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The Crumbling Touchstone of the Vatican's *Ostpolitik*: Relations between the Holy See and Yugoslavia, 1970–1989

Jure Ramšak

Science and Research Centre Koper, Koper, Slovenia

ABSTRACT

Based on Yugoslav archival sources, the paper analyses the relationship between the Holy See and Yugoslavia as the only Eastern European socialist state with which the former had official diplomatic relations. The relationship between the Holy See and socialist Yugoslavia provides insight into the precarious position of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, but also into the issues and dilemmas that the Holy See faced in terms of its *Ostpolitik* towards Eastern European socialist regimes. The article initially centres on the parallels between the Holy See and the foreign policy agenda of non-aligned Yugoslavia, especially during the papacy of Paul VI, when both actors shared an understanding of the acute problems of the Global South. It then analyses the stance of the Holy See towards the Yugoslav domestic policy of self-management that claimed that this system could present a viable environment for the life of believers in modern socialist society. The analysis closes with an in-depth examination of the role of the Holy See in the process of convergence between religion and nationalism during the 1980s, in which the Vatican did not play as clear-cut a role as it has generally been ascribed and proved unable to tackle this formidable phenomenon.

KEYWORDS

Yugoslavia; Vatican; Roman Catholic Church; Church-State relations; socialism

Introduction

In general discussions about the causes of the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 'the Vatican' is often named as one of the key external factors of the disintegration of this multi-ethnic and multi-religious federation. Proponents of this theory[1] argue that the Vatican never really approved the South Slav state. Beyond the scattershot judgements and conspiracy theory speculations, it can be established that in contrast to the expanding historiography about the complex diplomatic relations between the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Holy See,[2] or the break between post-war communist authorities and Pope Pius XII,[3] there are only a handful of studies which more thoroughly deal with the reactions of the chief of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and the Roman Curia to the Yugoslav crisis in the 1980s and the formation of successor states.[4] The majority of these are, for the obvious reasons of short temporal distance, not based on archival sources. As the Spanish scholar Carlos González Villa underscores in the premise of his recent reflection regarding how to contextualise the emergence of a

CONTACT Jure Ramšak jure.ramsak@zrs-kp.si

new state (Slovenia) within the new world order as established by the United States upon the end of the Cold War, there does not seem to be a 'missing link' in the breakup of the SFRY, the independence of Slovenia and international intervention, as all important information was available from the very beginning.[5] We could, roughly speaking, maintain much the same about the role of the Holy See, but details will remain unknown until the material related to the papacy of John Paul II kept at the Vatican Secret Archives becomes accessible.

The present article does not seek to reconstruct the role of the Holy See in the constellation of international relations within which the division of the SFRY became possible, although a close observation of the diplomatic contacts between the two states could, in certain aspects, relativise the prevailing interpretations. Rather, its point of departure is that following the restoration of highest-level contacts in 1970, the SFRY was the only European socialist country with established diplomatic relations with the Holy See,[6] which provides a privileged view into the state of bilateral relations between the ruling structures of the global RCC and this *sui generis* socialist state, and also into numerous issues and dilemmas associated with the complex issue of the so-called *Ostpolitik* of the Holy See – i.e. its attitude towards Central and Eastern European socialist regimes.[7] Taking into account Yugoslavia's leading role in the process of amalgamation of the Global South and in global peace initiatives, and as the British Envoy Extraordinary to the Holy See Desmond Crawley speculated as early as 1970,[8] the close relations between this influential Balkan state and the Holy See could also be set in the context of the Vatican's 'Southern Policy' or its more active role in confronting the enormous challenges of developing countries, which accounted for the greater part of the world population and an ever increasing share of Catholics. With the process of decolonisation reaching its acme in the early 1960s, the further presence of the Vatican and the development of the Catholic Church in the Global South came to vitally depend on the efforts to change the image of the Church as attached to imperialist oppressors. It is in this context that we should interpret Pope John XXIII's denunciation of not only colonialism but neo-colonialism as well, and a broader interest in pressing socio-economic issues emerging from the North-South axis, about which the majority of the questions asked within the United Nations Organization (UN) and other forums were raised precisely by Yugoslavia.[9] The third element that makes the study of the relationship between the Holy See and Yugoslavia relevant is the Yugoslav multi-religious landscape with its majority Orthodox population, which in this case also raised delicate questions of ecumenical dialogue.

The inaccessibility of the relevant archival sources in the Vatican makes the material of the former socialist state, security, and party bodies virtually the only available source in studying the dynamics of the attitude of these regimes towards the Holy See and the RCC. Yet, as the Hungarian expert András Fejérdy fairly warns, one should bear in mind certain limitations, such as the fact that ideologically organised party and government organs interpreted the working of the Church through a peculiar lens, as if projecting their own structures.[10] A similar bias can be encountered in dispatches of the SFRY embassy to the Holy See, whose textual legacy – now preserved at the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (DA MFA RS) – will be analysed further on. The direct diplomatic contacts between the two states allowed the authors of these documents direct access to several top-ranking officials of the Roman Curia, including the Pope, quite the opposite of Eastern European semi-diplomatic representatives and intelligence, who in Rome, as Fejérdy further observes, could obtain only second or third hand information.[11]

Still, this material does not always allow clear conclusions to be drawn regarding the implications and policy preferences that the turbulent development of Yugoslav internal political events triggered on the side of the Vatican and the local RCC. Reports sent from Belgrade by the well-informed Austrian ambassador or the consuls in Zagreb and Ljubljana (preserved at the Austrian State Archives) and which in Vienna reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the highest levels of the Austrian RCC (Cardinal Franz König), will therefore provide an added 'niche' viewpoint from which to observe the misapprehensions, miscalculations, and delusions that the

intense diplomatic contact between the Holy See and Yugoslavia failed to dispel, and which were instead only escalated by the broader social and political shifts of the 1980s.

An analysis of these processes should significantly contribute to the current research regarding bilateral relations between socialist states and the Holy See, which has in the case of Yugoslavia, as well as Poland, Hungary and other Central and Eastern European countries thus far mostly focused on the years up to the mid-1970s,[12] while dealing less with the later periods.[13]

Given that in the majority of the former Yugoslav republics the end of socialism was defined by the experience of a decade of armed conflict, these divided societies have been principally viewed along ethno-religious lines,[14] with other important aspects of 'civil' religious life, change and experience being relegated or ignored. By scrutinising discourses on different levels, not only diplomatic consultations between Yugoslav and Holy See diplomats, but also debates among Yugoslav post-conciliar theologians and Marxist humanist intellectuals, media polemics, and discussions in closed political circles and diplomatic consultations, while considering the general trends in (post)modern religious life, this article also aims to provide a novel perspective on the Yugoslav system as an international laboratory for the life of believers in a socialist secular society that aroused the interest of the Holy See. In addition to the Vatican's perception of the Yugoslav self-management system, attention will also be paid to the Yugoslav foreign policy of non-alignment as the other element on which the Holy See kept a watchful eye, and toward which it adopted different views during the pontificates of Paul VI (1963–1978) and John Paul II (1978–2005).[15] The article will discuss the hypothesis that at a certain point, the Holy See might have considered the way relations between the RCC and the state were, or could have been, regulated in Yugoslavia as an acceptable template for other state-socialist regimes. Despite the persisting stamp of Marxist-Leninist principles on Yugoslav religious policy, the leading men of the Roman Curia had in this case the possibility to observe unique currents, which, although largely restricted to the sphere of intellectual inquiry, widened the perspective of dialogue between believers and non-believers, and had an impact on the course of processes occurring in Eastern Europe.

