeden Weg abwanderst; so weitweisende Lese (Sammlung) hat sie.“ (Heidegger 1994, 282.) Der λόγος, den der Mensch hat, ist βαθὺν – Heidegger übersetzt mit „weitweisend“. Seine Tiefe „besteht im ausholenden Anweisen der Weite, aus der sich die Sammelbarkeit des Zusammelnden bestimmt. Insofern die Seele einen solchen λόγος hat, gehört zu ihrem Sichöffnen und zum aufnehmenden Zurücknehmen das ausholende Weisen in eine Weite.“ (Heidegger 1994, 282.)

Heidegger versteht Tiefe somit nicht nur nicht als Gegenbegriff zur Höhe, sondern „das Wesentliche“ (Heidegger 1994, 282) ist ihm die Erfahrung der

19 Z. B. Heidegger 1994, 221: „‚Die Tiefe‘ denken wir meistens nur im Gegensatz zur Höhe und also nach unten und hinab. Aber das Wesen der Tiefe ist anders.“

Weite. Er schreibt, indem er auf die Alltagsrede vom „tiefen Wald“ verweist: „Das Tiefe ist das Weite, aber gänzlich ins Verborgene hinein Weisende und so selbst irgendwie Sammelnde.“ (Heidegger 1994, 282.) An einer späteren Stelle seiner Vorlesung wiederholt er erläuternd dieses Verständnis: „Das Wesen der Tiefe liegt in der sich dabei selbst verbergenden Weisung in eine noch unausgemessene Weite der Verbergung und Verschließung. Wir übersetzen daher βαθύς nicht mit ‚tief‘, sondern mit ‚weitweisend‘ und ‚weitgewiesen‘.“ (Heidegger 1994, 305.) Heraklits Bestimmung der menschlichen ψυχή verweist in Heideggers Lesart in die Tiefe der Weite und in die Weite der Tiefe. Wucherer-Huldenfeld kann somit resümieren: „Das Menschsein besteht demnach in gesammelter Offenheit, in der Sammlung auf das Sein, in der offenen Weite des Wesens der Wahrheit des Seins.“ (Wucherer-Huldenfeld 1993, 10.)

Bezieht man diese unsere Existenzweise auf unser Mitsein, so bedeutet dies, dass menschliche Begegnung nicht bloß als ein Zusammentreffen von Subjekten vorgestellt werden kann, sondern sich als ein Geschehen der Wahrheit ereignen mag, dass Tiefe aus ihrem Lassen die Wahrheit eines Gesprächs gewährt und sein Zeigen geleitet. In einem Gespräch, das wir *sind* und nicht nur „führen“, sind wir ein-gelassen in die Tiefe und aus ihr auch einander vereignet, denn in diesem Gespräch berühren wir die Tiefe unserer selbst und die Mitte unseres Mitseins. Schweigen ist dann kein bloßes Verstummen, sondern ein Sammeln, welches das Wort ein zeigendes werden lässt, Unsagbares hütend: Und Hören hört dann den Anderen und sein Gesagtes, wenn es gesammelt nicht bloß Zeichenketten scannt, sondern Ungehörtes hört (vgl. Pöltner 1993 und 2018). Aus der Tiefe des „*Un-*“ des Ungehörten und Unsagbaren quillt Sprache und lässt Worte aus einer Brunnentiefe sagende sein. Während die benutzte und abgenützte Sprache – oftmals nützliche – Informationen bereitstellen kann, sind wir, wenn wir ein Gespräch sind, *ein* Gespräch. So kann uns nun nicht nur die Tiefe der Zeit, sondern auch die Tiefe des Wortes ein Quellgrund unseres Daseins sein. Und so berühren einander die Tiefe des Denkens und die Tiefe des Daseins. Kündigt sich hier eine Gabe an, die als Geschenk verstanden werden kann? Kann Weite so verstanden werden?

Heideggers Denken der Tiefe „radikalisiert“ sich noch einmal, wenn er einen Vers aus einem Gedicht Hölderlins, das zwischen 1796 und 1798 entstanden ist und den Titel *Sokrates und Alcibiades* trägt, aufgreift und darin die Verba betont: „Wer das Tiefste *gedacht*, *liebt* das Lebendigste." (Heidegger 1994, 221.) Auch hier versteht Heidegger das Wesen der Tiefe aus der Weite: „Die Tiefe ist die sich öffnend verbergende, in eine stets lichtere Verbergung weisende und darin sich sammelnde Weite." (Heidegger 1994, 221.) Durch die Betonung der Verba kommt noch etwas Anderes in den Blick: „Das eigentliche Denken ist das wahre Lieben und das Heimischwerden im Wesensgrund aller Bezüge: Rück-kehr." (Heidegger 1994, 221.) *Diese* „Kehre" mag die Gegenbewegung gegen das Verfallen in *Sein und Zeit* gelesen werden – wird so vielleicht der eigentliche Sinn des fundamentalontologischen Begriffs der Eigentlichkeit sichtbar? Ein Hinweis findet sich in seiner Abhandlung *Hölderlins Dichtung ein Geschick*. Dort notiert er zum inneren Bezug der Verba „denken" und „lieben": „Lieben nicht Folge erst, sondern Denken in sich ein Lieben" (Heidegger 2000c, 363) – und wendet sich damit gegen ein „gewöhnliches" Verständnis, das besagt: „Wo das Tiefste erlangt, da das Lebendigste." (Heidegger 2000c, 363.) Die Verba aber verweisen allerdings auch auf die Substantiva: In den Aufzeichnungen, die unter dem Titel Über den Anfang versammelt sind, heißt es zum Vers Hölderlins: das Lebendigste – „Dies aber ist das All-lebendige, das Heilige." (Heidegger 2005, 167.) Auch vom Lebendigsten gilt, was bereits vom Tiefsten gesagt wurde: es kann benannt, aber nicht hypostasiert werden.

Zum Abschluss: Über das Atmen als Einübung in die Erfahrung der Weite der Tiefe

Könnte es sein, dass wir atmend in der Möglichkeit stehen, uns selbst in unserer Tiefe zu erfahren (vgl. dazu Baier 1995)? In der Heraklit-Vorlesung zitiert Heidegger Heraklits Fragmente 45 und 50 und kommentiert sie:

> Der Mensch ist ζῷον – ein Lebewesen, ein durch das Leben bestimmtes Wesen. Doch was heißt da „Leben", ζῷή? Die Griechen denken bei diesem Wort, ähnlich wie beim Wort φύσις, an das „Von-sich-aus-aufgehen", das immer zugleich ist ein „In-sich-zurück-gehen". Das Aufgehen öffnet sich dem Offenen, behält es in gewisser Weise, hält sich im Offenen und bezieht dergestalt dieses in sich ein. Von altersher ist das Wesen des so erfahrenen Lebens und des Lebendigen durch die ψυχή ausgezeichnet; wir sagen „Seele" und nennen das Lebendige

> „das Beseelte". ψυχή bedeutet der Hauch, der Atem. Wir denken jedoch hier das Atmen nicht bloß als ein Sichregen und Bewegen und als das Funktionieren der Atmungsorgane, sondern als das Aus- und Einatmen. (Heidegger 1994, 280.)

Fragen wir im Stil Heideggers: Was aber heißt da Aus- und Einatmen? So wie nicht das Ohr hört, sondern wir selber, meint Atmen offenbar nicht, dass eine Luftpumpe Luft in unseren Körper quetscht – auch wenn die technologische Auslegung unserer Leiblichkeit – etwa im medizinischen Kontext – oftmals „wirkt" und dieses Selbstverständnis nahelegt. Solange unser Atmen jedoch ein freies und nicht durch instrumentelle Gewalt kontrolliertes ist, muss es aus dem leibhaften Vollzug unseres menschlichen Wesens, und d. h. unserer ψυχή, verstanden werden: Es ist der leibhafte Ort unseres Da- wie unseres Wegseins, die Ortschaft eines offenen Zeitspielraumes.

Methodisch ist damit gesagt, dass wir uns in einem erfahrungslosen Vorstellen unserer selbst als einer Maschine nicht adäquat als Menschen begreifen können. Nur wer den Atem nicht an- und festhält kann erfahren und begreifen, was Atmen heißt: Wenn der Atem stockt, erstarrt das Leben. Unser Atmen trägt uns in eine Dimension jenseits des Rechnens, Herstellens und Planens, denn als Loslassen ist es auch ein sich Einlassen in ein abgründiges Geschehnis: Atmend erfahren wir die Tiefe und Weite der Seele. Diese mit unserem Atmen erfahrene Tiefe ist kein metaphysisches Konstrukt, sondern der *Grund*-Vollzug unseres Existierens als eines Wesens, das einen λόγος hat: „Demnach hat die ψυχή, das Wesen des Lebewesens ‚Mensch', einen λόγος, und dieser λόγος; ist βαθύς – ‚tief', ja, er ist in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne ‚tief'." (Heidegger 1994, 282.) Mag also *Sein und Zeit* auch keine explizite Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit entworfen haben, so ist die Analytik des Daseins doch *auch* ein Blick auf unsere leibhaften Vollzüge. In seinem auf Heideggers Denken fundierendem *Grundriss der Medizin* kann Medard Boss deshalb schreiben: „Es gibt kein einziges Phänomen menschlichen Existierens, das unleiblich wäre." (Boss 1999, 271.)[20]

20 Inwiefern die menschliche Weise unseres Atmens auch medizinisch bedeutungsvoll ist, kann hier nicht ausgeführt werden. Ist es aber ein Zufall, dass tief zu atmen uns

Die Erfahrung der Tiefe menschlichen Existierens ist die Erfahrung der Tiefe des Da, des „Ek-“ der Ek-sistenz. In dieser Tiefe sind wir uns selbst entzogen – und können deshalb etwa über uns selbst auch staunen oder lachen, vielleicht sogar eine heitere Gelassenheit gewinnen: Weil die ψυχή so tief ist, kann sie in die Weite ausholend sich einholen. Im ausholenden Einholen *sich* sammeln heißt: Sich aus der Zerstreuung zurückrufen *lassen*. Der Sammlung des λόγος im Sich-zurückrufen-Lassen sich sammelnd zu entsprechen, dieses ὁμολογεῖν ist als Rück-Kehr die Grundbewegung der ψυχή, die im Atem ihre leibhafte *Selbst*bewegung findet.

Atmen betrifft uns in der Weise, *wie* wir in der Welt sind. Weil wir *selber* atmen, kann unser Atmen deshalb auch als leibhafte Hermeneutik verstanden werden, in der sich unser Dasein geworfen-entwerfend darauf versteht, Welt auszutragen und Anderen zu begegnen. Wer sich in den strömenden und tragenden Zug des Atems einlässt, dem kann sich ein Bezug öffnen: das „In“ des In-der-Welt-seins. In diesem Offen-sein für Welt vermögen wir überhaupt erst die Nähe des Nahen zu vernehmen. In besonderer Weise betrifft dies unser Miteinandersein, denn unser Atmen ist zwar nicht das Gleiche, jedoch das Selbe wie Stille und Schweigen: Es kann uns ruhig werden und in dieser Ruhe gesammelt präsent sein lassen. Nur so können wir einander hören und können *ein* Gespräch sein.

Brauchen wir die Ruhe des Atmens, um nicht nur Informationen, sondern Ungehörtes zu hören? Öffnet sich in der Erfahrung der Tiefe sogar das Unvordenkliche, das alles Verstehen Gewährende? Ein Sein-Lassen, das in *Zeit und Sein* in der Formel „Es gibt Sein“ seine Formulierung findet? Und ist diese Erfahrung der Tiefe wesentlich, um das Ganze unseres Daseins leben, und d. h. auch: sterben zu können?[21] Unser Fragen endet so nicht mit einer Antwort. Das Rätselhafte des Rätsels, das wir sind und das uns trägt, bleibt, ja, vertieft sich – und es könnte sein, dass das Wesentliche noch gar nicht gesagt, aber vielleicht doch ein wenig vorbereitet worden ist.

Erleichterung zu verschaffen vermag und Atemübungen sich positiv auf unsere Befindlichkeit auswirken? Boss gibt zumindest einen Hinweis auf asthmatische Leiden (Boss 1999, 558).

21 So wie das Ein- und Ausatmen nicht zwei getrennte Vollzüge sind, sondern das eine Ganze unseres Atmens, so gehören Anfang und Tod in das eine Geschehnis unseres Existierens.

Dieses, das Fragen weiter Tragende, kündigt sich in einem Gedanken an, den Heidegger in den *Schwarzen Heften* notiert und darin den Bezug von Tiefe und Mitsein berührt: „Das Höchste, was sterbliche Herzen einander reichen dürfen, ist die je und je geheimere Tiefe dessen, was sie an Schonung sich ersehnen." (Heidegger 2020, 12.) Diese kurze Anmerkung Heideggers enthält eine Fülle von Fragwürdigem, die sein Denken bestimmt. Zugleich weist sie über Heidegger hinaus in ein Gespräch mit anderen Philosophierenden: Kann sie etwa als Variation einer „Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen" verstanden werden, wie sie von Max Horkheimer in dem Interview „Die verwaltete Welt kennt keine Liebe" formuliert wurde: „Wir können nur mehr eines, anstatt des Dogmas von Gott die Sehnsucht hegen, daß das Grauen nicht das letzte Wort sein möge" (Horkheimer 1985, 362)? Und vielleicht könnte in Heideggers Anmerkung auch ein posthumes Gespräch mit Martin Buber fundiert sein, der im Schlusssatz seiner kleinen Schrift *Urdistanz und Beziehung* festhält:

> […] aus dem Gattungsreich der Natur ins Wagnis der einsamen Kategorie geschickt, von einem mitgeborenen Chaos umwittert, schaut er [der Mensch; J. V.] heimlich und scheu nach einem Ja des Seindürfens aus, das ihm nur von menschlicher Person zu menschlicher Person werden kann; einander reichen die Menschen das Himmelsbrot des Selbstseins. (Buber 1978, 37.)

Zusammenfassend und zurückbezogen auf unsere Ausgangsfrage könnte man sagen: Nur wenn wir die Tiefe unseres Daseins berühren, d. h. das Da unseres Seins, kann sich eine Weite öffnen und können wir die werden, die wird sind – und in dieser Weise unser Dasein als Sorge-sein mit Anderen übernehmen.

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„Rettung“ und „Gefahr“
Zum „zweideutigen Wesen“ der Technik

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“Salvation” and “Danger.” On the “Dual Essence” of Technology

Abstract

The paper discusses Heidegger’s thesis on the dual essence of technology from the text “The Question Concerning Technology.” The meaning of the thesis is manifested along the lines of a verse authored by Hölderlin as the co-belonging of danger (*Gefahr*) and salvation (*Rettung*) within the non-technical essence of technology. The non-technical essence of technology is first considered on the basis of the fundamental bond of revealing (*Entbergen*) and concealment (*Verbergen*) of the truth as an event (*Ereignen*) of both. The concept of *Ge-stell* as the essence of modern technology is, therefore, understood in the sense of the fully developed danger that is rooted in the very essence of truth, namely, as a concealment, which is itself concealed and which, precisely for that reason, constitutes the only support for the event of truth in the unfolding of immanent difference of revealing and concealment. Ultimately, it turns out that this salvific support belongs to the human being, who, by confronting the *Ge-stell* within itself, opens the possibility of liberating the event of truth as the non-technical essence of *Ge-stell*.

Keywords: Heidegger, technology, truth, danger, salvation.

»Rešitev« in »nevarnost«. O »dvoznačnem bistvu« tehnike

Povzetek

Članek obravnava Heideggrovo tezo o dvoznačnem bistvu tehnologije iz besedila »Vprašanje po tehniki«. Smisel teze se v skladu s Hölderlinovim verzom kaže kot so-pripadnost nevarnosti (*Gefahr*) in rešitve (*Rettung*) v netehniškem bistvu tehnike. Netehniško bistvo tehnike je najprej obravnavano na podlagi temeljne vezi razkrivanja (*Entbergen*) in skrivanja (*Verbergen*) v resnici kot dogodevanju (*Ereignen*) obeh. Pojem *Ge-stell*-a kot bistva sodobne tehnike je potemtakem razumljen v smislu polno razvite nevarnosti, kakršna korenini v samem bistvu resnice, in sicer kot skrivanje, ki je samo skrito in ki natanko zato predstavlja edino oporo dogodju resnice v razpiranju imanentne razlike razkrivanja in skrivanja. Naposled se izkaže, da ta rešilna podpora pripada človeku, ki s tem, da se v sebi sooči z *Ge-stell*-om, odpre možnost osvoboditve dogodja resnice kot netehniškega bistva *Ge-stell*-a.

Ključne besede: Heidegger, tehnika, resnica, nevarnost, rešitev.

Wie bekannt gipfelt die Auseinandersetzung Heideggers mit der Technik in seinem Vortrag „Die Frage nach der Technik“ im „Blicken“ in „das zweideutige Wesen der Technik“ (*GA 7*, 34). Diese „Zweideutigkeit“ zeigt sich darin, dass, dem Wort Hölderlins zufolge (vgl. *GA 7*, 29, 35; *GA 79*, 72), die „Gefahr“, welche dem Zeitalter der modernen Technik eigne, mit der „Rettung“ und dem „Wachstum des Rettenden“ (*GA 7*, 34 und *passim*) einhergehe. Die Frage ist nun, wie dieses Zusammenfallen von „Rettung“ und „Gefahr“ im Wesen der Technik bestimmter zu fassen ist. Damit zusammenhängend stellt sich die weitere Frage, was Heidegger unter dem Wesen versteht, wenn es als das Selbe durch die Differenz bestimmt sein soll.

Es scheint berechtigt, bei der Betrachtung der genannten Zweideutigkeit davon auszugehen, dass Heideggers Behandlung der Technik dem grundsätzlichen Unterschied von Technik und ihrem Wesen entspringt: „Die Technik ist nicht das Gleiche wie das Wesen der Technik. […] [D]as Wesen der Technik [ist] ganz und gar nichts Technisches.“ (*GA 7*, 7; vgl. *GA 79*, 34.) Das bedeutet: Dem eigenen Wesen nach, dem zufolge die Technik eben Technik ist, ist die Technik, sofern ihr Wesen nichts Technisches ist, zugleich etwas Anderes von ihr selbst.

Wie ist diese Differenz von Technik und ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen genau zu fassen? Handelt es sich dabei um eine ontisch-logische Kausalität, wie sie, z. B., aus dem Platonismus bekannt ist? Wie das Beispiel mit dem Baum und dessen Wesen andeutet (vgl. *GA 7*, 7, 30), soll es hier genau um einen solchen klassischen Unterschied gehen, nämlich dem zwischen dem Wesen im Sinne von *essentia* – also dem, „*was* etwas ist“ (ebda.), „*quidditas*“ oder der „Washeit“, unter welcher als der allgemeinen „Gattung“ sich etwas subsumieren und als das Wahre erkennen lässt (vgl. *GA 7*, 30 ff.) –, und seiner Manifestation im Seienden (*ens*). Dennoch trifft es ein solches Unterscheiden nicht, insofern das Wahre in keinem jenseitigen An-sich-sein, sondern – dem

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phänomenologischen Ansatz Heideggers zufolge – im faktischen Enthülltsein des Wesens und somit in der unverborgenen Erscheinung selbst verortet wird: „Nur dort, wo […] Enthüllen [des Wesens; P. Š.] geschieht, ereignet sich das Wahre.“ (*GA 7*, 9.)

Wenn aber die klassische Differenz von wahrem Sein als Wesen und seinem Phänomen durch das Verorten des Wahren im Enthülltsein aufgehoben wird, stellt sich die Frage, worin die Differenz von Technik und ihrem Wesen dann gründen soll und wie sich diesbezüglich die Zweideutigkeit im Wesen der Technik bestimmen ließe. Bisher ist nur klar, dass der klassische Wesensbegriff eine grundsätzliche Umdeutung verlangt: Das Wesen sei, so heißt es, „in einem anderen Sinne zu denken“ (*GA 7*, 31), als es „in der Schulsprache der Philosophie“ (*GA 7*, 30) üblich ist und war. Und den einzigen Leitfaden, der sich für eine solche Umdeutung ergibt, stellt das genannte Enthüllen dar, als welches sich das Wesen als das Wahre ereignet.

Im Rahmen der hier zu betrachtenden Problematik scheint es zunächst so, als stünde das Wesen der Technik in einem äußerlichen Verhältnis zum Enthüllen des Wahren. Denn das Wesen der Technik enthüllt sich eben nicht in dem, dessen Wesen es ist, also im Technischen, in dem – seiner „richtigen“ und „gängigen“ Vorstellung nach: als Instrument – dieses sein Wesen wie in einem Un-Wesen vielmehr verborgen bleibt: „Die richtige instrumentale Bestimmung der Technik zeigt uns […] nicht ihr Wesen.“ (*GA 7*, 9; vgl. *GA 79*, 60.) Das bedeutet offenbar, dass die Technik aufgrund dieser Verborgenheit des eigenen Wesens dem Ereignen des Wahren *qua* Wesensenthülltsein nicht zugehört.

Es scheint jedoch zugleich unmöglich, dass das Unenthülltsein des Wesens der Technik in der Technik unabhängig von ihrem Wesen sein kann. Denn, sofern die Technik ihrem Wesen nach Technik ist – und das impliziert jedes Sprechen vom Wesen der Technik –, ist es unausweichlich, dass auch die Verborgenheit ihres Wesens durch dieses Wesen selbst bestimmt sein muss. Es könnte also sein, dass sich die Wesentlichkeit des nicht-technischen Wesens der Technik gerade im Nicht-Zeigen in der Technik und somit in der Technik als eigenem, von sich selbst als dem Wesen entzogenen Un-Wesen zeigt und wirkmächtig entfaltet. Wie soll aber das Wesen durch den eigenen Entzug ins Verborgene noch immer wesentlich, d. h. enthüllend, sein können?

Der Differenz zwischen der Technik und ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen zufolge erweist sich das Fragen nach der Technik als „ein Weg des Denkens“ (*GA 7*, 7) durch die „gängige“, „richtige“ und dennoch das Wesen der Technik verhüllende „instrumentale und anthropologische Bestimmung“ der Technik als eines „Tuns des Menschen“ und neutralen „Mittels für Zwecke“ (*GA 7*, 7 f.), auf welchem zu ihrem verborgenen Wesen „oder wenigstens in seine Nähe zu gelangen“ (*GA 7*, 9) sei. Diesbezüglich ist hier von Belang, dass diesem Durchdringen ein Unterscheiden der griechischen *tekhne* von der modernen Technik eignet, und zwar so, dass sie sich als „grundverschieden […] und doch im Wesen verwandt“ (*GA 7*, 22) zeigen: „Beide sind Weisen des Entbergens, der ἀλήθεια.“ (Ebda.)

Zunächst wird also deutlich, dass die Differenz zwischen der Technik und ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen kein äußerliches Verhältnis der Technik zum Ereignen der Wahrheit *qua* enthüllendes Entbergen impliziert. Vielmehr weist sich das Wesen der Technik gerade darin auf, dass das Technische als solches – ungeachtet der Differenz von *tekhne* und Technik – das Entbergen und somit eine Weise der Wahrheit ist. Wesenhaft, das heißt ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen nach, ist also die Technik das Andere ihrer selbst, indem sie, gegen die vorherige Vermutung, als sie selbst dem entbergenden Ereignen des Wahren zugehört: „Technik ist eine Weise des Entbergens. Die Technik west in dem Bereich, wo Entbergen und Unverborgenheit, wo ἀλήθεια, wo Wahrheit geschieht.“ (*GA 7*, 14 f.; vgl. 13.)

Die Wesentlichkeit des Wesens der Technik wurde jedoch zugleich darin erkannt, dass dieses Wesen sich in der Technik gerade nicht zeigt und in seiner eigenen Ferne stets entzieht. Seinem Wesen nach ist die Technik also das Entbergen, indem dieses Wesen, wonach sie ein Entbergen ist, in ihr verborgen und gerade durch die eigene Ferne wesenhaft ist. In der Technik zeigt sich somit, dass sich das Wahre durch das Verbergen des Wesens als wesenhaftes Entbergen ereignet. Das Zusammenfallen von Entbergen und Verbergen, welches als Ereignen des Wahren im Sinne der „Lichtung für das Sichverbergende“ (*GA 65*, 88) bzw. der „lichtenden Verbergung“ (*GA 65*, 367) ausdrücklich wird, bezieht sich folglich auf ihr Zusammen im Wesen, dessen Wesentlichkeit es zugehört, im Sich-Verbergen entbergend zu sein: „Die Frage nach der Technik ist die Frage nach der Konstellation, in der sich Entbergung und Verbergung, in der sich das Wesende der Wahrheit ereignet.“ (*GA 7*, 34.)

In Bezug auf die erwähnte Umdeutung des Wesensbegriffs ist also festzustellen, dass diese Umdeutung kein Aufheben der Differenz von Wesen und dem Anderen, das durch das Wesen selbst besteht, bedeutet. Vielmehr wird diese Differenz gerade bestätigt, indem sie dem Wesen als dem Entbergenden selbst zugesprochen wird: Die Differenz von Technik und ihrem Wesen, kurz gesagt, weist die Differenz auf, welche das Wesen selbst ausmacht. Denn sofern Entbergung und Unverborgenheit des Wesens mit seinem Sich-Verbergen und der Verborgenheit zusammenfallen, ist die Wesentlichkeit dieses Wesens gerade darin zu erkennen, dass es als Enthüllendes im Anderen seiner selbst, in dem es unenthüllt ist – und d. h. hier in der Technik als eigenem Un-Wesen – doch auf sich selbst zurückgeworfen ist, dass es also im Sich-Verbergen sich selbst als dem Entbergenden doch treu bleibt.

Die Umdeutung des Wesens besteht folglich darin, dass das Wesen nicht als sich selbst gleiche und sozusagen unerschütterlich an sich selbst festhaltende Essenz anzusehen ist, sondern als das dynamische Differenz-Verhältnis von Entbergen und Verbergen. Als solches ist das Wesen nicht einfach vorhanden: Es ereignet sich als das Selbe im Entfalten des ihm eigentümlichen Unterschiedes, indem es sich in allem Entbergen als das Entbergende verbirgt und sich somit im Entborgenen, als dem eigenen Un-Wesen, durch die eigene Ferne doch als Wesen nah ist. Die Umdeutung des Wesens bezieht sich kurz gesagt darauf, dass das Wesen, statt nominal, „verbal“ verstanden wird (vgl. *GA 7*, 31), das heißt als differenzforderndes Ereignen bzw. „[W]ähren“ oder „[W]esen“ (vgl. ebda.) des Selben im beides zusammenhaltenden Unterscheiden von Entbergen und Verbergen, Wesen und Un-Wesen.[1]

Im Folgenden soll versucht werden, dieses dynamische, bisher überwiegend formal dargelegte Zusammen von Entbergen und Verbergen ausführlicher im Rahmen des Differenz-Verhältnisses von Technik und ihrem Wesen zu entfalten, um von hier aus die Verwandtschaft von „Rettung“ und „Gefahr“ im „zweideutigen Wesen“ der Technik bestimmen zu können. Denn es ist anzunehmen, dass die Zweideutigkeit im Wesen der Technik in der Unauflöslichkeit des dynamischen

1 Vgl. *GA 65*, 349: „Wahrheit ist also niemals nur Lichtung, sondern west als Verbergung ebenso ursprünglich und innig mit der Lichtung. Beide, Lichtung und Verbergung, sind nicht zwei, sondern die Wesung des Einen, der Wahrheit selbst.“

Bandes von enthüllendem Entbergen und verheimlichendem Verbergen gründet, dessen Ereignen gerade das Wesen bzw. das Wahre ist: „Das Wesen der Technik ist in einem hohen Sinne zweideutig. Solche Zweideutigkeit deutet in das Geheimnis aller Entbergung, d. h. der Wahrheit." (*GA 7*, 34.)

Zum entbergenden Ereignen des Wahren soll, wie gesagt, auf dem Wege gelangt werden, dass die instrumental-anthropologisch verstandene Technik auf ihr Wesen hin durchdrungen wird. Dieses Wesen wird zunächst in Bezug auf die griechisch erfahrene und verstandene *tekhne* erörtert und mittels der – im Sinne der vier Arten des „Verschuldens" *qua* Veranlassens „in die Ankunft" gedeuteten (vgl. *GA 7*, 9 ff.) – aristotelischen Tetrakausalität als *poiesis* aufgefasst, als das „Her-vor-bringen" im „Handwerk" und in der „Kunst" (*GA 7*, 12 ff.; vgl. 161 f.), jedoch gleichermaßen in der Natur (*physis*), die im Sinne „d[e]s von-sich-her Aufgehen[s]" sogar als „*poiesis* im höchsten Sinne" bestimmt wird (*GA 7*, 12).[2]

Diesem Sinn der *physis* entsprechend spricht Heidegger dem poietischen Hervorbringen eine grundsätzliche ontologische Bedeutung zu: Das Hervorbringen „bringt das Anwesende" als solches „in den Vorschein" (ebda.), oder in expliziter Anlehnung an Platons *Symposion*: Es „läßt das noch nicht Anwesende ins Anwesen ankommen" (ebda.).[3] Dieses Lassen des Anwesenden, sich-in-eigenem-Aussehen (*eidos*)-zeigend anzuwesen, als ein Bringen „aus der Verborgenheit her in die Unverborgenheit" (*GA 7*, 13), denkt Heidegger folglich als das nicht-technische Wesen des Her-vor-bringens und somit als Wahrheit im Sinne des Ereignens des enthüllenden Entbergens: „Her-vor-bringen ereignet sich nur, insofern Verborgenes ins Unverborgene kommt. Dieses Kommen beruht und schwingt in dem, was wir das Entbergen nennen. Die Griechen haben dafür das Wort ἀλήθεια." (Ebda.)[4]

2 Vgl. „Die Weisen der Veranlassung, die vier Ursachen, spielen somit innerhalb des Her-vor-bringens. Durch dieses kommt sowohl das Gewachsene der Natur als auch das Verfertigte des Handwerks und die Gebilde der Künste jeweils zu seinem Vorschein." (*GA 7*, 13.) Zur Heideggers „Anlehnung an die aristotelische Vier-Ursachen-Lehre" vgl. Meier 2012, 118 ff.

3 Vgl. Platon, *Symp*. 205b8-c2; vgl. auch: Soph. 219b4-6.

4 Es ist jedoch darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dass im Vortrag *Die Gefahr* das Gemeinsame von künstlerischem Herstellen und naturhaftem Hervorbringen – „Anwesenlassen von Anwesendem in der Unverborgenheit." (*GA 79*, 64 f.) –

Hier ist zu unterstreichen, dass das Entbergen nicht so gemeint ist, als ginge es darum, dass etwas, was je schon verborgen besteht, plötzlich unverborgen erscheint. Stattdessen – und hier tritt der grundsätzliche phänomenologische Ansatz Heideggers zutage – wird die Unverborgenheit, vor allem infolge der genannten Deutung der φύσις im Sinne „des aus sich lichtend [d. h. von selbst her; P. Š.] aufgehenden Her-vor-bringens“ (*GA 79*, 64), als das unhintergehbare bzw. voraussetzungslose und unberechenbare ontologische *Apriori* verstanden –,[5] durch das es das Seiende als solches und im Ganzen – „alles, was ist“ (*GA 7*, 27) – im Sinne des von sich selbst her Anwesenden allererst und überhaupt gibt: „Das Seiende in seinem Sein“, so heißt es im Vortrag „Die Gefahr“, „west als Anwesendes aus der ἀλήθεια“ (*GA 79*, 49).

Und da es infolge der ontologischen Apriorität der Unverborgenheit kein Verborgenes geben kann, welches erst im Nachhinein entdeckt werden könnte, muss das Verborgene im Ganzen in der Unverborgenheit, und zwar als diese selbst bzw. als ihre eigene Tiefe und Ferne, verortet werden. Es wird so der Unverborgenheit das spannungsvolle Widerspruchs-Verhältnis zugesprochen, das im Sinne einer aus sich selbst quellenden Unruhe oder „Schwingung“ dem Ereignen der Zweideutigkeit des Wesens im entbergenden Sich-Verbergen eigentümlich ist.[6]

Heidegger auf der Grundlage der Differenz entwickelt, die in der Zweideutigkeit des „Stellens“ bzw. „Setzens“ (θέσις) liegt: Während das Aufgehen des Anwesenden ins Unverborgene im Handwerk „durch ein menschliches Stellen“ (*GA 79*, 64), θέσει, d. h. als Her-stellen, geschieht, wird das Anwesende in der Natur „von sich her“, φύσει, ins Unverborgene hervorgebracht bzw. „aufgestellt“ (ebda.), wobei das erste nur aufgrund des letzten „möglich“ und „nötig“ sei (ebda.; vgl. *GA 5*, 70 ff.; hierzu vgl. Luckner 2012, 105.) Zu Heideggers Analyse der griechischen Technik als Hervorbringen, „nicht nur im Sinn des handwerklichen oder künstlerischen Verfertigens und Herstellens, […] sondern auch im Sinn des aufschließenden Entbergens, des Offenbarmachens oder Erkennens des Seienden“ vgl. Jakob 1996, 85 ff., 80. Zum Zusammenhang von *tekhne* und *physis* im nämlichen Sinne vgl. Jakob 1996, 121–129. Vgl. hier auch: Schüssler 2012, 66 ff., 84; Aurenque 143 f. Eine genetische Darstellung von „Heideggers Denken der Technik“ findet sich bei Luckner 2008, 54 ff.; 2015, 19 ff.

5 Heidegger 2006b, 36: „‚Hinter‘ den Phänomenen der Phänomenologie steht wesenhaft nichts anderes […].“ Vgl. *GA 79*, 64 f.: „Φύσις, von sich her aufstellen im Unverborgenen, ist Anwesenlassen von Anwesendem in der Unverborgenheit. Anwesenlassen von Anwesendem ist Sein des Seienden.“

6 Vgl. „[…] Welt bleibt in der Verborgenheit (Λήθη) auf die Weise, daß diese ihre

Damit zeigt sich nun bestimmter, was mit jener „verbalen“ Umdeutung des Wesens gemeint ist, die das Fragen nach der Technik impliziert. Als verhältnismäßiges Ereignen des sich verbergenden Entbergens gibt es – „west“ – das Wesen als Ereignen des Seins, das aus seiner eigenen apriorischen Unverborgenheit – aus ihrer eigenen, in ihr selbst sich verbergenden Tiefe und Ferne – immer wieder zu sich als dem Unverborgenen zurückkommt, und sich eben *als* dieser Übergang im Selben verbirgt und fern ist. Es ist eine Kehre des Selben in ihm selbst zu ihm selbst, welche die Differenz von Entbergen und Verbergen in sich birgt, oder, genauer, die durch dieses Unterscheiden als das Ereignen des Selben gerade zusammengehalten wird.

Zum Wesen als innigster „Schwingung“ des Selben, dank welcher das wahre Sein nie bloß ist, sondern sich als Wahrheit ereignet, ist noch zurückzukommen. Betont werden soll zunächst, dass die griechische Erfahrung der *tekhne* und der *physis* im Sinne des Hervorbringens die grundsätzliche Ebene darstellt. Und zwar nicht nur dafür, die Technik als Entbergen zu fassen, sondern auch dafür – so Heidegger in Anlehnung an Aristoteles', zum Teil aber auch Platons Auffassung der *tekhne* als einer Art des Wissens (vgl. *GA 7*, 14) –, dass das Entbergen als das Ereignen der Wahrheit des Seins, als ἀληθεύειν, zu fassen sei: „Das Entscheidende der τέχνη liegt […] keineswegs im *Machen* und Hantieren, nicht im Verwenden von Mitteln, sondern in dem […] Entbergen. Als dieses, nicht aber als Verfertigen, ist die τέχνη ein Her-vor-bringen.“ (Ebda.) 207

In diesem Sinne sei also auch die moderne Technik „ein Entbergen“ (*GA 7*, 15). Es handelt sich jedoch um ein entbergendes Ereignen des Wahren, das im Unterschied zur griechischen *tekhne* „das Beunruhigende ist“, somit aber zugleich das Einzige, das „uns bewegt, nach ‚der‘ Technik zu fragen“ (ebda.). Diesbezüglich liegt es nahe, anzunehmen, dass sich nur aufgrund der Einsicht

Verborgenheit gerade die Uverborgenheit gewährt: die Ἀλήθεια. Diese ist das lichtende Bergen von Anwesendem in die Unverborgenheit. […] Ἀλήθεια, Unverborgenheit des Anwesenden als eines solchen, west […] nur dann und nur so lange, als Verborgenheit, Λήθη, sich ereignet. Denn die Ἀλήθεια beseitigt die Λήθη nicht. Unverborgenheit zehrt die Verborgenheit nicht auf, sondern Unverborgenheit verlangt stets Verborgenheit und bestätigt sie auf diese Weise als die Wesensquelle der Ἀλήθεια.“ (*GA 79*, 49.) Zur „freien Schwingung“ als dem Grundzug der ekstatischen Zeitlichkeit vgl. *GA 26*, 268.

in den Charakter dieses „Beunruhigenden“ der modernen Technik auch die „Gefahr“ bestimmen lassen wird, die ihrem Wesen eigentümlich ist und die als solche mit der ebenso eigentümlichen „Rettung“ zusammenfällt. Wie ist also dieses „Beunruhigende“ zu fassen, das der modernen Technik als der Art des entbergenden Ereignens des Wahren eignet und in dem sich sowohl die Verwandtschaft als auch der Unterschied zwischen der griechischen *tekhne* und der modernen Technik offenbart?

Das wesenhafte, nicht-technische Entbergen in der modernen Technik bestimmt Heidegger als „Ge-stell“: „Ge-stell heißt die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der modernen Technik waltet und selber nichts Technisches ist.“ (*GA 7*, 21.) Im Unterschied zum poietischen Hervorbringen der *tekhne*, dessen Entbergen, wie gesagt, im bringenden Lassen – „hegen und pflegen“ bzw. „anheimgeben“ und „hüten“ (*GA 7*, 15 f.) – des Anwesenden in seiner Anwesenheit liegt, entbirgt die moderne Technik als herauforderndes Stellen: „Das Entbergen, das die moderne Technik durchherrscht, hat den Charakter des Stellens im Sinne der Herausforderung.“ (*GA 7*, 17.)

Es handelt sich um den in der kreisenden „Zirkulation“ (*GA 79*, 33) verschlossenen Steuerungs-Prozess, in dem alles und jedes gestellt – das heißt planmäßig, konsequent und methodisch „gespeichert“, „aufgeschlossen“, „umgeformt“ und „gelagert“ (*GA 7*, 15 f.) – wird, um, aus dem Ruhen in der eigenen Anwesenheit herausgerissen bzw. „geraff[t]“ (*GA 79*, 33), als ein unbehütetes bzw. „ohne die Wahr seines Dingwesens“ (*GA 79*, 46) gelassenes und daher sozusagen entwesentlichtes, entleertes Etwas dazu gezwungen und herausgefordert zu werden,[7] in jedem Moment als nutzbar und verwendbar für

7 Vgl. Seubold 1986, 110 (vgl. auch 105, 135): „Nicht werden die Dinge in ihrer Anwesenheit als Dinge zugelassen, weder in der Art des neuzeitlichen Ackerbaus der Boden als Boden und die Pflanzen als Pflanzen noch in der Tierzucht die Tiere als Tiere, noch in der Energiegewinnung der Rhein als Rhein etc., sondern das technische Entbergen tritt aggressiv an sie heran und fordert ihr Sein auf Berechen- und Beherrschbarkeit heraus, macht sie zu bloßen Schemen, zu blutleeren Gebilden für die Vernutzung des sich ohne Rücksicht durchsetzenden Machtwillens. So bekommt das Herausfordern den Zug der Vergewaltigung des Seins der Dinge, in welcher diese gezwungen werden, ihr eigenes, genuines Sein aufzugeben, um das Sein der bloßen Materialität und Funktionalität aufoktroyiert zu bekommen – eine Abgabe an die Dinge also, die ihnen nichts gibt denn ein Fremdes und sie in ihrem gewachsenen Wesen Zerstörendes.“

das Immer-weiter und so zum Unbegrenzten hin tendierenden – „[e]in Stellen fordert das andere hinaus, befällt es mit Gestellung." (*GA 79*, 28) – Stellen bestellt bzw. ausgeliefert zu sein: „Dieses Fordern bleibt […] im voraus darauf abgestellt, anderes zu fordern, d. h. vorwärts zu treiben in die größtmögliche Nutzung bei geringstem Aufwand. […] Überall ist es bestellt, auf der Stelle zur Stelle zu stehen und zwar zu stehen, um selbst bestellbar zu sein für ein weiteres Bestellen." (*GA 7*, 16 f.)[8]

Dass aber die moderne Technik, anders als die griechische *tekhne*, statt im hütenden Lassen des Anwesenden „in seinem Scheinen und Anwesen" (*GA 5*, 71) in der „verwahrlosenden" Herausforderung besteht – „Das Ge-stell west, indem es das Ding wahrlos lässt." (*GA 79*, 46) –, ändert nichts daran, dass es dennoch um die wesenhafte Entbergung des Seienden in seinem Sein geht, welches der Art dieser Entbergung eignet.[9] Was in diesem Sinne „durch das herausfordernde Stellen" in der modernen Technik ontologisch „zustande kommt", sei der „Bestand" (*GA 7*, 17). Der Bestand ist das, worin sich das nicht-technische, phänomenologisch-ontologische Wesen des Ge-stells *qua* sich-verbergendes Entbergen ausübt, welches sich also im herausfordernden Bestellen entbirgt und als das derart Unverborgene als das Wirkliche und Anwesende gilt: Das Ge-stell sei „die Weise, nach der sich das Wirkliche als Bestand entbirgt" (*GA 7*, 24). Als Bestand zeigt sich also in der modernen Technik das wirklich Seiende als solches und im Ganzen darin, dass es in der in sich verschlossenen Zirkularität des von sich selbst her gesteuerten,

8 Die Herausforderung, so Heidegger, „geschieht dadurch, daß die in der Natur verborgene Energie aufgeschlossen, das Erschlossene umgeformt, das Umgeformte gespeichert, das Gespeicherte wieder verteilt und das Verteilte erneut umgeschaltet wird. Erschließen, umformen, speichern, verteilen, umschalten sind Weisen des Entbergens. Dieses läuft jedoch nicht einfach ab. Es verläuft sich auch nicht ins Unbestimmte. Das Entbergen entbirgt ihm selber seine eigenen, vielfach verzahnten Bahnen dadurch, daß es sie steuert. Die Steuerung selbst wird ihrerseits überall gesichert. Steuerung und Sicherung werden sogar die Hauptzüge des herausfordernden Entbergens." (*GA 7*, 17.)