Archival material from the Slovenian Republican authorities will help introduce into the discussion an angle that shows the atmosphere of relations between the Holy See and the SFRY in a different light than that revealed through the documents of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs covering the last years of socialism. This divergence was the result of the impact of an intense process of 'ethnicisation of religion'[16] in the constituent republic of Croatia, while the equally majority Catholic, but well-nigh monoethnic, republic of Slovenia presented a different picture. Here, not only were the relations between state and church representatives ones of cooperation, it is even possible to detect certain signs of the coalescence of Marxism and Christianity, similar to those observed in Latin America and Western Europe; however, before long prevailing limitations emerged. In view of all this we should, in the continuation of this discussion, surpass the restrictions of state- and institution-centred perspectives and through spatial and temporal contextualisation take into account the regimen of temporality to better comprehend the importance of the interaction between Catholicism and the socialist system as experienced in the SFRY.

Odd partnership

After WWII, it seemed unlikely that Tito's Yugoslavia and the Holy See of Pope Pius XII would ever enter into a constructive dialogue again. The relation to the Holy See was inextricable from the context of the issues of socialist post-revolutionary transformation. What is more, Belgrade reproached the Vatican for supporting Italian territorial claims during the Trieste crisis of the early 1950s.[17] Moreover, as Alexander Mirescu emphasised, after WWII, Yugoslav communists

were more resolute in their decisions to embark on the fundamental separation between State and Church and to cut ethnonational ties than their comrades from other 'people's democracies' of Eastern-Central Europe.[18] The most clearly visible element during the 1946 trial against Zagreb's archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, and one that continued to resurface throughout the existence of the Yugoslav socialist state, was the common accusation made against the clergy that they sided with the occupying forces or local puppet Nazi-Fascist regime during the Second World War. In this first phase, an essential part of president Tito's attitude towards the RCC was to be as disassociated from the Holy See as possible, which was finally achieved in autumn 1952, when diplomatic relations between the two were severed due to the Holy See backing the Yugoslav bishops' decision to denounce pro-regime priestly associations.[19]

But the withdrawal and 1960 death of Stepinac (who had been promoted to cardinal in 1953), much like the releases of the primate of Hungary, József Mindszenty, or the archbishop of Prague, Josef Beran, created the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of the *Ostpolitik* of the Holy See. In the case of Yugoslavia it is likely even more important that this policy, initiated by Pope John XXIII (1958–1963), not be considered merely a series of events in diplomatic or Church history, but rather as a result of cultural and intellectual processes in contemporary Western Europe.[20] There was, as Pál Hatos expounds, a general surge of leftist thought in the 1950s and 1960s, even within all the mainstream Catholic churches of Western Europe, which created a peculiar context which the Holy See's *Ostpolitik* reacted to and emerged from.[21] In this sense, the original solutions attempted by Yugoslav ideologues in the decades after the split with Stalin in 1948 created an interest not only among Western leftist intellectuals,[22] but among religious experts as well.[23]

It would be difficult to estimate the entire range of expectations with which the Holy See stepped into a closer relationship with the SFRY, but at a time when Tito's regime had already built a clear international profile for itself and liberalised internal policies to some extent, they must have been greater than what the Vatican envisaged achieving in the Eastern European countries with which it had signed various agreements – with Hungary, for example, even shortly before doing so with Yugoslavia.[24] As Hansjakob Stehle, a German journalist and an excellent connoisseur of papal diplomacy, wrote in the early 1970s, the Roman Curia wondered at the time whether the 1966 Belgrade Protocol should serve only to consolidate a 'peaceful distance' or start regulating the relations as if it were a concordat.[25] Beyond this field test for the papal skills in managing international relations that took place in the territories of already well-transformed socialist regimes, a diplomacy that proceeded from nineteenth century patterns when popes rejected new republican states while cardinals struck political bargains with the same,[26] we can, in some of the leading figures of the Holy See, more than once sense a genuine desire for dialogue, established as a method of the RCC's interaction with the modern world by Pope Paul VI's encyclical *Ecclesiam suam* (1964).[27] Following this encyclical, the Holy See, after the end of the pontificate of Pope Pius XII no longer tied exclusively to the Western side of the Cold War division, came to regard dialogue as an end in itself rather than a medium employed to try to change the interlocutor, which coincided nicely with the ruling principle of the SFRY's international engagement; i.e. openness and cooperation with all countries without any preconditions.[28] At the same time, during the 1960s, Yugoslav communists still professed themselves to be atheists, yet claiming that atheism was not their faith and as such they were not intolerant of religious life.[29] The chief diplomat of the Holy See, Agostino Casaroli, who had been appointed secretary of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (soon afterwards renamed Council for the Public Affairs of the Church) in 1967 and cardinal secretary of State from 1979 onwards, would later write about Tito that popes John XXIII and Paul VI held in high esteem the engagement of this old partisan fighter turned statesman. To Casaroli, Tito was inspired by principles not necessarily in opposition to Christianity, and through his numerous international appearances he adopted a position that seemed of pure humane concern, though always reflective of his Marxist roots.[30]

Conversely, the Yugoslav side relied on the Holy See both in view of the tactical requirements of its internal policy as well as the strategic ambitions of its foreign policy in the Global South. The former was of primary importance to Belgrade, as even during the conclusion of the 1966 Protocol, its intention of securing the loyalty of the national episcopacy, Croatian bishops in particular, became evident; that was a recurrent goal meeting with variable success over the next two and a half decades of diplomatic relations.[31] In the process, the proximity of the positions of the two countries regarding multilateral questions was frequently used by Yugoslavia as compensation for problems in bilateral relations. Being the first to invite the Holy See to attend as observer the momentous 1970 Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) Summit in Lusaka,[32] Tito was clearly relying on the support of Pope Paul VI, with whom he had been exchanging missives regarding crisis situations around the world since 1967.[33] This *cordiale sintonia* (cordial harmony) in regard to major international topics characterised the conversation between Tito and Casaroli during the visit of the latter to Yugoslavia in 1970, and the Yugoslav president's audience with Pope Paul VI in the Vatican in 1971, which was considered the first official visit of the head of a communist state[34] and declared by the Italian and other Catholic media as a landmark in opening towards socialist countries and an acknowledgement of Yugoslav efforts for global social justice.[35]

With *Populorum progressio*, the encyclical on 'the development of peoples' that Pope Paul IV issued in March 1967, the role of the Catholic Church in these discussions had already become more prominent.[36] In the early 1970s, it seemed that similar views on world development would come to represent the most solid common denominator of the international engagement of Yugoslavia and the Holy See, especially if we consider the position adopted in 1971 by the Synod of Bishops in their statement *Justicia in Mundo*. It was in this spirit that Pope Montini started following ever more closely the initiatives promoted *via* the UN, but put into action by the NAM and G-77, coalitions of the Global South largely composed of non-communist countries while recognising Tito's Yugoslavia as the leading member. The Yugoslav diplomats saw proof of the Holy See's awakened interest in the structural issues of world order in the fact that the pope sent a savvy delegation to the Third Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago in April/May 1972. This was one in a series of global events in the 1970s in which frontline Yugoslav experts and diplomats tried to put forward – in Keynesian rather than Marxist terms – the idea of a more equitable distribution of world economic opportunities.[37] The Pope addressed the conference with a pastoral letter that some of his critics deemed too 'Marxist' because of his use of Marxist terminology and his disregard for the importance of private property.[38] Moreover, the president of the Pontifical Commission for Justice and Peace, Maurice Roy,[39] emphasised at the margin of this conference that previous actions to reduce the differences between the economically developed and underdeveloped countries had not yielded the desired results, which meant that changes were called for in the structure of aid and in the international trade system which should not work exclusively on the basis of the logic of the market.[40] As expected, Pope Paul VI remained rather reserved, although he did address a public letter of support to Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, host of the third NAM summit, a gesture greatly valued by Tito and the other summit participants.[41] Later, the head of the RCC eschewed associations with the NAM to avoid any international political confrontations, channelling his advocacy for similar principles through the UN, which allowed the Holy See a broader stance. This approach, which focused on multilateral institutions, neatly fitted into Yugoslavia's preferable operational framework.[42]

A high degree of convergence was also manifest during the Helsinki Process, a series of events following the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which counted as the first participation of the papal state at an international political meeting since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.[43] This initiative, in which the Holy See sought to set a profile for itself distinctly different from Italy's, saw in the lead role the Slovenian-born Apostolic Nuncio to Scandinavian countries Jožef Žabkar.[44] In relation to this conference, the former president of the

Yugoslav federal government, Mitja Ribičič, said that the Holy See was 'our best ally', particularly with regard to defending the rights of ethnic minorities, an acute issue in Yugoslavia's relationships with Austria and Italy. Although based on different ideological foundations, the representatives of the two states also managed to find a common language at the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference and with regard to a series of other key issues involving human development.[45]

In the second half of the 1970s, the emphasis on the shared traits of the international engagements of the two countries had become a leitmotif in the dialogue between the representatives of the Holy See and Yugoslavia. This topic consumed more time and attention in bilateral relations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia than the question of the Yugoslav RCC. During the visit of the federal secretary (minister) of foreign affairs Miloš Minić (in office from 1972 to 1978) to the Vatican in 1977, acquainting Casaroli with the problems of the Yugoslav RCC amounted to a mere half hour, whereas the entire remaining time of the two-hour conversation was devoted to the key issues of global development, during which the two interlocutors found that the positions of their respective countries were increasingly converging.[46] In March of the same year, on the occasion of the new Yugoslav ambassador Zdenko Svete presenting his credentials to the cardinal secretary of state Jean-Marie Villot, Casaroli stated that the positions of their countries were close and that the Holy See particularly appreciated the principled stance of Yugoslavia within the NAM, the UN and CSCE.[47] A similar statement on the 'identicalness' of the views on the questions of development and world peace was made by the long-time apostolic pro-nuncio to Yugoslavia, Michele Cecchini, who likely learned about these issues while he served as nuncio in Madagascar and Mauritius.[48]

From the conversations with Mons. Casaroli – sometimes held on a weekly basis – the Yugoslavs inferred that he was the one behind the document of the Council of the Bishops' Conferences of Europe from 1977, which emphasised Europe's role in strengthening peace and security in the world and its contribution to the New International Economic Order as the key project of G-77.[49] Clearly the 'Quintessence of Montanism', as Casaroli was dubbed by the French author Roland Minnerath,[50] was the member of the Roman Curia who had the highest hopes for a Yugoslav global role, especially when in the late 1970s, the détente between the superpowers failed and Fidel Castro, following a logic of 'natural alliance', tried to bring the NAM closer to Moscow, which was far from agreeable to the Vatican and Belgrade. After all, the Vatican had been advocating for Yugoslavia's nonaligned status since the early 1970s. In 1971, Pope Paul VI and the president of the United States, Richard Nixon, agreed that European stability was contingent on the stability of Yugoslavia, making it necessary to preserve the balanced position of this in-between nation betwixt the two blocs.[51] Similar discreet steps in favour of Yugoslavia's foreign policy goals also include the Holy See taking (in the eyes of Yugoslavia) a 'fair stance' during the period of negotiating the Treaty of Osimo, which in 1975 settled the boundary between Italy and the SFRY, when the Vatican distanced itself from those Italian nationalistic prelates who opposed the agreement.[52] At the time of Tito's terminal illness in early 1980, the Piacentine prelate, otherwise known for his calm reserve, flattered the Yugoslav collocutors with the rhetorical question of who would be able at that critical moment, when in his mind only the NAM could act as a stabiliser in the period of Cold War re-aggravation, to match the 'moral-political authority' of the departing Yugoslav president.[53] He even devoted a special prayer to the health of the atheist statesman, conducted by the vicar general of Rome, Cardinal Ugo Poletti, resulting in criticism of Casaroli from European right-wing circles and some cardinals.[54] But the taking into consideration Yugoslavia's role, at least as far as its international position was concerned, remained a constant even under Pope John Paul II, who envisioned a renewal of the world based on quite different foundations from those relied on by Paul VI. Yugoslav ambassadors and statesmen may have found the former less pleasant an interlocutor than his predecessor, but with regard to Yugoslav foreign policy and the principle of non-

alignment, John Paul II remained clear, stressing the global importance of the international policy of the NAM and hoping for its expansion and consolidation.[55]

'Nothing similar ever occurred in any other socialist country'

Unlike the break from the Soviet canon in many an area of the organisation of social life, leading Yugoslav theorists made no essential departure from the understanding of religious phenomenon. The League of Communists' programme, in force until 1990, demonstrates that they remained convinced that religion was engendered by conditions of material backwardness,[56] although they rather played down this interpretation during the late socialist period. There were dialogue-favouring Marxist Humanist sociologists who raised the hope of a redefinition of the Marxist-Leninist attitude towards religion, even in a certain number of left-leaning theologians and believers.[57]