9 Vgl. Schüssler 2012, 89: „*Beide* sind Weisen des *Ent*-bergens, d. i. des *Heraus*-nehmens aus der Verborgenheit und des *Stellens ins Offene*, die griechische τέχνη in der Weise des Her-vor-bringens des Seienden in das Offene seines *eidetischen Wesensbestandes* und die moderne Technik in der Weise des Her-aus-forderns des Seienden in das Offene des *bestellbaren Bestandes*."

unbegrenzten Bestellens als jederzeit verwendbares und, da von jeder Eigenart gereinigt, ersetzbares Funktionselement des Vernutzungsbetriebes anwest.[10]

Es ist hier nicht möglich, auf die Weisen dieses Stellens, in denen sich das Wirklichsein im Sinne des Beständigen entbirgt, tiefer einzugehen.[11] Hier geht es vor allem um die Frage, woran es liegt, dass das Entbergen des Wirklichen *qua* Bestand im Ge-stell diesem seinem nicht-technischen Wesen nach „das Beunruhigende" ist.

Diesbezüglich ist zu bemerken, dass sich der Charakter dieses „Beunruhigenden" merkwürdigerweise nicht in dem erkennen lässt, was in verschiedenen Gestalten schon auf den ersten Blick und unmissverständlich als das Bedrohliche im Sinne des ethisch Fraglichen oder gar des Lebensgefährlichen des „Geraffs" in das „in sich kreisende Treiben" des technischen „Betriebs" erscheint (vgl. *GA 79*, 32 f.).[12] Die eigentliche Natur

10 „Nur was so be-stellt ist, daß es sich auf der Stelle zur Stelle stellt, besteht als Bestand und ist im Sinne von Bestand beständig. Das Beständige besteht in der durchgängigen Bestellbarkeit innerhalb solcher Gestellung. Wieder fragen wir: Worauf läuft die Kette solchen Bestellens zuletzt hinaus? Sie läuft auf nichts hinaus; denn das Bestellen stellt nichts her, was außerhalb des Stellens ein Anwesen für sich haben könnte und dürfte. Das Be-stellte ist immer schon und immer nur daraufhin gestellt, ein Anderes als seine Folge in den Erfolg zu stellen. Die Kette des Bestellens läuft auf nichts hinaus; sie geht vielmehr nur in ihren Kreisgang hinein. Nur in ihm hat das Bestellbare seinen Bestand." (*GA 79*, 28 f.) Vgl. hierzu Vetter 2014, 174: „Indem unter der Herrschaft des Ge-stells alles Seiende daraufhin gestellt wird, als es bestellbar ist, entsteht der ‚Zwang zu immer neuen Bedürfnissen (GA 15, 388)'. […] Der Raum zeigt sich in der Gleichgültigkeit der Raumstellen, die Zeit als das Berechenbare. Auf die Dinge selbst lässt sich der Mensch nicht ein, sie erscheinen als messbare Quantitäten oder Qualitäten. Die Quantität geht ins Grenzenlose und schlägt um in eine eigene Qualität: in das *Riesige*. Es ist das Große, das sich ins Unmaß erstreckt." (Vgl. auch: Jakob 1996, 107 f.; Escudero 2024, 318). Für die „tief verwurzelte" „nihilistische Tendenz", die der „technologische Zugang zur Welt birgt", sowie für die „Gelassenheit" als die Weise ihrer „Überwindung" vgl. Escudero 2024, 309 ff.

11 Zur Vielfältigkeit des Stellens vgl. Vetter 2014, 172. Für die Darlegung der acht „Unterpunkte, Momente und Ausdifferenzierungen des Begriffes ‚Ge-stell'" (Seubold 1986, 105 f.) – „Materialisierung", „Uniformierung", „Funktionalisierung", „Subjekt-Objekt-Polarisierung", „Berechnung", „Durchsetzung und Herrschaft", „Herstellung und Bearbeitung", „Vernutzung und Ersetzung" – vgl. Seubold 1986, 53 ff.

12 Da es Heidegger um das nicht-technische Wesen der Technik und nicht um die faktischen Merkmale oder Folgen ihrer Ausführung geht, geht es ihm auch nicht um die Bedrohungen, welche die Technik impliziert und die in der Diskussion fast

„des Beunruhigenden", so ist hier im Voraus zu sagen, zeigt sich in Bezug auf den Ort des Menschen im „Ge-stell", das sich vielmehr eben infolge dieses Ortes als das wesenhafte Entbergen ereignet bzw. als dieses bestimmt. Dieses wesenhafte, den Menschen auf besondere Weise einschließende Ereignen des Ge-stells zeigt sich darin, dass es ein „Geschick" ist.

Auch wenn es nach der „gängigen" und „richtigen" „anthropologischen" Vorstellung der Technik im Sinne eines neutralen „Mittels zu[m] Zweck" (*GA 7*, 7) so scheint, als wäre „das herausfordernde Stellen" eine menschliche Tätigkeit – „ein Tun des Menschen" (ebda.) –, sieht die Sache doch anders aus.[13] Der Ort des Menschen im Ge-stell ist dadurch bestimmt, dass „über die Unverborgenheit, worin sich jeweils das Wirkliche zeigt oder entzieht, der Mensch nicht verfügt" (*GA 7*, 18), wenngleich das Entbergen zugleich auch nicht „jenseits" des „menschlichen Tuns geschieht" (*GA 7*, 24). Der Mensch befindet sich nämlich als je schon in eine Unverborgenheit geworfen – „er findet sich überall schon ins Unverborgene gebracht" (*GA 7*, 19) –, aber er wird von diesem Unverborgenen „durchwaltet" (*GA 7*, 25) und übernommen, indem er selbst durch sein eigenes Tun dieses übernimmt und an ihm tatkräftig teilhat. Der Mensch wird, anders gesagt, im Ge-stell von ihm selbst je schon bestellt und herausgefordert, „das Wirkliche als Bestand zu bestellen" (*GA 7*, 20).

Das Ge-stell erscheint somit als eine besondere Konstellation, als „ein Beisammen" (ebda.), dem entsprechend es als das Versammeln, genauer: als „das

ausschließlich im Vordergrund stehen. Daher handelt es sich bei Heideggers Denken der Technik weder um den Versuch, eine Ethik der Technik herauszuarbeiten, kraft deren die Technik sozusagen durch sich selbst beherrscht werden könnte. Wie besonders die Ausführungen in *GA 79* (55 ff.) zeigen, ist das Beunruhigende und Gefährliche, das bei Heidegger in den Vordergrund tritt, solches, das der Technik gerade infolge ihres nicht- und trans-technischen Wesens eigentümlich ist. „Die technischen Einzelerscheinungen", so Jakob (1996, 81), „interessieren [Heidegger; P. Š.] nur insofern, als sie Ausdruck des Wesens der Technik sind. So bleibt er denn auch in seinen Einzelanalysen zu konkreten Erscheinungen der technologischen Zivilisation wie etwa der Atombombe, der ökologischen Krise oder der Gentechnologie, die für andere Techniktheorien von zentraler Bedeutung sind, eher vage." Vgl. Luckner 2015, 18; Seubold 1986, 294 ff.; Kopriwitza 2015, 41 f., 46.

13 Für die Darstellung der „gängigen Vorstellung" der Technik vor dem Hintergrund der „exemplarischen Position" von Karl Jaspers vgl. Seubold 1986, 21 ff.

Versammelnde“ (ebda.) bestimmt wird. Der Charakter des Versammelnden wird im Ge-stell durch das „Ge-“ gekennzeichnet und, wenngleich es dabei auch um ein Gruppieren – vgl., z. B., bei „Gebirg“ (ebda.; vgl. *GA 79*, 32) – der unterschiedenen, aber zusammengehörigen Weisen des Stellens geht,[14] liegt doch der eigentliche Sinn des Begriffs im Versammeln des Menschen vom Ge-stell zum Zwecke des Ge-stells selbst: „Ge-stell heißt das Versammelnde jenes Stellens, das den Menschen stellt, d. h. herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des Bestellens als Bestand zu entbergen.“ (*GA 7*, 21.) Der Mensch wird also vom Ge-stell als er selbst versammelt, indem das Ge-stell selbst dank dem Menschen und doch von sich selbst her als *ein* wesenhaftes Entbergen versammelt wird.[15]

Im Zusammenhang dieser Betrachtung ist wichtig, dass es gerade das bezeichnete reflexive Verhältnis von Menschen und Sein ist, in dem sich das Ge-stell als das Ereignen des nicht-technischen Wesens der Technik aufweist. Denn das nämliche Verhältnis versteht Heidegger im Sinne des Entsprechens „dem Zuspruch der Unverborgenheit“, von der der Mensch immer schon, als in sie geworfener, angegangen und „angesprochen“ ist.[16] Daher sind drei

14 Vgl. hierzu die Analyse der „Wortbildung ‚Ge-stell‘“ in Seubold, 1986, 111 ff., bes. 114: „Und ebenso suggeriert der substantivierte Infinitiv ‚das Stellen‘ ein rein menschliches Tun, während das ‚Ge-stell‘ diese Betonung des menschlichen Machens verhindert – und darauf kommt es Heidegger an.“ Vgl. auch Vetter 2014, 172, 280.

15 Vgl.: „Wir nennen […] jenen herausfordernden Anspruch, der den Menschen dahin versammelt, das Sichentbergende als Bestand zu bestellen – das *Ge-stell*.“ (*GA 7*, 20.) Der Mensch wird, anders gesagt, im Kreisgang des Ge-stells zum Zwecke dieses Kreisgangs selbst gebraucht (vgl., u. a.: *GA 7*, 18; *GA 79*, 30 f.) Vgl. Vetter 2014, 172: „D[a]s vielfältige Stellen beherrscht alles menschliche Tun und Lassen. Der Mensch meint zwar, sein Vor-stellen sei souverän und stellt Seiendes in seinen Dienst. Doch weder wird er damit zum Herrn der Technik, noch ist er deren Knecht. Denn in der Epoche des Ge-stells verfällt alles dem Kreislauf eines universalen Stellens, wo keiner mehr Herr oder Knecht ist.“ Dazu Luckner 2008, 13: „Gerade dadurch, dass man zum ‚User‘ werden muss, um eine Technik in Gebrauch zu nehmen, ist es […] erforderlich, sich in einem gewissen, zu klärenden Sinn von eben dieser Technik in Gebrauch nehmen zu lassen.“ Vgl. auch Seubold 1986, 142.

16 *GA 7*, 19: „Wo immer der Mensch sein Auge und Ohr öffnet, sein Herz aufschließt, sich in das Sinnen und Trachten, Bilden und Werken, Bitten und Danken freigibt, findet er sich überall schon ins Unverborgene gebracht. Dessen Unverborgenheit hat sich schon ereignet, so oft sie den Menschen in die ihm zugemessenen Weisen des Entbergens hervorruft. Wenn der Mensch auf seine Weise innerhalb der

Merkmale hervorzuheben, die dem Ge-stell als dem entbergenden Ereignen des Wahren eigentümlich sind und aufgrund deren sich das Ge-stell als das Ereignen im Sinne des Geschicks bestimmt.

Das Ge-stell ist zunächst im strengsten, das heißt den absoluten und universalen Wahrheitsanspruch einschließenden ontologischen Sinne zu denken – als die Weise des je schon ereigneten Enthüllt- bzw. Entborgen-seins, in der oder als welche das Sein des Seienden im Ganzen, einschließlich des Menschen selbst, im Sinne der Bestellbarkeit des Bestandes „west". Dass die instrumental-anthropologische Deutung der Technik zu kurz greift und dass in ihr die Technik „in ihrem Wesen herabgewürdigt" werde, zeigt sich, so heißt es diesbezüglich, vor allem darin, dass die Technik „als etwas Seiendes unter vielen Seienden gilt, während doch in ihr und als sie das Sein selber west" (*GA 79*, 60): „Das Bestellen ist nur auf Eines gewendet, versus unum, nämlich: *das Eine Ganze* des Anwesenden als Bestand zu stellen. Das Bestellen ist in sich universal. […] Ge-stell nennt das aus sich gesammelte universale Bestellen der vollständigen Bestellbarkeit des Anwesenden im Ganzen." (*GA 79*, 32.)

Zum Zweiten ist festzuhalten, dass das Ereignen des Seins im bestellenden Entbergen nicht in der Macht des Menschen steht. Entsprechend der ursprünglichen Erfahrung der *physis* im Sinne des unergründlichen „von-sich-her-Aufgehens" des Anwesenden aus dem Verborgenen in die unverborgene Anwesenheit, ereignet sich das Entbergen „geschicklich" und somit „geschichtlich" (*GA 7*, 25), das heißt derart, dass „das Sein", wie es im „Brief über den ‚Humanismus'" heißt, „sich selbst" unberechenbar „schickt" und „gibt": „Das Sichgeben ins Offene mit diesem selbst ist das Sein selber." (*GA 9*, 331; vgl. 328 f., 332 und *passim*.) Das bedeutet, dass jenes verhüllte Verborgene, das als die dunkle Tiefe des Unverborgenen in diesem selbst verortet wurde, damit es aus diesem und doch von selbst her, sich entbergend, zu sich selbst zurückkommen kann, jetzt in der Unergründlichkeit und Unverfügbarkeit des sich schickenden Geschicks zu verstehen ist: „[D]as Ge-schickliche im Geschick ist, daß es sich in die je eine Schickung schickt. Sich schicken heißt: sich aufmachen, um sich zu fügen in die gewiesene Weisung, auf die ein anderes noch verhülltes Geschick wartet." (*GA 79*, 68.)

Unverborgenheit das Anwesende entbirgt, dann entspricht er nur dem Zuspruch der Unverborgenheit, selbst dort, wo er ihm widerspricht."

Drittens, wenngleich sich das herausfordernde Entbergen im Ge-stell „nicht nur *im* Menschen und nicht maßgebend *durch* ihn“ (*GA 7*, 24) schickt, bzw. wenngleich „das Geschick der Entbergung den Menschen immer durchwaltet“ (*GA 7*, 25), ereignet sich das bestellende Entbergen doch auch nicht ohne den Menschen. Infolge des bezeichneten reflexiven Verhältnisses, in dem der Mensch zum Zweck des geschicklichen Sich-Versammelns des Ge-stells von ihm selbst versammelt wird, soll das Sich-Schicken des Seins nur dadurch möglich sein, dass der Mensch „auf de[n] Weg jenes Entbergens gebracht wird“ (ebda.), als welches das Sein sich je schon geschickt hat: „Nur insofern der Mensch seinerseits schon herausgefordert ist, die Naturenergien herauszufordern, kann dieses bestellende Entbergen geschehen.“ (*GA 7*, 18.)

Durch diese drei Merkmale erweist sich das Ge-stell als die eine Art des Ereignens der Wahrheit im Sinne des Seinsgeschicks: „Auf einen Weg bringen – dies heißt in unserer Sprache: schicken. Wir nennen jenes versammelnde Schicken, das den Menschen erst auf einen Weg des Entbergens bringt, das *Geschick*. Von hier aus bestimmt sich das Wesen aller Geschichte. […] Das Ge-stell ist eine Schickung des Geschickes wie jede Weise des Entbergens.“ (Ebda.)[17]

17 Somit weist das Grundsätzliche des Ereignens der Wahrheit als Lichtung für das Sich-Verbergen letztlich in die Geschicklichkeit des Seinsgeschicks zurück, der zufolge die Geschichte als die Seinsgeschichte erscheint: „Die Ἀλήθεια schickt sich in das lichtende Bergen des Anwesens, schickt sich an, das Anwesende in das Geschickliche seines Anwesens zu entfalten. Die Ἀλήθεια ist das Geschick des Seins, als welches Geschick sich die Fülle der Seinsgeschichte in ihre Epochen fügt.“ (*GA 79*, 49; vgl. 69.) Vgl. Seubold 1986, 129: „Das, was den Menschen in eine jeweils geschichtliche Art des Entbergens versetzt, was ihm überhaupt die Möglichkeit des Entbergens gibt, nennt Heidegger ‚Geschick‘ oder […] ‚Seinsschickung‘. D. h.: das Sein schickt sich, entbirgt sich von Epoche zu Epoche in eine je andere Art und Weise von Unverborgenheit, neuzeitlich anders als mittelalterlich und mittelalterlich anders als antik. Und diese Schickung ist […] kein menschliches Geschehen, sondern eröffnet erst dem Menschen die Möglichkeit eines epochal-geschichtlichen Tuns und Lassens.“ Für das implizite Zurückführen des Seins als der apriorischen Gegebenheit bzw. Sich-Entborgenheit des Unverborgenen aus dem Verborgenen auf die Unverfügbarkeit des unergründlichen Geschicks vgl. Jakob 1996, 103: „Die Formel [‚Es gibt Sein‘; P. Š.] verleiht einerseits der Grunderfahrung Ausdruck, ‚dass etwas ist‘, und lässt andererseits das Sein als eine Gabe des absolut unverfügbaren, über alles verfügenden ‚Es‘, das wiederum für

Zusammenfassend ist also festzuhalten, dass sich im Ge-stell das nicht-technische Wesen der modernen Technik aufweist, insofern es um eine durch den universalen ontologischen Anspruch in sich verschlossene, epochal-geschichtliche, „je schon entschiedene Art der Weltauslegung“ (*GA 51*, 17) geht, in deren Einheitsdynamik, nämlich im reflexiven Verhältnis des „wechselweisen Sichstellen[s] von Mensch und Sein“,[18] sich die grundsätzlichen Merkmale des „In-der-Welt-seins“ aus *Sein und Zeit* abbilden. Die zentrale Änderung, die dabei infolge der bekannten „Kehre“ erscheint, liegt darin, dass sich die Auslegung nicht mehr im Rahmen der „Zeughaftigkeit“ hält, sondern, der Tendenz von *Sein und Zeit* selbst entsprechend, das Verhältnis von Mensch und Sein in den Vordergrund tritt, in dem als Selbem beide im Ereignen des Unterschieds zusammengehören. Jenes grundsätzliche Verhältnis in *Sein und Zeit*, in dem sich das Dasein als die je schon ohnmächtig in die Welt geworfene faktische Möglichkeit des Entwurfs von eigenen Existenzmöglichkeiten findet, wird hier als „verbales“ Wesen verstanden, das heißt als das Ereignen des Seins im sich-verbergenden Entbergen, worin es den Menschen überhaupt gibt und nur geben kann, indem er dem Unverborgenen, von dem er immer schon angesprochen wird, durch sein eigenes Tun aktiv entspricht, und zwar so, dass er dieses Unverborgene als ein von ihm selbst unabhängiges und unverfügbares Geschick übernehmend hütet und wahrt.[19]

den Heideggerschen Schlüsselbegriff ‚das Ereignis‘ steht. Der Heideggersche Begriff des Seins bezeichnet somit die oberste Instanz alles geschichtlichen Geschehens. Geschichte ist in ihrem innersten Wesen kein bloßes Menschenwerk, sondern ein Wahrheitsgeschehen, ein Verbergungs- und Entbergungsgeschehen des Seins.“

18 Vgl. *GA 11*, 44: „Dasjenige, worin und woher Mensch und Sein in der technischen Welt einander an-gehen, spricht an in der Weise des Ge-Stells. Im wechselweisen Sichstellen von Mensch und Sein, hören wir den Anspruch, der die Konstellation unseres Zeitalters bestimmt. Das Ge-Stell geht uns überall unmittelbar an.“

19 Den Zusammenhang von Heideggers Auslegung des „reflexiven“ bzw. „plastischen“ Charakters der in *Sein und Zeit* herausgearbeiteten Weltlichkeit im Sinne des „ekstatischen Bezugs […], der der Mensch ist“ (168) und des im Sinne von „Verhältnis von Anspruch und Entsprechung“ (170) bestimmten Ereignisses im Ge-stell betont Nielsen (2015), und zwar in dem Sinne, dass im Ge-stell dieser Bezug selbst als die eigenständige Selbst-Steuerung bzw. als „Kybernetik“, „objektiviert“ werde (168). Für die Zusammengehörigkeit von Weltlichkeit und Ereignis vgl. auch Jakob 1996, 102 ff. Zum Ursprung des späten Denkens Heideggers der Technik in der auf der „Nietzsche-,

Die Frage ist nun, wie sich „das Beunruhigende" bestimmter fassen lässt, das dem Ge-stell als der einen Weise der Wahrheitsentbergung und somit als dem einen „Wesensgeschick des Seins selbst" (*GA 79*, 68) zugesprochen wird. Diesbezüglich erscheint es lohnend, davon auszugehen, dass das Ge-stell in einem dreifachen Sinne als Gefahr erscheint.

Das Ge-stell zeigt sich zunächst als „*die* Gefahr" (*GA 7*, 27), sozusagen als die Gefahr als solche, insofern jedem geschickhaften Sich-Entbergen das Verbergen des wesenhaften Ereignens von Verborgenheit und Unverborgenheit eignet: „Das Geschick der Entbergung ist in sich nicht irgendeine, sondern die Gefahr." (Ebda.) Als *die* Gefahr erweist sich das Ge-stell somit darin, dass es als die eine Art der epochalen Weltauslegung doch in dem erwähnten absoluten Anspruch übernommen wird, der ihm als der Entborgenheit des Seienden im Ganzen zukommt: Im Ge-stell, so heißt es, gehe der Mensch „immerfort am Rande der Möglichkeit, nur das im Bestellen Entborgene zu verfolgen und zu betreiben und von da her alle Maße zu nehmen", wodurch sich ihm „die andere Möglichkeit verschließt, daß der Mensch eher und mehr und stets anfänglicher auf das Wesen des Unverborgenen und seine Unverborgenheit sich einläßt, um die gebrauchte Zugehörigkeit zum Entbergen als sein Wesen zu erfahren." (Ebda.)

Darüber hinaus zeigt sich das Ge-stell als „die höchste Gefahr" (ebda.) darin, dass der Mensch sich nur im scheinbar unerschütterlichen Rahmen des Ge-stells fasst – wenn er also, im „wechselweisen Sichstellen" vom Ge-stell als der Besteller bestellt, sich eben nur als Besteller versteht und glaubt, „alles was begegne, bestehe nur, insofern es ein Gemachte[s]" von ihm selbst – dem „Herrn der Erde" – „sei" (*GA 7*, 28). Im Ge-stell als höchster Gefahr erweist sich also das Grundsätzliche der instrumental-anthropologischen Deutung der Technik. Dieses besteht darin, dass der Mensch als das Subjekt figuriert, durch dessen Tun nicht nur die Technik in seinen Dienst gesetzt und nutzenbringend ausgeübt, sondern, da dieses In-den-eigenen-Dienst-Setzen ein Sich-Auskennen bzw. ein erkennendes Wissen voraussetzt, das Wahre im Sinne des richtig verstandenen und so eben „verwahrlosten" und „verwüsteten"

Spengler- und Jünger-Rezeption" basierten „Metaphysikkritik von *Sein und Zeit*" vgl. Seubold 1986, 43 ff.

Bestandes objektiviert wird, wobei das eigentlich Wahre übersehen bzw. verfälscht wird: „Insgleichen kann die Unverborgenheit, dergemäß sich die Natur als ein berechenbarer Wirkungszusammenhang von Kräften darstellt, zwar richtige Feststellungen verstatten, aber gerade durch diese Erfolge die Gefahr bleiben, daß sich in allem Richtigen das Wahre entzieht." (*GA, 7*, 27.)

Dass das Ge-stell letztlich als „die äußerste Gefahr" (*GA 7*, 29) bezeichnet wird, liegt darin, dass es, abgesehen von „der Steuerung und Sicherung des Bestandes", „jede andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung vertreibt" (*GA 7*, 28). Genauer, das Äußerste der Gefahr im Ge-stell ist, dass das Ge-stell gerade seinen „eigenen Grundzug" verbirgt; es verschließt die Möglichkeit, dass das Wesen, wie es sich in der geschicklichen Dynamik von Entbergen und Verbergen im Verhalten von Mensch und Sein als das Selbe im eigenen Unterscheiden ereignet, zum Vorschein kommt: „So verbirgt […] das herausfordernde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise des Entbergens, das Her-vor-bringen, sondern es verbirgt das Entbergen als solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin sich Unverborgenheit, d. h. Wahrheit ereignet." (Ebda.)

Es lässt sich also zusammenfassen, dass die dem Ge-stell eigentümliche Gefahr darin liegt, dass infolge des im Ge-stell gipfelnden, das heißt in ihm zur Eigenständigkeit gelangenden instrumental-anthropologischen Verständnisses und der dazugehörigen Ausführung der Technik nicht nur der sich als Subjekt verstehende Mensch seine eigene wesenhafte Zugehörigkeit zum Sein verfehlt – verfehlt wird vielmehr das Sein selbst, nämlich als Ereignen des Wahren, in dem das Ge-stell als grundloses Seinsgeschick begründet ist. Das „Beunruhigende" des Ge-stells erweist sich vor dem Hintergrund der ihm eigentümlichen Gefahr anders gesagt darin, dass die aus sich selbst quellende Unruhe, die dem Wesen als dem Ereignen des Selben im Unterscheiden zugehört, in der eindimensionalen Zirkulation des anscheinend immer hilfreicheren und nützlicheren Bestellens beruhigt wird. Eben dieses Beruhigt-Werden des an sich Unruhigen soll also das „Beunruhigende" sein, im Sinne dessen nämlich, was das Denken bewegt, auf dem Wege des Fragens nach der Technik durch ihre gängige Vorstellung hindurchzugehen und zu ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen vorzudringen (vgl. *GA 79*, 92).

Im Folgenden ist zu versuchen, anhand der gewonnenen Einsichten das Zusammenfallen von „Gefahr" und „Rettung" im nicht-technischen Wesen der Technik genauer zu bestimmen. Wie vor allem die Vorträge „Das Ding" und „Das Ge-stell" bezeugen, wird die dem Ge-stell eigentümliche Gefahr darin manifest, dass durch das „Geraff" in der Zirkularität des Bestellens jedes Ding in seinem ihm eigenen „Insichstehen" (*GA 79*, 6) „vernichtet" wird (*GA 79*, 9). In seinem eigenen Insichstehen unbehütet und unbewahrt, wird das Ding der ihm eigenen „Ferne" beraubt, aus der es dem Menschen begegnet und ihm nah ist; im Namen der „abstandslosen" „Gleich-Giltigkeit" der jederzeit lieferbaren und ersetzbaren „Bestandstücke" verschwindet somit das „Dinghafte" des Dinges (*GA 79*, 46) und mit ihm Welt: „Dingend nähert das Ding Welt und verweilt Welt. Wenn aber das Ding, wahrlos, wie es ist, nicht dingt, dann bleibt Welt als Welt verweigert. In der Verwahrlosung des Dinges ereignet sich Verweigerung von Welt." (*GA 79*, 47.)

Es ist im Rahmen dieser Betrachtung nicht möglich, darauf einzugehen, dass das Eigentliche des Seienden, das Heidegger im Sinne des Dinghaften als Insichstehen des Dinges denkt, in der Einfalt der Vierung bzw. im einigenden Ereignen des Gevierts von Himmel, Erde, Sterblichen und Göttlichen „verweilt" (vgl., u. a., *GA 79*, 17). Ebenso wenig möglich ist es, das metaphysische Denken genauer als das Tragende der „Subjekt-Objekt-Polarisierung" (Seubold 1986, 82) herauszuarbeiten, die der Subjektivierung des Menschen zugrunde liegt und in der die ihn selbst transzendierende unbedingte Subjektivität sowie die dazugehörige Verwahrlosung der Dinge zum Bestand im Ge-stell vollendet wird (vgl. *GA 7*, 79; *GA 9*, 337).[20] Der Beitrag beschränkt sich auf die Betrachtung der These Heideggers, wonach die bezeichnete Ent-dinglichung und Ent-weltlichung in der modernen Technik nicht an sich selbst gefährlich seien: „Das Gefährliche ist nicht die Technik. Es gibt keine Dämonie der Technik, wohl dagegen das Geheimnis ihres Wesens." (*GA 7*, 29.)

20 Zum Ge-stell als Punkt der Vollendung der abendländischen Metaphysik in der Vollendung des Menschen als Subjekt sowie zur entsprechenden Verwandtschaft und (qualitativen) Differenz von antiker *tekhne* und moderner Technik in Heideggers Denken vgl., u. a.: Jakob 1996, 45 ff., 76 ff., 88 ff., 94, 102; Seubold 1986, 43, 82 ff., 105, 135 ff., 166 ff., 288 ff.; Biemel 1996, 407 ff.; Escudero 2024, 311 f., 314; Vermal 2015; Luckner 2015; Luckner 2012, 99 ff; Luckner 2008, 18, 40 ff; Aurenque 2012, 144 ff.; Kopriwitza 2015; Schüssler 2012, 65 ff.

Dieses Geheimnis des Wesens der Technik erwies sich darin, dass das „verbal" verstandene Wesen das Geschehen ist, in dem es sich als das Selbe im „Unter-Schied" ereignet (vgl. *GA 7*, 28). Es handelt sich um das schwingende Verhältnis von Entborgenheit und Verborgenheit, wo in jedem Sich-Entbergen dieses Entbergen sich selbst gerade in seiner eigenen voraussetzungslosen Selbst-Ursprünglichkeit, d. h. als das sich von selbst her und somit unergründlich schickende Geschick, entzogen, geheim und verborgen ist, und zwar derart, dass es in diesem seinem Innigsten, als unergründlicher Selbst-Anfang, von selbst her „vergessen" wird. Das „Seyn selber" oder das Wesen ereignet sich daher als es selbst, indem es sich-vergessend sich selbst widerspricht und als das eigene Un-Wesen entgegensetzt. Somit erweist sich das Ereignen der Wahrheit des Seins grundsätzlich darin, dass „das Seyn als Seyn die Gefahr seines eigenen Wesens [ist]. […] Das Seyn ist in sich aus sich für sich die Gefahr schlechthin." (*GA 79*, 53 f.)[21]

Wichtig ist, dass dieses Sich-Entgegensetzen des Wesens „aus dem Wesen des Ge-Stells und in der Hinsicht auf [die] Verweigerung von Welt und [die] Verwahrlosung des Dinges gedacht" wird (ebda.): „[… D]ie Entgegensetzung von Welt und Ge-stell ist kein nur vorhandener und demgemäß vorstellbarer Gegensatz zwischen vorhandenen Gegenständen. Die Entgegensetzung ereignet sich. Sie ereignet sich im Selben als das Wesende des Seins selber." (*GA 79*, 52.)[22] Als die äußerste Gefahr erweist sich das Gestell somit in der Selbst-Vollendung der Gefahr im Sinne des dem Ereignen des Wahren eigentümlichen Entzugs: Ihrer eigensten, in der Zweideutigkeit des Wesens verwurzelten Natur des Sich-Verstellens und -Verbergens nach wird die Gefahr eben *als* Gefahr, nämlich als das Verstellen selbst, verstellt und verborgen (vgl. *GA 79*,

21 Vgl. „Das Wesende der Gefahr ist das Seyn selbst, insofern es der Wahrheit seines Wesens mit der Vergessenheit dieses Wesens nachstellt." (*GA 79*, 62; vgl. 50 f.) Vgl. Vetter 2014, 366.

22 Vgl. auch: „Welt und Ge-Stell sind das Selbe. Aber wiederum: Das Selbe ist niemals das Gleiche. Das Selbe ist ebensowenig nur der unterschiedlose Zusammenfall des Identischen. Das Selbe ist vielmehr das Verhältnis des Unterschiedes. Selbig ist, was notwendig in diesem sich ereignenden Verhältnis gehalten, d. h. gehütet, d. h. verwahrt wird, und so im strengen Sinne verhalten bleibt. Welt und Ge-Stell sind das Selbe und so bis ins Äußerste ihres Wesens einander entgegengesetzt." (*GA 79*, 52; vgl. 62) Vgl. Vermal 2015, 36.

51 ff.). Diese Selbst-Vollendung der Gefahr als Gefahr in ihrem vollkommenen Entzug erscheint als das „Gefährlichste", das Heidegger im „Nachstellen" als „das innerste Wesen des Stellens, als welches das Gestell west" (*GA 79*, 53), denkt:

> Das Gefährlichste der Gefahr besteht […] darin, daß die Gefahr sich als die Gefahr, die sie ist, verbirgt. Nachstellend dem Wesen des Seins, verstellt das Ge-Stell sein Gefahrwesen. Daher kommt es, daß wir dieses Wesens des Seyns, in sich als die Gefahr der Wahrheit seines Wesens zu wesen, zunächst und langhin überhaupt nicht, und wenn je, dann nur schwer gewahr werden. Wir erfahren die Gefahr noch nicht als die Gefahr. Wir erfahren das Ge-Stell nicht als das sich nachstellende und dabei sich verstellende Wesen des Seins. (*GA 79*, 54 f.)[23]

Um das Zusammenfallen von „Gefahr" und „Rettung" im zweideutigen Wesen der Technik zu fassen, ist also gerade von der grundsätzlichen Zweideutigkeit dieses Wesens selbst auszugehen, das sich im Unter-Scheiden und Ent-Zweien von Verbergen und Entbergen bzw. von Un-Wesen und Wesen als das Selbe ereignet und demzufolge „das Wesende der Gefahr", wie gesagt, „das Seyn selbst ist". Denn es ist die unausweichliche Implikation des Zusammenfallens von Gefahr und Ereignis im Ereignis selbst – was in den Bestimmungen der Technik als „des verborgenen Grundzugs der Wirklichkeit alles jetzt Wirklichen" (*GA 79*, 62) oder des Ge-stells als des „sich selbst verstellenden Ereignisses" (*GA 4*, 153) bzw. „des photographischen Negativs des Ereignisses" (*GA 15*, 366) eindrucksvoll zu Wort kommt –, dass die Gefahr in sich selbst gleichsam die rettende Möglichkeit des Wahrheitsereignisses birgt: „Im Wesen der Gefahr, wo sie als die Gefahr ist, ist die Kehre zur Wahrnis, ist diese Wahrnis selbst, ist das Rettende des Seyns." (*GA 79*, 73.)

Und so, wie sich die Gefahr nicht unmittelbar auf den lebensbedrohlichen Gebrauch der Technik bezieht, geht es auch bei der Rettung nicht darum, „das vom Untergang Bedrohte […] in seinem bisherigen Fortbestehen zu sichern"

23 Vgl. Vetter 2014, 281: „Das Äußerste d[e]r Gefahr liegt […] darin, dass das Ge-stell sein Wesen, d. h. die in ihm waltende Gefahr, verbirgt und damit verstellt." Vgl. auch Jakob (1996, 36) zum „Nihilismus, der sich selbst undurchsichtig ist" (vgl. auch 84 f.).

(*GA 7*, 29). Mit der Gefahr im Ereignen des Wesens zusammenfallend ist das „Retten“ ein „[E]inholen ins Wesen, um so das Wesen erst zu seinem eigentlichen Scheinen zu bringen“ (ebda.). Die Rettung soll somit als das Eingeholtwerden ins Wesen stattfinden, wodurch dieses gelassen wird, sich als das sich-verbergende Entbergen zu ereignen. Aber dieses das Wesen lassende Eingeholtsein ins Wesen kommt nicht von irgendeinem Außen, sondern soll ausschließlich als Vollzug des Wesensbezuges auf sich selbst im geschicklichen Entbergen möglich sein. Das Entbergen des Verborgenen schickt sich, wie gesagt, aus dem Unverborgenen in dieses selbst. Und das bedeutet, dass als die Kehre im Selben ins Selbe die Rettung nur als die Kehre im Ge-stell selbst zu fassen und auszuüben ist. Aber wie wäre diese Kehre genauer zu bestimmen?[24]

„Die eigentliche Bedrohung“, so Heidegger, die den Menschen im Ge-stell „bereits in seinem Wesen angegangen hat“, liegt darin, „daß dem Menschen versagt sein könnte, in ein ursprünglicheres Entbergen einzukehren und so den Zuspruch einer anfänglicheren Wahrheit zu erfahren.“ (*GA 7*, 29.) Es zeigte sich, dass diese Bedrohung in dem Sinne zu fassen ist, dass sich dem Menschen – sofern er sich „immerfort am Rande der Möglichkeit [bewegt], nur das im Bestellen Entborgene zu verfolgen und zu betreiben und von da her alle Maße zu nehmen“ – im Ge-stell die Erfahrung des Ereignens des Wesens als der sich-verbergenden Entbergung versagt. Nun sollte aber aus der obigen Erörterung auch deutlich geworden sein, dass im Versagen der Erfahrung des Ereignens des Wesens dem Menschen die Erfahrung seines eigenen Wesens versagt ist, sofern er wesenhaft eben diesem Ereignen zugehört.

Was der Mensch ist, liegt nämlich nicht in seinem bloßen Mensch-Sein, wie dieses gemäß der metaphysischen Wesensbestimmung im Sinne des *animal rationale* bestimmt ist. Der Mensch *ist* nur im Verhältnis zum Sein, derart, dass er von diesem versammelt und dass dadurch zugleich das Sein selbst ge-lassen wird, sich von sich selbst her zu entbergen. Dieses Gebracht-

24 Vgl. Nielsen 2015, 170: „Das ‚Ereignis‘ selbst ist in d[e]m technischen Wirkungszusammenhang nur im Sinne eines ‚photographischen Negativs‘ wiederzufinden, und zwar eines Negativs, dem kein Positivum im Sinne einer Substanz oder eines Subjekts entspricht. Es ist die Zeit oder das reine Geschick selbst, und dieses ist, wie Heidegger nicht müde wurde zu betonen, kein Etwas, sondern Bezug.“ Vgl. Seubold 1986, 300 ff., 323 ff.

Sein des Menschen auf den Weg des geschicklichen Entbergens zum Zwecke dieses Entbergens selbst ist also keine beliebige Möglichkeit des Menschen. Es ist *die* Möglichkeit des Menschen, wesenhaft zu sein – derart, dass er vom Entbergen, in welchem er sich immer schon befindet, gebraucht wird und dass er diese „gebrauchte Zugehörigkeit zum Entbergen als sein Wesen erfährt" (*GA 7*, 27).