Nevertheless, improvements in the quotidian life of believers were taken notice of within the walls of the Vatican at the very time of the establishment of diplomatic relations with this socialist state. In 1971, During Tito's visit to the Vatican, Paul VI stressed that the Yugoslav constitution was marked by the principles that aimed at 'the humanisation of the social environment', 'the strengthening of solidarity and of collaboration among men', 'respect of human dignity' and 'the general development of man as a free person'.[58] That same year, when the proliferation of the national movement in Croatia (the so-called Croatian Spring) brought about a state crisis that Tito fixed with repressive measures, the Yugoslav diplomats in the Vatican detected increased interest in Yugoslav domestic affairs. They were relieved to observe that the Holy See was somewhat satisfied with the denouement of the crisis and not overly concerned about the arrests of individual priests and the confiscation of religious magazines, but rather afraid of losing room for manoeuvre in the SFRY in the long term, for which it clearly had greater plans.[59] Naturally, the first apostolic pro-nuncio to Yugoslavia after the establishment of diplomatic relations, Mario Cagna, followed the enactment of religious policy and instances of infringement of believers' rights with vigilant attention, and he recommended to the Catholic clergy 'to stay one meter away from the border',[60] i.e. not to provoke Yugoslav authorities. His suggestion was a clear sign that the Holy See under Pope Paul VI was willing to occasionally relent or even turn a blind eye toward the persecution of religious figures in favour of preserving stable relations with Yugoslavia in the long run. The most blatant example of this stance was probably the intervention of the next apostolic pro-nuncio, Michele Cecchini, who stopped the publication of a petition written by Yugoslav bishops about the infringements of believers' rights in the country in 1977, at the time when Belgrade was hosting a follow-up CSCE meeting.[61] Even the deputy secretary of state, Giovanni Benelli, otherwise known for being censorious of socialist regimes, remained critical of tying the issue of the civil rights of believers to the discourse of human rights, which flourished during the Carter administration, and did not deem it appropriate to blacklist the SFRY in this campaign.[62]

A great deal of understanding had also been demonstrated two years before by Agostino Casaroli, in his reaction to the affair that saw a local Party official in Ljubljana calling for a list of religious activists. The main Slovene Catholic weekly *Družina* (Family) was banned for reporting on the case. Casaroli considered such events grist to the mill for those rare opponents of the Holy See's closer ties with the SFRY, but he assured the Yugoslav ambassador Stane Kolman that as long as he and Pope Paul VI were in office, the relationship towards Yugoslavia would not change.[63] This 'foreign minister' of the Holy See, who was, in the opinion of the Yugoslavs, together with Jean-Marie Villot, the principal opponent of the faction of Benelli,[64] 'the divine gendarme' (as one of the Yugoslav bishops dubbed him[65]), openly admitted in diplomatic talks during the 1970s that the SFRY was the touchstone of their *Ostpolitik*. In this case, according to Casaroli, it was the first time that the RCC had to adapt to the circumstances of a society

organised on Marxist principles. The Vatican was aware of the fundamental differences between Yugoslav self-management socialism and Eastern European real-socialism, but they were convinced that the evolution of socio-political and economic systems of Eastern Europe would proceed in the direction of Yugoslav solutions, thus the experience of the RCC's 'adaptation' in Yugoslavia acquired a broader meaning for them.[66] Several years later, in 1985, the unique developments (especially in Slovenia) regarding the RCC and the Holy See were also corroborated by the outgoing pro-nuncio Michele Cecchini, who in his farewell conversation with Janez Stanovnik, member of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, set this special relationship within a larger perspective, which he had had the opportunity to observe as head of the Eastern Europe section of the Vatican's Secretariat of State. In his opinion, the crucial moves had been those made under popes John XXIII and Paul VI, which were met with a favourable response on the part of Yugoslav state leadership, and represented progress never to be repeated in any other socialist country.[67] In this context, his successor Francesco Colasuonno, who assumed the post of papal envoy for the whole of Eastern Europe after only a year of service in Yugoslavia, and kept that position until 1990, maintained that the attitude towards and the solution of religious issues in the SFRY would, in many ways, condition the Holy See's politics towards the Soviet bloc.[68] It would have been 'an exceptional achievement', as he told the federal secretary of foreign affairs of the SFRY, Raif Dizdarević (in office from 1984 to 1988), should he succeed in applying the form of the Belgrade Protocol to regulate the interrelations in Eastern European countries and in the Soviet Baltic republics.[69]

Taking a look beyond diplomatic exchange allows us to pose some questions of perhaps greater complexity: What future did the Holy See envision for the life of Catholics in the SFRY? Were Yugoslavia's peculiarities in its social system, as well as in individual processes within its own RCC, anticipatory of a model of coexistence between believers and communists, or even of a renewed Christianity in a modern socialist society that could be acceptable to the Holy See? And, finally, were Yugoslav Communist ideologues and politicians genuinely willing to create such an environment that would postulate a departure from their strict worldview? The lacuna in Vatican sources creates a significant methodological and epistemological problem that Yugoslav sources could solve. As long as the Vatican archives remain closed, Yugoslav sources provide the only window through which it is possible to observe the Vatican's policies toward Yugoslav Catholics.

But a discussion on the nature of the relationship between Yugoslav socialism and the believers should, naturally, be framed by the global context of the dialogue between Marxists and Christians, of the emergence of new political theologies (e.g. Latin American liberation theology) and political shifts in Eurocommunist parties, especially in neighbouring Italy, all of which occurred between the late 1960s and the late 1970s and which had a great impact on the SFRY. Precisely in connection to the polemics triggered in 1977 by the secretary general of the Communist Party of Italy (CPI), Enrico Berlinguer, who invited the Catholics to join the communists freed of their monism in terms of worldview, Agostino Casaroli appears to have been the person who most clearly defined the boundaries of the 'joining' of Marxism and Christianity. As Casaroli candidly admitted to the Yugoslav ambassador, he saw no obstacle in the CPI entering the government; moreover, although Marxism and Catholicism were divided by an 'insuperable ideological barrier', this should not preclude cooperation in social and economic areas between Christian and communist 'men of good will.' But it was difficult to imagine, Casaroli said, that a good Catholic could, at the same time, be a good member of the Communist Party.[70] With these words the principal co-designer of the Holy See's policy towards communist regimes, for whom there are various estimates on how much he actually succumbed to the impression of the 'immortality' of this ideology,[71] stated indirectly that he did not believe in the idea upheld at the time by certain theologians in Slovenia and Croatia that it would be possible for Catholics to integrate into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the only party allowed.[72] That meant that the RCC would not encourage its believers to engage as Communists.

The fundamental postulates of Marxism, even if purged of Leninist derivations, remained a dividing line between Catholics and communists, although, in Casaroli's opinion, they shared the same views on the most important questions about man and society.[73] That the Holy See would not take the fateful step towards allowing Catholic doctrine to be enriched by select Marxist principles, not in the Yugoslav nor even in the Slovene environment, where both the Party and the RCC were most open to dialogue, became obvious soon after the election of the new pope, John Paul II. When he rejected the appointment of internationally known Vekoslav Grmič as the bishop of the Diocese of Maribor, he also gave up for lost a small group of adherents to 'socialist theology' under Grmič's leadership, who interpreted socialism in a similar way as kindred movements in Latin America and Western Europe, as a 'sign of the times'.[74] Although Grmič attempted to make Wojtyła see that the Yugoslav RCC was, through its own failings, far from having used to its advantage all the space available, the Polish pope remained a steadfast pessimist in regard to the promises of making religion an organic part of the social structure in socialist states.[75]

With regard to self-management[76] as such, the position of the Holy See was less definite; in the late 1970s, its semi-official magazine *La Civiltà Cattolica* described the Yugoslav path with much caution and doubt, yet outlining it with the positive prospects for the future.[77] Which prospects would have been those most to the Holy See's liking was revealed by the pro-nuncio Cecchini during a conversation at the Roman residence of the Yugoslav ambassador. Cecchini emphasised that 'as a socioeconomic system [self-management] has no fundamental quality that would necessarily put it in opposition to religion'. Self-management minus Communism would thus have been the formula to which even the RCC would have consented.[78]

The federal secretary of foreign affairs, Lazar Mojsov (in office from 1982 to 1984), realised, however, that under the Polish pope self-management *per se* was no longer a persuasive enough argument. When speaking to Wojtyła of the equality of atheists and believers in the SFRY and relating how tens of thousands of either were elected through secret ballot into various governing bodies every year, only to be cut off by the pope remarking that based on his own experience in Poland he knew perfectly well how things looked in practice in countries ruled by atheist ideology.[79] Several years before, Grmič, too, had left a meeting with Wojtyła under the impression that the pope was making no distinction between understanding the socialism and the position of religion in eastern European countries and in the SFRY.[80] Based on the criticism of two types of materialism (capitalist/consumerist and communist/collectivist) voiced in the encyclical *Laborem exercens* (1981) we may even assume that the Polish pope theoretically approved self-regulating economy and federal political structure in the SFRY, but the Polish trade union 'Solidarity' was very much on his mind.[81] Thus, when exhorting the pope to at least seat the Yugoslav (Croatian) bishops and representatives of the Communist Party around the same table a year later, the Yugoslav ambassador could not have hoped that the head of the Roman Catholic Church was conferring acclamation upon the Yugoslav system when he kept repeating: 'this, this is important … self-management is the most important.'[82]

The last event in Yugoslavia that pleased the pope and stirred great interest in Rome was the international and interdisciplinary colloquium called 'Science and Faith' organised by the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Holy See's Secretariat for Non-Believers, which took place in Ljubljana in May 1984. The idea had come from the archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Franz König[83], during his stay in Slovenia in 1980. Unlike Casaroli, who was in charge of diplomatic tasks, König as the second man of the Holy See's *Ostpolitik* was more involved with pastoral activities.[84] His initiative was carried on by his successor in the position of president of the Secretariat for Non-Believers, Paul Poupard and undersecretary Franc Rode, a Slovenian post-conciliar theologian who had stood out in the 1970s for his critical attitude towards both traditional Catholicism and state religious policy. Prior to this symposium, the latter had assured the officials that no ideologically 'delicate' questions would be received, and that the 'independent, non-aligned, socialist' Yugoslavia was a most suitable place for hosting an international meeting

of this sort, which would be a continuation of the dialogue between Marxists and Christians begun in the late 1970s.[85] Indeed, when Archbishop Poupard reported to Pope John Paul II upon completion of the colloquium about the surprising level of knowledge on the topic, the openness and humanism encountered in Yugoslav experts and politicians, the chief of the RCC praised as much the selection of the topic as he did the choice of the host country. He believed Yugoslavia was troubled by problems arising from the daily confrontation between theism and atheism, but also that his colleagues should bear in mind how much had been achieved in this dialogue and appreciate the accomplishment. At that moment, the pope did not dare predict how strongly this colloquium would reverberate, particularly not for the countries where the RCC enjoyed the least rights, for example, in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.[86] Still, as was noted in the Italian press some time later, the meeting in Ljubljana was, in the doctrinal sense, a key to the opening of the Holy See towards socialist Eastern Europe, as only two years later in October 1986, a similar colloquium was organised in Budapest, and in Leningrad in 1988.[87]

In the bed of Alojzije Stepinac

From the very beginning of this process, the most critical element of the Holy See's *Ostpolitik* towards the SFRY had been the question of the loyalty of the national episcopacy or, more precisely, of Croatian bishops, who, unlike their Slovenian counterparts, never agreed to be called 'Yugoslav'. Agostino Casaroli had, without much favour, taken notice of the ethnic-religious interrelation in Croatian bishops at the time of the adoption of the Belgrade Protocol, when he realised that in objecting to this agreement they would not speak of 'antireligious' or 'anti-Catholic' impulses of the federal government, but rather of 'anti-Croatian' ones, and that clearly their objections originated from some deep nationalistic and political aversion to 'Serbian' Belgrade.[88] Sometime later, when Archbishop Poupard himself enquired about the reasons the RCC was treated differently in Slovenia than in Croatia (the pope himself was aware of the differences[89]), Franc Perko, a Slovenian theologian, specialist in ecumenism and later archbishop of Belgrade, explained to him this unresolved nexus. Although unreconciled with the status prescribed for religion in self-management socialism, Perko underlined that Slovenian decision makers viewed the problem of Church and religion as a markedly social and not strictly political question, while the Croatian RCC was, due to its nationalism and emphasis on the narrow association with nationality, considered by the League of Communists to be the principal threat to the national unity of the SFRY.[90]

Whereas Pope Paul VI had addressed the Croatian bishops as 'Yugoslavians'[91] during their visits *ad limina apostolorum*, the situation changed profoundly when John Paul II took over. The most divisive issue was the previously mentioned figure of Alojzije Stepinac, of whom both the Party establishment and the Croatian RCC drew a 'monochromatic'[92] portrayal, although Achille Silvestrini, Casaroli's successor in the position of 'foreign minister' of the Holy See, himself admitted that Stepinac was a complex historical personage.[93] The principal advocate of his rehabilitation and the importance of strengthening the link between the Croatian people and Catholic faith in general was Stepinac's successor to the position of archbishop of Zagreb, Franjo Kuharić, who would say of himself that he was sleeping in 'the martyr's' bed.[94] It did not escape the notice of the Austrian consul in Zagreb that the polemics regarding the figure of Stepinac had long been present, but had remained stifled until the late 1970s. And Kuharić – or so the high-ranking Croatian communist politicians claimed – had not called forth the ghost of Stepinac from the crypt in the Zagreb cathedral with the intention of rectifying alleged historical injustice, but to emphasise that Stepinac was a *Croatian* martyr, which was an eloquent message at a time when, in the 1980s, the myth of self-victimisation was being revived.[95]

In the very first years of his papacy, Pope John Paul II made it obvious that his interpretation of the *Ostpolitik* differed from that of his predecessor. It was no longer yielding, rather – as

Giovanni Barberini says – aggressive both in cultural and political terms; 'it was a policy that rejected any hypothesis of the rootedness of Marxist-Leninist culture in the culture of the Slavic peoples.'[96] Only a few months after the election of Pope John Paul II, the Austrian ambassador could already recognise the symptomatic reaction of the Croatian RCC leadership to this new stance of the Holy See towards socialist regimes. At the official New Year's reception for the representatives of religious communities in January 1979, when Archbishop Kuharić exchanged polite tones for open criticism of the contradiction between the constitutionally guaranteed rights of believers, on the one hand, and the imposition of atheism, on the other, he was already openly testing the boundaries of pluralism in Yugoslavia.[97] Even before that, Kuharić had made it clear that there was no doubt as to whether he enjoyed the full support of the new pope in his response to the complaints of communist politicians that he was ruining their game and spoiling the positive atmosphere, focused on global challenge, that had been created between Yugoslavia and the Holy See during Paul VI's papacy.[98]

While at the end of 1979 the Yugoslav press still left room for people to only cautiously question whether the development of events might forebode the end of an era of positive relationships between Church and State,[99] less than two years later one could already find in the press comments that the RCC had become 'a place of asylum for renegades, supporters of the opposition, and political adventurers', including Ustashe emigres, with whom the RCC supposedly cultivated contacts.[100] At the time, the Yugoslav press would call attention to the commitment of the Holy See to prevent the misuse of religion for political purposes, but in the early 1980s no open accusations were yet made. Even in the eyes of the papal pro-nuncio the reproaches of the Croatian RCC being politicised appeared quite benign – as he confided to the Austrian ambassador – for he was convinced that exacerbation was not in the interest of either side, [101] however, not long afterwards his successors could not but accept the aggravating situation as a *fait accompli* and only attempt to defuse it.