Dem Zuspruch des Seinsgeschicks entsprechend und dadurch das Sein in seinem entborgenen Anspruch lassend, gehört der Mensch innerlich dem Ereignis der Wahrheit zu: „Als der […] Gebrauchte ist der Mensch dem Ereignis der Wahrheit vereignet." (*GA 7*, 33.) Diesem „ekstatischen" Wesen nach (vgl. *GA 7*, 28) wird der Mensch in dem Zwischen- und Verbindungspunkt des Entbergens und Verbergens verortet, in dem er, vom unverfügbaren Geschick des Entbergens je schon eingeholt und übernommen, dieses seinerseits übernimmt und lässt, sich von sich selbst her zu entbergen und wahr zu sein. Das Wesen des Menschen erweist sich somit darin, dass in ihm das Wesen selbst als das Ereignen des Selben im Unter-Schied „gewährt" bzw. „gewahrt" wird: Die „höchste Würde seines Wesens", so heißt es in diesem Sinne, „beruht darin, die Unverborgenheit und mit ihr je zuvor die Verborgenheit alles Wesens auf dieser Erde zu hüten" (*GA 7*, 33; vgl. *GA 79*, 70).

Diese während-wahrende Natur des Menschen als, wie es im „Brief über den ‚Humanismus'" heißt, „Hirt des Seins" (*GA 9*, 338) ist entscheidend, um die These zu verstehen, nirgendwo anders als im Geschick des Ge-stells selbst wachse auch das Rettende. „Jedes Geschick eines Entbergens", so schreibt Heidegger, „ereignet sich aus dem Gewähren und als ein solches. Denn dieses trägt dem Menschen erst jenen Anteil am Entbergen zu, den das Ereignis der Entbergung braucht. […] Das Gewährende, das so oder so in die Entbergung schickt, ist als solches das Rettende." (*GA 7*, 33; vgl. *GA 79*, 72.) Das bedeutet: Jedes Geschick ereignet bzw. schickt sich von selbst her, jedoch „nicht ohne die Mithilfe des Menschenwesens" (*GA 79*, 69) als des Gewährenden. Wenngleich sich also die Rettung aus der Gefahr im Geschick des Ge-stells, als die „Verwindung" desselben, nur „aus der Ankunft eines anderen Geschicks" (ebda.) zu ereignen vermag und wenngleich der Mensch kein Subjekt desselben ist – da er in jedem Geschick je schon von diesem durchwaltet wird –, so liegt doch vieles, um nicht zu sagen alles, am Menschen.

Nun kann aber der Mensch in diesem grundsätzlichen Sinne, nämlich als der Rettende, hilfreich sein, wenn er seinem Wesen nach ist, das heißt, wenn er als das Gewährende des Ereignisses von diesem „gebraucht" und ihm „vereignet" wird. Diese Möglichkeit, ins Ereignis eingeholt zu werden, öffnet sich dem Menschen im Durchdringen zum nicht-technischen Wesen der Technik, sofern dieses gerade im geschicklichen Ereignen des Wahren besteht. Und dieses Durchdringen soll in der Erfahrung des Ge-stells als der äußersten Gefahr münden. Die Möglichkeit der rettenden Kehre im Ge-stell gründet daher darin, dass im Durchdringen der Technik bis zum Ereignis als ihrem nicht-technischen Wesen, welches in der verstehenden Erfahrung des Ge-stells als der diesem Wesen eigenen äußersten – d. h. gänzlich verstellten und verborgenen – Gefahr stattfindet, der Mensch diesem Wesen „sich öffnet" (*GA 79*, 70):

> Gerade im Ge-stell, das den Menschen in das Bestellen als die vermeintlich einzige Weise der Entbergung fortzureißen droht und so den Menschen in die Gefahr der Preisgabe seines freien Wesens stößt, gerade in dieser äußersten Gefahr kommt die innigste, unzerstörbare Zugehörigkeit des Menschen in das Gewährende zum Vorschein, gesetzt, daß wir an unserem Teil beginnen, auf das Wesen der Technik zu achten. (*GA 7*, 33.)[25]

Es lässt sich also feststellen, dass das Einhergehen von Rettung und Gefahr im zweideutigen Wesen der Technik im nicht-technischen Charakter dieses Wesens gründet, sofern sich dieses als geschickliches Ereignen des Wahren *qua* Selben im differenzfordernden sich-verbergenden Entbergen auf die Weise des „wechselweisen Sichstellen[s] von Mensch und Sein" ereignet (vgl. hierzu auch *GA 7*, 34).

25 Vgl. Vetter 2014, 175: „Die Seinsverlassenheit beherrscht, solange das Seinsgeschick des Ge-Stells, als dieses außerhalb jeder Erfahrung bleibt. Doch dadurch verbirgt es die Gefahr, d. h. es ‚verhüllt sich in dem, was es wesen läßt, in der Technik' (GA 79, 57). Doch das Ge-Stell ist seinsgeschichtlich das Sein selbst. *Wird das Stellen als Sein erfahren*, kehrt sich die Vergessenheit des Seins zum Ereignis der Welt. In diesem Augenblick zeigen sich im Ge-Stell, wenn auch nur blitzartig, andere Erfahrungen des Seins." Zur zeitlichen Dimension der Kehre vgl. Vermal 2015, 35 und passim.

Ungeachtet dessen, ob das grundsätzliche Verhältnis von Mensch und Sein im Zusammenfallen von Gebraucht- und Vereignet-Werden, von Entsprechen und Angesprochen-Werden oder von Blicken und Erblickt-Werden gedeutet wird,[26] es handelt sich immer um das Verhältnis, in dem als Selbem Mensch und Sein nur durch den Unterschied zusammengehören: Sofern der Mensch vom Sein je schon übernommen wird, indem er das Sein übernimmt, gehört er durch sein übernehmendes Übernommensein dem Sein eben als das von ihm Unterschiedene konstitutiv und innerlich zu. Wesenhaft, so ließe sich der Zusammenhang ausdrücken, sind Mensch und Sein einander nur durch die je eigene Ferne nah. Und es ist dann gerade diese, sich selbst im Ge-stell entzogene Ferne von Mensch und Sein, in deren Nähern, welches in der denkerischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ge-stell inmitten desselben stattfindet, das rettende Eingeholtsein des Menschen im Ereignis des Wahren gründet, und zwar als die Weise, auf welche das Wahre selbst als das Ereignen des im Ge-stell gefährdeten Unter-Schiedes mithilfe des Menschen durch sich selbst gerettet und freigegeben ist.

Nun ist aber abschließend die Frage zu stellen, wie das rettende Eingeholtsein des Menschen ins Ereignis im Sinne der Entfaltung seiner nähernden Ferne eigentlich zu verstehen und, vor allem, auszuüben ist. Infolge des bezeichneten „wechselweisen Sichstellen[s] von Mensch und Sein" lasse, so Heidegger, dieses Eingeholtsein „den Menschen in die höchste Würde seines Wesens schauen und einkehren" (*GA 7*, 33). Von welcher Art soll aber die Erfahrung des Gestells als der höchsten Gefahr sein, damit das Eingeholtsein ins Ereignis und die Einkehr des Menschen ins eigene, dem Ereignis gehörige Wesen miteinander einhergehen können?[27]

26 Vgl. *GA 79*, 75: „[…] in allem Verstellen des Ge-Stells lichtet sich noch der Lichtblick von Welt, blitzt Wahrheit des Seyns. Dann nämlich, wenn das Ge-Stell in seinem Wesen als die Gefahr sich lichtet. Im Ge-Stell noch als einem Wesensgeschick des Seins west ein Licht vom Blitz des Seyns. Das Ge-Stell ist, obzwar verschleiert, noch Blick, kein blindes Geschick im Sinne eines völlig verhangenen Verhängnisses. Einblick in das was ist – so heißt der Blitz der Wahrheit des Seyns in das wahrlose Sein." (Vgl. *GA 7*, 234; *GA 79*, 100.)

27 Vgl. *GA 7*, 34: „Doch was hilft uns der Blick in die Konstellation der Wahrheit? Wir blicken in die Gefahr und erblicken das Wachstum des Rettenden. Dadurch sind wir

Es lohnt sich hier, wie es scheint, davon auszugehen, dass das „Geheimnis", als welches das Ereignen des Wesens erscheint, gleichsam als „das Befreiende" bestimmt wird (*GA 7*, 26). „Das Geschehnis des Entbergens, d. h. der Wahrheit", so heißt es, „und die Freiheit" stehen „in der nächsten und innigsten Verwandtschaft": „Alles Entbergen kommt aus dem Freien, geht ins Freie und bringt ins Freie." (Ebda.) „Wenn wir uns dem Wesen der Technik eigens öffnen", so wird daher geschlossen, „finden wir uns unverhofft in einen befreienden Anspruch genommen." (Ebda.) Damit soll auch zusammenhängen, dass der Mensch, indem er vom Ereignis des Wesens „vereignet" wird, auch selbst „in einem freien Verhältnis zu dem" steht (*GA 7*, 9), was ihn aus diesem Wesen angeht. Wie ist aber diese befreiende Freiheit im Ereignen der Wahrheit des Näheren zu fassen? Und wie soll der Mensch von ihr in Anspruch genommen sein, um sich im „Wechselbezug" mit dem Sein dem eigenen Wesen nach als frei zu erweisen?[28]

Die Seinsweise des Menschen im Ge-stell als der durch sich selbst vollendeten, höchsten und äußersten Gefahr manifestiert sich darin, dass er „unfrei an die Technik gekettet" bleibe (*GA 7*, 7). Diese Unfreiheit besteht, wie gezeigt, darin, dass sich der Mensch, „das Unverborgene" des Ge-stells „mißdeutend", an ihm „versieht" (*GA 7*, 27): Sein eindimensionaler Subjekt-Bestand „vertreibt jede andere Möglichkeit der Entbergung". Die Entbergung gründet aber in der Unergründlichkeit und Unverfügbarkeit des Seinsgeschicks. Die Unfreiheit zeigt sich somit letztlich darin, dass der Mensch, indem er in der durch die Selbst-Steuerung versicherten und immer entschiedener sich-versichernden Zirkularität des vermeintlich immer nützlicheren Bestellens eingeschlossen ist, auch bezüglich der Unverfügbarkeit des geschicklichen Von-selbst-her-Aufgehens und -Ankommens der Welt verschlossen ist.[29]

noch nicht gerettet. Aber wir sind daraufhin angesprochen, im wachsenden Licht des Rettenden zu verhoffen. Wie kann dies geschehen?"

28 Vgl. Jakob 1996, 108 ff.; Vermal 2015, 32.

29 Vgl. *GA 7*, 85 f.: „Die Technik als die höchste Form der rationalen Bewußtheit, technisch gedeutet, und die Besinnungslosigkeit als das ihr selbst verschlossene eingerichtete Unvermögen, in einen Bezug zum Fragwürdigen zu gelangen, gehören zusammen: sie sind das Selbe." Vgl. Seubold 1986, 309.

Demgegenüber sei „[d]ie Freiheit […] das lichtend Verbergende, in dessen Lichtung jener Schleier weht, der das Wesende aller Wahrheit verhüllt und den Schleier als den verhüllenden erscheinen läßt. Die Freiheit ist der Bereich des Geschickes, das jeweils eine Entbergung auf ihren Weg bringt." (*GA 7*, 26.)[30] Die Freiheit gehört, anders gesagt, der unverfügbaren und unergründlichen Möglichkeit des Seins zu, sich geschicklich in immer neuen Möglichkeiten zu entbergen. Dieses Ermöglichen wird bei jedem Entbergen je auf *eine* Möglichkeit reduziert und somit sowohl in seinem unergründlichen Selbst-Anfang als auch in seiner unerschöpflichen Fülle verschlossen, entzogen und verborgen – im Ge-stell scheinbar unwiederbringlich. Und doch „west im Ge-Stell noch als einem Wesensgeschick des Seins ein Licht vom Blitz des Seyns" (*GA 79*, 75). Das Eingeholtsein des Menschen ins Freie *qua* Unverfügbares und Unergründliches des geschicklichen Sich-Entbergens soll also noch – oder genauer: eben und erst – inmitten des Ge-stells möglich sein.[31]

Wenngleich sich aber im Durchdringen zum Ge-stell als dem nicht-technischen Wesen der Technik der Mensch diesem Wesen als dem geschicklichen Ereignen des Seins gegenüber öffnen kann, muss ihm das rettende und befreiende Geschick der wesenhaften Entbergung noch lange verschlossen und fern bleiben. Und zwar bis zu dem Augenblick, in dem das sich von selbst her unverfügbar schickende Geschick des Seins durch das ihm entgegenkommende Entsprechen des von ihm angesprochenen Menschen in der ihm eigenen, nie aufhebbaren Ferne, in der es dank der eigenen Unverfügbarkeit je schon entzogen ist, übernommen und gewährt werden kann. Dem vorbereitenden langsamen Nähern dieser Ferne gehört dabei ein Einüben ins anfängliche – „andenkende[…]" (*GA 79*, 20) – Denken zu, das ganz anderer Art ist als das „vorstellende, d. h. erklärende" (ebda.) metaphysisch-technische Denken, das sich im Ge-stell vollendet. Dieses findet Heidegger in

30 Vgl. hierzu die etymologische Deutung, nach der der Sinn der „Lichtung" vor allem im „leichter machen", „freimachen", „freigeben" und „freilassen" begründet sein soll (vgl. Vetter 2014, 304).

31 Vgl. Vermal 2015, 37: „Was den Menschen wesentlich auszeichnet, ist nicht eine vorhandene Eigenschaft, sondern die Bewegung, sich selbst als eine Öffnung zu gewinnen, wobei das Selbst kein fester Stand ist, sondern eben das Aussetzen in das, was ihm zugeschickt entgegenkommt. Nur so kann er geschichtlich sein und über die Beschränkung des jeweiligen Geschicks hinausgehen."

der Dichtung bzw. der Kunst als dem Bereich, der, wie auch die Technik selbst, „einerseits mit dem Wesen der Technik verwandt und andererseits von ihm doch grundverschieden ist“ (*GA 7*, 36).

Dazu ist aber zu bemerken, dass es, ebenso wie bei der Auseinandersetzung mit der Technik, nicht um das Dichterische als solches geht. Es geht um die Möglichkeit des Menschen, wesenhaft zu sein, und das heißt aus der Gehörigkeit dem, dem geschicklichen Ursprung nach unergründlich und der Möglichkeit nach unerschöpflich befreienden, Ereignen des Wahren zu sein. Diesem aber nähert sich der Mensch in seiner unaufhebbaren, sich selbst in eigener Unverfügbarkeit verbergenden Ferne, wie es scheint, auf die Weise, dass er sich in der „Zwiesprache des göttlichen und menschlichen Geschickes“ (*GA 7*, 35), die in der Kunst der Griechen „zum Leuchten“ gebracht wurde (ebda.) und aus der auch noch Hölderlins Dichtung lebt, dem nähert, was ihm – so schon der Grundsatz von *Sein und Zeit* –, solange er lebt, zugleich unüberbrückbar fern und doch innerlich zugehörig ist – das unüberholbare und unbestimmt-unverfügbare Geschick seines Todes. Allein und gerade als Sterblicher in der Vierung des Gevierts wird der Mensch vom Ereignis des Wahren gebraucht und auf diese Weise, das Ereignis des Wahren selbst lassend, zu sich selbst in seiner freien Eigenständigkeit gebracht.

> *Der Tod gehört in das aus dem Wesen des Seyns ereignete Dasein des Menschen.* So birgt er das Wesen des Seyns. Der Tod ist das höchste Gebirg der Wahrheit des Seyns selbst, das Gebirg, das in sich die Verborgenheit des Wesens des Seyns birgt und die Bergung seines Wesens versammelt. Darum vermag der Mensch den Tod nur und erst, wenn das Seyn selber aus der Wahrheit seines Wesens das Wesen des Menschen in das Wesen des Seyns vereignet. *Der Tod ist das Gebirg des Seyns im Gedicht der Welt.* (*GA 79*, 56.)[32]

32 Vgl. GA 79, 20 (vgl. auch 17 f.): „Wann und wie kommen Dinge als Dinge? Sie kommen nicht durch die Machenschaften des Menschen. Sie kommen aber auch nicht ohne die Wachsamkeit der Sterblichen. Der erste Schritt zu solcher Wachsamkeit ist der Schritt zurück aus dem nur vorstellenden, d. h. erklärenden Denken in das andenkende Denken.“ Es ist hier nur darauf hinzuweisen, dass es wahrscheinlich dieser Zusammenhang – der auch der Zusammenhang von *Sein und Zeit* ist –, in dem

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sich das Vermögen des Todes, welches den Menschen, seinem Wesen entsprechend, zum Sterblichen macht, als die Weise erweist, ins Seinsgeschick eingeholt zu werden, der Grund dafür ist, dass Heidegger von der „Angst vor dem Denken" spricht, „das bedenkt, was ist, welches Denken außerhalb der Kunststücke und des Scharfsinns des Intellekts, aber auch außerhalb der Sentimentalität, nüchtern seine Pfade in das zu Denkende sucht" (*GA 79*, 62). Vgl. Luckner 2012, 108. Für die Rolle der Gelassenheit als der „freien Beziehung zur Technik" in diesem Zusammenhang vgl.: Luckner 2008, 125 ff; Escudero 2024, bes. 319 ff.

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Hermeneutik der Zukunft als Hermeneutik der technischen Zukunft

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Hermeneutics of the Future as Hermeneutics of the technological Future

Abstract

The text discusses the challenges that philosophy of technology increasingly faces due to the emergence of new, the so-called transclassical techniques. This applies particularly to the field of technology assessment, where a "hermeneutic turn" is emerging, within which communicative practices and strategies for understanding how to deal with new technologies are being developed, rather than consequentialist, prognostic, and scenario-based approaches. Furthermore, the contribution first highlights the diversity of hermeneutic approaches and then discusses the guiding concept of a "hermeneutics of the future" in the philosophy of technology as the constitutive primacy of the future in the existential sense.

Keywords: hermeneutics, future, technology, understanding, philosophy of technology.

Hermenevtika prihodnosti kot hermenevtika tehnične prihodnosti

Povzetek

Besedilo obravnava izzive, s katerimi se filozofija tehnologije sooča zaradi pojavljanja novih, t. i. transklasičnih tehnik. To zadeva zlasti področje evalvacije tehnologij (»technology assessment«), kjer se naznanja »hermenevtični obrat«, znotraj katerega se namesto konsekvencialističnih, prognostičnih in scenarijskih pristopov razvijajo komunikativne prakse in strategije za razumevanje, kako se spoprijemati z novimi tehnologijami. Prispevek najprej poudarja raznolikost hermenevtičnih pristopov in nato kot vodilni koncept »hermenevtike prihodnosti« v okviru filozofije tehnologije razgrinja konstitutivno prvenstvo prihodnosti v eksistencialnem smislu.

Ključne besede: hermenevtika, prihodnost, tehnologija, razumevanje, filozofija tehnologije.

"*Hermeneutic turn*" in *Technology Assessment*

In seinen auf die Fragen der Technikfolgenabschätzung orientierten Diskussionen spricht Armin Grunwald von dem „hermeneutic turn" bzw. von einer hermeneutischen Umorientierung der diesbezüglichen problemtheoretischen und methodologischen Ansätze. Dabei hat er im Blick vor allem die Unzulänglichkeiten der sog. konsequentialistischen Zugangsweisen innerhalb der Technikfolgenabschätzung (*Technology Assessment* / TA), die in unterschiedlichen Graden auf einem Technodeterminismus aufbauen und davon ausgehen, dass Technikentwicklung eigentlich nach einer der jeweiligen Technik inhärenten kausalen Dynamik abläuft und daher primär einen epistemischen Zugang erfordert. Dies gilt insbesondere für die prognostischen Ansätze, bei denen es um die epistemische Ermittlung eines wahrscheinlichen künftigen Ausgangs der Entwicklung einer bestimmten Technik geht. Die extrapolativ gewonnenen antizipativen Erkenntnisse über den Entwicklungsprozess sollen dann eine rechtzeitige praktische Anpassung an die künftigen Folgen ermöglichen. Im Rahmen des konsequentialistischen Paradigmas kommt bei dem szenaristischen Ansatz der praktische Zug stärker zum Ausdruck, wobei es im Unterschied zum stark deterministisch bestimmten und extrapolativ verfahrenden prognostischen Methoden eher von einem teleologischen Model ausgegangen wird. In diesem Zusammenhang versteht man den Zukunftshorizont als grundsätzlich offen im Sinne praktischer Erwägung zwischen den alternativen Optionen projizierter technischer Zukünfte. Hier wird an der Herausbildung stabiler Handlungsstrategien gearbeitet, wobei die am plausibelsten erachtete Zukünfte als Folge der Handlungen und Entscheidungen aufgefasst und im Hinblick auf ihre Erwünschbarkeit und Akzeptierbarkeit bewertet werden (Grunwald 2018, 324).

Die Entwicklung neuer, vorwiegend informatischer Technologien stellt den Diskurs über die technischen Zukünfte vor neue Herausforderungen, da genannte Technologien eine Pluralität der plausiblen künftigen Entwicklungen offenbarten, die nicht nur prognostische, sondern auch szenaristische Ansätze obsolet machte. Denn der Möglichkeitshorizont, den diese Technologien öffnen, erlaubt weder ein Denken in wenigen Alternativen noch gar eines, das nur einen möglichen Ausgang im Blick hat. Die Überlegungen über die Möglichkeiten neuer Technologien erstrecken sich stattdessen in der Regel zwischen den Extremen der Verheißungen universeller technischer Lösungen und dystopischer und apokalyptischer Szenarien und Visionen (Grunwald 2018, 321).

Wie bereits erwähnt, schlägt Grunwald an dieser Stelle einen hermeneutischen Ansatz vor, bei dem es vor allem um das Verstehen der aktuellen kommunikativen Praxis über die künftige technische Entwicklung geht. Nicht der Zukunftshorizont und der wie auch immer gestaltete antizipative Zugang dazu, so Grunwald, ist hier ausschlaggebend, sondern die Gegenwartsperspektive der aktuellen Diskurse, in denen sich das Verhältnis zu der technischen Zukunft artikuliert (Grunwald 2018, 327). Das Objekt der Forschung und die ihm korrespondierende Verantwortung sind hier keine Folgen der Entwicklung der neuen Technologien, sondern "the processes of creating, disseminating and deliberating the meaning of specific NEST developments. These are taking place in the present and already have consequences and impacts in the present—and therefore should explicitly be made subject to responsibility assessments and reflections." (Grunwald 2016, 170.) Laut Grunwald wird dieser Ansatz hermeneutisch genannt, weil es darum geht, das in solchen Diskursen vorhandene implizite Wissen verstehend zu ermitteln. Demnach sind das bevorzugte Objekt dieser Bemühungen sprachliche Artikulationen über technische Zukünfte. Das praktische Ziel aber bleibt im Hinblick auf die Artikulationspraxis reflexiv und aufklärerisch bzw. eine selbstaufgeklärte Artikulation des Nachdenkens über die künftigen technischen Entwicklungen (Grunwald 2018, 328). Die Selbstaufklärung wirft aber neue Fragen auf, die die Verständnisvermittlung zwischen den unterschiedlichen individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Diskursen betreffen: Wie lässt sich der Verständnistransfer etwa zwischen Forschungs-, Politik- und Alltagsdiskursen herstellen, welche Instanzen können und dürfen über Bedeutungszuschreibungen entscheiden, wie lässt sich über alternative Interpretationen denken etc.

Medialität des Technischen

Laut Christoph Hubig soll der tiefere Grund solcher Umstände in dem „Verlust der Spuren“ (Hubig 2006, 255) gesucht werden, womit das fortschreitende Verschwinden der Schnittstelle Mensch–Technik bei den neuen Technologien bezeichnet wird. Den entscheidenden Punkt dabei bildet das Verschwinden der Erfahrungsbasis bzw. der Erfahrung der Differenz der Konzeptualisierung und der Ausführung des technischen Handelns. In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch von der Medialität der Mittel die Rede, womit das Potenzhafte der eingesetzten Mittel bezeichnet wird. Demzufolge geht der Einsatz der Mittel beim technischen Handeln nie in einer vollen Erfüllung des intendierten Zwecks auf. Die Verwirklichung der intendierten Zwecke bleibt stets entweder unter der Erwartung oder übertrifft diese, so dass der Mitteleinsatz auch auf die anderen möglichen und ursprünglich nichtintendierten Anwendungen hinweist.

Nun stellen uns die neuen Technologien vor eine Herausforderung, indem man eine technisch induzierte Regulierung der Medialität selbst bzw. die systemische Präformulierung der Zweckvorstellung vorfindet. Im Hinblick auf sog. transklassische Techniken (Hubig 2006, 255) unterliegt die Medialität des Technischen sozusagen einer Autoregulierung und technischer Schematisierung des Handlungsraums. Die Lebens- und Handlungswelt wird als virtuelle Umgebung gestaltet und der praktische Umgang mit der Welt erhält den Charakter der virtuellen Interaktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch von der „wirklichen Virtualität“ (Hubig 2005; Hubig 2006, 255 f.) gesprochen. Durch die technische Schematisierung der Handlungsabläufe gehen tendenziell die Handlungsoptionen bzw. die Optionen bei der Wahl der Handlungszwecke und -mittel verloren. Diesem Optionsverlust korrespondiert die Verringerung der Widerständigkeit des Handelns und überhaupt des Umgangs mit der Welt, so dass Klaus Wiegerling den genannten „Verlust der Spuren“ eigentlich als Verlust der Widerständigkeit der Dinge und Relationen in unserer Umgebung identifiziert (Wiegerling 2011; 2021). Es ist aber das Kennzeichen einer entwickelten Kultur, so Wiegerling, dass sie einen mittelbaren Charakter hat, d. h. eine große Anzahl der Elemente der Vermittlung enthält. Eine entwickelte Kultur einerseits verringert den Widerstand der Welt, aber andererseits ihre

Entwicklung wird ständig begleitet von der Herausbildung neuer Formen des Widerstands. Wie Wiegerling betont, handelt es sich bei der Widerständigkeit nicht nur um den hyletischen Widerstand, der auch als solcher eine wichtige Voraussetzung für, z. B., Lern- und Entdeckungsprozesse ist, sondern der Widerstand kann auch auf abstrakteren Stufen stattfinden, wie etwa der Widerstand gegen die Einfügung in die institutionelle Ordnung (Wiegerling 2011, 70 f.; 2021). Also, trotz der Entlastungsfunktion der Kultur gilt es, die Möglichkeit und Sichtbarkeit der Widerstandsquellen zu erhalten, da sie eben wichtige Antreiber der Kultur- und Handlungsentwicklung sind.

Die kommunikative Strategie, die auf den „Verlust der Spuren" antwortet, soll sich laut Hubig auf die indirekte Sichtbarmachung der Spuren der technischen Handlung beziehen, wobei vier Kommunikationsebenen unterschieden werden. Die erste betrifft die als problematisch angesprochene Kommunikation Mensch–Technik, die weiteren drei die kommunikativen Weisen der Aufklärung der Medialität des Technischen. Zunächst geht es um „eine Verständigung über gemeinsam zu unterstellende Handlungsschemata", die zwischen den Akteuren des technischen Handelns erfolgt. Weiterhin ist die Rede von einer auf die Systemtransparenz abzielenden „Parallelkommunikation" mit dem technischen System, die während der Systemnutzung die Aufklärung über die Interaktion selbst und die Ausstiegsmöglichkeiten gewährleisten soll. Als Beispiel für die Kommunikation Mensch–System führt Hubig die technischen Assistenzsysteme an. Eine dritte Kommunikationsebene bezieht sich auf die „expliziten Parallelforen der Reflexion", die „eine gesellschaftliche Metakommunikation über die Systemkommunikation" ermöglichen und für die transklassischen Techniken die Leistung erbringen sollen, der bei den klassischen Techniken die Herausbildung der Routinen und Traditionen entspricht (Hubig 2006, 190 f.).

Hermeneutik der technischen Lebenswelt

Wenn es um das Denken der Technik jenseits der naturalistischen und methodologischen Verkürzungen und um die Aufdeckung einer breiteren lebensweltlichen Erfahrungsbasis des Umgangs mit Technik geht, dann müssen wir durchaus auch die diesbezüglichen phänomenologischen Auffassungen in den Blick nehmen. Allerdings wird Edmund Husserl im Rahmen seiner

Phänomenologie den wissenschaftlichen und technischen Fortschritt nicht in seiner phänomenalen Positivität, sondern als fortschreitenden Abfall von der ursprünglichen Lebenswelt und als den Verlust des lebensweltlichen Sinnes begreifen (Husserl 1954, 10). Ungeachtet dessen soll laut Husserl gerade der wissenschaftliche Zugang das verschüttete Fundament der Lebenswelt wieder ans Licht bringen. Diese neue Wissenschaftlichkeit ist aber eine phänomenologische. Die Phänomenologie ist die Wissenschaft, die nicht nur die weltanschaulischen und historizistischen Relativismen überwindet, sondern vor allem auch den Szientismus und den Technizismus der sog. objektiven Wissenschaften. Husserl wird eine Konvergenz des Szientismus und Technizismus annehmen und unsere modernen Wissenschaften als „Fabriken", in denen in praktischer und herrschaftlicher Hinsicht die gekünstelte Wahrheit produziert wird. Im Unterschied dazu soll die intuitiv verfahrende Phänomenologie an die Quellen und die ursprünglichen Evidenzen der Wissenschaften jenseits von technizistischen und szientistischen Verkürzungen gelangen (Husserl 1952, 95 f.).

Anders als Husserl wird Heidegger diese „Verlustgeschichte" als eine seinsgeschichtliche Entwicklung auffassen. Heidegger zufolge gehört die Frage nach der Technik in den Zusammenhang der Seinsfrage selbst und als solche stellt sie einen Versuch der Überwindung der instrumentalistischen Technikauffassung dar. Jenseits der technischen Schematisierungen der Handlung ist sie eigentlich die Frage nach dem, was *ist*, d. h. primär eine ontologische Frage. Heidegger versteht die Technik als „Herausforderung" des Wesens der Welt und des Menschen und als solche ist sie die Kulmination der „Anwesenheitsmetaphysik". Um zu klären, in welchem Sinne hier von einer wesenhaften „Herausforderung" durch die Technik gesprochen wird, geht er von einer Aufteilung in moderne und vormoderne Technik aus. Die letztere ist charakterisiert dadurch, dass sie nicht in einem bloßen Verhältnis von Zweck und Mittel aufgeht, sondern durchaus auch an anderen Zusammenhängen, wie etwa Kunst und Religion, partiziperen kann. Demnach lässt die vormoderne technische Handlung auch künstlerische und religiöse Interpretationen zu, die über den modernen Funktionalismus hinausgehen und die Möglichkeiten zulassen, darin etwa auch die Verwirklichung des göttlichen Wollens oder eines Schönheitsideals zu sehen. Bei der modernen bzw. neuzeitlichen Technik fallen solche Konnotationen weitgehend weg. Das landwirtschaftlich bestellte Feld wird nun hauptsächlich als Mittel zum Zweck der Lieferung bestimmter Lebensmittel betrachtet. Hier gibt es keinen Raum mehr, darin auch die Stätte des religiösen Ritus zu erkennen, wie es das lateinische Wort *cultus* suggeriert. Der Unterschied zeigt sich auch darin, dass die vormoderne Technik sozusagen in den natürlichen Kreislauf der Dinge eingebaut ist, während die moderne Technik eben die Dinge in den eigenen Kreislauf einbaut. So etwa, um Heideggers Beispiel aufzugreifen, nutzt eine alte Wassermühle die Wasserkraft des Flusses, ohne in den Flusslauf störend oder substantiell verändernd einzugreifen, während bei dem modernen Wasserkraftwerk durch die Herstellung der Wasserakkumulation der Fluss ein Teil des Funktionskreises des Wasserkraftwerks wird. Der Fluss wird nicht in seinem Lauf belassen, sondern wird ausschließlich als Mittel zum bestimmten Zweck gesehen. Der Fluss wird lediglich als Wasserdrucklieferant verstanden. Eine wesentliche Neuerung in diesem Zusammenhang besteht auch darin, dass Mittel sozusagen vorrätig bereitgestellt werden (Heidegger 2000, 19). Für Heidegger handelt es sich hier um eine ontologische Frage, denn die moderne Technik führt dazu, dass sich alles in der Weise des „Stellens“ entbirgt. Dass die neuzeitliche Technik alles uniformiert, vergegenständlicht, berechenbar und funktionalisiert erscheinen lässt, heißt in ontologischer Perspektive, dass es sich hier nun um eine bestimmte Seinsweise handelt – die Anwesenheit. Alle Dinge und Prozesse erhalten nun ihre Seinsweise aus dem technischen Verwendungszusammenhang. Auch der Mensch wird zum Material, Rohstoff, Mittel der technischen Herstellung. Heidegger zufolge ist hier ein Wille zur Macht am Werk, ein befehlendes Wollen, das eine globale unbedingte Herrschaft zum Ziel hat. Die Welt, die Dinge werden auf die Imperative eines herrschaftlichen Subjekts zugestellt. Die Dinge (und die zu Dingen herabgesetzten Menschen) werden vernutzbar und ersetzbar. Diese Vernutzbarkeit und Ersetzbarkeit hat einen ontologischen Grund, denn im Verborgenen herrscht eine Leere, die Leere des Seins, auf die Technik im Zuge einer „Organisation des Mangels“ durch eine Fülle des Seienden reagiert (Heidegger 2000, 94; siehe auch: Escudero 2024; Seubold 1986). Die Alternative im ontologischen Sinne, so Heidegger, bietet die Kunst. In einer Umdeutung des Terminus „Ding“, der beim früheren Heidegger seinen Platz im Zusammenhang der Begriffe Vorhandenheit und Anwesenheit hatte, geht Heidegger im *Ursprung des Kunstwerks* davon aus, dass die Dingheit durch die Eigenwüchsigkeit und das Ausbleiben des Nützlichkeitsbezugs charakterisiert wird. Das Ding bzw. seine Dingheit, die durch das Kunstwerk zum Vorschein gebracht wird, steht für den Unterschied zu der Seinsweise des Zeugs bzw. technischen Herstellens. Das Kunstwerk bzw. das Werk lässt im Unterschied zum Zeug seine Materie und das Geschaffensein hervortreten. Das Werk zeigt das Wesen der Dinge bzw. das *Wie* des jeweiligen Dinges, und kann demzufolge auch das Sein des Zeugs zum Vorschein bringen. An Werken werden die Seinsweisen ersichtlich (Heidegger 2003, 1–74).

Die phänomenologische Zugangsweise zum technischen Handeln finden wir auch bei Don Ihde. Anders als Heidegger ist er nicht am ontologischen Charakter der menschlichen Interaktion mit technischen Systemen interessiert, geht aber auch von der Technizität als einem Momentum der Lebenswelt und der Existenz aus. Dabei unterscheidet er drei Arten der Interaktion Mensch–Technik: *embodied relations*, *hermeneutic relations* und *alterity relations*. *Embodied relations* betreffen die Relationen, in denen die menschlichen Körper und die technischen Artefakte in gewisser Weise eine Symbiose eingehen. Auch wenn die Grenze zwischen diesen Entitäten doch stets erhalten bleibt, begegnen uns oft die Phänomene, bei denen sich diese technischen Artefakte durchaus etwa in den Rhythmus der körperlichen Bewegungen (z. B. das Umgehen mit dem Tennisschläger) einfügen oder von uns als Teil unseres Körpers wahrgenommen werden (z. B. die Brille). Dabei haben die technischen Artefakte eine transformative Funktion und gehen somit über ihre instrumentelle Funktion hinaus (Ihde 1990, 75). *Hermeneutic relations* betreffen die symbolische Charakteristik der Beziehung zum technischen Artefakt. Diese sind nicht Teil eines in Bezug auf die Welt transformativen symbiotischen Verhältnisses mit dem menschlichen Körper, sondern geben Auskunft über die Welt. So etwa transformiert ein Thermometer die Welt nicht in dem zuvor genannten Sinn, wir erleben die Welt (etwa die Kälte oder Wärme) nicht durch den Thermometer, sondern an ihm werden die Zustände der äußeren Welt abgelesen. Bei der *alterity relations* geht es um das Verhältnis Mensch–Technik als Verhältnis zweier selbstständiger Entitäten. Hier wird den technischen Artefakten eine Alterität zugeschrieben und anerkannt, in etwa der Weise, wie wir das im Hinblick auf die Natur tun.

Sowohl bezüglich Heidegger als auch Ihde lassen sich die phänomenologischen Funde auf die Weisen ihrer Erfahbarkeit befragen. Denn die Erfahrung lebensweltlicher Bezüge ist eine wie auch immer rudimentär sinnhaft artikulierte und als solche verstehbar. In gewisser Weise stehen wir hier vor der Konsequenz, die auch der frühe Heidegger gezogen hat, als er sich bei der Herausbildung der existential- und fundamentalontologischen Fragestellung auf eine phänomenologisch-hermeneutische Zugangsweise festlegte. Allerdings wird bei Heidegger der Charakter der Hermeneutik als einer Kunstlehre des Verstehens (der Lebensbezüge) im Rahmen seiner existentialontologisch modifizierten transzendentalphilosophischen Fragestellung der Einbeziehung des Verstehens in die Begründungsfragen weichen müssen, wobei das Verstehen zu einem Existential avancierte und sich dementsprechend eine primär verstehend-entwerfende Auffassung der Temporalisierung des In-der-Welt-seins herausbildete. Der daraus hervorgegangene Primat der Zeitekstase Zukunft radikalisierte die Vorstellung von der geschichtlichen Situation als solcher und damit auch die Frage des verstehenden und interpretativen Umgangs mit der Geschichtlichkeit der lebensweltlichen Bezüge selbst. Die Hermeneutik der Zukunft in diesem Sinne bezieht sich auf die Klärung der Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Verstehbarkeit der Welt.

Auf den Spuren solcher Überlegungen befindet sich auch die Auffassung Hans Blumenbergs von der Lesbarkeit der Technik als Lebensform, wobei er den Begründungsansatz um metaphorologische Reflexionen organisiert. Die Metapher der Lesbarkeit verwendet Blumenberg, um die Möglichkeit des Verstehens der impliziten Sinngehalte des technischen Handelns zu bezeichnen. Bei der „Lesbarkeit der Welt“, so Blumenberg, geht es um den interpretativen Zugang zu der Erfahrung der Weltvermittlung. Demnach gehört auch das technische Handeln bzw. die technischen Gebilde zu den Sinnstiftungen, die es hermeneutisch zu entschlüsseln gilt. Blumenberg betont die ursprüngliche Zusammengehörigkeit der Technik und der Lebenswelt, indem er nachzuweisen versucht, dass es schon auf den elementarsten Ebenen des Bewusstseins Formalisierungsleistungen gibt. Diese sind ein integrativer Bestandteil der Lebenswelt, so dass es sich sagen lässt, dass es keine unformalisierte und nichttechnische Lebenswelt gibt (Blumenberg 2009).

Laut Wolf versucht Blumenberg im Unterschied zu Husserl und Heidegger aber von einem „offenen Ende" des Verstehens auszugehen, um zu einer „methodisch-operationalen Auslegung der Technik" und einer „sinnstiftenden Dimension" zu gelangen (Wolf 2006, 314). Wolf zufolge unterliegt Husserls Technikauffassung einem „sinngenetischen ‚Reduktionismus'" auf den urstiftenden Akt, während es sich bei Heidegger um „seinsgeschichtlichen ‚Romantizismus'" handelt, bei dem ein neuer alternativer Anfang gesucht wird. Der hermeneutische Ansatz spiegelt sich in der Auffassung, dass das technische Handeln nicht ein indifferenter Instrumentalismus, den es dann in normativer Hinsicht zu regulieren und begrenzen gilt, sondern es geht darüber hinaus um „*intentionale* und *integrative* Weltverhältnisse", die es zu verstehen gilt: „Aufgabe einer Hermeneutik der Technik ist daher die Vervielfältigung der Interpretationen und eine Verschmelzung ihrer Implikationen zu einem Gesamtgefüge technologischer Leistungs- und Lebensformen als dem offenen Horizont des Wissens und Handelns." (Wolf 2006, 314 f.)

Narrative Hermeneutik der Technik

Bruno Gransche bestimmt die narrative Hermeneutik als:

> […] die Selbstauslegung des Daseins als poietisch-mimetische Auslegung eines in Geschichten verstrickten Wesens. Diese Hermeneutik ist universal in dem Sinne, dass sie Menschen, Leben, Geschichten, Handlungen, Ereignisse, Veränderungen aller Art interpretiert, darstellt und zu verstehen sucht, unabhängig von den Medien, in denen diese sich zu verstehen geben; seien es Texte, mündliche Erzählungen, Szenen, Symbole, Filme, Tänze oder Ähnliches. (Gransche 2013, 238.)

Gransche geht von einer grundlegenden Konvergenz der Narrativität und des Verstehens. Denn nur das Erzählbare ist, so Gransche, in der Tat verstehbar. Eine Idee der „narrativen Hermeneutik der Zukunft" ergibt sich laut Gransche im Hinblick auf die nicht zuletzt durch die neuen Technologien generierte Ungewissheit und Komplexitätsüberforderung.

Da Gransche von einem „Zukunftsprimat der narrativen Hermeneutik ausgeht" (Gransche 2013, 240), bietet sich an dieser Stelle die existentialontologische hermeneutische Auffassung Martin Heideggers, die selbst von einem konstitutiven Primat der Zeitekstase Zukunft ausgeht, um die Möglichkeiten einer solchen narrativistischen Hermeneutik genauer zu bestimmen. Heidegger geht eigentlich von der Gleichursprünglichkeit der Zeitekstasen Zukunft, Gegenwart und Vergangenheit aus, räumt aber der Zukunftsekstase im Rahmen der ekstatischen Einheit die Vorrangstellung ein. Heidegger zufolge kann jede Ekstase eine konstitutive Rolle einnehmen, aber die eigentliche, im existentialontologischen Sinne authentische Existenz konstituiert sich nur aus der Zukunft: „*Das primäre Phänomen der ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit ist die Zukunft.*" (Heidegger 1993, 329.) Da das Dasein, dessen Sein als das Sein zum Ende bestimmt wurde, nicht einfach bis zu seinem eigenen Ende existiert, bis sich dieses Ende letztendlich verwirklicht, sondern ursprünglich *als endlich* existiert, ist die authentische Zukunft eine endliche. Als solche modifiziert Zukunft in authentischer Weise die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Um sich die Auffassung von der authentischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit verständlicher zu machen, sollte man sich eben die unauthentischen Varianten verdeutlichen. Bei der uneigentlichen Vergangenheit sollte man paradigmatisch an ein antiquarisches Pflegen der Tradition denken, wobei diese als das zu bewahrende nicht mehr vorhandene Seiende verstanden wird. Demzufolge konstituiert sich hier die Vergangenheit aus der Zeitekstase Gegenwart. Die unauthentischen Weisen sind eigentlich und im Sinne der sog. Anwesenheitsmetaphysik die Extensionen der Gegenwart. Die Vergangenheit ist demnach die nicht mehr präsente, während die Zukunft die noch nicht präsente Gegenwart. Bei der authentischen Konstitution geht es im Grunde um die Erhaltung des existentialen Möglichkeitscharakters des Vergangenen und des Gegenwärtigen. Die existentiale Möglichkeit drückt eigentlich die existential konstitutive Unverfügbarkeit der Zukunft aus. Denn im Unterschied zu dem Zukunftsverhältnis der Seinsweisen Vorhandenheit und Zuhandenheit handelt es sich bei der Zukunft nicht primär um eine noch nicht realisierte Möglichkeit, um einen noch nicht vervollständigten gegenständlichen oder teleologischen Zusammenhang. Im existentialen Sinne bedeutet Möglichkeit, das Ausstehende, nicht einen Mangel am Sein, sondern sie konstituiert die Seinsweise Existenz selbst. Das existentielle Verhalten zu der ständigen unverfügbaren Möglichkeit der Aufhebung der eigenen Existenz konstituiert das existentielle Verhalten zu den Möglichkeiten der Existenz. So wie die Möglichkeit des Todes noch vor dem Ableben die Existenz konstituiert, so modifiziert auch jede ergriffene Möglichkeit die Existenz als ein Ganzes. Eine ergriffene Möglichkeit ist zugleich das Uminterpretieren dessen, was man mal war und das Erzeugen der gegenwärtigen Situation, in der man sich befindet. Die Existenz zeitigt sich aus der Zukunft, indem sie sich als ein ständiges, d. h. immer schon gewesenes Seinkönnen in die gegenwärtige Situation des Handelns bringt. So kann Heidegger behaupten, dass es an dem Existieren des Daseins nichts Wirkliches, sondern nur Mögliches gibt. Eine Erzählung lässt sich auch als ein ganzheitliches Sein zum Ende verstehen. Eine wesentliche Verbindung der Existenz und der Narrativität ergibt sich nun daraus, dass die Erzählung nicht nur irgendwann zu Ende geht, sondern ihr Ende ist stets antizipiert und bestimmt stets das Fortschreiten der Erzählung. Das fortschreitende Hinzukommen der neuen Teile der Erzählung ist also keine fortschreitende Vervollständigung einer noch nicht fertigen (vorhandenen oder zuhandenen) Ganzheit, sondern der Erzählvorgang kann stets abgebrochen werden und die Erzählung wäre dennoch vollständig. Die Erzählung kann sich also zeitigen im Sinne der Zeitigung der Existentialität. Vorlaufend auf ihr eigenes Ende erschließt sie sich als ein ständiges, immer schon gewesenes Seinkönnen, wodurch man in die Gegenwart der Erzählsituation gebracht wird. Um entsprechend Heideggers Diktum von dem existentialen Primat der Möglichkeit vor der Wirklichkeit zu paraphrasieren, können wir sagen, dass es an der Erzählung nichts Wirkliches, sondern nur Mögliches gibt (Radinković 2011). Diese tiefere Verbundenheit der Existentialität und der Narrativität gilt es auch im Bereich der Technikphilosophie zu beachten, wenn eine „Hermeneutik der Zukunft“ bemüht wird. Denn der Zukunftshorizont ist nicht als eine noch nicht zustande gekommene Gegenwart, als ein indifferentes Bereich der potentiell zu vergegenständlichenden Zeitobjekten zu verstehen. Es handelt sich vielmehr um ein konstitutives Verhältnis, in dem so etwas wie geschichtliche Situation entsteht. Armin Grunwald betont zurecht, dass es bei der sog. hermeneutischen Wende in der Technikfolgenabschätzung vor allem darum gehen muss, sich über die aktuelle Situation zu verständigen. Die Bedingungen für einen produktiven hermeneutischen Zugang werden aber nur gewährleistet, wenn die richtige Auffassung der geschichtlichen Situation gewonnen wird, d. h., wenn es zu keiner Vergegenständlichung des

Geschichtlichen kommt. Auch wenn er sich zu den wirkungsgeschichtlichen Konsequenzen der Hermeneutik Hans-Georg Gadamers kritisch verhält und in dem von ihm behaupteten Traditionsvorrang, bei dem die einzelne geschichtliche Subjektivität depotenziert wird, eine Rekonstruktion der logischen Subjektivität erkennt, betont auch Hubig, dass indem

> […] man Verstehen klar als Reflexion ausweist, ist das Ziel der Auslegung nicht primär die Deutung des einzelnen Textes, sondern die Rekonstruktion der (bedingenden) Möglichkeiten, aus denen heraus er verwirklicht wurde. Erst dadurch wird er in seiner Spezifik erkannt; die Deutung der in den Texten vorgelegten Deutung folgt also nicht der Deutschlehrerfrage, „was uns der Autor wirklich sagen wollte", sondern ist Mittel zu einem höheren Zweck. Bezogen auf eine hermeneutische TA würde dies bedeuten, dass eine „Erweiterung" darin läge, explizit zu machen, was implizit in den Texten und den Prozessen ihrer Herstellung enthalten ist. Auf diese Weise werden wir in die Lage versetzt, uns nicht nur zu den Texten selbst, sondern auch und gerade zu den Möglichkeiten, aus denen heraus sie modifiziert/verwirklicht wurden, in ein Verhältnis zu setzen. (Hubig 2018.)

In diesem Zusammenhang lassen sich noch die Einwände der sog. Posthermeneutik anfügen, innerhalb derer die transzendentalphilosophisch konstitutive Rolle der Hermeneutik verworfen und nicht zuletzt im Hinblick auf die Technik eine Hinwendung zu der materiell induzierten Geschichtlichkeit des Diskurses gefordert wird. So wird Friedrich Kittler davon ausgehen, dass die Diskursanalyse materialistische Züge annimmt, und zwar im Sinne des Paradigmas der sogenannten zweiten industriellen Revolution, die neben Energie und Arbeit auch Informationen integriert, was wiederum zur Folge hat, dass Subjekt und Bewusstsein entmachtet und der Fokus auf die Materialität der Kommunikation verlagert wird. Kittler zufolge hat jede philosophische Diskussion, die den technischen Raum der Speicherung, der Übertragung und der Berechnung nicht thematisiert, einen vorkritischen, metaphysischen oder sogar mythologischen Charakter, und die Entmystifizierung dieses Diskurses entlarvt die Hermeneutik als (Staats-)Instanz seiner Kontrolle und Mobilisierung (Kittler 2003, 30). Den hier proklamierten „Ausgang aus dem Apriori der Interpretation" (Mersch 2010, 9) vollzieht auch Hubig im Rahmen seiner philosophischen Reflexion der Medialität des Technischen, lässt aber aufgrund seiner dialektischen Auffassung dieser Medialität Raum für den verstehenden Umgang mit den technischen Diskursen bzw. den sie bedingenden Möglichkeiten.

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LITERATURES

III.

KNJIŽEVNOSTI

Original scientific paper
Izvirni znanstveni članek

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Lamentation and Poetic Imagination of Psalm 22

A Dialogue with Ricoeur on Secularization and Eschatological Hope

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Abstract

Psalm 22, profoundly marked by lamentation and the transition to hope, offers an opportunity to explore the convergence between Paul Ricoeur's biblical hermeneutics and contemporary challenges of secularization and the absence of eschatology. The contribution articulates the experience of abandonment described by the psalmist with the need for a poetic imagination capable of re-signifying existence. Ricoeur provides tools to understand the performativity of this psalm, bridging the tensions between narrative, metaphor, and the dynamic of “the power to be” inherent in biblical language.

Keywords: Paul Ricoeur, biblical hermeneutics, lamentation, hope, secularization.

Tožba in pesniška domišljija v psalmu 22. Razgovor z Ricoeurjem o sekularizaciji in eshatološkem upanju

Povzetek

Psalm 22, ki je globoko zaznamovan s tožbo in prehodom k upanju, ponuja priložnost za premislek bližine med biblično hermenevtiko Paula Ricoeurja ter sodobnimi izzivi sekularizacije in odsotnosti eshatologije. Prispevek izkustvo zapuščenosti, kakršno opisuje psalmist, razgrinja kot potrebo po poetični domišljiji, ki zmore nanovo osmisliti eksistenco. Ricoeur priskrbi orodje za razumevanje performativnosti, s katero psalm premošča napetosti med pripovedjo, metaforo in dinamiko »moči prebivanja«, kakršne so prisotne znotraj biblične govorice.

Ključne besede: Paul Ricoeur, biblična hermenevtika, tožba, upanje, sekularizacija.

1. Introduction: Psalm 22 as lamentation and eschatological narrative

Psalm 22 begins with one of the most anguished expressions of human despair: “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Psalm 22:1; NRSV.) This cry is not merely a reflection of suffering, but a narrative, transitioning from despair to trust in God. In Ricoeur’s reading, such a dynamic suggests more than emotional exposition; it is an invitation to explore poetic imagination and the performativity of the text.

In a secularized world, how can we discuss the relevance of lamentation as a narrative structure? Ricoeur argues that secularization can be seen as an opportunity to re-signify the Christian narrative, shifting it from an economy of power to an economy of gift and superabundance.

2. Narrative and metaphor: The performativity of psalm 22

Ricoeur observes that the biblical narrative transcends structuralist logic by introducing existential markers that open the narrative to transcendence. In psalm 22, the initial lamentation is an “unfinished” narrative that only finds meaning in its eschatological opening: the declaration of trust and praise in the final verses. This transition, from the initial abandonment to the proclamation of salvation, operates as a metaphor, re-signifying reality. In metaphor, as Ricoeur explains, we encounter a “calculated error” that reveals new possibilities of meaning. Thus, the lamentation in psalm 22 is not merely an expression of suffering, but a dialectical movement, bringing the psalmist closer to the eschatological hope.

The psalm’s narrative, therefore, is not self-contained. On the contrary, it establishes a “power to be”—an opening to the future promised by resurrection, as Ricoeur suggests in *Vivant jusqu’à la mort*.

In a secularized world, the psalmist’s cry—“Why have you forsaken me?”—takes on new contours. For many, the absence of God seems definitive. However, Ricoeur suggests that secularization can expand the understanding of religious texts, liberating them from authoritarian appropriations and allowing them to be re-appropriated as expressions of vulnerability and hope.

The lamentation in psalm 22 becomes, in this context, a performative practice. It articulates human suffering as a bridge to transcendence, without dissolving the tension between the human and the divine. Ricoeur challenges us to understand this performativity as an act of meaning-making, in which the reader is called to rewrite their own narrative in light of the eschatological hope.

Ricoeur argues that poetic imagination is essential for interpreting biblical texts. In psalm 22, vivid images of abandonment (disjointed bones, pierced hands and feet) and salvation (communal praise, universal proclamation) form a metaphorical tension that points to the mystery of human suffering and divine redemption.

This poetic imagination operates on three levels:

1. linguistic: the tension between the literal and metaphorical in the language of lamentation and praise;

2. existential: the rewriting of the reader's life in light of the psalm, integrating suffering and hope;

3. eschatological: the opening to a future beyond the narrative, not nullifying suffering, but integrating it into a reconciled vision of existence.

3. Lamentation as an eschatological act

Psalm 22, read through Ricoeur's hermeneutics, is more than a text of despair or relief. It is a narrative structure that teaches the reader to inhabit the space between absence and promise, between the "no longer" and the "not yet."

In a secularized world, lamentation becomes an eschatological act, pointing to a hope that transcends the limitations of the present narrative. Through poetic imagination, we are invited to re-signify the experience of suffering, finding in it not merely the absence of God, but the possibility of a new presence—a presence made real in the superabundance of gift and in the horizon of resurrection.

Ricoeur teaches us that lamentation, when lived in the tension between narrative and metaphor, between faith and critique, is not merely an expression of pain, but a path to freedom according to hope.

The Vatican's 2017 document *Veritatis gaudium* (*The Joy of Truth*; Francesco 2018) offers a rich horizon for reflecting on education, particularly within the framework of an integral anthropology. It proposes an education that goes beyond the mere transmission of technical or scientific knowledge, fostering the integral development of the human person. In this context, I propose an approach, inspired by psalm 22, which oscillates between a cry of anguish and trust in God, as a model for "restless education." This approach combines lamentation and hope, acknowledging the shadows and tensions of the world, while steadfastly pursuing meaning and transcendence.

Psalm 22 begins with a heart-wrenching cry: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" It is a lament that does not shy away from pain or the sense of abandonment. Yet, as the psalm progresses, a renewed trust in God emerges, culminating in praise full of hope. This movement between lamentation and hope is profoundly pedagogical: it teaches that pain and crisis are not interruptions of the educational journey, but constitutive moments of deeper learning.

In the educational realm, lamentation can be understood as the capacity to question and confront the ethical and cultural challenges of our time with honesty and courage. This includes recognizing institutional failures, inequalities, and the limitations of the dominant technocratic model. On the other hand, hope serves as the driving force that enables education to transcend these difficulties, seeking a renewal of humanism that integrates spirituality, ethics, and science.

The document *Veritatis gaudium* points in this direction by emphasizing the need for "dialogue between faith and reason," avoiding both fideism and scientism. Restless education, while lamenting the wounds of the world, cultivates a hope grounded in the conviction that learning and human growth have a transcendent purpose.

Paul Ricoeur's biography, written by François Dosse (*Paul Ricoeur. Les sens d'une vie*; 1997), provides a concrete testimony of how a life marked by restlessness and intellectual exile can become a paradigm of restless education. Ricoeur faced the challenges of secularization and "laïcité" in both France and the United States. In France, he experienced the clash between the Christian tradition and modern rationality. In the United States, particularly in Chicago, he found a more pluralistic and tolerant environment that allowed him to engage with diverse intellectual currents, without abandoning his Christian identity.

This experience of navigating between different cultural and academic contexts shaped his educational perspective. For Ricoeur, intellectual formation should not be a place of absolute certainties, but a space of "restless trust," as he himself described it. It is a form of learning that acknowledges human fragility, while opening itself to the possibility of reconciliation and hope. In his work, this reconciliation is manifested in the constant dialogue between narratives, traditions, and worlds of meaning.

Drawing inspiration from psalm 22, the document *Veritatis gaudium*, and Ricoeur's journey, we can envision an education that embraces the tension between lamentation and hope as its central dynamic. This proposal requires the following:

1. The acknowledgment of pain and failure: Restless education must confront the difficult questions of our time—the impact of technology, ecological crises, and social inequalities, etc. Recognizing these issues without offering easy answers mirrors the initial cry of psalm 22.

2. A dialogue with tradition and innovation: Just as Ricoeur integrated both Christian traditions and the challenges of modernity into his reflection, education must promote dialogue that does not discard the past, but also does not fear the new.

3. Active hope: While lamentation is vital, it cannot turn into resignation. Restless education should cultivate in students the capacity to imagine a better world, and work actively to bring it about.

4. The integration of the spiritual dimension: As emphasized by *Veritatis gaudium*, humanistic education must integrate the spiritual dimension, understood as the search for meaning and transcendence.

Restless education lives in the tension between lamentation and hope. Inspired by psalm 22, it acknowledges the pain and suffering of the world, without succumbing to despair. As Paul Ricoeur's life testifies, restlessness is fertile ground for learning and growth. The document *Veritatis gaudium* challenges us to renew our educational vision, embracing the complexity of the human condition and promoting an integral anthropology that unites faith and reason. In this model, education is not merely the transmission of knowledge, but a restless pilgrimage towards truth.

4. Forgiveness as a surplus: Towards a new logic of hope

The lamentation in psalm 22, culminating in the eschatological hope, resonates profoundly with Ricoeur's notion of forgiveness as surplus. This "poetics of will" transcends the boundaries of reciprocity and the equivalence of moral debt, proposing a new economy rooted in gift and grace. Ricoeur invites us to see forgiveness not merely as an act of moral correction, but as a transformative rupture with the past—a liberation akin to the psalmist's transition from abandonment to praise.

Ricoeur's interpretation of forgiveness emphasizes its metaphorical and imaginative dimensions, paralleling the poetic structure of psalm 22. The vivid imagery of despair and redemption in the psalm embodies what Ricoeur calls "the logic of surplus," disrupting the cycle of retributive justice and opening a horizon of reconciliation and renewal. Just as the psalmist's lament re-signifies suffering into a proclamation of universal salvation, forgiveness reframes human relationships through an economy of generosity.

This logic finds its theological grounding in the Pauline affirmation:
"where sin increased, grace abounded all the more" (Rom 5:20; NRSV). For Ricoeur, forgiveness, like grace, is not bound by the constraints of equivalence, but operates through an excess that transforms. The narrative arc of psalm 22, moving from the depths of human vulnerability to the heights of divine promise, mirrors this dynamic. It is in this surplus of meaning—beyond lamentation, beyond justice—that the psalmist and the forgiver alike find their freedom.

Ricoeur's reflections further illuminate the pedagogical implications of psalm 22. The performative nature of forgiveness, much like the lamentation of the psalm, challenges the reader to engage with their own narrative of suffering and reconciliation. It is an invitation to inhabit the tension between justice and grace, between memory and renewal. In this way, forgiveness becomes an eschatological act, aligning with the psalm's ultimate declaration of trust in God.

Psalm 22, with its interplay of despair and trust, offers a poignant entry point for a dialogue between biblical hermeneutics and secular experiences of alienation and hope. Paul Ricoeur's insights into narrative and metaphor create a framework to approach the psalm not only as a sacred text, but also as a human one. Its lamentation resonates with universal themes of abandonment, loss, and the search for meaning, making it accessible to secular readers who might otherwise resist theological interpretations.

Ricoeur's concept of "second naiveté" invites a rereading of the psalm that transcends literal or dogmatic interpretations. For the secular reader, the psalm's language of forsakenness and redemption can be reframed as a metaphorical narrative reflecting the human condition. The vivid imagery—"I am poured out like water" (Psalm 22:14; NRSV), "they bound my hands and feet" (Psalm 22:16; NRSV)—functions as a mirror for existential experiences of fragmentation and vulnerability. In this light, the psalm's transition from lament to hope is not merely a theological affirmation, but a poetic re-signification of existence.

The secular reader is thus invited into a performative engagement with the text, where the act of reading becomes a form of existential reflection. By entering into the psalmist's narrative, they encounter their own fears, longings, and possibilities for renewal. Ricoeur's hermeneutics, emphasizing the capacity of metaphor to disclose new worlds of meaning, transforms the psalm into a site of dialogue between sacred tradition and secular imagination.

In conclusion, the dialogue between psalm 22 and Ricoeur's philosophy of forgiveness enriches our understanding of lamentation and hope. Both lamentation and forgiveness are transformative acts that refuse to be constrained by the logic of retribution, pointing instead to a future shaped by the generosity of the gift and the possibility of new beginnings. Through the poetic imagination, we are called to dwell in the space where lamentation and forgiveness meet, discovering in both the surplus of meaning that redefines our existence in light of the eschatological hope.

5. The eschatological horizon: Beyond the divide between the secular and the sacred

Ricoeur's philosophical theology suggests that eschatology is not confined to dogmatic formulations of "the end times," but is a horizon of meaning that informs human existence. Psalm 22, with its movement from abandonment to trust, exemplifies this eschatological orientation. The psalm does not deny the reality of suffering, but situates it within a larger narrative of redemption.

For Ricoeur, this eschatological dimension is not merely a future projection, but an existential posture. The "not yet" of the eschatological hope permeates the present, challenging both secular and religious readers to reimagine their lives in light of promise. Psalm 22 articulates this tension: the psalmist's lamentation is deeply rooted in the present moment of despair, yet it reaches towards a future of communal praise and universal salvation.

In a secular age, this eschatological horizon is reframed as the human capacity to transcend the given. Ricoeur's reflections on hope and imagination suggest that the psalm's vision of salvation can inspire a secular ethics of solidarity and renewal. The poetic imagination enables readers to move beyond the dichotomy of the secular and the sacred, discovering in the psalm's narrative a shared language for grappling with suffering and envisioning hope.

Psalm 22's lamentation, viewed through Ricoeur's hermeneutics, is not a passive expression of despair, but an active engagement with the limits of human existence. By voicing abandonment, the psalmist exercises a form of freedom that disrupts silence and oppression. Ricoeur identifies this performative act as a reclaiming of agency within the constraints of suffering.

This dynamic is particularly relevant in contemporary contexts of systemic injustice and personal loss. The psalm's lamentation invites readers to name their suffering and, in doing so, to resist its dehumanizing effects. Yet, the psalm does not remain in lamentation; it transitions to a proclamation of hope, modeling a praxis of freedom that embraces both critique and renewal.

In this sense, lamentation becomes a precursor to the eschatological hope. Ricoeur's insights into the logic of superabundance underscore the transformative potential of this transition. Just as the psalmist's cry is answered by a vision of communal praise, human suffering is re-signified through acts of imagination and reconciliation. The psalm challenges readers to live in the tension between the "already" of human agency and the "not yet" of divine promise, embodying a freedom grounded in hope.

The interplay of lamentation and hope in psalm 22 provides a foundation for an ethics of vulnerability informed by Ricoeur's hermeneutics. Vulnerability, as expressed in the psalmist's cry, is not a condition to be overcome, but a space of encounter and transformation. Ricoeur's emphasis on the relational dimension of human existence suggests that vulnerability is integral to the experience of hope.

Psalm 22's movement towards communal praise highlights the social dimension of this ethics. The psalmist's trust in God culminates in a vision of universal worship, where individual suffering is integrated into a collective narrative of redemption. This communal aspect resonates with Ricoeur's call for an ethics of mutual recognition and solidarity.

In a secularized world, this ethics finds expression in practices of empathy and care. The psalm's narrative invites readers to engage with the suffering of others, recognizing their shared humanity and the possibility of shared hope. Through poetic imagination, the lamentation of psalm 22 becomes a catalyst for ethical action, transforming vulnerability into a source of strength and connection.

Conclusion

Psalm 22, as a poetic and performative text, bridges the tensions between secularization and eschatology, vulnerability and hope, lamentation and freedom. Ricoeur's hermeneutics illuminate its capacity to re-signify suffering and inspire new possibilities for meaning and action. In a world marked by disconnection and despair, the psalm's narrative arc challenges readers to inhabit the space of tension, discovering in lamentation the seeds of the eschatological hope. Through poetic imagination, both secular and sacred readers are invited to dwell in this transformative space, where human vulnerability is met with the promise of renewal.

Psalm 22, as interpreted through Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics, stands as a profound testament to the interplay of lamentation and hope. Its raw expressions of abandonment resonate deeply with the human condition, yet its transition towards trust and praise reveals a transformative power that redefines suffering within a broader eschatological horizon. Ricoeur's emphasis on narrative, metaphor, and the performative nature of lamentation enriches our understanding of the psalm as a dynamic text that not only reflects despair, but actively re-signifies it, creating new possibilities for meaning and existence.

In this way, psalm 22 invites readers to inhabit the tension between absence and promise, between the present brokenness of the world and the future vision of reconciliation.

In both sacred and secular contexts, psalm 22 challenges us to reimagine our engagement with suffering and hope. Through the lens of poetic imagination, it serves as a bridge between individual vulnerability and communal renewal, offering a framework for both personal and collective transformation. Ricoeur's hermeneutics illuminate the psalm's relevance for contemporary life, particularly in a secular age, where the need for re-signification of meaning is as ever pressing. Ultimately, psalm 22 inspires an ethics of vulnerability and solidarity, where lamentation becomes not a sign of defeat, but a precursor to the freedom found in the eschatological hope, enabling individuals and communities to confront suffering with courage and reimagine the possibilities of a reconciled future.

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Journey as a Philosophical Topos in Early Romantic Literary Narratives

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Jenaers

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Abstract

The motif of the journey is one of the most widespread and enduring themes in Western literature. It is also a universal and timeless philosophical topos that thinkers from various traditions and backgrounds have used since antiquity. This figure plays a special role in the works of the French and German Romantic pioneers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Jenaers (Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Friedrich Hölderlin) who imbue literary narratives about journey with philosophical meaning. My aim is to reveal the shared conceptual foundation of these narratives and demonstrate significant connections between various manifestations of early Romantic thought in the French and German traditions. In the sections of the article, I explore the early Romantic literary figure of journey as the narrative basis for: the philosophical concept of education, the category of cognition/self-cognition in an anthropological context, and the first attempts to develop a modern model of historiosophy.

Keywords: journey, Romanticism, literature, education, anthropology, historiosophy.

Potovanje kot filozofski topos v zgodnjeromantičnih literarnih pripovedih. Jean-Jacques Rousseau in jenska šola

Povzetek

Motiv potovanje je ena izmed najbolj razširjenih in trajnih tem znotraj zahodne književnosti. Je tudi univerzalni in brezčasni filozofski topos, ki so se ga misleci različnih tradicij in provenienc posluževali vse od antike naprej. Posebno vlogo igra v delih francoskih in nemških romantičnih pionirjev Jeana-Jacquesa Rousseauja in pripadnikov jenske šole (Novalisa, Friedricha Schlegla in Friedricha Hölderlina), ki so literarne pripovedi o potovanju prepojili s filozofskim pomenom. Namen prispevka je razgrnitev skupne konceptualne podlage teh pripovedi in prikaz pomembnih povezav med raznolikimi manifestacijami zgodnjeromantične misli znotraj francoske in nemške tradicije. V posameznih delih članka raziskujem zgodnjeromantično literarno figuro potovanja kot narativno osnovo za: filozofski pojem izobraževanja, kategorijo spoznanja/samospoznanja v antropološkem kontekstu in prve poskuse razdelave modernega modela historiozofije.

Ključne besede: potovanje, romantika, književnost, izobraževanje, antropologija, historiozofija.

Introduction

The idea of journey occupies a special position in the history of Western civilization. This word does not mean only one of the most prevalent activities in our daily lives and a primary means of experiencing the world, but also a metaphorical construct imbued with a multitude of symbolic nuances. In light of this, it is unsurprising that journey is regarded as a fundamental and inextricable form of the imaginative life of men in its various forms (Roppen and Sommer 1964, 108).

The present article explores the concept of journey in two main areas: literary works and philosophical reflection. Since ancient times, this figure has invariably accompanied Western literature as "a metaphor for narrative, duration, extension, and purpose" (Roppen and Sommer 1964, 14–15), while it at the same time also "appears on the pages of philosophical works often enough to be considered as a universal philosophical topos" (Wieczorkiewicz 2008, 104). The multidimensionality of the journey topos enables the author to traverse seamlessly between narrative and storytelling, and the realm of concepts and thought, which was a common practice in the works of early Romantics, including the French thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the representatives of the Jena Romanticism: Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), Friedrich Schlegel, and Friedrich Hölderlin. These authors all considered expressing philosophical ideas in literary form to be a defining feature of their work. In this sense, the figure of travel can be regarded as a significant and emblematic symbol of Romanticism as a phenomenon situated at the intersection of philosophy and literature. This seems particularly relevant for the study of the various Romantic traditions, mainly because of their enormous diversity, which has led some scholars to conclude that "the 'Romanticism' of one country may have little in common with that of another," and that "any study of the subject should begin with a recognition of a *prima facie* plurality of Romanticisms, of possibly quite distinct thought-complexes" (Lovejoy 1924, 235–236).

An analysis of the various meanings of journey in the works of the early Romantics, representing different national traditions, allows for the observation of numerous similarities in its seemingly disparate manifestations. This study will focus on these commonalities, offering insights into the convergences that characterize the Romantic travel narrative.

The primary subject of this analysis is the figure of journey as a philosophical topos in early Romantic literary narratives, including the works of Rousseau, such as *Julie, or The New Heloise* (1761), *Emile, or On Education* (1762), *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* (1782), as well as selected novels by the Jenaers: *Hyperion* (1799), *Lucinde* (1799), *The Novices of Sais* (1798), *Henry von Ofterdingen* (1802). The objective of my study is to examine how the authors of these texts use the literary motif of journey to present, explain, or reinterpret specific philosophical ideas that shape the conceptual landscape of Western culture at the dawn of modernity. The philosophical meanings of the early Romantic concept of travel identified in these works are of interest due to their surprising convergence in seemingly distant narratives, including, for example, the stories of the obedient Emile and the ironic Julius, or the sentimental teacher Saint-Preux and Hyperion as the leader of the Greek independence uprising. It is my intention to reveal the common conceptual horizon of these narratives, which demonstrate significant connections between various expressions of early Romantic thought in French and German traditions. In order to realize the above ideas, in the following sections of this article, I explore the early Romantic literary figure of journey as the narrative basis for: the philosophical concept of education, the category of cognition/self-cognition in an anthropological context, and the first attempts to develop a modern model of historiosophy.

Early Romantics and the concept of educational journey

During the Age of Enlightenment, it became widely accepted that travel was an essential aspect of human education, originating directly from the ancient sources of our culture: "If travelling was in such high esteem among the ancients, no wonder that the moderns should be fond of imitating their example, and that this excellent custom should so generally obtain in this learned age." (Nugent 2005, 16.) The concepts of travel and education are becoming increasingly intertwined over time. In Chevalier de Jaucourt's article published in the *Encyclopédie (1756)*, the term *voyage* is defined in relation to three main contexts, one of which is education as the transfer of knowledge and skills (Van

Den Abbeele 1992, XV–XVI). At the same time, the Enlightenment educational process became increasingly difficult to imagine without traveling: "The last part usually in education is travel, which is commonly thought to finish the work and complete the gentleman." (Locke 1996, 158.) As Georges Van Den Abbeele observes, the basis for this correlation between the categories of travel and education is Locke's epistemology of sensory perception and the related pedagogical concept of personality formation through direct interaction with the external world. In his view, it is expressed both in the practice of the Grand Tour and in certain aspects of the development of the modern novel, including the *Bildungsroman* genre and autobiographical writing (1992, 85).

The term "Grand Tour" was first employed by Richard Lassels in his guidebook, *An Italian Voyage* (1670), which included a description of routes and destinations recommended to young gentlemen embarking on their final stage of education (Lassels 1697, 18). The young man began the two-year Grand Tour between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one, usually under the guidance of a tutor (Locke 1996, 158–159). His destination was initially mainly Italy (Rome, Venice, Florence), but in time also France (Paris, Lyon, Versailles) and German cultural centers or health resorts (Berlin, Dresden, Baden-Baden, Karlsbad). In the eighteenth century, there is also a growing conviction that "to study human nature to purpose, a traveler must enlarge his circuit beyond the bounds of Europe," visiting North America, China and Japan, Africa and Arab countries (Hurd 2005, 18). Of the analyzed examples of early Romantic prose, the journey of Emil from Rousseau's novel is the most analogous to the conventional Grand Tour. The young man begins it at the age of twenty, as the final stage of his education, and over the course of two years, he visits first Paris and then "a few of the great countries and many of the smaller countries of Europe" (Rousseau 2015, 414). The course of this travel is meticulously planned and controlled so that "the voyage will only have those effects intended by Emile's tutor" (Van Den Abbeele 1992, 86). We can also find some elements of the traditional Grand Tour model in other novels of the early Romantics. At the age of twenty, Henry von Ofterdingen leaves his hometown of Eisenach in Thuringia. Rather than travelling throughout Europe, he sets off to visit his grandfather Schwaning in Augsburg. As with Emil, however, this journey is undertaken for the purpose of completing his education, thereby initiating his adult life (Novalis 1964, 24–25). In comparison, Hyperion traverses both the territory of his native Greece and the traditional Grand Tour route through Italy, Germany, and France, which he ultimately decides to embark upon at the end of the novel's second volume (Hölderlin 2019, 76). In contrast, in *The New Heloise* Rousseau introduces the theme of travel to countries outside of Europe. In addition to the conventional Grand Tour itineraries to Italy or Paris, Saint-Preux embarks on a maritime journey around the globe, visiting Brazil, Mexico, Peru, China, and Africa (1997, 339–340).

In the eighteenth century, the educational value of the Grand Tour was most often equated with the extensive knowledge gained by young men about the history, geography, economy, legal system, and social customs of other nations: "The rational design of travelling is to become acquainted with the languages, customs, manners, laws and interests of foreign nations; the trade, manufactures and produce of countries; the situation and strength of towns and cities." (The Gentleman's Magazine 2005, 14). In an analogous way, Emil acquires proficiency in "two or three of the chief languages" during his travels in Europe. Additionally, he gains knowledge of the "natural history, government, arts, or men" of various countries and nations (Rousseau 2015, 414). Before Hyperion travels to Smyrna, his father gives him the following advice: "[…] learn there the arts of seamanship and war, learn the speech of polished peoples, learn about their constitutions and opinions and manners and customs, prove all things and hold fast the best" (Hölderlin 2019, 17). Less pragmatic, but equally encyclopedic in scope, is the knowledge of the world that Henry of Ofterdingen acquires during his journey. Its different aspects are embodied by successive characters: merchants telling of the mythical Atlantis, Crusaders recalling the Holy Land, a captive Arab girl named Zulima, a miner exploring the secrets of nature, and a hermit (count Friedrich von Hohenzollern) studying history. Novalis equips his hero with an encyclopedic knowledge, but he also reinterprets the traditional task of the Grand Tour in the Romantic spirit, because in his novel "warfare, the Orient, nature and history, poetry, love and death are drawn together through the movement of poetic imagination and the interplay of reality, interpolated narratives and dreams" (Phelan 2009, 48).

In addition to the acquisition of a specific type of knowledge, the aim of the Grand Tour was also to bring the young man to a stage of personal and social maturity. Lassels suggests that achieving independence from parental influence, developing freedom and responsibility, and broadening intellectual horizons are key factors in accomplishing this task (1697, 14–16). The early Romantics especially expose this aspect of the educational journey. As Rousseau observes, travel is an integral part of the formation of a mature personality, reinforcing the innate characteristics and predispositions of individuals and ultimately defining their moral character, because "when a man returns from traveling about the world, he is what he will be all his life" (2015, 398). According to Schlegel, the Grand Tour gives a young person "more freedom and inner versatility and thereby greater independence and self-sufficiency" (1971a, 204). In early Romantic novels, a female character represents the male protagonist's personal and social maturity. The journeys of Saint-Preux correspond to the successive stages of his moral development, which is expressed in the evolution of his love for Julie. His initial naïve affection, reflective of the natural beauty of the Swiss Alps, is replaced by mature devotion and respect, forged in the crucible of global travel: "I felt obliged to have a new sort of respect for her; her familiarity was almost a burden; as beautiful as she seemed to me I would have kissed the hem of her dress more willingly than her cheek." (Rousseau 1997, 348.) When Emil first meets Sophy on his journey, he is not mature enough to start a family and, as a result, he has to "leave her in order to return worthy of her" (Rousseau 2015, 392). Similarly, in German literature "inspiration through love is a key factor in Romantic protagonists' development to maturity" (Schmidt 2009, 27). Johann Wolfgang Goethe was the first to give full expression to this idea in his *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1795/96). Because of the connection between the idea of education and the category of travel, this novel has repeatedly been referred to as an "odyssey of education" (Janion and Żmigrodzka 1998, 66).[1] In

1 Meister's story begins with a merchant voyage that he interrupts to join a troupe of traveling actors. With them, he arrives at Lothario castle, where he meets members of the elite Tower Society, who gradually dissuade him from his theatrical aspirations in favor of a vocation for the conscious life at the bosom of family and society: "Goethe's hero journeys through various romantic attachments, but also through a practical and aesthetic education in theatre, towards the recognition of personal responsibility and

each of the early German Romantic novels, the figure of the female protagonist is central, but the Goethean idea that the path to maturity passes through the world of women, who "educate" man, is most overtly expressed in the plot of *Lucinde*. In the section "Apprenticeship for Manhood," Schlegel ironically travesties the title of Goethe's novel, thereby rendering his protagonist's journey already purely metaphorical. This is evidenced by the various stages of Julius's "odyssey of education" as they manifest in his many love adventures. In contrast with the protagonists of Rousseau or Goethe, Julius's journey is not oriented towards social integration. Instead, his goal is the Romantic ideal of the fullness of humanity that can only be achieved through the power of love: "[…] it is love that first makes us true and complete human beings and is the essence of life […]" (Schlegel 1971c, 110).

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the two principal tenets of the Grand Tour pedagogical tradition—the pursuit of knowledge and the holistic development of the individual—found their expression in the German term *Bildung*: "This word signifies two processes—learning and personal growth—but they are not understood apart from one another, as if education were only a means to growth." (Beiser 2003, 91.) The term *Bildung* has its roots in theology, where it denotes the process of forming a human being into an image of God (*imago Dei*), but over time it has become synonymous with upbringing (*Erziehung*) or development (*Entwicklung*) as self-education (*Selbstbildung*). In the eighteenth century, the terms *Entwicklung*, *Erziehung*, and *Bildung* acquired distinct meanings as a result of the integration of natural science terminology into humanistic discourse. Since then, the first denotes the spontaneous development of the human being as an organic whole; the second signifies the education of the individual according to preconceived pedagogical principles and norms; the third represents the process of forming the human personality without the planned influence of other people (Selbmann 1994, 1–2). In contemporary discourse, the distinction between the meanings of these three terms has given rise to the concept of the literary genre *Entwicklungsroman*

social integration." (Phelan 2009, 41.) However, this would not have been possible without the different kinds of love, as the course of Wilhelm's education is influenced far more by the women who love him than by the Tower Society (Janion and Żmigrodzka 1998, 111).

(novel of development) and its two variants: *Erziehungsroman* (novel of education) and *Bildungsroman* (coming-of-age novel). An example of the first type is Rousseau's *Emile*, whereas the second is represented by Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, to which the Jenaers' novels are related (Engel 2008, 265).[2] It should also be noted that the defining characteristics of the *Bildungsroman* genre can be found not only in the works of Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel, but also in Rousseau's *The New Heloise*. This latter text narrates the story of an individual's moral development in the face of unforeseen circumstances and a variety of social interactions, in contrast to Emil's education, which is determined by meticulously planned curriculum. One of the basic common features of works within the *Bildungsroman* genre is precisely the motif of journey, which serves as an excellent metaphor for the educational process,[3] wherein the acquisition of knowledge is interwoven with various aspects of individual growth and development. At the same time, just as the concept of *Bildung* cannot be simply reduced to the phenomenon of education in its most common sense, so, too, the metaphor of travel in early Romantic literature cannot be reduced to a mere element of the plot of a coming-of-age novel.

From an educational journey to a modern philosophy of man

The educational significance of the journey does not exhaust the richness of the meanings attributed to it by the early Romantics, because they do not

2 It is important to note that neither Goethe nor the Jenaers used the word *Bildungsroman* to describe their novels. This term was first used by Karl von Morgenstern in 1810 and later popularized by Wilhelm Dilthey. Both scholars identified the first example of this genre in Christoph Martin Wieland's *Geschichte des Agathon* (1766/67), and agreed that *Wilhelm Meister* was the exemplar for this genre (Engel 2008, 263). *Wilhelm Meister* "has been imitated in a whole series of 'Bildungsromane' and made this the German species of the novel" (Bruford 2009, 29), but it also "played a very serious role in the formation and dissemination of the specifically German 'educational idea,' or notion of *Bildung*" (Janion and Żmigrodzka, 51).