Meanwhile, in the background of a second peak of the Cold War, Yugoslav diplomats were still playing the card of the importance of their country's stability and tried to draw the Holy See into these calculations as well. An official invitation had been extended to John Paul II in the summer of 1980, during the rush to search for external and internal supporters in the difficult period following Tito's death, when the Yugoslav designers of religious policy optimistically relied on the expectations that the pope's visit would be interpreted as objective support of the SFRY and encourage the integration of the RCC into Yugoslav society; in other words, that it would resonate in a completely different way than his visit to Poland the year before.[102]

In that atmosphere, Yugoslav politicians and diplomats still somehow succeeded in making the Polish pope see that they were on the same side as far as the Global South was concerned, although the 'Southern Policy' of the Holy See had changed considerably. Still, by the mid-1980s there was no longer any doubt that the new wave spreading eastwards from Rome and eagerly caught by the Croatian episcopacy, was in view of Yugoslav ideas about a modern socialist society, a retrograde shift that would inevitably lead to confrontation.[103] The most obvious manifestation of the new course, which could not have happened without the approval of the Holy See, occurred in autumn 1984 at the Croatian shrine of Marija Bistrica, where a mass Eucharist congress took place. The mentions of Stepinac in the speech held by the special papal envoy, Cardinal König, and statements made by other high representatives of the Holy See, such as the call 'so long as you are Catholics, so long you are Croatians' directed to the crowd, were interpreted by the Yugoslav authorities as a 'triumphalist crusade' ventured on by the Holy See and the Croatian RCC. They also reproved the two for disregarding the dangers of sowing dissension among the citizens of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional SFRY, and communicated this reproach, in an unprecedentedly sharp tone, in a special aide-mémoire to pro-nuncio Cecchini and verbally to Achille Silvestrini.[104]

The attempt to subdue the insubordinate structures within the national episcopacy through the Holy See, the same tactics the Polish authorities had employed against John Paul II,[105] was

no longer effective after the latter's election. During his visit in 1980, the pope's only promise to the president of the Yugoslav presidency, Cvijetin Mijatović, a Serb from Bosnia, was that the discussion regarding Stepinac would be left to history;[106] and a few years later Joseph Ratzinger, in the position of the prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, deemed it quite inconclusive.[107] The Yugoslavs were thus left to rely on Agostino Casaroli, whom they trusted, as a 'proven anti-Stepinac' (as they branded him), to see through Kuharić's parochialism.[108] They also hoped that the 1983 promotion of this thorn in the side of Yugoslav authorities would mean that as a member of the College of Cardinals, Kuharić would be required to stick more firmly to the 'official foreign policy' of the Holy See, which was still in the hands of 'a friend of Yugoslavia', Casaroli.[109] That expectation, however, turned out to be unrealistic. The appeal of pro-nuncio Francesco Colasuonno to the RCC to impose a 'self-moratorium' in the increasingly heated public polemics had no effect. His attempt was based on the lesson about the latent danger of violence among the Yugoslav ethnicities, with which he had become acquainted as a young man during WWII, when 'an exceptionally educated Slovenian partisan woman' took shelter with his family in Italy.[110] The 'self-moratorium' on the reporting about the increasing Yugoslav crisis towards the end of the 1980s was observed by the semi-official Vatican press, with *L'Osservatore Romano* only reporting news provided by the official news agency *Tanjug*. Conversely, as early as 1988, a more independent Milanese Catholic daily *Avvenire* openly wrote about the existence of two Yugoslavias, defined by a civilisational divide into the western Catholic and the eastern Orthodox, which would be difficult to deliver into a peaceful coexistence, particularly after the 'Serbian Machiavelli', Slobodan Milošević, had come to power in the largest Yugoslav republic.[111]

Yugoslav communists were thus hard-pressed to find evidence of Pope John Paul II and his closest associates starting a fire among believers, an obvious practice during his visits to Poland,[112] although they hung on to every word he directed to the crowd of young pilgrims now flocking to Rome from Croatia in even greater numbers than from the proverbially most Catholic country in Europe.[113] But due to Wojtyła's unpredictable nature and particularly since he refused to take the path set for him by the Yugoslav Party decision makers (and by the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church), the planned visit of the pope to Yugoslavia was so fraught with ominous whispers that it never came to be. The authorities intended to lend a statesmanlike note both to the visit and the relations with the Holy See in general, and include in the pope's itinerary places such as Tito's tomb and the former concentration camp of Jasenovac in Croatia, where he would pay homage to the mostly Serbian victims of the Croatian Ustashe (which was allegedly also the condition under which the Serbian patriarch German had agreed to meet him). The Croatian bishops, on the other hand, wanted to leverage the pastoral aspect of the visit as much as possible and take the pope to Stepinac's tomb in the Zagreb cathedral, a move strongly opposed by atheist politicians and the Orthodox religious leaders in Belgrade.[114] Given that the invitation was never officially retracted although the entire state leadership was against it, Yugoslav diplomats were left with the least enviable task of all, having to explain again and again to curious Vatican representatives that the situation had not yet matured to a stage that would allow for the organisation of the visit.[115] Finally, at a certain point, ambassador Zvonimir Stenek choked off further questions from Somal Martinez, in charge of Yugoslavia, regarding when the time would be ripe with a sharp 'maybe never'.[116]

Concluding remarks

'Nowadays, an Italian pope could do much more and much better for the Catholic Church and the world,' breathed pro-nuncio Cecchini at the end of a conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador in the mid-1980s. Cecchini, who otherwise praised the high personal qualities of John Paul II, at the same time regretted his lack of universality and being burdened with his experience

with the Polish RCC.[117] In this respect we can conclude that Wojtyła saw in the Croatian RCC a companion to that of the Polish and allowed it, in the name of anti-Communism, to become an undeniable champion of national and nationalist interests, without ever admonishing it about what that could lead to in the case of the fragile multinational structure that was the SFRY.[118] From the mid-1980s onwards, communication between that country and the Holy See was thus characterised by discourses revolving around the 'ethnicisation of religion'. Those who, on the part of the latter, were aware of the dangers this process posed for a fragile multi-ethnic state seem to have been drowned out by John Paul II's increasing assertiveness, although with regard to Yugoslavia, different voices could be heard within the Vatican walls up until the late 1980s. Not everyone in the Vatican – as the penultimate Yugoslav ambassador Štefan Cigoj wrote at the expiration of his term of office in 1989 – wanted to see Yugoslavia destabilised, but acted according to the general course of international developments.[119] It is in this context that we should interpret the off-the-record statement of the long-time observer of Yugoslav developments Agostino Casaroli, who, upon the announcement of the Vatican's intentions to acknowledge Slovenian and Croatian independence made by his successor Angelo Sodano, commented that it was 'a catastrophe'. He justified his diverging opinion with the legitimate anticipation that this precedence would not solve the Yugoslav crisis nor change the power relations between the superpowers, and remarked that the Holy See could do more by preserving a consistent position of neutrality and urging a real dialogue among the parties in conflict.[120]

This finding is another tile in the mosaic of knowledge on diplomatic relations between socialist Yugoslavia and the post-conciliar Holy See, which the detailed analysis of Yugoslav diplomatic sources revealed as challenging for either side. The exchanges exposed the elasticity and, at the same time, the rigidity of the two systems represented by their respective skilful diplomats. Therefore, the first conclusion is that this communication and occasionally even surprisingly frank and scintillating exchange of opinions was possible because of the essentially different understanding on the part of the Yugoslavs of the role of religion and the Holy See in the contemporary world compared to how they both were perceived by dogmatic decision makers in the Soviet bloc before the end of the 1980s.[121]

Still, the relations between the SFRY and the Holy See, which one cannot separate from the internal attitude towards religion, as much as Yugoslav politicians may have wanted to, must be considered within the framework of the democratic deficits of the self-management social project. Although changes in the Marxist-Leninist interpretation and regulation of the position of believers were first foreshadowed with the late 1970s generation of liberal sociologists and politicians, mostly in Slovenia,[122] their substantial redefinition only took place after the collapse of the socialist system in the years 1989–1990. Also telling is the reproach brought on his Yugoslav comrades by the leader of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, Alfonso Comín, that in the SFRY the Church was banned, but not studied.[123] The reluctance to rethink the role of believers in modern socialist society and to ensure them full equality as citizens remained the stumbling block that continued to trip up the representatives of the Holy See; admittedly, at least some were not completely without appreciation for the principles of self-management, but one without the hegemonic role of the Communist Party and its prescribed materialistic worldview. A discussion on such a horizon of expectations surpasses our present analysis of dialogue between two partners as dissimilar as were the SFRY and the Holy See, both from the 1960s onwards in considerably changed versions, but in their ideological essences still the same. Therefore, the framework of speculation that could only turn into more concrete facts many years from now when the Vatican archives of the papacies of Paul VI and John Paul II are opened, must include the question why the Holy See did not at least try to implement the principles of 'socialist theology', which in the context of socialist states emerged uniquely in a small bishopric in the north of the SFRY in the 1970s. Rigidity was apparently characteristic of both sides, one upheld by its bi-millennial history and the other counting on a future at least as long.

In this frame of mind, one side considered it an accomplishment if it managed (according to its own claims) to persuade the other into, say, appointing a cooperative bishop, and the other side when it succeeded in smoothing the way of exodus for the 'problematic' members of the national episcopacy: but both failed to look at the issues from the perspective of those on whose behalf and to whose benefit they acted – religious and non-religious citizens. The diplomatic relations with the Holy See thus contributed to the situation that the German historian Klaus Buchenau describes as disastrous for the Yugoslav regulation of religious matters, with incongruity between the growing liberal stance toward the clergy on the one hand and the persistent everyday discrimination against the believers on the other, which in the end only fomented religious nationalism.[124] The Yugoslav elements of the touchstone that tested the genuineness of relations between the RCC and the modern socialist state were apparently not solid enough for this experiment to take root as a serious mode of international relations with the Holy See. Many years will pass before we can really know if it was even meant as such.

Notes

1. A. Antonić, *Vatikanski tuneli za razbijanje Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Revija 92, 1994); S. Vuković, 'Uloga Vatikana u razbijanju Jugoslavije', *Sociološki pregled* xxxix (2004), 423–443.
2. Massimiliano Valente, *Diplomazia Pontifica e Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni (1918–1929)* (Split: Filozofski fakultet, 2012); R. Radić, 'Jugoslavija i Vatikan 1918–1992. godine', *Annales. Series Historia et Sociologia*, xxix (2014), 691–700; Igor Salmič, *Al di là di ogni pregiudizio: Le trattative per il concordato tra la Santa Sede e il Regno dei Serbi, Croati e Sloveni; Jugoslavia e la mancata ratifica (1922–1938)* (Roma: Gregorian & Biblical Press, 2015); Gašper Mithans, *Jugoslovanski konkordat: pacem in discordia ali jugoslovanski "kulturkampf"* (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2017).
3. Stella Alexander, *Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); M. Akmadža, 'Uzroci prekida diplomatskih odnosa između Vatikana i Jugoslavije 1952. godine', *Croatica Christiana Periodica*, xxvii (2003), 171–202; Mateja Režek, 'Cuius Regio Eius Religio: The Relationship of Communist Authorities with the Catholic Church in Slovenia and Yugoslavia after 1945' in Balázs Apor *et al* (eds), *The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period* (Washington: New Academia Publishing, 2008), 213–233; Charles R. Gallagher, *Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008).
4. Christine de Montclos, *Le Vatican et l'éclatement de la Yougoslavie* (Paris: PUF, 1999); E. Pelikan, 'Katoliška cerkev v Sloveniji in leto 1991', *Acta Histriae*, xi (2003), 221–232; Branislav Radeljić, *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy* (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 146–168; Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, 'Le religioni e la dissoluzione della Jugoslavia' in Antonio D' Alessandri, Armando Pitassio (eds), *Dopo la pioggia. Gli stati della ex Jugoslavia e l' Albania* (Lecce: Argo, 2011), 469–488; Egon Pelikan, 'The Catholic Church and Politics in Slovenia' in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed), *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 115–130.
5. Carlos González Villa, Nova država za nov svetovni red: mednarodni vidiki osamosvojitve Slovenije (Ljubljana: Založba/*cf, 2017), 12.
6. Vjekoslav Cvrlje, *Vatikanska diplomacija: pokoncilski Vatikan u međunarodnim odnosima* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost & Školska knjiga, 1992). The envoy of the Holy See came to Belgrade right after the conclusion of the so-called Belgrade Protocol and the normalisation of relations in 1966; four years later, he was promoted to apostolic pro-nuncio. This is the same status as nuncio but reserved to envoys of states which do not automatically designate the Holy See's representative as the doyen of the diplomatic corps.
7. For a general overview of the history of the Vatican's *Ostpolitik*, see Karl-Joseph Hummel (ed), *Vatikanische Ostpolitik unter Johannes XXIII. und Paul VI. 1958–1978* (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1999); Andrea Riccardi, *Il Vaticano e Mosca 1940–1990* (Bari: Laterza, 1992); Alberto Melloni (ed), *Il filo sottile. L'Ostpolitik vaticana di Agostino Casaroli.* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2006); Giovanni Barberini, *L'Ostpolitik della Santa Sede. Un dialogo lungo e faticoso* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007); Giovanni Barberini (ed), *La politica del dialogo. Le Carte Casaroli sull'Ostpolitik vaticana* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008); Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Tra Est e Ovest: Agostino Casaroli diplomatico vaticano* (Milano: San Paolo, 2014); András Fejérdy (ed), *The Vatican "Ostpolitik" 1958–1978. Responsibility and Witness during John XXIII and Paul VI* (Roma: Viella, 2016). Although in these reviews Yugoslavia is often unrepresented, well-corroborated historical accounts of its role in the context of Vatican *Ostpolitik*, albeit focused on the periods of the 1960s and early 1970s, have recently been contributed by B. Vukićević, 'The Holy See and Tito's Yugoslavia: Ostpolitik in the Adriatic', *Journal of*

Mediterranean Studies, xxvi (2017), 169–87 and M. Akmadža, A. Levak Sobolović, 'The Holy See's Eastern Policy – The Yugoslav Example', *The Catholic Historical Review*, civ (2018), 499–527.