3 The enduring connection between the category of travel and the concept of *Bildung* is also evidenced by the presence in modern German of the terms *Bildungsreise*, *Ausbildungsreise*, or *Fortbildungsreise*, which refer to different types of educational journey (Żołądź 1994, 8).

limit the idea of education to the sphere of pedagogical influence, but also see it as an important anthropological category. Using the metaphor of the journey, early Romantic literature tries to establish its philosophy of man either through cognition or self-cognition. We can analyze the first of these paths with the example of Rousseau's novels. In *Emile*, the French author assumes that an educational journey has a philosophical function when its goal is the knowledge of different nations:

> To travel to see foreign lands or to see foreign nations are two very different things. The former is the usual aim of the curious, the latter is merely subordinate to it. If you wish to travel as a philosopher you should reverse this order. (2015, 398.)

Saint-Preux, returning from a journey around the world, shares with Clara his knowledge of exotic nations enslaved by the yoke of European colonialism, but at the same time he also writes about the English nation: "Finally I have seen in my travelling companions an intrepid and proud people whose example and freedom restores in my eyes the honor of my species [...]" (Rousseau 1997, 340). As Rousseau argues in *Emile*, cognition of other nations means "full knowledge of questions of government, public morality, and political philosophy of every kind" (2015, 401). Thus, during the journey, the protagonist is not interested in the history or art of different countries, since "Emile is not an archeologist. His attention is directed especially to questions of government, to customs and laws. He will study politics and comparative legislation on the spot." (Compayré 1971, 78.) A comparative analysis of the political and legal systems of different countries leads to an understanding of the human species as a whole, providing the basis for Rousseau's anthropology: "He who has compared a dozen nations knows men, just as he who has compared a dozen Frenchmen knows the French." (Rousseau 2015, 395.) Emil's Grand Tour is therefore not limited to education as a process of acquiring knowledge or skills, but in Rousseau's novel, "the pedagogical function of travel has to do, it would seem, with overcoming ethnocentrism, and with the corresponding establishment of a general anthropology" (Van Den Abbeele 1992, 89). This turn from education to the philosophy of man explains why, in *Emile*, the account of the Grand Tour is limited to the most basic information and is followed by reflections on the importance of the institution of travel and detailed considerations of political philosophy, which take the form of regular lessons the educator gives the young man, "as if Emile were not on a journey but in a lecture on constitutional law" (Oelkers 2008, 127). Consequently, the literal meaning of the hero's journey becomes secondary, and the metaphorical sense comes to the forefront. For Rousseau, it is not so much a journey through time and space, but rather the intellectual journey, during which he seeks an answer to the most fundamental questions about human nature by studying the various manifestations and forms of social life, and the political and legal systems.

The establishment of an early Romantic anthropology also constitutes a significant objective in the novels of German authors. Nevertheless, in contrast to Emil, the protagonists of these literary narratives choose the path of self-discovery, perceiving it as the optimal strategy for comprehending human nature:

> We dream of journeys through the cosmos: isn't the cosmos then in ourselves? The depths of our spirits we know not.—Toward the Interior goes the arcane way. In us, or nowhere, is the Eternal with its worlds, the past and future. The outer world is a shadow world, which casts its' shadow into the realm of light. (Novalis 1989, 26.)

The journey of self-discovery should lead to reaching a specific point on the map of human consciousness. According to Schlegel, "true human being is one who has penetrated to the center of humanity" (1971b, 249), whereby this applies not only to the individual, but also to the human species as a whole: "[…] mankind struggles with all its power to find its own center" (1968, 83). In Schlegel's novel, each of Julius's love experiences brings him closer to this objective and the culmination of this journey is his relationship with Lucinde who embodies the moment of self-knowledge: "A light entered his soul: he saw and surveyed all the parts of his life and the structure of the whole clearly and truly because he stood at its center." (1971c, 102.) The moment of supreme self-awareness, which provides Julius with access to the center of his humanity, is tantamount to achieving the unity of the dispersed elements of the personality, which is the objective of the educational process understood in the Romantic way. The story of Julius's love adventures allows us to see in him:

> […] a hero whose journey is an education in experience through stages of awareness which culminate on the level of intellectual maturity—a stage of integrity, power, and freedom in which the protagonist finally learns who he is, what he was born for, and the implicit purpose of all that he has endured on the way. (Abrams 1971, 193–94.)

The deepest meaning of Hyperion's wanderings—first with his mentor and teacher Adamas, and then with his friend and companion Alabanda and his beloved Diotima—can be understood in a similar way. The figure of Diotima, like Schlegel's Lucinde, represents the moment of supreme unity that the protagonist experiences when reaching the center of his humanity in the process of self-discovery: "For some time now, under Diotima's influence, more stability had come into my soul; […] I felt it with threefold purity, and the scattered swarming energies were all gathered in one single golden mean." (Hölderlin 2019, 66.) According to Meyer Abrams, Hölderlin's literary narrative of his protagonist's journey represents "the course of life as an approximation to its center in the primordial unity of being" (1971, 238), since "from childhood to manhood Hyperion passes through stages of experience in which he periodically appears to approach a lost harmony with himself and with the outside world" (1971, 239). As a result of the interactions with the various characters he encounters, Hyperion's educational journey evolves into a process of self-discovery, as „his spiritual growth consists not in the steady enlargement of personality, but rather in the deepening of consciousness through a recurrent experience" (Salzberger 1952, 26). In German Romantic anthropology, self-cognition, understood as an inner movement that stimulates the individual's development towards personality integration, does not end, when unity is achieved. In other words, there is no single center of humanity where an individual, upon reaching it, remains permanently in a state of harmony with the world and with himself. That is why, in Hölderlin's novel, Adamas leaves Hyperion, his friendship with Alabanda ends, and Diotima dies, obliging the protagonist to continue the effort of self-discovery, which means that "the equilibrium proves unstable and immediately splits into opposites, which in turn strive for a new integration" (Abrams 1971, 239). Likewise, Schlegel's novel does not end, when Julius first stands at the center of his humanity (that is, when he meets Lucinde), but the story continues "by opening the journey of self-discovery to a sense that identity is available only in a fragmented or fragmentary way" (Phelan 2009, 49).

In their search for the truth about man and his world, the early Romantics also point to the different methods of cognition and self-cognition. The first is observation, which Rousseau's protagonists often use during their travels. As Saint-Preux reports from the Valais, "I have spent scarcely a week travelling through a countryside that would require years of observation […]" (Rousseau 1997, 62), while during his stay in Paris he writes to Julie: "It also seems to me that it is folly to try to study the world as a mere spectator. He who pretends simply to observe observes nothing […]" (1997, 202). Observation, which in Rousseau's philosophy comes directly from the intellectual traditions of the Enlightenment,[4] does not consist in simply looking at various objects or events. Rather, it means the rational and scientific "method of conscious and direct observation of things" (Compayré 1971, 67). Accordingly, in *Emile*, the French author provides precise guidelines for his method of observing nations:

> Before beginning our observations we must lay down rules of procedure; we must find a scale with which to compare our measurements. Our principles of political law are our scale. Our actual measurements are the civil law of each country. (Rousseau 2015, 402.)

The notions of scale and measurement allow us to consider this procedure as a typical tool of the Enlightenment philosophy, which, as Baczko notes, was based on facts gathered by the methods of experiment and observation commonly used in the natural sciences (1965, 56–57). In Rousseau's novels, travel plays an important role in cognitive processes, because it facilitates direct and systematic observation, thereby enabling the discovery and accumulation of new facts in alignment with the doctrine of sensualism. At the same time, this typical method of the Enlightenment is also often replaced by an alternative mode of cognition, which Rousseau calls meditation, reverie, or

4 In the eighteenth century, mainly due to the philosophy of Locke and Condillac, sensualism became the leading epistemological doctrine. As Bronisław Baczko points out, it "constituted the theoretical justification of the entire theoretical-cognitive concept of the Enlightenment, and at the same time was most closely connected with the ethical-social doctrine" (1965, 57).

contemplation: “It is certain that this state of contemplation constitutes one of the great charms of sensible men.” (1997, 456.) Contemplation can be directed towards the outside world, especially nature, but it also means “the habit of turning within” that Rousseau practiced in his last years and documented in *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*:

> By my own experience, I thus learned that the source of true happiness is within us and that it is not within the power of men to make anyone who can will to be happy truly miserable. For four or five years, I habitually tasted those internal delights that loving and sweet souls find in contemplation. (1992, 13.)

As a solitary walker, the French author appears to be merely wandering around Paris, but in fact he is undertaking a journey into himself, embarking on a path of inner contemplation. It becomes a method of philosophical cognition of the nature of man, because, in the case of Rousseau’s thought, “inward exploration yields knowledge of the same reality, it reveals the same absolute norms, as does exploration of the most remote past” (Starobinski 1988, 19).

The two methods of cognition postulated by Rousseau also manifest themselves in the works of the representatives of the German early Romantic tradition. However, these authors reinterpret them in the context of transcendental philosophy that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. In this context, Novalis again refers to the figure of the journey and distinguishes between “the way of experience” and “the way of intuition”:

> He who takes the first road has to figure out one thing from another by laborious calculation, while he who takes the second immediately penetrates to the essence of every event and object and is able to contemplate these essences in their vital complex interrelationship and easily compare them with everything else like numbers on a slate. (1964, 29–30.)

Novalis’s interest in the opposition between immediate and mediate cognition in this form derives from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who “still explicitly and emphatically affirmed both the possibility of thinking an intellectual intuition and its impossibility in the realm of experience” (Benjamin

1996, 121). Johann Gottlieb Fichte then presents a new formulation of this question, elucidating the reflexive nature of thinking. This is demonstrated by the essential connection between two forms of consciousness (the self):

> We have a self in a dual aspect: partly, insofar as it is reflective, and to that extent the direction of its activity is centripetal; partly, insofar as it is that upon which reflection takes place, and to that extent the direction of its activity is centrifugal out to infinity at that. (Fichte 1970, 241.)

The ways of experience and contemplation that Novalis distinguishes correspond to the dual structure of the transcendental self, which in infinite movement turns to the external object of cognition and then returns to itself. In other words, as Walter Benjamin notes, "the forms of consciousness in their transition into one another are the sole object of immediate cognition, and this transition is the sole method capable of grounding that immediacy and making it intelligible" (1996, 122–123). The figure of the journey perfectly illustrates this infinite movement of reflection from the world to itself, for the reason that "the journey belongs to the essence of thinking, since thinking in its essence is doubled between 'here' and 'there,' between the finite and the infinite […]" (Gadacz 2007). While Fichte considers the question of the two-way activity of the self in the context of the epistemology of the Science of Knowledge, the Romantics transfer it to the sphere of the philosophy of man, distinguishing two anthropological types. According to Novalis, the way of experience is travelled by those who are inclined to action and who are set on exploring the world around them: "Their soul may not indulge in introspective reverie; it must be steadily directed outward and be an industrious, swiftly-deciding servant of their mind." (1964, 93.) The second way is chosen by people who belong to another type of wanderers, "whose world is their soul, whose activity is contemplation, whose life is a gradual development of their inner powers" (ibid.). The German Romantics usually juxtapose the two anthropological types, emphasizing the contrasts between them. In *The Novices of Sais*, the typical man of action is a teacher:

> When he grew older, he roamed the earth, saw distant lands and seas, new skies, strange stars, unknown plants, beasts, men, went down

> into caverns, saw how the earth was built in shelves and multicolored layers, and pressed clay into strange rock forms. (Novalis 2005, 7.)

In contrast, the type of the contemplative man—the wanderer on the inner path—is represented by his disciple: "With me it has never been as with the teacher. Everything leads me back into myself. I well understood whose words of the second voice." (Novalis 2005, 13.) In a manner analogous to Fichte, who posits that "this necessary reflection of the self upon itself is the basis of all its going forth outside itself" (1970, 243), the German Romantics recognize the ideal of contemplative life as the most fundamental mode of human existence, which is capable of revealing the deepest mysteries of our condition:

> The mind has this peculiarity, that next to itself it loves to think most about something it can think about forever. Hence, the life of the cultivated and meditative man is a continual cultivation and meditation on the lovely riddle of his destiny. (Schlegel 1971c, 119.)

The German Romantics replace Fichte's abstract transcendental subject with the anthropology of a living individual, developing in a historically conditioned world of culture (*Bildungsgeschichte*). In this view, the fate of the individual not only merges with the biography of humanity as a whole, but also serves as a kind of prototype for it, determining the fundamental shape of early Romantic philosophy of history. As it turns out, this is another idea that the Jenaers share with Rousseau, and like him, they link it to the literary motif of journey.

A circular journey, or a return to the home of nature

In early Romantic literary narratives, historiosophical concepts usually manifest themselves in the theme of the home "as that point from which the voyage begins and to which it circles back at the end" (Van Den Abbeele 1992, XVIII). Both Rousseau and the Jenaers employ the concept of the circular journey as an allegory for the return to a state of nature, which they perceive as the original homeland of humanity. This process unfolds historically and is reflected in the attempt to reconstruct the ideal of the natural man, living in complete harmony with nature and self-unity: "The natural man lives for himself; he is the unit, the whole, dependent only on himself and on his like." (Rousseau 2015, 7.)[5] The state of nature is often presented by the Romantics as the time of "the old golden age, in which she was man's friend, consoler, priestess and enchantress, when she lived among men and divine association made men immortal" (Novalis 2005, 35). The early Romantic historiosophical tradition assumes that the history of human culture begins with the end of the golden age. The circular journey as a metaphor for human history, however, does not imply a return to its mythical beginnings. Instead, "it fuses the idea of the circular return with the idea of linear progress, to describe a distinctive figure of Romantic thought and imagination—the ascending circle, or spiral" (Abrams 1971, 184). In *The New Heloise*, the symbol of this kind of return to nature is Julie's garden, called Elysium (in reference to the mythical land of eternal happiness). It is deceptively reminiscent of a wilderness untouched by man, whereas, as Mrs. de Wolmar points out, "nature did it all, but under my direction, and there is nothing here that I have not designed" (Rousseau 1997, 388). Julie designs Elysium according to the idea of nature as it might have been experienced sensually by primitive man, but it is in fact "a nature reconstructed by rational beings who have passed from sensual existence to moral existence" (Starobinski 1988, 111) in the course of the historical development of our culture. An analogous concept of recapturing nature is presented by an old miner in *Henry von Ofterdingen*: "Nature is approaching human beings; and whereas she was formerly a wildly producing cliff, today she is a tranquil, growing plant, a silent human artist." (Novalis 1964, 88.) It is noteworthy that, in the German tradition, Rousseau's historiosophical model of the return to nature was first proposed by Friedrich Schiller who distinguished three periods in the history of culture and related them to the stages of personal development. Significantly, Schiller also uses a language that refers to the figure of the journey:

5 As Jürgen Oelkers observes, the concept of the natural man (the savage man or, in French, *homme sauvage*)—a key idea in the work of Rousseau—emerged from popular narratives of mid-century expeditions in America. This demonstrates that the "the 'noble savage' is not an invention by Rousseau but an often-used topos of contemporary literature" (2008, 46).

> This path taken by the modern poets is, moreover, that along which man in general, the individual as well as the race, must pass. Nature sets him at one with himself, art divides and cleaves him in two, through the ideal he returns to unity. (Schiller 1966, 112.)

The historiosophy of the Jenaers refers—more or less critically—to Schiller's reinterpretation of Rousseau's thought in the spirit of idealism:

> […] what was nature is the ideal. And it's by this ideal, this rejuvenated godhead, that the few shall know each other and they are one, for the oneness is in them, and from them, these few, shall begin the second age of the world. (Hölderlin 2019, 55.)

If the idea of a circular journey implies that human history reproduces the destiny of each individual, wandering along the paths of his life from the innocence of childhood to the self-consciousness of adulthood, an important source of historiosophical knowledge can be the biography of each human existence accessible through inner contemplation. One of the most characteristic features of Rousseau's work, documented in autobiographical writings from 1765 to 1778, is undoubtedly his deep reflection on his own past. In *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, the historiosophical idea of mankind's return to the house of nature is paralleled by the autobiographical narrative of the individual's return to the personal experiences of childhood and youth:

> I went back over the movements of my soul from the time of my youth, through my mature age, since having been sequestered from the society of men, and during the long seclusion in which I must finish my days. (1992, 14.)

The theme of rejection and alienation, to which Rousseau returns obsessively in his memories, plays an extremely important role in his historiosophy. Baczko notes that it reveals—at the heart of Rousseau's autobiographical reflection—the conflict between the individual and society as an element of moral self-knowledge. This relates his personality and unique history to the universal conflict between historical culture and ahistorical nature (2009, 190). Simultaneously, Rousseau perceives this journey along the trajectory of one's personal history as a means of recapturing nature. This process does not entail the examination of external historical artifacts, but rather the introspective exploration of one's own inner self:

> […] a retired and solitary life, an active taste for reverie and contemplation, the habit of looking within oneself and seeking, in the calm of the passions, those original traits that have disappeared in the multitude, could alone enable him to rediscover them. In short, a man had to portray himself to show us primitive man like this […]. (Rousseau 1990, 214.)

In a similar manner, as with the question of the conflict between nature and history, so, too, with regard to the issue of the return to nature, one encounters difficulty in separating Rousseau's historiosophical studies from his autobiographical reflections. Indeed, as Jean Starobinski aptly concludes:

> Rousseau did not have to travel back somehow to the beginning of time in order to enter the state of nature and become its historian. He had only to describe himself, to know himself intimately, to get close to his own true nature through a process that was at once active and passive: exploring his inner nature and abandoning himself to reverie. (1988, 18–19.)

Among the German authors, Schlegel makes the most interesting use of the autobiographical theme in the context of the conflict between nature and history. He transforms the story of his love affair with Dorothea Veit—the prototype of the title character *Lucinde*—into a metaphorical narrative about the reconciliation of opposites as the main metaphysical principle of the becoming of the world. Schlegel derives it from the system of the Science of Knowledge, but at the same time he seeks to relativize Fichte's thought, arguing that "there is no self-knowledge except historical self-knowledge" (1971b, 254).[6]

6 Ernst Behler posits that Schlegel's ambivalence towards Fichte's philosophy is primarily due to his rejection of the ahistoricity of the system of the Science of Knowledge: "Schlegel, in other words, raised the question of Fichte's own historicity, or the historicity of what was going on in his system, and felt that what was proclaimed here as absolute Ego or absolute thought was nothing more than Johann Gottlieb

The vision of the reconciliation of lovers in the sexual act corresponds to the return of the Fichtean self to itself, placed in the context of Julius's individual existence. This reflects on a micro scale the historiosophy of the return to the house of nature. In the section entitled "Reflection," the protagonist's erotic experiences become the backdrop for an ironic game that seeks to equate the sexual act as a symbol of the eternal reproduction of the cycle of nature with mental activity as a constant reflection on one's own existence:

> It has often struck me as strange that sensible and respectable people could repeat this petty game and repeat it again in an eternally recurring cycle, performing it with untiring energy and enormous seriousness. And really the game apparently has no function or purpose, even though it may be the oldest of all games. (Schlegel 1971c, 119.)

In this ambiguity of reflection, which paradoxically turns out to be both a physical and a mental activity, Peter Firchow sees "the function of generalizing Julius's experiences and his new awareness," as it allows the protagonist to place his own biography in the context of the history of all mankind (1971, 36). If we add that Julius's experiences are in fact a literary adaptation of Schlegel's biography, the historical nature of self-knowledge becomes fully apparent only in relation to the category of autobiography. In the light of Schlegel's conception of reflection as a sexual-mental activity, this new self-awareness, as articulated by Firchow, does not signify an order opposed to nature, but represents its highest form. Although Schlegel's view of nature differs from that of Rousseau, the idea of the return to nature shows common features in the concepts of both authors, since in *Lucinde*—as in Rousseau's autobiographical works—"[…] the discovery of nature in its parts and as a whole is necessarily also a journey of self-discovery, on which self-knowledge and the understanding of nature mutually condition and support each other" (Barkhoff 2009, 211).

As we have seen, an important place in the historiosophy of the return to nature is occupied by the idea of a new golden age, which in the novels of Rousseau and the Jenaers is closely linked to the problems of solitude and community. These two categories relate to the primary structural elements of

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Fichte in Jena, including all his personal idiosyncracies and prejudices." (1993, 190.)

the journey metaphor, namely the question of human nature and the ethical organization of social life (Roppen and Sommer 1964, 15). The ultimate goal of the journey of Rousseau's protagonists is to live in an authentic community, which the French author contrasts with modern society. The result of Emil's Grand Tour, which "defines him as a full member of society (in his accepting the rights and obligations entailed in living within that society)" (Van Den Abbeele 1992, 94), is the formation of a family unit as the foundation for the development of a larger community. The nuptials of the young couple inaugurate a golden age, which signifies a return to living in harmony with nature:

> I see the young couple in the midst of the rustic sports which they have revived, and I hear the shouts of joy and the blessings of those about them. Men say the golden age is a fable; it always will be for those whose feelings and taste are depraved. People do not really regret the golden age, for they do nothing to restore it. (Rousseau 2015, 417.)

In turn, Saint-Preux's travels prepare him to participate in the community of friends formed around the family of Julie and Wolmar. In *The New Heloise*, the symbol of the return of the golden age is the grape harvest festival, which serves to unite all residents of the Wolmar estate in common labor, regardless of the divisions that have resulted from traditional social arrangements: "[…] the gentle equality that prevails here re-establishes nature's order, constitutes a form of instruction for some, a consolation for others, and a bond of friendship for all" (Rousseau 1997, 497). However, both golden age communities exist on the periphery of modern society and are accessible only to a select few. The idea of this hermeticism refers to the solitude of modern man, since in Rousseau's work "the *general* exaltation of the closed community becomes a symbol of universality, though it remains a subjective, psychological experience" (Starobinski 1988, 102). In this way, the fictional world of Rousseau's novels "is as much an affirmation of his own solitude and isolation in the existing world as it is a postulation of another moral world and the constitution of another ideal community" (Baczko 2009, 151). At the end of his life, Rousseau finally abandons the literary fantasies of the ideal community, and replaces them with the reveries of a solitary wanderer who believes that the only way to preserve the authenticity of his own existence is to be absolutely free of all social ties: "These hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones in the day during which I am fully myself and for myself, without diversion, without obstacle, and during which I can truly claim to be what nature willed." (Rousseau 1992, 12.) Consequently, for Rousseau, solitary wandering serves as a metaphor for experiencing and interpreting the inner world of man in accordance with his own nature, while the social life is always an obstacle to this process.

In the context of the German prose, the dialectic of community and solitude is most fully manifested in the story of Hyperion whose beliefs represent "a blend of mystical ideas and the social tenets of Rousseau" (Salzberger 1952, 32). Similar to Emile or Saint-Preux, the primary aim of his journey is the establishment of a new kind of community, in which "humanity and nature will unite into one all-embracing godhead" (Hölderlin 2019, 77). In order to achieve this goal, Hyperion must fight for his country's independence in a war against the Turkish invaders. But instead of a real Greek society, he attempts to build a closed and ideal community that conforms to the rules of the individual's inner world:

> It's a better age you're seeking, a more beautiful world. It was only that world you embraced in your friends, with them you were that world […] The loss of all the golden centuries, as you felt them, compressed into a single happy moment, the spirit of all the spirits of better times, the energy of all the energies of the heroes, all this was to be made good for you by a single mere man. (Hölderlin 2019, 57–58.)

Nevertheless, under Diotima's influence, he aspires to abandon his introspective and solitary journey of self-discovery and instead become a leader who will guide his people to victory: „But first I must go forth to learn. I'm an artist, but I lack the craft. I can mould in my mind, but I haven't yet learned to direct my hand." (Hölderlin 2019, 76.) Hyperion ultimately fails to achieve his intended goal, because he proves to be utterly helpless in a fundamentally alien external world, where "he is 'other-directed' rather than self-directed. His decisions are usually not his own, but those of other, stronger individuals: Adamas, Alabanda, Diotima, even Notara." (Silz 1969, 39.) Finally, the vision of an ideal society is ultimately untenable, because "Hyperion is not the man to set his country in order. He has little knowledge of men." (Salzberger 1952, 32.) When the struggle for Greek freedom turns to unpunished robbery and murder, Hyperion is left alone on the ruins of his ideals. His destiny is not community, but solitude, as the novel's subtitle—*The Hermit in Greece*—already informs the reader. From the perspective of community building, Hyperion's journey is thus revealed as futile and devoid of meaningful results, exposing the profound solitude that individuals face in the modern world.

Conclusion

My attempt to present journey as a philosophical topos in early Romantic thought certainly does not exhaust the full range of meanings we can attribute to one of our culture's most universal metaphors in the works of Rousseau and the Jenaers. However, I did not intend to analyze all possible contexts, in which this motif manifests itself in the early Romantic literature selected for this study. The aim of my work was to identify those contexts, in which this topos plays an important role as a link between: (1) the sphere of narrative and the domain of concepts; (2) the two national traditions of early Romanticism; and (3) the most important ideas expressing significant dilemmas in the reflection on man and history, which shaped the paradigm of modern anthropology and historiosophy. In this regard, I attempted to demonstrate that both Rousseau and the early German Romantics intentionally used the motif of journey to illustrate the conceptual unity and close interdependence of the key elements of their philosophical thought: the broad concept of education, major anthropological principles, and early attempts at a modern philosophy of history.

In consideration of the analysis conducted, it can be posited that the most literal interpretation of literary journey narratives exhibits a close association with the educational process, conceptualized as the creative endeavor of an individual who is oriented towards self-development or the shaping of another individual. Education, in this sense, emerges as an indispensable prerequisite for establishing the paradigm of early Romantic anthropology on the paths of cognition and self-knowledge, which more or less directly invariably refer to the literary figure of the road. Subsequently, early Romantic thought, emphasizing anthropological ideas of human formation and development, also adapts them to its three-stage historiosophical model, in which the postulate of a return to nature—as a result of the educational aspirations of modern man—is expressed in a literary vision of a circular journey.

In summary, the implementation of the assumptions of such a research approach serves as a crucial complement to the interpretative approaches presented in the extant literature on the subject, to which I refer in the article.

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Unlocking Borders
Albanian Literature in Translation

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Abstract

The article analyzes the development and challenges of Albanian literary translation within the Balkan and European contexts, emphasizing the interplay between translation practices, cultural identity, and social influences. Historically, Albanian literature faced significant barriers to international dissemination due to political isolation under the communist regime in Albania and the restrictive environment in Kosovo during the Yugoslav rule. These conditions hindered the growth of translation efforts, resulting in limited exposure of Albanian literary works to foreign audiences. The post-1990 period, following the fall of communism in Albania and the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, marked a revival of literary translation spurred on by the opening of borders, increased cultural exchange, and renewed interest in Albanian literature. Despite these advances, the field continues to face challenges, such as the shortage of translators and the linguistic complexity inherent in translating Albanian. The study employs a comparative analysis of translation practices, integrating qualitative interviews with translators of Albanian literature and examining case studies, in order to investigate how translation navigates the intersections of language, identity, and power in disseminating Albanian literature.

Keywords: Albanian literature, literary translation, language and identity, translation challenges.

Odklepanje mej. Albanska književnost v prevodu

Povzetek

Članek analizira razvoj in izzive albanskega literarnega prevoda znotraj balkanskega in evropskega konteksta, pri čemer poudarja soigro med prevajalskimi praksami, kulturno identiteto in družbenimi vplivi. Albanska literatura je, zgodovinsko gledano, naletela na številne prepreke pri mednarodnem razširjanju zaradi politične izolacije pod komunističnim režimom v Albaniji in omejevalnega okolja v času Jugoslavije. Takšni pogoji so preprečevali rast prevajalskih naporov, kar je tujemu občinstvu omejevalo dostop do albanskih literarnih del. V obdobju po letu 1990, zlasti po padcu komunizma v Albaniji in po koncu vojne na Kosovem leta 1999, je literarno prevajanje doživelo preporod, kar so spodbudili odpiranje mej, povečana kulturna izmenjava in obnovljeno zanimanje za albansko književnost. Kljub napredku je področje zaznamovano z izzivi, kakršna sta pomanjkanje prevajalcev in lingvistična kompleksnost, ki jo vsebuje prevajanje albanskega jezika. Študija se poslužuje komparativne analize prevajalskih praks, pri čemer ob kvalitativnih intervjujih s prevajalci albanske književnosti raziskuje posamezne primere, da bi bilo mogoče raziskati, kako se prevajanje pri razširjanju albanske književnosti spopada s presečišči med jezikom, identiteto in močjo.

Ključne besede: albanska književnost, literarni prevod, jezik in identiteta, prevajalski izzivi.

1. Introduction

Translation is not simply a linguistic transfer, but a complex phenomenological event that mediates inter-literary and intercultural communication. It entails a hermeneutic engagement with the text, the source culture, and the target reader, fostering a dialogical relationship between different horizons of meaning. Over the past decades, translation has enabled Balkan and European readers to encounter Albanian literature—a literary corpus characterized by linguistic and thematic particularities, as well as historical marginality. However, the field of translation studies as applied to Albanian literature remains underdeveloped, necessitating a deeper phenomenological and hermeneutical investigation of its processes and challenges.

In order to shed light on the lived experience and interpretive strategies of those engaged in this translational event, we conducted qualitative written interviews with several literary translators from the Balkans and Europe. These interlocutors have significantly contributed to the transmission of Albanian literary works into Bulgarian, Romanian, Greek, German, Italian, French, Dutch, Czech, Montenegrin, and other languages. Employing a mixed-methods framework—integrating qualitative, quantitative, phenomenological, and comparative methodologies—, this study seeks to uncover how translation operates as a transformative encounter with language, identity, and power in the dissemination of Albanian literature.

The findings suggest that scholarly engagement with Albanian literary translation is a relatively recent development, reflecting the delayed institutional recognition of translation as a legitimate literary practice within Albanian cultural history. Aleksandër Xhuvani's research traces the emergence of the term "translation" (*përkthim*) in the Albanian linguistic consciousness to the late nineteenth century, first articulated within the Albanian diaspora in Bucharest, particularly through the newspaper *Albania* (Xhuvani 1980).

Further hermeneutical development can be observed in the work of Faik Konica, whose multifaceted roles as publicist, poet, critic, and translator illustrate the interplay between literary creativity and translational mediation. His *Bibliographie* functioned as a hermeneutical chronicle, presenting

Albanian literary and cultural production in both Albanian and French, thus facilitating a dialogical opening between cultures. Konica's editorial initiative, *Koha e Letrave Shqipe*, represents a key institutional moment in the affirmation and circulation of Albanian literary identity through translation and critical reflection (Rugova 2005).

This study invites further phenomenological reflection on translation as a place where the ethical and hermeneutical responsibilities of translators as mediators of literary meaning should be emphasized. In this regard, literary translation appears not simply as a technical or linguistic act, but as a deeply embedded cultural and interpretive act. Regardless of the cultural setting, the field of literary translation constitutes an extraordinary endeavor that occurs at the junction of two distinct literary traditions and cultural frameworks. As Moga (2021) notes, it involves the transfer of literary texts from a source language and culture in such a way that the translated work becomes understandable, resonant, and acceptable within the hermeneutical horizon of the target culture. This process, which encompasses all major literary genres—poetry, prose, and drama—, requires not only linguistic skill, but also a deep attunement to the ontological and aesthetic dimensions of literature, thus reaffirming the role of the translator as a cultural and ethical agent.

The earliest substantial contributions to the history of Albanian literature consist mainly of translations of religious texts. In terms of original literary works, the 19th century marked the golden age of Albanian Romanticism. This period witnessed an unprecedented diversification of literary forms, including poetry, novels, and drama. Significantly, literary communities in the Albanian diaspora—particularly in Italy, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire—played a crucial role in the preservation and circulation of Albanian texts to European centers. The most notable development in Albanian literary translation, however, emerged in the late 20th century and has continued to expand into the 21st century.

2. Methodology

The present study adopts a mixed-methods research design that integrates qualitative, quantitative, phenomenological, and comparative approaches to investigate the role of literary translation in the interpretation and dissemination of Albanian literature. Our main objective was to explore how translation mediates literary meaning across languages and cultures, with particular attention to stylistic and hermeneutic dimensions.

At the core of our methodology lies an inquiry into how theories of translation intersect in the meaning of translated literary works. Drawing on established theoretical frameworks in literary translation (including hermeneutic and semiotic models), we explored whether literary style, voice, and cultural specificity are translatable, and under what conditions such a transfer maintains fidelity to the source. This theoretical basis allowed us to frame translation not simply as linguistic substitution, but as a complex act of inter-literary and intercultural communication.

In order to gain insight into the experiences of Albanian literary translators and the strategies and practices they used, I conducted semi-structured, written interviews with several well-known Albanian literary translators. These translators were selected based on specific criteria:

1) demonstrated experience in translating Albanian literary texts into target languages (including but not limited to Romanian, German, Greek, French, Italian, Dutch, etc.);

2) diversity in cultural and linguistic backgrounds to provide different perspectives;

3) previous publication of Albanian literary texts in their languages.

Although the sample size is modest, it represents a broad cross-section of contemporary translators actively engaged with Albanian literature. Interview questions focused on the translators' interpretive choices, challenges of stylistic fidelity, and cultural adaptation, particularly in relation to emblematic authors of Albanian literature, such as Lasgush Poradeci and Ismail Kadare.

2.1. Phenomenological and comparative method

Phenomenological research allowed us to focus on the translators' subjective experiences and embodied encounters with the text, language, and culture of the source material. Comparative methods were used in the analysis of a limited set of parallel texts—comparing original passages from Albanian literary works with translated ones—, in order to assess stylistic fidelity and cultural equivalence. While anecdotal observations were made—such as two translators' remarks on the perceived "untranslatability" of Lasgush Poradeci—, future research will involve systematic comparative textual analyses to test such claims more rigorously.

2.2. Methodological limitations

We acknowledge the limitations of our study:

1) the selection of translators, although deliberate, does not constitute a statistically representative sample of all Albanian literary translators;

2) the lack of detailed comparative case studies on specific authors (e.g., Poradeci) limits the generalizability of stylistic claims.

However, the methodological plurality employed in this research has allowed for a nuanced exploration of the translation process. It reveals the complex interplay of linguistic fidelity, cultural transfer, and literary interpretation.

3. Theoretical and methodological framework

The discourse surrounding translation theories can be traced back to the 16th century, with early contributions by Etienne Dolet in his work *La Maniere de bien traduire d'une langue en aultre*. Dolet outlined fundamental principles for translating texts between languages, emphasizing the necessity of comprehending the source language, possessing a profound grasp of the target language, and acquiring a substantial familiarity with the subject matter (Norton 1974). Contemporary scholars in translation theory have synthesized universal tenets that characterize the translation process. This paradigm comprises three integral elements: the original text in its source language, the meaning encapsulated within, and the transcribed version in the target language. Eugene A. Nida, renowned as the progenitor of modern translation science, elucidates the nature of translation as a multifaceted process, encompassing not only the transference and superficial alignment of linguistic forms, but also the analysis and restructuring of the text. This complex endeavor ensures the preservation of the style and meaning of the original text (Nida 1969). Current translation methodologies demand more than a mere transposition of words from one language to another. They necessitate a contextual analysis that enables the selection of words with equivalent meanings in specific contexts rather than a direct, word-for-word translation. This draws upon the translator's extensive knowledge to safeguard style and meaning, making the translated text accessible to foreign readers. Nida's theory of textual transition delineates multiple stages: source text, textual analysis, transference, and final restructuring and translation into the target language.

Consequently, translating literary texts from one language to another emerges as a complex undertaking, with stringent criteria for proficient literary translators who must possess grammar and semantic analysis skills. Umberto Eco, a luminary figure, encompassing literature, semiotics, and professorship, underscores that literary translation is an art. It encompasses the transfer of text between languages and a transition from one culture to another, a shift from one realm of knowledge to another (Eco 2006).

This study endeavors to discern the application of these theoretical principles in the translation practices of Albanian literature into European languages. Notably, global scholarly discourse has continually grappled with the complexities of literary translation, wherein words expressing particular emotions may retain or lose their significance when transported into another language. However, despite these challenges, literary translators persist in facilitating literature transmission, thereby recognizing the universal values inherent in literary works. This perspective is corroborated by Anthony Pym, an Australian scholar who posits that the value and significance of a text in one language equate to its translation into another. In contrast, the text in the translated language cannot revert to its source language (Pym 2009). Literary translators serve as intermediaries, bridging linguistic and cultural divides, decoding the nuanced literary constructs, and conveying the authors' messages from one language to another. Proficiency in the source and target languages is paramount, as is an understanding of the culture and traditions of the people for whom the literary work is intended. Acknowledging the creative nature of literary translation, scholars concur that the process encompasses three distinct phases, often referred to by varying terminologies. This study adopts Mossop's terminology, denoting the pre-drafting, drafting, and post-drafting phases (Borg 2017). Such an approach aligns with the practices of translators of Albanian literature into Balkan and European languages, underscoring the significance of having knowledge of the Albanian language and a deep familiarity with Albanian culture. Literary translation demands comprehensive linguistic, cultural, and literary acumen, as emphasized by Umberto Eco, who asserts that translating works, such as those of the Irish novelist and poet James Joyce, necessitates understanding the Irish style and literary thought. In this research, we explore how Albanian literary texts have been translated into Balkan and European languages, scrutinizing the practices and models employed by literary translators. Furthermore, we illuminate the motivations and reasons that impel these translators to function as conduits of inter-literary and intercultural communication, promoting Albanian literature within the Balkans and Europe.

From our research on the practices of translators of the Albanian-language literature, we note that the methods they chose to translate Albanian literature into their original language focus on analyzing the complexity of the text they chose for translation. According to them, the analysis is necessary, because the text can have different meanings due to the stylistic effect or the context; therefore, a special analysis of words is required, which in some cases can return the interpretation process to the zero point as it becomes impossible to translate targeted expressions. This practice is based on the theory of translation that requires the translator to evaluate and decide on the usage of the right word, in order to translate from the original in the targeted language, avoiding thus complete literal translation.

This is considered one of the most difficult practices when translating Albanian literature into foreign languages. In part, this is due to the dilemma that during the translation of the text from one language to another, the work may lose its literary values in the original language. The late German–Albanian translator Hans Joachim Lanksch as well as the Greek–Albanian translator Romeo Çollaku believe that translation of the poetry of the modern Albanian poet Lasgush Poradeci, with its rich figurative language, is the most challenging experience, sometimes raising the question whether Lasgush Poradeci can be translated into German and Greek at all. According to them, his poetry is difficult to interpret in another language. Therefore, his work may remain untranslatable. According to them, semantic values are preserved by following the semantic method of translation. Translating literary figures that convey the writer's emotions is considered the most difficult work. As for the translator, semantic values are preserved by following the semantic translation method. This theory also develops the distinction between non-literary and literary language, explaining how non-literary and literary languages represent an idea expressed through stylistic figures (Munday 2000, 5–8).

The semantic translation method is applied especially in translating poems, proverbs, and texts with dialectal content, which is considered the most difficult work. Therefore, to achieve the targeted text, a literary translator, in addition to knowing the language, must know the culture and social life of the people of the countries, in which the original work was written. This situation requires the application of theories on the analysis of literary texts, in this case, literary texts with nuances. Russian professor of Albanian literature, Alexander Novik, does not see the analysis of the literary text in the translation process as necessary in translating texts, where dialects and stylistic figures are present. The analysis of the literary text is also necessary, confirms the Montenegrin translator Jovan Nikolaidis, since, according to him, the Albanian language has a different linguistic structure from the Slavic languages. Thus, the Slavic literary translator must analyze the text he translates several times, before translating it into the language intended.

Researchers and translators who use translation methodology by analyzing the text from different cultural, educational, sociological, political, and historical perspectives are mainly scholars who work in the same fields. Thus, it is much more convenient for them to use this translation methodology from a multidimensional perspective. For example, we can take the Hungarian–Albanian translator Istvan Schuts and the Swiss–Albanian translator Basil Schade, who translated Albanian literature by putting the translation process into a given context. Generally, the first phase includes preliminary preparation, followed by drafting an idea of the text. The core translation process includes the translation of words and phrases induced by the text analysis that completes the idea of the text, interpretation of the source text, structuring, writing the translated text, again going back to the analysis of the source text, and finally re-reading the translated text before completion.

Nevertheless, different methodologies have a common goal: translating a text from one language to another. There is generally a request to establish quality control standards. According to studies dedicated to translation quality, it is difficult to find and apply standards that can accurately evaluate quality, because the translation process is developed through specific methods and with specific values. Theories based on equivalence (as a concept in translation studies) see the translation process as an attempt to rewrite the source text. At the same time, they appreciate that the translated text in the targeted language cannot be equal to the text in the original language without following some strict steps.

Katherina Reib, a German researcher on translation, defines translation as a bipolar process aimed at producing a new text with constant reference to the source text, making equivalent findings from the source language to the targeted language at the acceptable level of the text in general and its parts, taking into account the linguistic context and stylistic level. In such a case, the targeted text will have the same value as the source text. On the other hand, when translation evaluation is done through the functional approach, the concept of function is seen as a possible concept defined by the translator that must be related to the use of the text in the targeted language and culture. Regardless of the methods of literary translation, the translation process is an action that, as Saussure says, includes linguistic signs that do not unite a name with an object, but an acoustic image with a concept.

4. Case study analysis

4.1. Ismail Kadare in Jusuf Vrioni's translation

One of the most frequently cited and analyzed cases in the context of Albanian literary translation is the translation of Ismail Kadare's novel *Gjenerali i ushtrisë së vdekur*. This work has been translated into many languages and has been the subject of extensive analysis regarding how its metaphorical meaning, irony, and Albanian cultural elements have been rendered into foreign contexts.

Jusuf Vrioni, Kadare's first translator into French, is often mentioned for the role he played not only as a translator, but also as an interpreter of the author. He adopted an approach that at times deviated from the original Albanian structure, in order to adapt the work to the Francophone readership. Scholars consider that Vrioni followed a model close to Nida's dynamic equivalence, adapting the text to preserve its aesthetic and emotional impact.

An important aspect in this case was the translation of terms and realities that are unique to Albanian culture. For example, the term *kanun* or the concepts of honor and hospitality in the Albanian village are not easily translatable. In such cases, Vrioni used footnotes or careful contextualization to avoid cultural misunderstandings. This is an example where intercultural translation requires conscious choices, in order to preserve the authenticity of the original message.

4.2. Martin Camaj in translation by Hans-Joachim Lanksch

Another highly significant case study is the translation of Martin Camaj's poetry by Hans-Joachim Lanksch, a German translator who has brought many key authors of Albanian literature into his language. Camaj's poetry is laden with symbolism, complex syntactic structures, and the use of the Gheg dialect.

In his translations, Lanksch aimed to preserve the structure of the verse and the musicality of the original. He followed the formal equivalence approach, maintaining the rhythm and figurative composition of the lines. For him, translation was not merely a linguistic act but an effort to transfer the spirit of the Albanian language into a different cultural and literary system. This effort is documented in interviews and his reflections on working with Camaj, where he admits that his translation was not merely technical, but an act of emotional and aesthetic interpretation.

4.3. Gjergj Fishta in Přemysl Vinš's translation: Challenges and relative failures

Another notable case of analysis is the translation of *Lahuta e Malcisë* (*The Highland Lute*) by Gjergj Fishta, a work that embodies not only an ancient and rich language, but also a unique national worldview. Translators, such as Přemysl Vinš, have publicly acknowledged that translating this work into Czech is extraordinarily difficult, due to its dialect language, the Gheg dialect, and its folkloric elements.

This situation illustrates the theory of "relative untranslatability," where translation may be technically possible, but fails to convey the original's emotional depth and effect. This is a clear example, where translators require additional tools—footnotes, prefaces, glossaries—, in order to bring the foreign reader closer to the original context. In such cases, translation becomes as much an educational act as it is an aesthetic one.

4.4. Roel Schuyt's translation of Kadare from an intermediate language

A particularly unique case is that of the Dutch translator Roel Schuyt who initially translated Ismail Kadare's work from French, using the versions by Jusuf Vrioni and later Tedi Papavrami. This secondary translation approach highlights the issue of dependency on intermediate translations. In such cases, there is a risk of meaning distortion due to the linguistic and cultural distance between the original source and the final target language.

After learning Albanian, Schuyt resumed translating directly from the original, but still used the French versions for comparison. This method of translation comparison is widespread in literary translation and underscores the need for translators to understand the decisions made by previous translators as part of a conscious and critical process.

4.5. Romeo Çollaku's translations: Fidelity to the tone of the text

The case of Romeo Çollaku, a prominent translator of Albanian literature into Greek, illustrates another essential aspect: preserving tone. He emphasizes that, for him, a translation is unsuccessful, if it does not convey the tone and emotion of the original. In his experience with the poetry of Lasgush Poradeci, he refers to the "greatest betrayal" of a text as the loss of its style and musicality.

This is a typical example of translation, where the strategy of stylistic adaptation dominates, with the translator creating an "aesthetic equivalent" rather than following a word-for-word rendering. In this context, translation becomes an act of creativity, where the translator is, in a sense, a co-author of the new text (Hasani Pllana 2024).

From all the cases discussed, it becomes clear that the translation of Albanian literature cannot be understood as a mechanical process. It is an act of cultural communication, where the translator mediates not only between languages, but also between worldviews, aesthetics, and emotional landscapes. Each case demonstrates the necessity for interpretive sensitivity, cultural knowledge, and artistic judgment in preserving the integrity and vitality of the original text.

5. Literary translation between interpretation and cultural transference

Within the discourse of literary translation, various differences exist regarding the extent, to which a translated work can preserve the essence of the original. Some argue that literary translation can risk diminishing or distorting the emotional, symbolic, cultural, and stylistic depth of the source text. These major arguments are supported by empirical studies showing how some emotionally charged expressions lose their nuanced meaning when translated into another language.

In contrast, other theorists claim that translation is a vital mechanism for cross-cultural communication and the transmission of universal literary values. Without translation, they argue, global access to cultural expressions would be limited. David Bellos, a scholar and translator of literature, challenges the notion of inherent untranslatability. In his influential work *Is That a Fish in Your Ear?* (2011), Bellos argues that translation is an interpretive act that, when done skillfully, does not compromise the original, but rather expands its reach. He emphasizes that while literary translation may involve transformation, it does not amount to betrayal. Instead, it creates a renewed version of the text capable of resonating in a new linguistic and cultural context. Other studies, such as Anthony Pym, emphasize that the success of a translation lies not in the repetition of words for words, but in the understanding of the original's communicative intentions and true knowledge. Pym (2014) argues that the word of the translated text serves as a voice for the values and meaning of the original to be re-embodied, suggesting that translation is both a linguistic and cultural negotiation. The process of literary translation is often compared to acts of psychoanalysis or code-switching, where the structure of the text—its symbolic, emotional and ideological dimensions—is translated through a subjective but informed interpretive lens. Translators are therefore not simply transmitters of meaning, but co-creators of literary schools, deciphering and reconstructing the text for new audiences. This foreign complexity is evident in the reality of Albanian literature, where practices in common languages often face the challenge of uniqueness. Examples provide the case studies of translation mentioned above.

6. Conclusions

The act of translating Albanian literature into Balkan and European languages constitutes much more than a mechanical or linguistic translation—it is a complex process of translation in the cultural, emotional and intellectual contexts. This study has shown that literary translation, especially from a language like Albanian, is deeply rooted in hermeneutic interpretation, cultural sensitivity, and aesthetic perception. The case of Albanian literature is uniquely illustrative of how translation not only facilitates interlingual exchange, but also contributes to the shaping of a national literary identity on the global stage.

As this research has shown, the historical and socio-political contexts, in which Albanian literature has evolved—namely, the long periods of political isolation in Albania and the complex cultural dynamics in Kosovo—, have had a direct impact on the visibility of Albanian literary works in the international arena. During the communist regime, both censorship and the lack of cultural diplomacy limited the export of literature and hindered the development of translation infrastructure. The post-1990 era brought a transformation, opening the door to a revival of literary translation and to the European translators' interest in Albanian literature. However, challenges remain, particularly in terms of institutional support, qualified literary translators, and the continued reliance on intermediary languages, which puts original meanings and stylistic nuances at risk.

Insights gathered through interviews with translators and detailed case study analyses have highlighted the critical role that translators play as cultural mediators. Jusuf Vrioni's translation of Ismail Kadare's work, for example, reveals nuanced decisions made to preserve emotional and symbolic depth for a Francophone reader. Similarly, Hans-Joachim Lanksch's attempt to translate

Martin Camaj's Gheg dialect poetry into German illustrates the lengths, to which translators must go to preserve the rhythm, mood, and symbolic world of the source text. Such examples highlight the impossibility of achieving one-to-one correspondence between languages, emphasizing instead the need for what theorists, such as Nida and Pym, call "dynamic equivalence" and "communicative fidelity."

One of the conclusions from this study is the idea that translation is not simply a transfer of content, but a recreation of the cultural and emotional resonance of the text in a new linguistic system. This becomes particularly evident in the translation of highly stylized or poetic works, such as those of Lasgush Poradeci or Gjergj Fishta, where linguistic novelty, dialectical variation, and symbolic density pose formidable challenges. Translators, such as Romeo Çollaku, argue persuasively that the loss of musicality and tone constitutes a betrayal of the original work. As a result, translators must often prioritize the recreation of aesthetic and emotional experience over strict semantic fidelity. This reaffirms the notion that translators are co-authors—creators who navigate the boundaries between languages, cultures, and literary systems.

This research also sheds light on the theoretical and methodological diversity that underpins translation studies. From semantic translation to functional equivalence and beyond, translation emerges as an interdisciplinary act, drawing on linguistics, philosophy, semiotics, and literary criticism. Translating literary works with strong dialectal or cultural specificity, such as *Lahuta e Malcië*, requires a nuanced methodology that combines linguistic expertise with deep cultural understanding. In such contexts, translation can become "relatively untranslatable," not in the sense of impossibility, but in its inability to fully capture the emotional and symbolic impact of the original without extensive contextual complementation.

Furthermore, this study illustrates that translation is deeply intertwined with broader issues of identity, power, and intercultural communication. Albanian literature, long placed on the periphery of European literary canons, enters the global conversation through the efforts of dedicated translators who act as scholars and cultural ambassadors. Their work not only makes the Albanian voice heard, but also challenges dominant narratives and expands the boundaries of European literature. The gradual institutionalization of translation studies in universities across Europe and the Balkans—accompanied by growing scholarly interest—signals a growing recognition of translation as a legitimate and necessary form of literary production and cultural exchange.

Finally, while this study has identified a number of effective practices and strategies, it also highlights the need for continued institutional support for translators of Albanian literature into European languages.

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TRANSLATION

PREVOD

Translation
Prevodno besedilo

UDC: 130.2

Attention and Hospitality
An Attempt at a Socio-Phenomenological Definition of the Relationships Between Asylum Seekers and "Helpers"

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Abstract

The essay is a philosophical reflection carried out by way of a sociological investigation. The goal is to understand what role attention plays in the everyday life of asylum seekers, from its pathological aspects that affect their identity to the attention that they give to others or that they receive from others, which revives their responsivity. Perpetually stimulated by the state accommodation centers for asylum seekers (reception systems) and their life as asylum seekers, the capacity to direct their attention becomes jeopardized. But when intersubjective relationships open up a common sphere, attention is revived and can be directed again: new responses are possible. On the basis of phenomenological descriptions coming from fieldwork, I characterize this inter-attention (between asylum seekers and "helpers") as a particular mode of hospitality. From this, I conclude by sketching an ethics of attention.

Keywords: attention, hospitality, Bernhard Waldenfels, asylum seekers, applied phenomenology.

Pozornost in gostoljubje. Poskus socio-fenomenološke definicije odnosov med iskalci azila in »pomočniki«

Povzetek

Prispevek predstavlja filozofsko refleksijo, izpeljano s pomočjo sociološke raziskave. Z njo skušamo razumeti, kakšno vlogo igra pozornost v vsakdanjem življenju iskalcev azila, od njenih patoloških vidikov, kakršni zadevajo njihovo identiteto, do pozornosti, ki jo dajejo drugim ali jo od drugih prejemajo, kar oživlja njihovo responzivnost. S tem ko državni nastanitveni centri (sprejemni sistemi) in njihovo življenje sámo iskalce azila neprenehoma stimulirajo, postaja njihova sposobnost usmerjanja pozornosti bolj in bolj ogrožena. Toda: če intersubjektivni odnosi razprejo skupno okrožje, pozornost oživi in jo je mogoče spet usmerjati: možni so novi odgovori. Na temelju fenomenoloških deskripcij, kakršne izhajajo iz terenskega dela, to vmesno pozornost (med iskalci azila in »pomočniki«) okarakteriziram kot poseben modus gostoljubja. Prispevek zaključim z orisom etike pozornosti.

Ključne besede: pozornost, gostoljubje, Bernhard Waldenfels, iskalci azila, uporabna fenomenologija.

Introduction

Since the so-called "migrant crisis" of 2015, numerous authors[1] have explored the concept of hospitality, contributing to a "theoretical revival" (Boudou 2017, 18) of this idea. Faced with the inhospitality of states (Agier 2021)—which itself is not a new phenomenon (Noiriel 1991; Fassin *et al.* 1997)—and problems of hospitality revealed by this "crisis," it now seems urgent to conceive of a world that is open to the *étranger*.[2] Among this constellation of authors who attempt to "rethink" hospitality, define it, examine its concrete practices, or demonstrate its political necessity, I propose a new approach. My goal is not to construct a general theory of hospitality (Deleixhe 2016; Boudou 2017; Stavo-Debauge 2017) nor to demonstrate how the aid activities of welcomers are characteristic of a private hospitality that opposes public inhospitality (Agier 2021, Gourdeau 2019, and Ristic 2020, among many others). My objective is rather to attempt to define the characteristics of the relationships between asylum seekers and "helpers" *when they go well* (my study is limited to volunteers and social workers, excluding the doctors,

1 Joan Stavo-Debauge offers a fairly comprehensive overview in his review of Agier 2021 (published in French in 2018). See Stavo-Debauge 2020a.

2 *Translator's note:* In this text, Aulanier plays with the polysemy of the word *étranger* in French, sometimes to designate migrants, sometimes the phenomenological concept of *Fremd*, inherited from Waldenfels. *Etranger* has several possible English translations including *stranger*, *alien*, *other*, or *foreigner*. Multiple of these translations are used throughout this text, in an effort to avoid flattening the nuanced meanings highlighted by Aulanier.

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lawyers, etc., who also populate the domain of asylum).[3] These relationships are often described, in public discourse and by the people involved, through the mode of hospitality: as a sort of charitable gift from the welcomers who "open up" to the welcomed. While hospitality is a natural framework for analysis when private citizens host asylum seekers in their homes (Gerbier-Aublanc 2018; Deleixhe 2018; Gerbier-Aublanc and Masson Diez 2019), the use of the concept is less directly evident when examining interactions between migrants and "helpers" more broadly. Not all of these interactions, even those involving aid or assistance, can necessarily be categorized as hospitality.[4] I introduce the concept of attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*) in an effort to describe in greater detail the relationships between asylum seekers and helpers. I move beyond a view of openness that does not take into account the hosts' ability to contain or *encaisser*—in the words of sociologist Joan Stavo-Debauge (2009 and 2017)—the arrival of foreigners.[5] Hospitality will not be cast aside during this analysis, as the concept remains central to the definition of the link between the *own* and the *alien*. This text therefore aims to use the concept of attention to clarify the meaning of hospitality.

What is it about these relationships that "does good by opening the mind," as one asylum seeker aptly put it? Is it possible, in drawing from field observations, to provide the first elements of an ethics of attention as a mode of hospitality? These two overarching questions form the backbone of this article, which is part of an interdisciplinary research project that pairs empirical sociological research on the *Lebenswelt* of asylum seekers (Aulanier 2021b and 2021c) with

3 I intentionally rely on a rather vague definition of "helpers." For this analysis, I do not examine how specific, precisely defined categories of professionals or volunteers helped asylum seekers feel better and revive their responsivity. Rather, I start from situations that I interpreted as allowing such revival. My observations largely concerned volunteers and social workers, but I use the term "helpers" in a broad sense to leave open the possibility of identifying such situations in other interactions.

4 Such interactions, which provide aid, but do not constitute hospitality, will not be discussed here. Take, for example, assistance that is strictly legal or medical, whose circumstances or consequences do not contribute to the asylum seeker's sense of belonging to a community.

5 *Translator's note*: Sociologist Joan Stavo-Debauge developed the concept of *encaissement* (lit. "to enclose" or "to encase") to describe the welcomer's ability to support, take into account, contain, and receive what happens (to them).

philosophical reflection on the modalities of a "healthy" relationship with the alien, in line with the German phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels (Aulanier 2020 and 2021a). The aim here is to bring together these two lines of inquiry, which, while not totally unrelated, are seldom in direct conversation with one another.

My approach will center on the present event [l'évènement en train de se faire]. My reflections, following Waldenfels, are based on the fact that the alien *is* there; it is therefore not a question of investigating the reasons for their arrival or the best way to deal with them. Rather, I aim to understand *what happens* when these interactions go well.[6] First, as an introduction, I summarize the current situation for asylum seekers in Europe, demonstrating that one primary problem is the alienation of their attention. Then, I describe four scenes that demonstrate what happens between asylum seekers and "helpers." Through these scenes, I will demonstrate that the fact that these relations *do good* is linked to what can be understood as "happy attention" ["attention heureuse"] (cf. Moinat, 2010) that opposes the pathologies of attention engendered by the asylum system. I aim to show that this form of attention, by reviving responsiveness (Waldenfels 1994, 2001, 2011, and 2015), leads to a common sphere, which, because it belongs to no one, is hospitable. Finally, I conclude with several suggestions for a responsive ethics of attention that is based, not on top-down morality, but, drawing from phenomenology, on the reality that the alien is there and that human relationships are taking place.

1. Pathologies of attention

The present philosophical reflection is based on sociological fieldwork that was conducted over the course of many years in France and Germany. Day after day, I followed asylum seekers on their daily routines, attended their appointments with social workers and volunteers, and went with them to meetings and other gatherings organized by associations. In addition to this

6 This aim is based, in part, on my view that sufficient work exists that focuses on what happens when these interactions go poorly (including my own …), as well as the idea that it is not beside the point to know a bit more about positive moments, in order to reflect on ways to improve the situation.

prolonged immersion in their daily life and numerous informal conversations conducted over time, I conducted in-depth interviews with around thirty asylum seekers and ten social workers and volunteers. This study, like others before it,[7] reveals the difficult living conditions of asylum seekers in Europe. Notably, my research shows how the conditions, under which asylum seekers are received by the state, affect their responsivity, causing pathologies of attention. In particular, the loss of control over time and space and the absence of the possibility of establishing a new home for oneself, even temporarily, are at the root of these pathologies. I have detailed elsewhere (Aulanier 2021c) the ways in which the time spent in the asylum procedure affects the ability of asylum seekers to respond to their situation.[8] Here, I present a brief summary of my findings.

The imposed waiting translates into a loss of hope that then provokes difficulties of attention. Attention, perpetually drawn to a distressing and uncertain future as well as to a materially difficult present, cannot be directed towards an intentionally *desired* direction. Asylum seekers relentlessly refer to these "thoughts" and, sometimes, "bad thoughts" that plague them and cannot be redirected to anything else. Their attention is not only drawn in this direction, but it also cannot turn anywhere else. The double-event of attention, drawn and directed in one gesture (Waldenfels 2004 and 2010), is split apart, along with the asylum seeker's sense of self. It is not a matter of *an* event, however traumatic, changing the asylum seeker. The period of the asylum process is not in and of itself a *turning point* (Hughes 1971) or a biographical event (Leclerc-Olive 1997). Rather, it is the repetition of calls (*Requêtes*, *Widerfahrnisse*, *Aufforderungen*) that remind one of the waiting, without it being possible for the asylum seeker to respond by stepping outside of the period of waiting. This repetition affects one's hopefulness. As Camara insightfully explains, "when you lose hope, your self-confidence goes with it. So, it gets worse and worse:

7 See Aulanier 2021b and 2021c for a complete bibliography on the current situation for asylum seekers.

8 Without taking into account difficulties related to language, which are central to challenges in making sense of what happens to us. See more on this subject in texts from the ANR LIMINAL program, for example Saglio-Yatzimirsky et Galitzine-Loumpet 2022.

it's a struggle." (*Interview, April 2019.*) Without even minimal self-confidence, it is difficult to pay enough attention to others for interactions to engage in a common sphere; it is difficult to contribute enough of oneself to nurture this common sphere.

I propose the concept of alienated attention to describe this experience of asylum seekers. I borrow this expression from Frédéric Moinat, who explains that alienated attention characterizes situations, in which "*passivity and activity are dissociated and pushed to the extreme*" (Moinat 2010, 57). Drawing on Simone Weil's research with factory workers, the philosopher explains that the attention of these workers is on the one hand "subject to passive interruptions," such as abnormal machine noise, and on the other hand to the "order of the factory." Everything the senses perceive is immediately referred to the social order of the factory, causing the worker to think of nothing else and remain passive. But, if they want to keep their job, on which they depend, they must continue to be attentive. In alienated attention, therefore, there remains an element of activity that manifests "by a considerable effort of attention." The worker must thus invest "*voluntarily and with considerable psychic energy*" (2010, 57) in the accomplishment of their task, and do so continuously. "Therefore, alienated attention is paradoxically characterized by extreme passivity on one side and extreme activity on the other," concludes Moinat. Asylum seekers are placed in a similar situation. On the one hand, they are in a social situation that can be understood as a policy of waiting, where the only thing to do is wait for the institution to respond. The impossibility of projecting oneself into the future as long as the administrative situation is unstable leads to considerable passivity. On the other hand, asylum seekers must perpetually invest in their lives as asylum seekers. They must think about what they need to do, both in order to survive as well as in order to obtain refugee status in the future. It is therefore hard to think about anything else, and time is quickly consumed almost entirely by these concerns. This is exhausting, causing the slightest movement to require a major effort. Sleep, the only refuge, is also affected. The perpetual effort of attention that comes and goes constantly prevents one from falling asleep. In addition to the pressure of waiting, being haunted (Stavo-Debauge 2012b) by a denied asylum application also alienates attention. Fassin and Kobelinsky (2012, 465) explain:

> […] refugee status is truly vital for the claimants, both since possessing it provides access to social rights whereas being deprived of it can threaten their very existence. The possibility of denial has a paralyzing effect, all the more so as the asylum seeker's life is at stake, and they may not necessarily understand the institution's decision or the criteria it is based on.

The precarious living conditions and the loss of power over space are not insignificant when it comes to difficulties escaping these efforts of attention, difficulties that follow the self everywhere, at every moment. Without stable accommodations that serve as a *home*, even in the broadest sense of the word, and without a place that is even minimally "inhabitable" (Breviglieri 2006a and 2006b; Stavo-Debauge 2017), it is difficult to stay active, to successfully direct one's attention at something, and to escape this alienation of attention. It is not solely the length of the asylum procedure as a whole that is affected. Every moment of every day relates back to the administrative situation. Like the worker described by Weil, who sees their entire environment and all of their thoughts oriented solely towards the work at hand, towards the machines to be operated, the asylum seeker sees their entire everyday life colonized by the asylum process. Experience becomes distorted by a tsunami of pathos that inhibits response. The body reacts by crying, by remaining prostrate at the bus stop, by becoming agitated, by lying in bed for hours waiting for better days to come. The "struggle" mentioned above by an asylum seeker also manifests itself in the body, which suffers from a perception of uselessness, a feeling of not mattering, of not being able to contribute to the community. The absence of an "inhabitable" space reinforces this sentiment, especially as absence of a home makes it impossible to know how to organize one's life. The asylum seeker lives in the passive, in the mode of undergoing: this recalls "the provisional and the absence of choice" (Laacher 2013, 135). Thus, asylum seekers are unable to make sense of the unfamiliar calls that affect them, unable to assign meaning and develop rules to reconstruct a responsive repertoire. Rather, these calls get bogged down in the body: the process of transforming pathos into meaning fails (Waldenfels 2015, 22).

Phenomenologically, "the awakening [l'éveil] of attention corresponds to a dynamic of the constitution of meaning. […] This constitution of meaning, where the initiative does not unilaterally come down to either the subject or the world, but to both at the same time, is described by Husserl in *passive Synthesis* as a 'constitutive duet.'" (Moinat 2010, 46.) In other words, attention does not start with me. Waldenfels (2004) goes further by focusing on response: the awakening of attention is a *response* to a *pathos* that strikes us. This is a departure from the understanding of a core subject affected by the world; the self emerges by responding, by becoming attentive to the calls that strike it. The social world plays an important role in this emergence of the self through response, because our experience is constructed by complex systems of norms, which Waldenfels, inspired by Foucault, calls "orders." In this case, the order of asylum is made up of dozens of overlapping norms: residence requirements, mandatory institutional appointments, preparation of life stories, complicated laws for finding work, etc. The entirety of the asylum seeker's experience is therefore defined by the order of asylum. This constraint is so strong that it draws all attention back to *the social role of asylum seeker*. In other words, meaning making fails in the face of the difficulties of the order of asylum. Pathos no longer transforms into meaning. In this case, the subject says that they "are no longer themselves." They do not recognize themselves. Moussa explains this to me:

> Lately, I'm either sad and do nothing, or I freak out, I even threw my bike into the Deûle… I'd never have done that before—that's not me, Audran, but I'm so stuck, when I did it, I couldn't help it, it was the anger, the problems. I still don't understand why I did that—now I have to buy a new bike, if not I can't deliver anymore [he works for Uber Eats]. (*Interview, May 2019.*)

We are dealing here with a "response block" (Waldenfels 2015, 23) or with reflex-responses that are inappropriate, or, in any case, unwanted. Action stems directly from the *waiting*-self, without the *respondent*-self truly having a say. Identity is then torn apart, one pole becomes omnipresent at the expense of the other. The order of asylum opens attention only onto itself, in isolation; as soon as asylum seekers' attention is awakened, vocative interpellation transforms into a subject to be dealt with in the third person, like an administrative file to be processed: all *inter*-attention is prevented.

The following section thus builds upon this observation: the European reception system is characterized by pathologies of attention among asylum seekers.[9] This raises the question: what, within the margins of reception, can revive attention?

2. What is happening. Scenes between asylum seekers and "helpers"

The asylum application period, therefore, generates an attention that can no longer be intentionally directed; the double movement of attention—drawn/directed in the same gesture—splits apart. Attention is so drawn, in so many different ways, that the self can no longer resist, that it can no longer *contain* [*encaisse*] (Stavo-Debauge 2012a). With no more response, attention is no longer directed. Or, rather, it is *too* well directed, by the reception system, towards a major preoccupation: receiving/not receiving papers. The enduring uncertainty ends up getting in the way of all action and often leads to a fear of losing one's mind (Saglio-Yatzimirsky 2018, 110–126). The particular form of waiting imposed on asylum seekers at official reception spaces augments this uncertainty (Kobelinsky 2010). Far from facilitating a hospitable shift, which would allow a living-*with* the host and no longer simply living *in their space*, these places accentuate a sense of dependency and infantilization.

While there is no cause for celebration, I propose to describe four scenes depicting possibilities for asylum seekers to be reoriented towards a response that is not entirely fabricated by the asylum system. These four possibilities are certainly not exhaustive, but they indicate some directions for developing a responsive ethics, based on attention, that will be outlined in the final part of this text. Through the re-birth of responsiveness that they allow, the mobilizations of attention presented here can be characterized as modes of hospitality, offering a refuge for learning, resting, playing, projecting oneself, and more.

9 As this text focuses on the relationships and interactions between asylum seekers and "helpers," it should be clarified that the effectiveness of hospitality will be studied from asylum seekers' point of view and not that of the "helpers."

a. Scene 1: New solicitations of attention

Aslam is an Iranian man in his early thirties. Since we met, he has been granted asylum. He was lucky, he says, but luck had some help. Someone he met when he started his application, a social worker in an emergency accommodation center, played an important part in his ability to not "pop like a balloon and disappear." When he first arrived, Aslam had trouble concentrating on learning French and he barely left the center. He slept a lot, just waiting for time to pass. "I would go out to grab something to eat, but I didn't eat much!" he says. But four months after his arrival at the center, a new social worker was hired. She would invite asylum seekers into her office to talk. Aslam spent a lot of time speaking with her. He got to know her husband and their children. This woman inspired him to go out, to move. She gave him passes to the pool, along with weekly challenges to get faster and to improve his crawl, since he favored the breaststroke. After a month of constant visits ("I gave it my all in the pool, it felt great!"), he caught the eye of a woman his age, also in her thirties. They exchanged Instagram handles and got drinks from the coffee machine in the pool lobby. After getting together to swim a few times, they went out together. Aslam now has a daily routine. He has regained his appetite, goes swimming, and, above all, has this woman over almost every day. She is Belgian and lives across the border with her grandmother. She takes the bus to the pool and to the accommodation center as well. They now spend their afternoons together. And now that he is lucky enough to have a private room (thanks to a letter from a psychiatrist), she can sometimes spend the night with him. Or, to be precise, they spend the evening in bed, and then he leaves it to her and sleeps on a mattress on the floor. But this is not the most important point: by hosting her, he is offering this woman hospitality. In a place where he is welcomed, he also welcomes. Responsiveness is revived.

A lot happened between these moments and Aslam being granted asylum: a child, being forced to move following a decision by the OFII (French Office for Immigration and Integration), a separation (due to the displacement), a Christian pilgrimage in France, a job working as a commis chef in a restaurant in Lille. But the fact that all of this could have *happened to him*, that is to say he could define himself once again as a subject through experience, was thanks to his interactions with that social worker: "before her, nothing happened to me, all I did was sleep and eat. She took the time for me, she made me think about other things, that's—yeah—really what changed my life, honestly!"

The new social worker that Aslam met *obliged* him to think of other things. This is a surprising gesture of hospitality, in the guise of a constraint. And yet, this encounter is a positive one and has lasting effects. Aslam even recounts it on his "private calendar" as a "biographical event" (Leclerc-Olive 1997) that granted him a new lease on life. The events that followed (starting with meeting the future mother of his child) are interpreted, in his retelling, in relation to that meeting. The value of this constraint is that it enabled Aslam to respond creatively, to overcome the responsive block that threatened his selfhood, with a responsive re-birth, to use Bernhard Waldenfels's terms. It is important to remember that, as mentioned above, attention does not begin with me. Even when everything is going well, when I am attentive in a positive sense, when I can make sense of what I perceive, attention is first aroused (*geweckt*, as Waldenfels says) by a *Widerfahrnis*, a call that happens to or strikes me. There is always an element of constraint in attention: we do not direct it in an entirely autonomous manner. But there is a fundamental difference between the way in which the social worker arouses Aslam's attention and the way in which his attention does (not) awaken while he waits for time to pass. In the latter case, each time that his attention is awakened, the path of response is already largely predetermined, in what we might call a rut of meaning. The room's damp ceiling that he sees when he opens his eyes reminds him that he is living in an accommodation center, the food that he picks up from food banks reminds him that he no longer eats his country's cuisine, his exchanges with other social workers remind him that he is not at home. But each time that he meets with that new social worker, she is interested in him not simply as an asylum seeker, but as an adult emigrant in his thirties. She talks to him as much about herself as she does about him, telling him about her husband and her children, whom he meets. They speak about his old job and his city in a positive light, not about the persecutions that lead to his departure. It is a form of *invitation* that opens a common sphere through the attention that it arouses. The information they share is not offered up for its own sake (as in the case of the events recounted before the officials who make asylum decisions, which must be classified according to the categories of persecution defined in the Geneva Convention), rather it provokes speech, it allows the speakers to take an interest in one another based on what they say. It is a personal way of opening up the other's attention. At the heart of everyday dialogue lies something out of the ordinary that breaks (partially and momentarily) the chains of alienated attention. My use of the metaphor of chains is not unintentional. A renewal of attention allows one to see *the same things* differently, which is truly liberating. For example, the room may be damp, but it allows him to have his girlfriend over; the quality of the food is not great, but they are able to eat *together*, etc. A community develops with his girlfriend, allowing him to tell his story in a different way.

The common sphere created with the social worker is also established through small athletic challenges. One of the social worker's first concrete actions was to convince Aslam to go swimming. Giving him challenges allowed her to arouse his attention even when she was not with him. These challenges acted as self-timer, issuing calls even after their interaction. But they also had, in a very concrete way, a corporeal aspect. Instead of lying prostrate in his room, she "invites [Aslam] to use his body, to arouse his motor skills, specifically in the form of a challenge, therefore with the aim of improving, in this case honing a skill, a possible source of pride."[10] Finally, this meeting and those that follow facilitate a renewal of the process of attention for Aslam, who is bolstered by the fact that, once again, he *feels* good. This revival allows him to partially leave the order of asylum, but also, in a literal sense, to *awaken* his attention. Before the social worker's arrival, his attention was alienated by the asylum system, but it was also partially *asleep*. It takes more and more time for calls to arouse a response. This is evident in the many hours spent sleeping and the fact that, according to Aslam, even when thoughts arise, they often pass, before he has had "time to think about them." The self, divided between passivity and responsiveness, finds itself essentially deprived of response and initiative. In addition to all these actions, we can hypothesize that the fact that the social worker arrived at the center *after* him helped Aslam renew his

10 I thank Joan Stavo-Debauge for highlighting this corporeal aspect. He is quoted here according to a personal communication.

attention, since she was not part of his field of perception upon his arrival at the center, nor during his first weeks there. Attention cannot awaken on its own, as Waldenfels reminds us, when he writes that "[i]n the past the secondary school transcript had an evaluative category called 'keenness' [Fleiß], which appeared next to that of 'attention' [Aufmerksamkeit], making one think that everything important hinged on the good will and understanding of the pupil." However, he asks, "how do we assess the kind of attention that needs to be awakened first?" (2011, 64). Knowing how to awaken attention without creating pre-established responsive ruts can be a tool for making the other feel like they can be a part of the community and that they are not condemned to remain on the threshold, like a guest who must behave according to the host's rules.

This renewal of the responsive process does not fix everything. "I still often do things the wrong way, not like the French," Aslam explains to me. Just because he is newly able to direct his attention does not mean that he now belongs fully to the community. It does not resolve all the problems the foreigner must face, in order to find their place (Schütz 1944). But this allows them to become themselves again in another way, even if it must be noted that this "re-becoming" remains largely dependent on the government. If an asylum application is rejected, one must sometimes start over from zero. At the day-to-day level, everything is not resolved by this revival, but offering the possibility of creative responses is a first step. This also gives the foreigner the chance to interpret for themselves, which rules, norms, and customs they must learn to respect, without pre-directing their attention towards the things that seem obvious to *us*.

Finally, as we examine the following scenes, it is important to keep in mind the fact that it can be difficult to draw the line between moments that *go well* and interactions that can be characterized as paternalistic. The line between a demanding hospitality that includes an element of constraint meant to redirect attention, and "a benevolence which necessarily includes a good measure of scorn" (Delphy 2016, 107), as paternalism is defined in materialist feminism, is not always as clear. The difference lies in the capacity to contribute to the common ground, to not *only* be constraining, but also considerate. It involves accepting to give of oneself, to share common ground, without positioning oneself as being above or distant from the other or as someone in the know telling them what to do without being open to the possibility that they too could play an active role in the relationship.

b. Scene 2: Specific domains of attention

Mahmoud, an Iraqi asylum seeker living in a reception center in a mid-sized city in Baden-Württemberg, explains that volunteer-organized outings were very important to him:

> With the other residents, we don't really have relationships in the center… But luckily, some people, the volunteers, really do a lot. For starters, they help with the language, with finding training courses. And above all they really do a lot for us—it's… very moving. Now, I love the region: it's thanks to them. Multiple times they've offered to organize outings to castles, to visit old things in Heidelberg, to a forest with big rocks. If I know the region, it's thanks to the volunteers; and I tell you what, it's not thanks to the social workers. For them, it's, "you have to do this, la di da." Now, you see, the volunteers said to us, "We really like to go to this place or that, would you like us to organize something and go there together?" You see, the thing is, they think about us: if you don't want to come, you don't come, that's it. Actually, a lot of people from the center didn't come. But I'm telling you, it's very good for your head, very good! You really think about other things, the problems stay in your room. And it lets you better understand their way of thinking. Anyway, it's their special German way of thinking, always with the papers, direct, a little harsh. After I saw the old streets, the big castle, I told myself: "OK, even old Germans liked order, it's not us that they have a problem with." After all, in Iraq we also have our way of thinking, but it's not the same. But it's really with these outings that I learned that; after that, man, I was more relaxed. But the social workers? [My initial question was about the relationships between social workers and residents.] No, really, they help with the papers. It's fine. But the volunteers are really important. They can't do it often, they have—I don't know—but, probably kids, work, you know. But it helps a lot, that's for sure. (*Interview, July 2019.*)

Mahmoud points to the influence of these outings on two levels:

(1) In the moment, he "really think[s] about other things," which allows him to escape his problems for a while. If asylum seekers are part of the

migrant populations who experience "the world as problem" (Agier 2016, chap. I), these moments allow Mahmoud to see the world, for a few hours, not as a problem, but as something to discover. In other words, he manages to deflect the insistent, paralyzing call of "asylum problems" by responding with an attention that lends itself to the discovery of new places. In this respect, these outings play, in part, the same role as Aslam's exchanges with the social worker.

(2) Afterwards, these outings give him the tools to interpret the world, in which he finds himself and the behavior of Germans. He gains information that allows him to form ideal types of Germans' mentality by referring to their history. This process is only possible due to the fact that he feels "more relaxed." This relaxation allows him to *contain* [*encaisser*] (Stavo-Debauge 2012a) that, which had previously inhibited his responsiveness, and to transform the pathos into meaning. In this way, the activities were just as much occasions to revive the investigative process of a foreigner arriving in a new place (Schütz 1944), which was previously impeded ("it's really with these outings that I learned that," he said). Here, interpretation is oriented more directly than that of "rediscovering oneself," as evoked in Aslam's story, because it is based on direct observations and explanations from volunteers who, as Germans, have a particular understanding of their own culture.

Finally, while on the one hand he seems almost to lament—albeit in an understanding way—the fact that the outings do not take place more frequently, he also emphasizes the ability to choose: "if you don't want to come, you don't come, that's it." In fact, it is due to the infrequency of these invitations that the capacity to choose is perceived as intact. If the outings took place more regularly, responses would transform into response ruts and would take on an element of repetition, which would not function as effectively as a way out of the world as problem. In other words, it is once again the extra-ordinary at the heart of the everyday that allows the everyday to be revived and redirected. The fact that it is volunteers who organize these outings is not unimportant. Attention is paid seemingly for nothing in return and without contractual obligation, as is the case of social workers, for example. This is what Mahmoud says is "very moving."[11] This importance of choice, of participation, is demonstrated in a new way when another asylum seeker, Kenese, living in the same center, explains that he feels a form of insistence from the volunteers. "They do too much for us, it's almost uncomfortable," he says. Here, the recipients of the volunteers' attention are scared of responding poorly to what they are offered. "They do so much for us, it's too much pressure, right now, first, I'd like to relax," declares Kenese. If the volunteers are acting in the name of a certain form of hospitality, if they "are doing what they think is best and are not guilty of any violation of hospitality," the foreigner is "nevertheless not immune from fear, and will have many reasons to harbor some fears" (Stavo-Debauge 2017, 204). In light of this observation, it should be emphasized that, too often, hospitality (perhaps following Derrida) is thought of exclusively as the opening of a well-defined place or even a subject. It is clear that, in order to give to another, we must open ourselves up; we must not close ourselves to the foreigner's call. But here we see that it is not necessary to open a *place* (the state takes care of this in the

11 But this emotion can sometimes be problematic. In some cases, it can represent a form of power that the person who elicits the emotion holds over the other, who is then indebted and has trouble returning the favor. As my focus in this is moments that go well and are hospitable, I will not linger on these possibilities. However, in Aulanier 2021b, I describe a moment, in which an asylum seeker's world falls apart following the rejection of his application for refugee status. He loses all ability to contribute to the small community he formed with social workers by serving as an interpreter. Emotionally, he asks for help. Here, it is the social worker who finds herself indebted in the relationship, unable to offer anything, following such a sudden and tragic appeal. Neither of them is in a position to make a positive contribution to the *common* ground of the *community*, attention is no longer shared, and no longer offers hospitality. There is nothing left (at this moment) to allow a revival of responsive ability.
More common, perhaps, is the insistence of some volunteers (particularly those who host asylum seekers in their homes) on explicitly seeking recognition from asylum seekers, by letting them know that they can (or must…) express their emotions. But this is not a straightforward issue, and we cannot confine ourselves to getting upset with people who welcome others, even if they expect something in return (emotion is a form of repayment), without studying the motivations behind their actions. Generally, hospitality is never entirely free (although it is worth the effort to make it as egalitarian as possible), and idealist visions of perfectly symmetrical hospitality should be avoided. At the very least, occupying a position that enables one to welcome another into a space implies an imbalance, even if it is not necessarily in the form of unequal rights.

form of reception centers, themselves rather inhospitable) to be in a mode of hospitality. Time and information can be offered in the name of hospitality; it is in this way that attention transforms into a mode of hospitality. In doing so, attention is at risk of the dangers defined by Stavo-Debauge in the expression "the newcomer's fears" (205). Paying too much attention to a newcomer increases the risk of them feeling anxious about "not being able to rise to the level of hospitality extended to them, or worrying about not knowing how to demonstrate the abilities that would seal their integration" (205). This fear signifies that while the modalities of opening attention may have constructed a common ground between those who are involved, the norms and customs of the host country have not become common. The common ground may, as is the case for Mahmoud, open specific domains of attention. Here, it is, in particular, the so-called German desire for "order," on which common ground is found. Attention is awakened by "the old streets, the big castle," which act as a reflective surface to sustain shared attention on an everyday problem for Mahmoud: the apparent order of the streets, which he contrasts with the "madness and noise" of cities in Iraq. But the desire for common ground, and through it the desire to participate, is not exhausted in these specific domains, numerous as they are. Mahmoud, who considers himself well-integrated (I speak German with him, he has a good command of the language; he cooks in a German restaurant and now knows how to prepare German specialties, etc.), continues to fear that he has not done enough to receive his papers. This fear sometimes pushes him to doubt his loyalty: does he *deserve* to stay in Germany? It is sometimes through this lens that he experiences the volunteers' invitations to continue participating in activities: he has to do even more. There is a long way to go before his attention is no longer redirected towards administrative concerns, towards his *papers*.