8. D. J. C. Crawley to C. S. R. Giffard, 20 Aug. 1970 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives], F[oreign] & C[ommonwealth] O[ffice Records] 33/1244, WRV 3/329/1.
9. Vukićević, 'The Holy See', 179.
10. András Fejérdy, 'New Perspectives in Researching the Vatican's Eastern Policy' in András Fejérdy (ed), *The Vatican "Ostpolitik" 1958–1978. Responsibility and Witness during John XXIII and Paul VI* (Roma: Viella, 2016), 9–16, at 11.
11. Fejérdy, 'New Perspectives', 12.
12. Alberto Melloni, Maurilio Guasco (eds), *Un diplomatico vaticano fra dopoguerra e dialogo: mons. Mario Cagna (1911–1986)* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003); N. Žutić, 'Protokol između Jugoslavije i Vatikana iz 1966. godine', *Istorija 20. veka*, xxxii (2013), 135–156; Piotr H. Kosicki (ed), *Vatican II Behind the Iron Curtain* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016).
13. An exception being a recent in-depth study by Emilia Hrabovec, 'L'Ostpolitik di Giovanni Paolo II e la Slovacchia (1978–1989)', in Andreas Gottsmann *et al* (eds), *Incorrupta Monumenta Ecclesiam Defendunt: Studi offerti a mons. Sergio Pagano, prefetto dell'Archivio Segreto Vaticano* (Città del Vaticano: Archivio segreto Vaticano, 2018), 267–290.
14. Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
15. For an exhaustive overview of the Yugoslav engagement in the Non-Aligned Movement, including some responses of the Vatican to this policy, see Jakovina, Treća strana Hladnog rata (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011).
16. Morozzo della Rocca, 'Le religioni', 484.
17. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 83–91.
18. A. Mirescu, 'National Churches, Religious Policy and Free Space. A Comparison of Religious Policy in Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia during Communism', *International Journal of Public Administration*, xxxii (2009), 58–77.
19. B. Kolar, 'The Priestly Patriotic Associations in the Eastern European Countries', *Bogoslovni vestnik*, lxviii (2008), 231–256, at 244, 251.
20. Fejérdy, 'New Perspectives', 13.
21. Pál Hatos, 'Eastern Policy – Western Roots: The Cultural Context of the Vatican's Ostpolitik' in András Fejérdy (ed), *The Vatican "Ostpolitik" 1958–1978. Responsibility and Witness during John XXIII and Paul VI* (Roma: Viella, 2016), 19–43.
22. Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 170.
23. James Reimer (ed), The Influence of the Frankfurt School on Contemporary Theology: Critical Theory and the Future of Religion (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992).
24. Alberto Melloni, 'L'"Ostpolitik" e i suoi uomini' in Alberto Melloni, Maurilio Guasco (eds), *Un diplomatico vaticano fra dopoguerra e dialogo: mons. Mario Cagna (1911–1986)* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), 217–242, at 240.
25. Hansjakob Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans* (München & Zürich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1975), 362.
26. Jonathan Luxmoore, Jolanta Babiuch, *The Vatican and the Red Flag. The Struggle for the Soul of Eastern Europe* (London & New York: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), 157.
27. Alberto Melloni, 'La politica internazionale della Santa Sede negli anni Sessanta' in Alberto Melloni (ed), *Il filo sottile. L'Ostpolitik vaticana di Agostino Casaroli* (Milano: il Mulino, 2006), 3-48, at 21.
28. Cf. Lars Nord, Nonalignment and Socialism. Yugoslav Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice (Uppsala: Akademisk Avhandling, 1974).
29. Michael F. Feldkamp, 'I paesi del socialismo reale negli ultimi anni del pontificato di Paolo VI' in Alberto Melloni (ed), *Il filo sottile. L'Ostpolitik vaticana di Agostino Casaroli* (Milano: il Mulino, 2006), 233–245, at 239.
30. Agostino Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti. Sveta Stolica i komunističke zemlje (1963.–1989.) (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2001), 365.
31. Barberini, 'L'Ostpolitik', 251.
32. D. J. C. Crawley to C. S. R. Giffard, 20 Aug. 1970, FCO 33/1244, WRV 3/329/1.
33. KPR-I-1/1342, 24 Aug. 1967, [A]rchives of [Y]ugoslavia.
34. Jože Pirjevec, *Tito and His Comrades* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2018), 375.
35. Morozzo della Rocca, 'Tra Est e Ovest', 75; Document 46397, 10 Feb. 1972, [D]iplomatic [A]rchive of the [M]inistry of [F]oreign [A]ffairs of the [R]epublic of [S]erbia, P[olitical] A[rchives], F 179, 1972.
36. Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development. A Cold War History* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019), 136.
37. Herb Addo (ed), *Transforming the World-Economy? Nine Critical Essays on the New International Economic Order* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984).
38. Cable 414624, 17 Apr. 1972, DA MFA RS, PA, F 179, 1972.

39. A year later the mentioned Canadian cardinal surprised observers with an essay published in the Vatican daily *L'Osservatore Romano*, which he allegedly wrote upon Paul VI's request and in which he spoke about the 'cultural revolution' in the RCC and described the doctrine of class warfare as 'the fruit of lucid dialectic' (Luxmoore, Babiuch, 'The Vatican', 162).
40. Cable 414624, 17 Apr. 1972, DA MFA RS, PA, F 179, 1972.
41. Luigi Bianco, 'La missione in Jugoslavia' in Alberto Melloni, Maurilio Guasco (eds), *Un diplomatico vaticano fra dopoguerra e dialogo: mons. Mario Cagna (1911–1986)* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), 175–216, at 199.
42. Cable 410458, 26 Feb. 1980, DA MFA RS, PA, F 162, 1980.
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Jure Ramšak, PhD, is a Research Associate at the Science and Research Centre, Koper, Slovenia. The main scope of his research interest is the political and intellectual history of post-war Yugoslavia. He has authored two monographs (2015, 2019), co-edited a book of testimonials (2014), and contributed several articles to collected volumes and leading peer-reviewed journals, such as the 'Journal of Church and State', and 'Religion, State and Society'.