Despite all the care given to the way attention is offered, it remains a partial mode of hospitality, never certain, always risky. Achieving happy attention within certain specific domains does not mean that pathologies of attention are altogether resolved and that the newcomer's fears are behind them. This nonetheless permits a form of an augmentation of being, or of becoming-vigilance, as discussed by Natalie Depraz (2014, 143–201), which enables us to become more human (again). The struggle against the dehumanization engendered by the asylum system (Aulanier 2021c)—which leads to a separation from the outside world (Täubig 2019)—is nevertheless an important mode of hospitality in the sense that it allows the newcomer to emerge from their status as surplus, as a superfluous individual, through the common ground (never fixed and continuously nurtured) created by attention.

c. Scene 3: Story as mediation

The common ground of attention, as I have presented it, can have a reflective quality. This is particularly true in the case of a specific form of *story*, which I explore here, as I present the third scene of interactions between asylum seekers and volunteers.

An organization that works to support asylum seekers organized an afternoon for them to share their stories and their perceptions of hospitality in Lille. After presenting, Tidjani, an asylum seeker, explained:

> Me, I kind of wrote five pages like that, and my text was selected as the best text, and I have been asked to read it like that in front of people, so that people really understand the experience. I'm in the network now, basically. That—it's really amazing, a very, very powerful experience. Very powerful. A lot of emotion. And on top of that, it reframes you. [He pauses on this word, I ask him to elaborate.] I mean that truly, I had to take time to write this you know, to think back on meetings, think back on my entire life after arriving here in France. I realized the luck I had to, *voilà*, to have known so many people like that, like you, I met you there. Without that, I wouldn't have met you and… all the other people either. There, truly I've thought about that multiple times, and now I have the video to remember it. J. [a volunteer] sent it to me on *WhatsApp*. Black brothers and the French, I know almost all of them. Actually, she just sent a message: we're here until 5:30 PM, come one come all. You see, that's what's good about it, you get together, you chat, it's a huge relief. Yes, really! (*Interview, May 2019.*)

We see here, as in the previous scene, a durable aspect of attention, which does not limit itself to the instantaneousness of initial perception. This duration, this continuous contact, leads us to understand that hospitality goes beyond an "opening up." What is a "huge relief" to the asylum seeker here in particular is the fact of *re*joining the others, to see each other and offer a reassuring environment. The duration of hospitality is important (Stavo-Debauge 2019). This duration becomes effective here through the common ground that is progressively created through the shared attention to the stories told by asylum seekers. (On another note, within this association, courses, whose themes are largely determined by the explicit wishes of asylum seekers, work to set up and shape a common ground.) For example, in sharing his story, Tidjani does not solely offer an object of knowledge to be appropriated by the people present. Rather, through the attention that he pays to his own (written) story in the way that he reads it aloud and through the attention others pay to him as he speaks, "the phenomenon of attention opens an intersubjective scene that can no longer be reduced to the economy of property" (Alloa 2010, 137). And, as it can no longer be reduced to an economy of property, this scene nurtures common ground and allows it to last, because the quality of Tidjani's text is recognized. He is recognized as having something important to contribute to this common ground, which he is proud to point out to me several weeks later. Recognition of the quality of his text implies that the group members pay attention to him: they recognize him at the next meetings, talk to him again about his text, involve him in French courses for other asylum seekers. In this way, attention permits a mode of hospitality liberated in part from the burden of place, which belongs to someone who must open it (and then close it again) to offer protection to those who need it. This liberation is only partial, because a place must still have the minimal qualities of hospitality (calm, cleanliness, etc.) necessary for supporting shared attention. Thanks to this form of shared attention, writes Alloa, "the common bond is not formed on the basis of *being-one-through-the-other*, but on being devoted to that, which belongs neither to the other nor to Me." Everyone concentrates on the story in a different way, the "intentional beam bends and folds to form a shared attentional space" (Alloa 2010, 137). This attention among one another makes it possible to welcome clumsy, awkward calls, to borrow a phrase from the phenomenologist Michel Vanni.[12] Paying attention to the common-between-us [le commun-entre-

12 *Translator's note*: In the original French, Vanni introduces a play on words with his use of the term *mal-adressé*, translated literally in this sentence as *awkward*. The

nous] involves "not reacting too normatively to internal awkwardness that runs through [a system], but rather to make them productive" (Vanni 2010, 202). Starting from the common nature of attention, the other's awkwardness in how they address or respond to me is interpreted on the basis of the nascent and continuing relationship, not as characteristic of the other. I turn again to Vanni's reflections on what it means to be an activist:

> The activist here is one who, far from being frightened by the inherent awkwardness of all practical actions and all institutions, instead tries to encourage it. They are not an expert, nor a professional revolutionary, and they never know with total certainty, which are the worthy causes, nor if there are only voices to be heard and to be made heard. Yet, they act well and truly with urgency and determination, but without believing that the answers they give are definitive and perfectly addressed. In short, I intend to dispel any claim to a mastery of the voice. If there is such a thing as an activist creativity, it is essentially the result of trial and error, and deliberately so. Therefore, whatever the failures or delays, the activist will always refuse to succumb to despair, which is born above all from the mistaken belief in expert address and in the effectiveness of listening to voices. (Vanni 2010, 203.)

These lines seem important to my desire to characterize the relationships between asylum seekers and "helpers" when *they go well*. In their descriptions of a hospitable welcome or relationships that improve life as it is, asylum seekers rarely focus much on professional expertise. They know more or less where to find this when they need it. Instead, they focus on the fact that, regardless of their level of expertise, those who offer attention are conscious of the fact that the way calls are addressed may not be perfectly *effective*, but will be *more or less* understood. The common ground created by attention, when it is not rejected, also shatters "any claim to a mastery of voice." In doing so, it deflects hospitality towards an *in-between-space* (that is not exclusive to anyone) that allows, in reviving responsivity, to pave the way for a possible belonging that is

French word *adresse* can also mean directing (a speech or an action) and is translated as *address* in the following passage. Vanni juxtaposes the awkwardness and imperfection of activism with the illogical ideal of *l'adresse experte* (expert address).

neither assimilation of the newcomer nor forced integration. Hospitality takes place here on the basis of the awkwardness of responses that, far from being a pretext for accusations of mis-integration, are occasions to create a space for exchange based on third-party objects. These can be, as in the case described here, personal narratives that allow "a shared attentional space" to form. They can also be spaces of political struggle, or appear in a more everyday way, during conversations about the news or sports, for example.

To suppose that hospitality is found in the acceptance of awkwardness is to say that the common ground is not always constructed in a linear and rational way. Tone of voice, gazes, and gestures can all sometimes be as important as the content of the message itself, which can be difficult to grasp. In other words, awkwardness highlights the corporeal aspect of hospitality.

d. Scene 4

In contrast to the previous scenes, which concerned the modalities of attention, this final scene presents a positive aspect of *in*attention.

Samuel is Cameroonian. He is thirty-five. He arrived in Germany in 2015 during what has been called "the long summer of migration." He lives in the same reception center as Mahmoud, but has had very few relationships with social workers or volunteers. As his asylum application has not been successful, he has taken the opportunity to begin a work-study professional training program in baking. This program offers him the possibility to stay in Germany, until he receives his diploma, thanks to his status as "tolerated."[13] This status, he explains, is not very

13 *Geduldet* in German. In Samuel's case, this status, which allows him to work, has enabled a responsive revival. However, one should not be too quick to assume that this is an enviable status for migrants (even Samuel understands that he is not entirely welcome). With "chain toleration" (*Kettenduldung*), it is possible to have a particularly uncertain legal status for multiple years, without being able to see a future for oneself, since tolerance is valid only for the duration of the training program or after signing an employment contract. This is called "toleration," because this status is not a residence permit, but rather a suspension of the obligation to leave the country for people who otherwise would be deported from Germany. The ones who are classified as being under *Duldung* can, if the situation in their country of origin changes (in cases of people who are refused asylum, but cannot be deported due to a war in their country of origin) or if their individual situation changes (loss of employment, interruption in

clear to him. What he knows is "that it shows that they [the Germans] aren't super open to us being here either." Accommodation at the reception center, a frequently noisy place that cannot be made into a home, contributes to this impression.

> When you leave there, people know right away that you don't have your stable papers; for starters, you have black skin, or it's the same for all of the Arabs who live here, they can see that you're not *Deutsch*. But when you leave there, it's worse.

As the conversation continues, he talks about his education and general classroom experience. Just as in the immediate surroundings of the accommodation center, he feels *noticed*.

> For starters, I'm getting a little old, the others are children, so we're already not thinking about the same things. And then the teachers, they often say that we need to integrate, that we need to get better at the language, even if it's hard. There's another teacher, in math, he's nice you know, but he comes to talk to me all the time to tell me, "Let's go, keep it up." It's really annoying; I say thank you, but it's mentally exhausting. I know exactly what I need to do. But anyways…

In contrast, now, after eighteen months at the bakery he works for, he no longer has the impression of being the center of attention.

> Of course, my coworkers see me, they say hello, they ask me things. The boss is a little annoying, but you know, he's like that with everyone. He's not always watching over me, he's not, like, "Okay what did you do there with your flour, did you add the salt?", like the practice course teacher at school, for example. I do my job in peace, like, it relaxes the mind, because you have the impression of being a normal guy; I can concentrate on my job.

education…), be deported, even if they have been in Germany for many years. For more details about this status and the problems it entails, in particular for young Sub-Saharan immigrants, see Sandrine Bakoben's work, for example: Bakoben and Rühl 2020.

His words allow us to draw out a fourth lesson: too much attention suffocates the creativity of response. Samuel nevertheless distinguishes two major modalities of *overflow*. The first is present in public space: the place where he lives and the color of his skin lead him to feel a weight in the gaze of passersby. This sensation reminds him relentlessly of his status as an immigrant without a stable residence permit (even if he is there legally). In contrast, the "big city" has an aspect of rest, as urban sociology has long pointed out: a place opens up, if it is accessible without one's presence being noticed, or at least noticed as a potential immigrant, for example. This concerns being noticed solely *as a passerby*, and thus the response to the opening of attention becomes simply a form of averting one's gaze, in order to signify: you do not worry me, you are not out of the ordinary. "This attentional regime consists of putting certain powers of the eye to sleep, […]. This 'civil inattention' constitutes 'the effective form of the culture of city hospitality' (Joseph 2007, 217)." (Stavo-Debauge 2020b, 65.) Once an asylum seeker no longer feels noticed in public, they are protected by a certain form of anonymity. From this moment on, it is simpler for them to act, without their attention being alienated by the order of asylum and without the constitution of meaning being oriented towards their status as an asylum seeker every time their attention is opened. This observation—in addition to that of, for example, very poor living conditions (as referenced in Täubig 2009 and Aulanier 2020c, among many others)—is an argument in favor of smaller reception centers and accommodations in city apartments, both of which favor autonomy and anonymity, as well as integration into the urban fabric. It is, however, important to note that the city does not offer the same refuge for everyone. Florent Chossière (2021) has provided evidence that LGBTQI+ asylum seekers feel cramped in the city due to a fear of being recognized. In this way, population density can play an opposite role to that of the benevolent anonymity.

The second feeling of overflow, on the other hand, is situated at the heart of an intersubjective relationship, during Samuel's exchanges with his teachers. Even as he distinguishes a "nice teacher" who encourages him "all the time" from other instructors who explicitly discuss integration, the result is the same: "it's mentally exhausting." Showing someone that you are paying attention to them too insistently is counterproductive. Far from being able to create an inter-attention, which engages a form of common ground, giving one's attention in such a repetitive way is the gesture of someone *in the know*, who is not ready to abandon their power, and places the recipient of this attention in a position that can be infantilizing, especially for adults. This gesture prevents the recipient of this attention from directing it and from responding creatively. In the same way that "the success of the instructor's actions depends on the response of the person being taught," the success of one who pays attention to someone in need is dependent on the possibility of the latter to direct their attention. Further, "it is necessary to wait for attention to come. As the French suggests, *attention* is not only close to *intention*, but also to *attente* (waiting)" (Waldenfels 2010, 43). There is no point in being overly insistent, in coming "all the time" to show one's presence and availability. Aroused attention only becomes a mode of learning or, in our case, a mode of hospitality, when it is captured mid-air and redirected towards the construction of meaning that takes the aspect aroused as its basis, without being satisfied with it. Repetition brings with it the risk that "directed attention [will] degenerate into fabricated attention," which, as Waldenfels points out, is already "to some extent the reality we know" (43). In other words, paying attention to someone is important, and potentially crucial, for that person's responsive capacity, when it is possible to go beyond the intersubjective relationship, in order to call upon a common ground that does not solely belong to either of the two people involved in the exchange, but that opens to the world and helps interpret it. To give a brief example, it is nonsensical to make hospitality conditional on asylum seekers' efforts to pay attention to language learning: other means must be found to ensure that language emerges as the focus of attention. Otherwise, compulsory language courses are simply assimilation processes for the unilateral benefit of the state.[14] Attention must allow for a focus on the *relationship* itself, not weigh more heavily on one of its two poles.

14 The unilateral nature of this benefit arises when attendance at a language course comes to be seen by immigrants as something owed to the state, as a stigmatizing constraint that prevents them from voluntarily directing their attention. For more on this subject, see Emma Fiedler's work on integration courses for newcomers in France and Germany. For a preliminary overview, see Fiedler 2020.

These four lessons have provided us with the elements required to outline an ethics of attention, that is to say an attentive behavior with regard to the other that revives their capacity to respond, to make sense of that, which strikes them, and that has a lasting influence.

3. Attention as a mode of hospitality. Outlining an ethics of attention

Before developing a *mode* of hospitality, it seems necessary to shed light on what would constitute truly hospitable hospitality, starting from the evocation of contacts between the own and the alien. To do so, I draw on the one hand from Waldenfels's phenomenology of the alien, which describes healthy relationships with the alien, and on the other hand from Stavo-Debauge's grammar of hospitality. Below, I mention three key points.

First, hospitality must make way for the *extra*ordinary, the disconcerting. The gesture of hospitality is a gesture that creates common ground. In other words, conceiving hospitality means not pre-categorizing the welcomed, as is the case in cosmopolitan thought, particularly fashionable since the "crisis" of 2015.[15] Cosmopolitanism requires thinking about the common "*us*," a common morality. And this premise presumes a common political world. In a cosmopolitan world, those who do not belong to this performative "us," who do not belong to this "cement with definable attributes that enables men and peoples to come together" (Bisiaux 2016, 168), are excluded. Others ("undocumented" and "illegal" immigrants, "asylum seekers," etc.) are reduced to their own voice since:

> No We says "we," but I or someone else says "we," and this to you or to you all. No "we," however inclusive, can clarify this difference between the own and the alien position. A purely "inclusive community" would be a ghost. The performative "we" of the act of declaration does not coincide with the "we" of acknowledgement of the end of the declaration. (Waldenfels 2007, 362.)

15 Among other references: *Raison présente* 2017 (201); Policar 2019.

The only way for the alien to exist is paradoxically to no longer be alien. Those who remain others, outside the movement of appropriation and the entry into the cosmopolitan sphere—the rejects, the excluded, the outsiders—, are undesirables who may become enemies. They are not among those who can be received, who can participate in the sharing, the creation of common ground. Common ground must be thought of as a result: as a socio-phenomenologist, it is necessary to show how it is created and how the actors experience it. Cosmopolitanism, on the contrary, presupposes common ground (common Humanity, common Reason…), and finally asks a lot of the other, who must take part in a common sphere, before even trying to contribute to it.[16]

Second, the welcomer must be able to "contain" ["encaisser"] the shock of the other's appearance, as explained by Stavo-Debauge (2009, 238 *et seq*.). In other words, before welcoming the other, one must have the strength and the energy necessary to face the new, which is never neutral. The ability to absorb change that is at work in hospitality also depends on the habitability of the place, which must "covet facility of movement, ease of gesture, convenience of space" (Breviglieri 2006b, 92). A certain arrangement of the space is required to allow both the welcomer and the welcomed to absorb part of the discord of the relationship. Own space becomes common space and in so doing, the everyday is changed. Mirroring containment [encaissement], too much must not be expected of the other. The welcomer must not demand that the other should change, must not be awaiting a shock, an experience that improves their being or satisfies their curiosity (through the moment that hosts sometimes expect, in which the welcomed reveal themselves, offering their story in exchange for hospitality).

Third, and finally, "it is also necessary to consider [the] temporal deployment [of hospitality], by going beyond the sole decision that opens hospitality to the

16 Regarding the dynamic of the exclusion of the foreigner from cosmopolitanism, see my commentary on Waldenfels in Aulanier 2021a. For a more detailed presentation that returns to the sources of cosmopolitanism before considering a cosmo-politics that is more respectful with regard to the foreigner, see Sophie-Anne Bisiaux's book (2016). We refer to the first section (Bisiaux 2016, 25–72), before she details her own suggestions, in order to learn more about cosmopolitanism's ambivalent relationship to the alien.

other and by understanding it as a welcome as much as a reception" (Stavo-Debauge 2017, 208). The sociologist is thinking here of the Derridean concept of hospitality, which focuses entirely on the extreme openness of a subject-welcomer for the guest-welcomed. If, in fact, hospitality begins with openness to the other's call, it endures over time. It requires adaptations and is not steady. The relationship transforms over time, as the guest develops the ability to live with the welcoming community, rather than in someone else's home.

Building upon the four lessons described above and upon these three key points, I will now outline an ethics of attention, which is one possible mode of hospitality.

It must first be noted, with Waldenfels, that "attention is connected to adoration, to respect, to regard, to watching-out, to *Andenken*. [...] Those who keep an eye on the Other cannot help but notice when there is something wrong with him, but also if he is somehow joyful." (2011, 65–66.) With these links, we see that attention engages a corporeal gesture, which is visible in the German *Zuwendung* and which once again shows that attention is not something that is purely personal, but is rather situated between the *own* and the *alien*. Above all, this corporeal gesture depends on something or someone that arouses it. Attention awakens, when something or someone is there: this is an eminently practical issue, based on the fact that the alien *is* there. It is not a question of an "us," of defining the limits of who we can/should welcome. The fact is plainly that the alien is there and awakens attention. It is in this sense that Waldenfels recommends a politics of neighborhood (2021), which conceives of hospitality on the basis of everyday encounters in close geographical proximity and third-party figures who help make these encounters possible. Conceiving of attention on the basis of neighborhood reduces the risk of placing too much weight on the event of appearance: if I offer attention, then the creation of the sphere of common attention turns this instantaneous state into a (more or less) enduring one. Giving one's attention is not as demanding as the gift that goes beyond what one possesses of the Derridean hospitality, since attention is precisely what I never possess in my own right. To pay attention is to engage a common ground, which can continue in a doing-together or in an understanding-together. In any case, there is a form of reciprocity in attention that is situated beyond that, which is actually exchanged. For the foreigner, this common reciprocity is perceived in the first person as hospitality, because it enables a revival of responsivity by breaking out of the ruts of meaning created by the world of asylum. This common ground is what gets the ball rolling to "establish a community, to which they could both belong; insofar as it would be hospitable to the sharing of things that concern them, so that they could live together and hold together, despite that which separates them and what they are otherwise attached to." "This dynamic was not modeled" (Stavo-Debauge 2017, 289), explains the author, by Simmel, Schütz, Derrida, and Crépon, who he studies in his book. The phenomenon of attention appears to allow us, following the conclusion of Stavo-Debauge, not to overly separate hospitality from integration.[17] The former continues, while the latter's process begins. Attention, through the duration of the common ground that it creates (let us think back to Aslam's social worker, to Mahmoud's new interpretations…), is a hospitality that does not forget that the guest can be treated as a member of the community. Even in cases, where the joint object of attention is a story told by a foreigner, it does not function as a worn-out story offered up to thank the host, but as a point of departure of a responsive re-birth, as the story does not have an imposed framework. It speaks from a self, but addressing a small community allows for a necessary distance, and an interweaving of action and suffering. Finally, attention is linked to regards, according to the quote from Waldenfels. These regards appear in multiple ways, but they are never as present as when *in*-attention becomes necessary to responsive reconstruction. Being hospitable here means not giving one's attention, not insisting, when one perceives that insistence no longer leaves space for the creativity of the response, that the common ground is no longer sustained, but that the call of the other is perceived as a sort of threat. When attention is focused on the common ground, as in inter-attention, it is truly a mode of hospitality that allows the welcomer to take care of themselves as much as they take care of the other.

Attention, however, leaves little room for place. Of course, a meeting place is necessary, but it is not centrally important. Moreover, this is perhaps what makes attention only *a* mode of hospitality, that it remains incomplete for

17 A heavily charged concept in the sociological sense and one that should be used with caution, *integration* nonetheless allows us to highlight an essential point: when we think of hospitality, we must think of its duration, and enable the welcomed not to remain a guest, but to finally be able to be *at home*.

understanding the nature of this relationship between hosts and guests. There is a moment when a sustainably inhabitable place is necessary. But in the case of asylum seekers, it is perhaps precisely this minor importance given to place that makes attention such an important mode of hospitality, in contrast to the official state reception that provides housing, though not always, or even the space of the national territory. The experiences depicted in the four scenes above show that hospitality cannot be reduced to the question of reception infrastructure; rather, it concerns the milieu that allows (or prevents) sharing (thus a dynamic process). The experience of this sharing, and thus of hospitality, is then realized through the experience of being able to direct one's attention creatively once again, to act creatively through the lively experience of imagination.[18] Directing one's attention creatively means being able to give responses that go beyond (at least partially) *the order of asylum*, as I described it in the first part of this text. Such responses are creative not in the sense that they escape any order, but in the sense that, starting from a solicitation of attention, they create a new direction. This direction is not *imaginary*, it is also subject to other orders, but it is not trapped in a rut of meaning. But, while it is not imaginary, it is permitted by the lively experience of imagination, which I understand here as a capacity to project oneself into the future, to suspend pre-established response pathways, in order to attempt, clumsily, through trial and error, new paths. These paths do not always work, do not always yield *results*, but they contribute to making experience lively, to maintaining hope by staying in motion and awakening attention. A mode of attention that allows such experiences of imagination is particularly important for asylum seekers, who have seen their possibilities for hope mishandled by the order of asylum. These difficulties are not without consequence for taking care of oneself, as is demonstrated by Camara's lucid and sad analysis quoted at the beginning of this article ("when you lose hope, your self-confidence goes with it," he said). To experience the liveliness of imagination is to regain the ability to hope.

18 For more on the links between imagination and attention, notably drawing from Ricoeur and Boltanski, see Ascarate 2022 (chapter II and III) and Loute 2020. On the concept of acting creatively, which I borrow from Waldenfels with slight modifications, I refer back to chapter 4 of his work on the limits of normalization, entitled "Symbolic, Creative, and Responsive Aspects of Action" (Waldenfels 2008, 82–94).

If the management of asylum seeker's attention is an element of the reception system and is one of the manifestations of the state's inhospitality, an ethics of attention responds by developing a common ground that combats this inhospitality.

Conclusion

I have shown, based on empirical research, that the asylum system in Europe provokes pathologies of attention for asylum seekers. The goal of this text was thus to examine possible remedies for these pathologies, while understanding that they cannot disappear entirely as long as one remains an asylum seeker, due to the weight of rigid administrative constraints present during this time. Through the analysis of different scenes, I was able to develop the first outline of an ethics of attention as a mode of hospitality. Attention allows hospitality not to be thought of as a movement that goes primarily from the self to the alien, risking overlooking the wishes of the welcomed. The inherent trial and error of attention makes it possible, among other things, to understand the intentions of the person being welcomed through consecutive attempts, which are not necessarily the same as those of the welcomer.[19] What is at stake for everyone is the successful creation of a common ground through shared attention.

Through its approach, this text establishes a window into a phenomenological practice, notably opened by Natalie Depraz (2004). Indeed, "in phenomenology one is used to not knowing exactly what one is looking for, and to turning this partial ignorance into an additional stimulus for research, a spur to open up questions and problems" (Vanni 2009, 11). In my research, I began by describing situations using the practical tools of phenomenology. The proposition of an ethics of attention was constructed in the same way—clumsily and by testing different avenues, taking circuitous routes—that a common ground is built in the relationships between asylum seekers and those who help them. To be interested in modes of response is to leave behind an ethics of the *Other*, which presupposes the Other as a starting

19 This also allows "not to confuse transit with reception." For a discussion on the omission of the migrants' intentions, see the critique that Joan Stavo-Debauge (2020a) addresses to Michel Agier.

point, and take on the features of a responsive ethics as described by Bernhard Waldenfels. The ethics of attention as a mode of hospitality proposed here is ultimately a practical variant of the German phenomenologist's elaborations regarding intermediate domains, which contain "co-affections, cooperation, life rhythms, social techniques, relationships, value tables, norm systems—in short, everything that can neither be attributed exclusively to myself nor exclusively to Others" (2012, 14).[20] Attention as an intermediate domain is the point of departure for a relational hospitality, which in itself belongs to no one. Phenomenology ultimately allows us to detach hospitality both from cosmopolitanism, which encompasses the own and the alien in a common reason, and the total engagement of a *subject*, which risks understanding a unilateral hospitality.

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20 The next step for this research would be to consider moving from an ethics of attention to an attentional politics of the alien. Here, the ethics of attention can in a certain way act as a practical guide for "helpers." The shift to politics would involve reflecting on what a community guided by the modes of attention described above should look like. For example, it would probably be necessary to accentuate intermediaries of all kinds (interpreters, psychologists, social workers, etc.), who enable us to establish personal relationships that are a stepping-stone to feeling a sense of belonging to the community. But I wonder to what extent the shift to a truly political way of thinking would overly stiffen the flexibility, with which attention, within the bounds of the neighborhood, allows hospitality to be seen as a responsive revival. A politics, in which responsive revival is an *objective* to be achieved, would lose sight of its principle: the need to let attention fumble, try things out, experiment. It would also risk being too quick to turn certain types of experience into "tricks" to be applied after certain events, forgetting that sometimes these events, when they are not contained [encaissé], do not allow us to "experiment" (Stavo-Debauge 2012a).
This research is therefore unfinished and will require further discussions, in-depth explorations, and testing.

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Damir Smiljanić

Das Pathos des Sozialen
Neue Phänomenologie und Soziologie
(Ein Gespräch mit Robert Gugutzer)

> Damir Smiljanić: *Lieber Herr Gugutzer, Sie bemühen sich seit Jahren darum, die Neue Phänomenologie von Hermann Schmitz für die soziologische Diskussion fruchtbar zu machen. Woher kommt das Interesse am Werk eines eigenwilligen Denkers, der selbst in der philosophischen Branche als „Geheimtipp" gehandelt wird?*

Robert Gugutzer: Ich bin während meiner Dissertationszeit, die ich im Graduiertenkolleg „Identitätsforschung" an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg verbrachte, auf Hermann Schmitz gestoßen. Meine Dissertation hatte ich zunächst als eine körpersoziologische Arbeit zum Thema „Identität" angelegt – es sollte, kurz gesagt, um die Frage gehen, worin die Identitätsrelevanz des Körpers besteht. Einer der Dozenten des Kollegs war der Politologe Walter Reese-Schäfer, der in einem Nebensatz mal zu mir sagte, er glaube, dass für mein Dissertationsthema die Leibphänomenologie des Philosophen Hermann Schmitz wertvoll sein könnte. Der Name Schmitz sagte mir nichts, aber ich nahm die Empfehlung meines Dozenten ernst und habe deshalb das *System der Philosophie* zu lesen begonnen. Auch wenn ich erstmal vieles nicht verstanden habe, hat mich dieser Ansatz, vor allem die Leibphilosophie, fasziniert. Das führte schließlich dazu, dass sich die theoretische Ausrichtung meiner Dissertation verschob, nämlich eher weg von der Körpersoziologie hin zur Leibphänomenologie. Die Körpersoziologie war zu der Zeit – Anfang der 2000er Jahre – eine junge, schnell wachsende Bindestrichsoziologie, in der ich mich dann nach Abschluss meiner Dissertation einige Jahre engagierte und dabei konsequent Schmitz' Leibphänomenologie starkmachte. Sozial bedeutsam ist eben nicht nur der Körper, sondern auch der Leib. Von da ging es dann weiter in die Allgemeine Soziologie mit meinem Versuch, deren rationalistischen und aktivistischen Bias leibphänomenologisch zu korrigieren. Der Ausgangspunkt war also Schmitz' Leibphilosophie, später kamen dann noch seine Situations- und Atmosphärentheorie hinzu. Leib, Situation, Atmosphäre sind Themen und Konzepte, die in der Soziologie, und zwar auch in der phänomenologischen Soziologie, die sich ja primär als Wissenssoziologie versteht, nach wie vor zu wenig Beachtung finden. Mit

Schmitz kann man daher die Soziologie konstruktiv erweitern, und das reizt mich.

Sie haben prägnant die drei Grundpfeiler der Schmitz'schen Art von Phänomenologie benannt. Bleiben wir zunächst beim Leib. *Spätestens seit Plessners grundlegenden Arbeiten zur philosophischen Anthropologie ist dies ein* terminus technicus *in der Philosophie. Was ist das Neue in Schmitz' Leibphänomenologie, das, was ihn von phänomenologischen Autoren wie Edmund Husserl oder Maurice Merleau-Ponty, aber auch von Plessner und anderen Leibphilosophen unterscheidet? Und warum sollte das auch für die Soziologie von Wichtigkeit sein, die bisher eher den Begriff des Körpers bevorzugt hat?*

Ich würde sagen, dass Schmitz vielleicht der erste Philosoph ist, der den Leib als Phänomen bzw., genauer gesagt, als Phänomengebiet wirklich ernst genommen und einen Leibbegriff entwickelt hat, der klar, präzise und so differenziert ist wie kein anderer Leibbegriff. Plessner wird in der Soziologie immer wieder mit seiner Unterscheidung von „Leibsein" und „Körperhaben" zitiert, doch hat Plessner selbst keineswegs klar zwischen Leib und Körper differenziert, die beiden Begriffe vielmehr recht unsystematisch verwendet. Wichtiger war für ihn die Unterscheidung von Sein und Haben des Körpers/Leibes. Husserl hat zwar das Wort *Leib* genutzt und zum Beispiel von „Empfindnissen" gesprochen, so wie auch Merleau-Ponty, der außerdem Wahrnehmung und Bewegung starkgemacht hat. Aber beide Autoren meinten *de facto* immer wieder den materiellen, physischen Körper, den Körper als (nicht zuletzt naturwissenschaftliches) Objekt, wenn sie vom Leib sprachen. Schmitz differenziert hier viel konsequenter. Leib und Körper (und Seele) sind für Schmitz verschiedene Phänomene, wobei Leib das affektive Betroffensein, das sich Spüren meint. Er versteht den Leib als ein pathisches Phänomen und nicht, wie Husserl, Merleau-Ponty oder auch Waldenfels in einem „fungierenden" Sinne. Schmitz hat den riesigen Phänomenbereich des Spürens philosophisch entdeckt und salonfähig gemacht, und davon profitiert auch die Soziologie in mehrfacher Hinsicht. Erstens eröffnet sich für die Soziologie mit dem Leib ein thematisches Spektrum, das, z. B., die Soziologie der Sinne und Emotionen zu erweitern hilft. Zweitens eignet sich der Schmitz'sche Leibbegriff für eine Korrektur soziologischer Grundbegriffe und -ideen, von denen viele einen kognitivistischen, rationalistischen, aktivistischen Bias haben. „Verstehen", z. B., ist nicht nur rationales, sondern auch leibliches Verstehen, und Soziologie muss (oder sollte) keineswegs eine reine Handlungswissenschaft sein, sondern kann (oder sollte) auch eine „Widerfahrniswissenschaft" sein, wie ich das in meinem Buch *Das Pathos des Sozialen* genannt habe. Drittens ist die Leibphänomenologie von Schmitz für eine kultur- und zeitkritische Analyse der modernen Gesellschaft nützlich. Aus der „Sicht" des Leibes kann man sehr präzise die personalen und lebensweltlichen Kosten benennen, die sich aus der Durchsetzung des Cartesianismus, Rationalismus und des Siegeszuges der Naturwissenschaften ergeben haben.

Der Begriff der Situation scheint in der Soziologie einen festen Platz zu haben (man denke etwa an das Thomas-Theorem oder die Verwertung dieses Begriffs im symbolischen Interaktionismus bzw. der Rational-Choice-Theory*). Welche Facetten des Situationsbegriffs wären von Nutzen für die Soziologie, wenn man sich dabei von der Neuen Phänomenologie inspirieren ließe? Der Gegenbegriff zu „Situation" bei Schmitz ist „Konstellation". Welche Implikationen hätte das Spannungsverhältnis* *zwischen Situation und Konstellation für die soziologische Analyse des menschlichen Verhaltens und Handelns?*

Es ist richtig, dass der Situationsbegriff in der Soziologie eine lange Tradition hat. So unterschiedlich die soziologischen Situationsbegriffe sind, ähneln sie sich dabei mehrheitlich darin, dass damit mikrosoziale Situationen gemeint sind, in denen *face-to-face* Interaktionen stattfinden, also eine körperliche Kopräsenz von mindestens zwei Akteuren gegeben ist, die sich wechselseitig wahrnehmen. Der neophänomenologische Situationsbegriff ist verglichen damit breiter angelegt und differenzierter. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass, wie Schmitz sagt, Menschen in ganz verschiedenen, ineinander verschachtelten Situationen leben, hilft sein Situationsverständnis beispielsweise, den traditionellen soziologischen Gegensatz von Individuum und Gesellschaft oder von Mikro- und Makrosoziologie zu überwinden. Egal um welchen sozialen Sachverhalt es geht, empirisch betrachtet sind immer persönliche und gemeinsame Situationen, aktuelle und zuständliche Situationen, impressive und segmentierte Situationen ineinander verschränkt. In diesem Sinne plädiere ich für einen „methodologischen Situationismus" in der Soziologie. Einen weiteren Vorteil des Schmitz'schen Situationsbegriffs sehe ich darin, dass er eine Vielzahl sozialer Kollektive begrifflich genauer zu erfassen erlaubt, als es der Soziologie üblicherweise gelingt. Das gilt zum Beispiel für den Gegensatz von Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, aber auch, wie Michael Uzarewicz gezeigt hat, für soziale Phänomene wie Massen, Meuten, Trauben oder Herden. Und mit Blick auf das für Schmitz wichtige Spannungsverhältnis von Situation und Konstellation scheint mir seine soziologische Relevanz vor allem in einer kritischen Gesellschaftsdiagnose und Gesellschaftstheorie zu liegen. Die von Schmitz nachgewiesene Tendenz zum Konstellationismus findet sich in der Soziologie ja sinngleich in Schlagwörtern wie Individualisierung, Singularisierung, Atomisierung oder Digitalisierung. Damit sind gesellschaftliche Prozesse bezeichnet, die im Schmitz'schen Sinne auf einen Bedeutungsverlust gemeinsamer, implantierender Situationen hinweisen. Unabhängig davon, ob man hier eine kulturkritische Lesart präferiert oder nicht, *Situation* und *Konstellation* scheinen mir nützliche begriffliche Instrumente für eine genaue Analyse der Gegenwartsgesellschaft zu sein.

> *Neben den Konzepten des Leibes und der Situation ist auch – vielleicht sogar* vor allem *– derjenige der* Atmosphäre *ein „Aushängeschild“ der Neuen Phänomenologie. So werden Gefühle als eigenartige Atmosphären statt als „innere Zustände“ des einzelnen Menschen beschrieben. Das hat dann etwas mit Schmitz’ Kritik der abendländischen Auffassung der Seele zu tun – damit auch mit seiner Kritik der philosophischen Grundlagen der Psychologie als selbstständiger Wissenschaft. Könnte man etwas dergleichen auch an der Soziologie aussetzen – eventuell am Begriff des* Raumes*, von dem in den meisten soziologischen Theorien ausgegangen wird? Lassen sich Atmosphären auch sozial verorten? Wie könnte man also Schmitz’ Atmosphärenbegriff produktiv in die soziologische Diskussion einbeziehen? Was sind hier die Theoretisierungschancen, welche* Möglichkeiten *bieten sich für die empirische Forschung – und vor allem: was sind die methodologischen oder sonstigen Vorurteile, die man vielleicht zuerst beseitigen müsste?*

Das waren jetzt viele und vor allem viele gewichtige Fragen auf einmal. Ich will mal so anfangen: Von Schmitz’ Atmosphärentheorie kann die Soziologie als allererstes und ganz grundsätzlich lernen, dass Atmosphären Phänomene *sui generis* sind. Das ist weniger selbstverständlich, als man meinen könnte. Die Soziologie hat zwar quasi von Geburt an atmosphärische Ereignisse und Situationen gesehen, aber Atmosphären nicht als eigenständige sozial relevante Phänomene behandelt. Marx zum Beispiel sprach Mitte des 19. Jahrhunders von einer „revolutionären Atmosphäre“ in Europa, Durkheim von der sozial integrierenden Kraft „kollektiver Efferveszenzen“, die nichts anderes sind als gemeinsam erlebte Atmosphären, und auch Simmels Beschreibungen des „großstädtischen Seelenlebens“ Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts sind voller atmosphärischer Verweise. Man könnte vielleicht sogar Webers „Geist des Kapitalismus“ als eine atmosphärische Erscheinung interpretieren … Auch in aktuellen soziologischen Gegenwartsdiagnosen wie jenen von Hartmut Rosa, Andreas Reckwitz oder Heinz Bude ist von Stimmungen und Atmosphären als Phänomenen, die für das menschliche Zusammenleben wichtig sind, die Rede. Doch einen soziologischen Atmosphärenbegriff, geschweige denn eine soziologische Atmosphärentheorie gibt es nicht, wenngleich sich in den letzten Jahren mit dem Aufkommen der *affect studies* hier einiges tut. Mehrheitlich aber werden in der Soziologie kollektive Atmosphären – und nur darum geht es der Soziologie, von privaten Atmosphären, wie Schmitz das tut, spricht sie natürlich nicht – emotionssoziologisch interpretiert. In der Raumsoziologie, der Architektursoziologie und durch meine Arbeiten auch in der Sportsoziologie gibt es mittlerweile aber eine verstärkte Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber den Atmosphären als Phänomenen in eigenem Recht, und das hat zweifelsfrei damit zu tun, dass Schmitz' Arbeiten in der Soziologie zunehmend breiter rezipiert werden. Dasselbe gilt im Übrigen für die ästhetikphilosophischen Arbeiten von Gernot Böhme, in denen die Atmosphären ja ebenfalls eine wichtige Rolle spielen.

Ich würde also sagen, Schmitz' Atmosphärenkonzept dient der Soziologie, in den Worten Herbert Blumers, zu allererst als ein *sensitizing concept*: Wer die Schmitz'sche Atmosphären-Brille aufsetzt, sieht Atmosphären, wo andere nichts oder nur Unscharfes sehen. In diesem Sinne ist der Schmitz'sche Atmosphärenbegriff ein empirischer Gewinn für die Soziologie, sensibilisiert er sie doch für ein *bis dato* sträflich vernachlässigtes, sozial relevantes Phänomen, das es zu untersuchen gilt. Darüber hinaus halte ich den Atmosphärenbegriff von Schmitz sowohl für die Sozialtheorie als auch für die Gesellschaftstheorie bedeutsam. Sozialtheoretisch könnten – meines Erachtens müssten – die drei zentralen Themen der Soziologie um das Atmosphärenkonzept erweitert werden: Soziales Handeln, soziale Ordnung und sozialer Wandel sind untrennbar mit Atmosphären verknüpft, weshalb es diese sozialtheoretisch zu berücksichtigen gilt. Zugespitzt gesagt: Atmosphären sind ein soziales Existenzial. Und dass Atmosphären von der Gesellschaftstheorie nicht mehr ignoriert werden können, sollte spätestens seit der Corona-Pandemie oder dem Aufkommen rechtspopulistischer bzw. rechtsextremer Gruppen und Parteien eine Selbstverständlichkeit sein, wurde bzw. wird das soziale Klima davon doch maßgeblich beeinflusst. Eine soziologische Gesellschaftstheorie, die nicht über den Menschen schwebt, sondern sich empirisch verortet, hat deshalb auch eine Makrosoziologie der Atmosphären zu integrieren.

Sie beschäftigen sich intensiv mit Fragen einer Sportsoziologie *– nicht nur in der Lehre, sondern auch in Ihren theoretischen Publikationen. Können Sie an diesem konkreten Beispiel – an der Exploitation des Leibes in der Leistungsgesellschaft – kurz aufzeigen, was die Vorteile der neuphänomenologischen Vorgehensweise sind? Zu welchen Einsichten führt sie?*

Da Sie meine Lehre ansprechen: Ich habe es überwiegend mit Studierenden der Sportwissenschaft zu tun, und bei denen ernte ich jedes Mal wieder großes Staunen, wenn ich ihnen nahezubringen versuche, dass sie für ihren Sport nicht nur ihren Körper brauchen, sondern auch ihren Leib. „Was ist das, der Leib? Wofür brauchen wir den Leib, warum reicht nicht das Wort ‚Körper'?" Das sind typische Fragen, die ich gestellt bekomme. Die Sportsoziologie reagiert auf den Leibbegriff ganz ähnlich: Wozu ist dieser brauchbar? Ich versuche, und zwar in der Lehre genauso wie in meiner Forschung, deutlich zu machen, dass das Spüren nicht nur etwas anderes ist als der von außen beobachtbare und instrumentell einsetzbare Körper, sondern dass das Spüren ganz entscheidend ist für das sportliche Handeln und Interagieren. Ich setze dazu an den empirischen Phänomenen des Sports an, um den analytischen Gewinn des neophänomenologischen Leibbegriffs zu demonstrieren. Ausgehend von meiner These einer „Dualität von Körper und Leib" will ich, z. B., zeigen, dass für den Sport nicht nur „Techniken des Körpers" (Marcel Mauss) wichtig sind, sondern ebenso Techniken des Leibes. Mit einem Ausdruck von Schmitz meine ich damit zum Beispiel Techniken der „Leibbemeisterung", also den konstruktiven Umgang mit Affekten und leiblichen Regungen aller Art. Einer meiner Forschungsschwerpunkte ist die *Sportsucht*, und die lässt sich gut beschreiben, wenn man den Sport als eine „Technik zur Auslösung personaler Regression" versteht, wie es bei Schmitz heißt. Die Sportsoziologie profitiert also vom Schmitz'schen Leibbegriff insofern, als damit sportrelevante Phänomene (z. B. auch *flow* oder das Gefühl der Stimmigkeit) genauer beschrieben werden können als mit welchem Körperbegriff auch immer. In diesem Sinne könnte man auch einen kulturkritischen Blick auf den Sport werfen, wie Sie es andeuten, nämlich die Ausbeutung – oder moderater formuliert: das Ignorieren – des Leibes im Leistungssport. Soziologisch ergiebiger finde ich persönlich, mit Hilfe von Schmitz' Leibphänomenologie das sportliche Geschehen zu analysieren, um es besser zu verstehen. Hierfür ist Schmitz' Konzept der *leiblichen Kommunikation* von allergrößter Bedeutung. Eine Sportsoziologie, die mit diesem Konzept arbeitet, ist, z. B., in der Lage, die ohne Worte vonstattengehenden Abstimmungs- und Verständigungsprozesse in der alltäglichen Praxis des Sports genauer zu beschreiben als das gängige soziologische Konzepte wie „körperliche Interaktion" oder „nonverbale

Kommunikation“ vermögen. Leibliche Kommunikation ist ein enorm fruchtbares Analyseinstrument für alle mikrosozialen Situationen, in denen die Beteiligten spontan, intuitiv, ohne Reaktionszeit agieren und reagieren. Es ist außerdem ein Konzept, mit dem transhumane Koordinationsprozesse, etwa zwischen Reiterin und Pferd, phänomengerecht beschrieben werden können, genauso wie zwischen den Athleten und ihren Sportgeräten und den – wie Schmitz sagen würde – *Halbdingen*, mit denen sie zu tun haben, etwa dem Wind oder der Nacht. Schmitz’ Leibphänomenologie weitet damit den Blick auf sozial relevante Phänomene des Sports und liefert der Sportsoziologie die hierfür passenden analytischen Instrumente gleich mit.

Könnten Sie am Beispiel einer konkreten Sportart kurz aufzeigen, wie sich hier mit neuphänomenologischen Begriffen des Leibes, der Situation und der Atmosphäre entsprechende Phänomene beschreiben lassen?

Ich will es mal am Beispiel Fußball versuchen. Mit Hilfe von Schmitz’ Situationstypologie lässt sich die Sportart Fußball als gemeinsam-zuständlich-segmentiert-inkludierende Situation beschreiben im Unterschied zu einem konkreten Fußballspiel, das eine gemeinsam-aktuell-impressiv-inkludierende Situation ist. Wer von klein auf Fan eines Fußballvereins ist, für den ist das Fansein eine persönlich-zuständlich-segmentiert-implantierende Situation. Diese Situationsbeschreibungen sind zugegebenermaßen ziemlich hässliche Wortungetüme, hier bräuchte es elegantere Kurzversionen, um leichter mit diesen Situationstypen arbeiten zu können. Für eine neophänomenologisch-soziologische Fußballforschung sind sie dennoch hilfreich, vor allem wenn man die drei konzeptuellen Bausteine des Situationsbegriffs dazu nimmt. Denn damit lassen sich zum Beispiel atmosphärische Unterschiede in einem Fußballstadion sehr gut beschreiben, etwa bei einem so genannten „Geisterspiel“ verglichen mit einem Spiel, bei dem das Stadion einem „Hexenkessel“ gleicht. In beiden Fällen handelt es sich um Stadionatmosphären in einer gemeinsam-aktuell-impressiv-inkludierenden Situation, doch könnten die Atmosphären nicht unterschiedlicher sein. Der Grund dafür ist, dass die Sachverhalte, Programme und Probleme in beiden Situationen grundverschieden sind: Der offenkundigste Sachverhalt ist, dass im einen Fall keine, im anderen Fall sehr viele Zuschauer anwesend sind; aus Sicht der Spieler sind zudem die Erwartungshaltungen wie auch die programmatischen Wünsche und Hoffnungen sowie die möglichen Probleme andere, je nachdem, ob Zuschauer anwesend sind oder nicht. Weil Atmosphären in Situationen eingebettet sind, lassen sich ihre vielfältigen Erscheinungsweisen aus einer situationstheoretischen Perspektive sehr genau beschreiben. Das gilt im Übrigen nicht nur für kollektive, sondern auch für private Atmosphären. Erinnern Sie sich an den Kopfstoß von Zinédine Zidane gegen Marco Materazzi im WM-Finale 2006? Wenn man verstehen will, wie es zu diesem spektakulären Verhalten kommen konnte, ist es hilfreich, Atmosphären als machtvolle Phänomene zu begreifen, von denen Menschen so sehr ergriffen werden können, dass sie sich spontan danach verhalten. Zidane hat den so genannten „Widderkopfstoß" gezeigt, weil er von der privaten Atmosphäre „Wut" oder „Zorn" ergriffen wurde. Und dass er in den Bann dieser atmosphärischen Macht geriet und diese „Gebärdensicherheit", wie Schmitz sagt, zeigte, hatte mit seiner gemeinsamen Herkunftssituation zu tun, allen voran dem Programm „Ehre", das in der persönlichen Situation von Zidane fest verankert ist.

Kann bei der Beschreibung des Fußballspiels auch der Begriff der leiblichen Kommunikation von Nutzen sein?

Das Erkenntnispotenzial von Schmitz' Leibphänomenologie lässt sich besonders gut am Beispiel der leiblichen Kommunikation in einem Fußballspiel illustrieren. Ich habe das in mehreren Seminaren mit meinen Studierenden untersucht, und dabei haben wir unter anderem Folgendes herausgearbeitet: Fußbälle können subjektiv als zu leicht oder zu schwer empfunden werden, und dieser synästhetische Charakter entscheidet, ob man gute oder schlechte Pässe spielen kann; eine Flanke oder ein Einwurf ist eine Bewegungssuggestion, die dazu führt, dass der „Empfänger" des Balls dorthin läuft, wo die Flugkurve des Balles endet und nicht dorthin, wo sie beginnt; ein Linksverteidiger weiß sich leiblich im Raum zu orientieren, so lange die Seitenlinie links von ihm ist – muss er als Rechtsverteidiger spielen, befindet er sich in einem fremden leiblichen Richtungsraum, an den er sich erst gewöhnen muss; wer Stammspieler ist und mit anderen Stammspielern zusammenspielt, empfindet das als solidarische Einleibung („es funktioniert reibungsfrei"), während das Zusammenspiel mit Ersatzspielern einer wechselseitig-antagonistischen Einleibung („es ist Sand im Getriebe") gleicht, selbst wenn die Ersatzspieler genauso gut sind wie die Stammspieler; die leibliche Kommunikation und auch leibliche Regungen unterscheiden sich in ihrer subjektiv erlebten Qualität, je nachdem, ob es sich um die Situation „Training" oder „Ligaspiel" handelt. Viele weitere Beispiele ließen sich nennen.

> *Diese anregenden Ausführungen zum Thema „Fußball" dürften ausreichen, um das deskriptive Potential des Schmitz'schen Vokabulars anzudeuten. Gibt es jedoch Begrifflichkeiten, die bei Schmitz nicht vorkommen, die aber ebenfalls fruchtbar für die Verwertung von Sportereignissen wären? Das heißt: auf eine Weise, die von Vorteil für den neuphänomenologischen Ansatz wäre?*

Schmitz ist ja nicht nur dafür bekannt, dass er seine Begriffe genau definiert, sodass man immer weiß, wovon er spricht (womit er sich von anderen Phänomenologen wie zum Beispiel Merleau-Ponty unterscheidet, dessen Metaphernreichtum zwar faszinieren mag, bei dem man aber oftmals nur rätseln kann, was er meint), sondern auch dafür, dass er sie im Laufe seines Lebens immer weiter ausdifferenziert hat. Der begriffliche Werkzeugkasten von Schmitz ist also üppig bestückt, sodass man, wie er selber sagt, in „begreifender Sensibilität" phänomenologisch gründliche „Ausgrabungen zum wirklichen Leben" vornehmen kann. Seinem Werkzeugkasten etwas hinzuzufügen, ist daher schwierig, vor allem als Soziologe. Unmöglich ist es gleichwohl nicht, wobei ich sagen würde, dass keine Begriffe hinzugefügt werden sollten, die aus einem anderen phänomenologischen oder disziplinären Kontext wie der Soziologie stammen, damit es ein originär neophänomenologischer Werkzeugkasten bleibt. Sinnvoller bzw. stimmiger erscheint es mir stattdessen, an Schmitz' Begriffsinventar herumzufeilen und es zu schärfen. In diesem Sinne schlage ich beispielsweise vor, Schmitz' Konzept „leibliche Disposition" auszuweiten und darunter auch so etwas wie den „Bewegungsdrang" zu fassen. Schmitz versteht unter leiblicher Disposition eine „vitale Qualität des Antriebs", die „in hohem Maß Schicksal und Artung der Persönlichkeit" bestimmt, und in diesem Sinne halte ich auch den Bewegungsdrang für eine leibliche Disposition, die, z. B., das Schicksal von Sportsüchtigen prägt, wie ich in meiner Sportsuchtstudie zeigen konnte.

Ein weiterer Ansatzpunkt für eine begriffliche Präzisierung ist Schmitz' Situationskonzept und die darin enthaltenen Situationsdimensionen. Sieht man von der Unterscheidung *persönliche/gemeinsame Situation* ab, fällt auf, dass Schmitz' Situationsdimensionen einen zeitlichen Bias haben. Für einen Autor wie Schmitz, der den Raum ins Zentrum seiner Philosophie gestellt hat – erkennbar allein am *System der Philosophie*, wo „Der Raum" in der Mitte der fünf Bände steht und zudem fünf Teilbände umfasst –, ist es überraschend, dass der in seiner Philosophie so wichtige Situationsbegriff zwar zeitlich konzipiert ist, aber keine räumliche Dimension aufweist. Beim Begriffspaar *aktuell/zuständlich* ist die Zeitlichkeit offenkundig, aber auch für *implantierende/inkludierende Situationen* spielt die Zeit eine zentrale Rolle, ist man doch nur deshalb in einer Situation wie dem Herkunftsmilieu oder der Muttersprache verwurzelt, weil man eine lange Zeit seines Lebens darin verbracht hat. Daher kommt man nur schlecht oder gar nicht davon los, anders als von einem Sportverein, in dem man während seines fünfjährigen Studiums Mitglied war. Schließlich sind auch *impressive Situationen* insofern zeitliche Phänomene, als sie sich auf einen Schlag zeigen, anders als *segmentierte Situationen*, wo das nicht der Fall ist. Ich weiß nicht, wie Schmitz auf diese Situationendimensionen gekommen ist, jedenfalls fehlt mir hier eine räumliche Dimension. Ich habe deshalb als fünfte Situationsdimension den Gegensatz von *ortsgebunden/ortsungebunden* vorgeschlagen (genauer müsste es heißen: *ortsräumlich gebunden/ungebunden*). Zumindest für die Soziologie ist das eine hilfreiche zusätzliche Situationsdefinition, weil sie es, z. B., ermöglicht, den Unterschied zwischen (ortsgebundenen) *face-to-face*-Interaktionen und (ortsungebundenen) digitalen Interaktionen begrifflich genauer zu fassen.

Und um noch ein drittes Beispiel zu geben, wie man sozusagen mit Schmitz über Schmitz hinaus die neophänomenologischen Instrumente erweitern oder zumindest schärfen kann: In seiner Atmosphärentheorie spricht Schmitz davon, dass kollektive Atmosphären immer in gemeinsame Situationen eingebettet seien, dass es aber auch „Atmosphären ohne Situationen" gebe, „so lange sie privat bleiben". Das heißt, private Atmosphären sind nicht in Situationen eingebettet. Das halte ich nicht für zutreffend. Private Atmosphären sind meiner Auffassung nach immer in die persönliche Situation des Menschen eingebunden, und da die persönliche Situation wiederum aus gemeinsamen

Situationen hervorgegangen ist, sind sie auch in diese eingebunden. Schmitz müsste das eigentlich wissen, weil er in seinem Buch *Die Liebe* gezeigt hat, auf welche Weise eine private Atmosphäre wie die Liebe in Situationen eingebunden ist. Aber davon abgesehen, scheint er private Atmosphären situationslos gedacht zu haben. Hier kann man also mit seiner Hilfe auf einen Aspekt seiner Philosophie verweisen, den er selber vielleicht nicht genügend ernst genommen hat.

> *Kommen wir nochmals auf Ihre eigenen Forschungsschwerpunkte zurück. Demnächst erscheint ein Sammelband mit dem Titel* Extreme Körper, *bei dem Sie auch Mitherausgeber sind. Können Sie etwas kurz darüber sagen – inwieweit ist die kommende (oder schon geschehene?) radikale Modifikation evtl. sogar Transformation des Körpers ein Symptom der heutigen Gesellschaft, sodass es Sinn hat, sie zum Thema einer soziologischen Zeitdiagnose zu machen?*

Ausgangspunkt des Sammelbandes, den ich gemeinsam mit Thorsten Benkel herausgebe, war unsere empirische Alltagsbeobachtung, dass es anscheinend immer mehr Menschen gibt, die mit ihrem Körper Sachen anstellen oder mit deren Körper Sachen angestellt werden, die in unseren Augen extrem sind, weil sie unseren Vorstellungen eines irgendwie „normalen" Körperumgangs und -erlebens zuwiderlaufen. Ganzkörper- oder Augapfeltätowierungen, Hardcore-Pornografie oder Extremsport, Sex mit künstlichen Puppen, Tieren oder Leichen, freiwilliges oder (zum Beispiel politisch) erzwungenes Hungern, körperliche Selbstverletzungen und Selbstkreuzigungen, Massenvergewaltigungen, Folter und Selbstmordattentate, *body horror* in Spielfilmen und *snuff videos*, solche Sachen. Körpermodifikationen und Körpertransformationen dieser Art sind keine Zukunftsvisionen, es gibt sie im Hier und Heute, sie sind mitten unter uns. Interessant finden wir daran, dass solche extremen Körperpraktiken auf gesellschaftlich vorherrschende Normalitätsvorstellungen verweisen, indem sie diese auf besonders plakative Art in Frage stellen. Mehr noch scheint uns, dass die diversen Variationen des Körpermöglichen als performative Verstörungen herrschender Körpernormen in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft geradezu zwangsläufig sind. Extreme Körper sind keine Körper außerhalb der Gesellschaft, sondern ein typischer, wenn auch ziemlich auffälliger Teil von ihr. Sie eignen sich daher für eine soziologische Zeitdiagnose, weil sich im körperlichen Extremfall das gesellschaftlich Allgemeine zeigt. Und dieses gesellschaftlich Allgemeine, das auch die 20 Beiträge des Sammelbands verbindet, ist unseres Erachtens der Umgang mit und die – spielerische oder ernsthafte – Überschreitung von Grenzen. Grenzverletzungen, Grenzverschiebungen, Grenzbehauptungen sind ja ein generelles Merkmal unserer Zeit, und sie sind das eben auch im Feld des Körperlichen. Unsere körpersoziologische Zeitdiagnose läuft deshalb darauf hinaus, die Gegenwartsgesellschaft als eine Transgressionsgesellschaft zu beschreiben, deren Prototypen die zeitgenössischen körperlichen Extreme sind.

Am Ende würde es mich interessieren, was Sie als nächstes Forschungsziel vor Augen haben. Gibt es schon irgendwelche Ideen in dieser Richtung? Welches Thema würden Sie für eine neuphänomenologisch ausgerichtete Soziologie besonders reizvoll finden?

Das allernächste Forschungsziel habe ich bereits in Angriff genommen, nämlich die Verbreitung der Neuen Phänomenologie in der internationalen Soziologie. Während Schmitz' Philosophie in der deutschsprachigen Soziologie zunehmend rezipiert wird, ist das in der englischsprachigen Soziologie noch kaum der Fall. Aus diesem Grund geben Gesa Lindemann und ich in der Zeitschrift *Human Studies* ein Schwerpunktheft zum Thema „New Phenomenology and Sociology" heraus, das 2026 erscheinen und circa zehn Artikel enthalten wird, um so Schmitz' Ansatz international bekannter zu machen. Ich selber möchte in den nächsten Jahren mein Theorie- und Forschungsprogramm namens *Neophänomenologische Soziologie*, kurz NPS, weiter vorantreiben, indem ich es zum einen um zusätzliche theoretische Bausteine der Neuen Phänomenologie erweitere. Wie vorhin gesagt, greift die NPS und die Soziologie insgesamt vor allem Schmitz' Leib-, Situations- und Atmosphärentheorie auf; soziologisch lohnenswert erscheinen mir aber ebenso, z. B., Schmitz' Zeit- und Normentheorie. Damit ließe sich das sozialtheoretische Fundament der Soziologie gewinnbringend ausbauen. Zum Zweiten würde ich gerne das gesellschaftstheoretische Potenzial der Neuen Phänomenologie genauer erkunden bzw. nutzen. Tatsache ist ja, dass die Neue Phänomenologie bislang vor allem für mikrosoziologische Untersuchungen herangezogen wird, und zwar auch von mir, aber dabei muss es nicht bleiben. Eine neophänomenologische Makrosoziologie scheint mir nicht unmöglich, sondern auch machbar, etwa durch die Integration von Schmitz' Zeit- und Normentheorie. Und drittens fände ich es lohnenswert, die Neue Phänomenologie auch für eine Gesellschaftsdiagnose in Anschlag zu bringen. Anknüpfungspunkte dafür könnten Schmitz' Ausführungen zu den „vier Verfehlungen des abendländischen Geistes" und zur „Ideologie der totalen Vernetzung" sein, also das Überhandnehmen des Konstellationismus in unserer Zeit. All das – eine neophänomenologisch fundierte Sozialtheorie, Gesellschaftstheorie und Gesellschaftsdiagnose – fände ich reizvoll, nur befürchte ich, dass mich allein das überfordert. Aber wir sind ja erst am Anfang einer breiteren Rezeption der Neuen Phänomenologie innerhalb der Soziologie, weshalb ich hoffe und eigentlich auch ganz optimistisch bin, dass sich genügend Menschen finden werden, die sich dem Programm einer neophänomenologisch ausgerichteten Soziologie widmen möchten.

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Teoria. Rivista di filosofia

Topographies of Risk. Theoretical Approaches (Vol. 44, No. 1; 2024)

Topographies of Risk. Areas of Application (Vol. 44, No. 2; 2024)

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How to Navigate Uncertainty?

Introduction

The concept of risk has undergone significant changes and variations over the centuries, but its purposes have remained constant. It has always represented an attempt to control and manage the disorder that invades reality. This is particularly highlighted by Mary Douglas, an anthropologist who has extensively studied the political and cultural significance of this notion. Connected to the sphere of contamination and purity, risk is part of those symbolic aspects that allow for the attribution of blame and the creation of social cohesion:

> Whose fault? is the first question. Then, what action? Which means, what damages? what compensation? what restitution? and the

> preventive action is to improve the coding of risk in the domain which has turned out to be inadequately covered. Under the banner of risk reduction, a new blaming system has replaced the former combination of moralistic condemning the victim and opportunistic condemning the victim's incompetence. (Douglas 1992, 15–16.)

Risk is a concept of Modernity, related to the idea of calculus and probability. It has gained increasing centrality, even to the point where we now speak of a true "risk society." Today, in the face of the climate crisis, pandemics, geopolitical instability, and the terrifying advances of Artificial Intelligence, references to risk are much more frequent and require special attention. Is "risk" still the appropriate term to describe our reality, so unstable and uncertain? Can we use it to control and predict these incalculable dangers?

The purpose of the two 2024 issues of the journal *Teoria* is precisely to investigate the meanings and applications of the concept of risk. In this contribution, we begin with a historical and conceptual survey and then go on to present the contents of the issues of the *Teoria* journal.

History of risk

The need to confront the future and its uncertainties has been one of the hallmarks of human history. However, not all cultures have employed the same strategies, in order to address this issue. In ancient times, these concerns were addressed through the relationship with divinity and the interpretation of its will, without using the concept of risk and the associated techniques of calculation, management, and evaluation. According to Peter Bernstein (1996), it is precisely the shift away from relying on gods to manage and predict the future, in favor of rational and strategic calculation, that marks the distinctive feature of this concept.

Although the origin of the term is not entirely certain—it may possibly be Arabic (cf. Luhmann 1996, 9)—, the neo-Latin form *risicum* is documented as early as the medieval period. It finds its first usage mainly in relation to maritime trade and ship insurance, indicating primarily adverse events that could jeopardize the success of a voyage, such as floods, epidemics, and earthquakes. These phenomena do not depend on human action and are not even considered calculable, which excludes the connection between this initial idea of risk and human responsibility. Additionally, the scope for action and prediction is extremely approximate. Therefore, in this initial phase of its appearance, risk essentially represents a danger of encountering misfortune, over which human intervention has very little control.

With the transition to modernity in the 18^{th} century, the meaning of the term expands to include elements related to human action. In this context, it acquires a calculable and objective character. A clearer distinction between risk and danger is established: "[…] only in the case of risk does decision-making (that is to say contingency) play a role. One is exposed to dangers." (Luhmann 1996, 23.)

A combination of factors contributed to the development of this new understanding. Firstly, the Enlightenment mentality fostered a general belief in human progress and the rational and objective knowledge of the world. Additionally, actual advancements in the fields of probability and statistics allowed for the refinement of prediction techniques based on mathematical principles.[1]

The modern sense of the term is characterized by its distinction from danger, as it depends on human decision, its distinction from uncertainty, due to its rational and measurable nature, as well as its ambivalence between positive and negative connotations. Especially in its use in finance and insurance, taking risks can represent a loss, but also an opportunity and a gain.

Things change significantly in the transition from modernity to postmodernity or late modernity, marking the entry into what Ulrich Beck has effectively defined as "the risk society." With the growing distrust in certainties and the objectivity of sciences, the fragmentation of grand narratives and traditions, and the concurrent suspicion with regard to authority and institutions, the conception of risk gradually shifts from the dimension of control to that of uncertainty. As Anthony Giddens argues:

1 For a reconstruction of the link between the concept of risk and the development of probabilistic theories, see Bernstein 1996.

> Risk was supposed to be a way of regulating the future, of normalising it and bringing it under our dominion. Things haven't turned out that way. Our very attempts to control the future tend to rebound upon us, forcing us to look for different ways of relating to uncertainty. (Giddens 2000, 40.)

A widespread sense of insecurity unsettles society, primarily because the nature of the dangers we face has changed. In her text dedicated to this topic, Deborah Lupton (2023) identifies six types of risks that characterize our era: 1) environmental risks; 2) lifestyle risks; 3) health risks; 4) risks in interpersonal relationships; 5) economic risks; 6) crime-related risks. While different areas of impact can be identified for these risks, their common origin lies in their connection to the development of new technologies. As Luhmann states, technology "transforms dangers to risks simply because it creates possibilities of making decisions that had not existed before" (Luhmann 1987, 88).[2] We thus speak of both technical risks and sociotechnical risks. The former refers to adverse events caused by the very structure of the technology used (e.g., an accident due to a system malfunction), while the latter refers to damage caused by a specific intent to use such technologies and the power dynamics that drive it (e.g., the dropping of a bomb).

It is not surprising that the evolution of the concept of risk has become even more evident in our era of significant technological progress. On the one hand, calculative and predictive capabilities, as well as tools for improving life, have greatly increased. On the other hand, the margins of instability and unpredictability regarding the consequences of human actions have equally intensified. The distinction between natural and artificial is also becoming blurred: the catastrophes looming over our planet are increasingly caused by humans and their use of technology. François Ewald has even referred to these as true "artificial catastrophes" (Ewald 1993, 223).

2 The author uses this effective example: the risk of getting wet exists from the moment an umbrella exists. Previously, there was *a danger* of getting wet, since such a happening was not related to a human decision.

The global nature[3] and, in many aspects, unpredictable consequences of current issues make it difficult to exercise calculability and control. The spatial and temporal extension of the impact of our actions renders the causal chain of responsibilities less certain and often impossible to reconstruct. The responsibility for present actions increasingly conceals the pitfalls of unimaginable and unforeseeable consequences.

In this context, risk transforms into uncertainty, diminishing the possibilities of compensation, damage limitation, security, and calculability: "Risk society is a catastrophic society. In it, the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm." (Beck 2013, 25.) In an era like ours, the impact and importance of each decision increase, as does the desire to identify those responsible, but likewise does, at the same time, also the difficulty of doing so in the face of uncertainty. Thus, the modern idea of risk gives way to a much more unstable and vaguer concept, which does not allow us to fully contain and control our future and the consequences of our actions. However, it does not stop trying to "calculate the incalculable" (cf. Dean 1998). As Mark Coeckelbergh (2015) argued, risk, or rather being-at-risk, becomes a true existential category, describing the state of exposure and uncertainty of humanity in the age of new technologies.

The purpose of any risk prediction and calculation is to develop strategies for eliminating or containing the threat. Covello and Mumpower (1985, 108) suggest that, historically, the main techniques are: 1) avoiding risk through prohibitions; 2) regulating and modifying human activities to decrease the magnitude of the risk; 3) reducing the vulnerability of exposed individuals; 4) developing interventions following events to mitigate the impact; and 5) compensating for damages through insurance methods.

However, in the face of such power and unpredictability, our risk management techniques, as Beck says, "would be like a bicycle brake on an intercontinental jet" (1992, 106). Precautionary techniques for prevention and reduction of subjects do not seem entirely effective, because the catastrophic consequences of our actions are often not entirely predictable (consider, e.g.,

3 It is important to distinguish between globalized risks, which, although local, occur in various parts of the planet, and global risks, which involve all of humanity. Cf. D'Andrea 2004.

pollution and climate change). On the other hand, *ex-ante* solutions, such as interventions and insurance, do not appear sufficient or proportional: how and who will compensate in the event of a catastrophe or irreversible global damage, like the explosion of a nuclear power plant?

In addition to its evolution over time, which has caused significant changes in the concept, there is also a plurality of ways to interpret this notion (cf. Lupton 2023). Although the landscape is broad and varied (cf. Zinn 2008), we can mainly distinguish two interpretive schools: one that understands risk in a fundamentally objective and rational way, and another that defines it as a social and cultural construct that does not depend on factuality, but on how it is managed and constructed.

In the first case, the disciplines of engineering, actuarial mathematics, statistics, and epidemiology are primarily involved, relying on a technical-scientific approach. In this context, risk is something inherent in the reality of things. What is not objective is rather the perception of risk, which varies between experts and laypeople, and is influenced by specific cognitive mechanisms that compromise the rationality of human evaluation. As a factual datum, therefore, it can be measured objectively, as the product of the probability of an event occurring and the harmfulness of its consequences, namely the magnitude. The attempt to contain and mitigate risk, therefore, involves modifying the value of one of these two variables. Thus, both the identification of risk and the solutions proposed to address it are normally entrusted to technical aspects.

The second perspective—of a sociocultural nature—is developed mainly through philosophical, anthropological, and sociological reflection. The basic premise is that risk, even before being an objective datum, is the interpretative category, through which modern society is governed, and which determines its relationship with otherness, knowledge, and the future. This makes the category of risk and the decisions that derive from it into a political dimension, leading to the development of specific governance strategies and the distribution of responsibilities in response to a risk. In the past decade, Artificial Intelligence has taken the leading role in public and academic discussions. The so-called "Fourth Revolution" (Floridi 2014) has exposed humanity's illusory superiority over machines, demonstrating the ability to simulate human actions almost indistinguishably. In fact, in some areas, AI has even surpassed humans in performing tasks and practices that have traditionally been their domain.

Alongside the many opportunities opened up by interacting with these systems, new problems are also emerging, raising concerns about their use. There are both continuities with past risks and some elements of significant novelty. In today's situation, these risks often assume a global dimension, potentially leading to real catastrophes. In the case of AI systems, these global and globalized risks are primarily due to the amount of data involved and the pervasiveness of the technologies. Like the risks of the 20th century, the risks associated with AI can also be defined as incalculable and unpredictable, falling more within the realm of uncertainty.

However, unlike in the past, these characteristics are not solely due to the human inability to foresee consequences, distant in spatial and temporal terms. In the case of AI systems, which are often opaque, the very functioning of the system remains unknown, representing a black box for humans. This poses serious problems, when we apply algorithmic decisions to various contexts, such as finance or medicine, basing our decisions on outcomes that are unintelligible to us and creating new modes of correlation. The risk of AI, therefore, becomes exponentially incalculable and unpredictable.

The Teoria *journal issues on risk*

How can this state of uncertainty be inhabited? In this day and age, can one still rely on calculation and strive for control over risks that are growing into global proportions? Based on which criteria can one interact with risky situations that lay bare the limitedness of the human being? The two 2024 issues of *Teoria. Rivista di filosofia* set out to investigate this key concept of contemporary thought and to answer these and more questions. The ultimate goal is to recreate and work out a "risk topography" that may allow us to understand more dependably the meaning of such a notion and that may bring together the spheres of application, in which it is used. The combination of the two issues then tries to keep the two complementary directions together. The first issue, a more descriptive one, focuses on the conceptual re-creation through the main milestones and most significant figures in the history of thought. The second issue explores the many potential uses of the term in the areas it has been applied to: environmental, economic, political, technological, medical, pedagogical. The effort to survey widespread debates on the subject of risk wants therefore to achieve a double goal: on the one hand, it wishes to provide an exhaustive guiding overview and, on the other hand, to work out new, unprecedented perspectives on risk management.

The first issue is opened by two essays that piece the development of the concept together within the modern tradition. Notably, Natasha Cola's article shows how the concept of risk has spread as an expression of the crisis of modern social imagery that, through the notion of social choice, can offer a new idea of rationality. Osvaldo Ottaviani's essay deals instead with the distinction between risk and uncertainty, emphasizing that they do not represent two different approaches to the same sphere of interest, but two approaches to different domains, the calculable and the non-calculable one. Considering in particular the concept of radical uncertainty put forward by Knight and Keynes, the author runs through the highlights of the debate throughout the history of thought, especially the dispute between Leibniz and Bernoulli. On a more epistemological note, Maria Laura Ilardo and Marta Bertolaso analyze the connection between causality and risk, claiming that when the former is differently understood, the latter takes a different shape too. Prompted by such an assumption, the authors discuss the implications of risk management in different contexts (cause and effect, probabilistic causality and Bayesian causality). This is followed by articles that are more focused on the ethical implications of the notion. At the center of Roberto Formisano's essay is the relationship between risk and fear in Jonas's philosophy. An analysis of the German philosopher leads the author to update the theory and to consider risk as a central factor in the development of moral judgement and in finding principles even in today's real world. Simone Grigoletto focuses on the role of moral risk and its importance in normative ethics. Supported by Thomas Aquinas's considerations and Second Scholasticism, he argues against moral perfectionism, showing that the total removal of uncertainty from the sphere of decision-making is impossible, and even less desirable. Partly along the lines of such an argument, the perspective opened by Ivan Rotella's essay shows that, rather than being a society of control, that of risk becomes a non-knowledge society that, through strategies and methods, struggles with the lack of a single preordained path. The focus of Ralf Lüfter's essay is mainly on risk in its relationship with the future within the confines of economic theory. The author emphasizes the extremely critical character of the concept, since in this context, the calculability of the present future often ends up disregarding some critical factors that are essential to understanding how transition, investment, and credit work. Melanie Erspamer delves deeper into the subject of risk in the inherently uncertain domain of political decision-making. As she lingers on the case of the COVID-19 crisis, the author proposes that an "auxiliary principle" (AP), inspired by Neurath's auxiliary motive, should replace the precautionary principle as advocated by Rawls. At the end, with Corrado Claverini's article, we move from the discourse on risk to that on risks. His essay addresses new risks, emerging in the context of generative AI and, more specifically, its manipulation for malevolent purposes. His analysis brings into sharp focus the growing need for a human-centered AI, in order to counter the new dimension of risk in the technological sphere.

The rich tapestry woven by the first issue of *Teoria* shows us the main routes to the topography of risk. The second issue enables us to further extend, without the pretense of exhaustiveness, the scope of enquiry, in order to find our feet in the multidimensional reality of risk in its semantic richness, in its multiple evolutions, and in the ethical-political implications it carries.

The second *Teoria* issue on risk focuses on the exploration of the main areas of application of this concept. These include ecological reflection and climate risk, technological risk, its management in the new dimension of Artificial Intelligence, risk in health care, as well as in pedagogical education. The need to move into the terrain of application is conditioned by the very nature of the subject, which is used in the most diverse fields, becoming a pivotal concept in the management of our daily lives. Our thinking is in fact shaped by the idea of risk, the calculation of the probability of the occurrence of an adverse event, and the attempts to control or limit the damage. On the practice of calculating and managing risk depends the success of our activities and our greater or lesser confidence in the infrastructure, systems, and devices we use. This concept is so present in our society that it is almost transparent and interwoven with our very lives, and is thus likely to end up escaping criticism. In order to retrace its meaning and bring out its various uses, the second issue explores some of its main areas of application.

The second issue therefore opens with Dean Komel's contribution that offers a reflection on the nihilistic root of the risk society in correlation with a series of current phenomena that undermine or redefine the sense of the world, in particular the climate crisis and the development of AI. By critically analyzing Ulrich Beck's notions of "reflexive modernization," Zygmunt Bauman's "liquid modernity," and Niklas Luhmann's "self-production of social systems," the author highlights how "the risk society" constitutes an "operational concept," only if it is grounded in the apparatus of ecosociology, which links eco-nomics, eco-logy, and eco-technology. Dimitri D'Andrea clarifies the difference between risk and threat, arguing that in the case of climate crisis, it is more correct to speak of a threat, since it appears as a natural and certain consequence of our reckless behavior towards the environment. The author analyses the reasons for the general denial that paralyses the fight against this phenomenon, identifying them in particular in the emotional and cognitive distortions that derive from the perceived excessive renunciation of goods and freedoms that such a fight implies, and the difficulty of devising realistic and effective solutions. The answer to this impasse lies mainly in the coordinated engagement of global and local institutions, recovering the value of the closest and most particular realities. Marco Emilio's paper also examines ecological and climate risk. In particular, the argumentation is based on local examples that underline the conflicting nature of the transition to different energy sources. The author illustrates conflicts that include social, technological, economic, and ecological aspects. Using the concepts of epistemic responsibility and vulnerability, he suggests improving the interaction between the social sciences, climate science, and the philosophical exploration of risk and collective action. This improvement aims at a deeper understanding of decision-making, particularly in situations of profound uncertainty, and effective risk communication, in order to prevent the dangers of collective inaction and the sense of powerlessness. With Žarko Paić's essay, we move onto the terrain of the technosphere, i.e., the relationship between human beings and technology. The author analyses the link between risk and chaos, entropy and contingency. These concepts, in fact, increasingly present in both contemporary science and philosophical reflections, are both the foundation of policies and practices based on risk and their threat: they are contained and controlled by the disciplines of statistics and probabilistic calculation. Still remaining on the technological terrain, Veronica Neri focuses in particular on the risks of image-generating AI. Indeed, images created by artificial intelligence allow the development of unimaginable creative possibilities, but open up equally serious ethical issues, which must be regulated, in order to limit their dangerousness. Through an examination of these risks (bias, deep fakes, manipulation, multiple identities), the author offers a public ethics response based on strengthening information and awareness, in order to provide subjects with the appropriate skills to counter the state of uncertainty caused by these systems. Anastasia Siapka analyses the risk-based approach in the European regulation of artificial intelligence (AI Act). The author argues that, in order to make this approach more operational and effective, the objective dimension must be integrated with a regulatory governance perspective. To achieve this integration, she examines AI-induced risk from the dominant approach of consequentialism, highlighting its limitations under conditions of uncertainty. She then proposes virtue ethics as an alternative approach to AI-induced risk. The essay concludes with an analysis of the implications of this approach for research, policy and practice. With Leopoldo Sandonà's essay, we move on to analyze risk in the context of health services. While at first this concept was only considered from the medical-clinical perspective, today, it is joined by a corporate perspective. However, this complex system that holds together the clinical space and that of complex organizations seems to reveal its limitations, particularly linked to a legalistic approach that puts the ethical approach towards the patient and the therapeutic relationship in the second place. In response to this, the author emphasizes the importance of an ethically informed approach to risk, which makes it possible to approach the individual case, but relates it to a global ethical perspective. To conclude the monographic section, Ilaria Malagrinò's contribution focuses on the relationship between risky conduct and young actors. This relationship is usually mediated by the use of new technologies, in particular social media, which modify our practices, revealing moral connotations. Precisely by analyzing this technological context and the idea of risk and uncertainty that are promoted in it, the author expresses the urgency for a rethinking of our moral conduct within digital environments and a serious assumption of responsibility for future generations.

The contributions gathered in both issues of the *Teoria* journal dedicated to the topography of risk, varied in their contents and perspectives, provide a comprehensive view of the multifaceted nature of this concept. It is not possible to simplify this complexity; what can be done is to outline a topography that allows us to navigate the meanings and the applications of risk.

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The journal *Phainomena* welcomes all submissions of articles and book reviews in the field of phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy, as well as from related disciplines of the humanities. Manuscripts submitted for the publication in the journal should be addressed to the editorial office, the secretary of the editorial board, or the editor-in-chief.

The journal is published quarterly, usually in two issues. The tentative deadlines for the submission of manuscripts are: March 31, for the June issue; August 31, for the November issue.

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